Attributions about self and others in commons dilemmas

An experiment was conducted to investigate the effects of self-harvest and resource management outcome on self–other attributions in a simulated commons dilemma. In groups of five or six, participants (n=171) managed a limited, shared, self-regenerating resource. Self-attributions to ignorance, concern for others, fear, and greed were compared to the same attributions made for cooperative and noncooperative others. The attributions were made in two contexts: efficient management and rapid resource depletion. As predicted, self-attributions resembled those made for similar others; heavy harvesters made similar attributions for themselves and noncooperative others, and light harvesters made similar attributions for themselves and the cooperative others. A self-serving bias was evident, especially among heavy harvesters. Attributions were also influenced by the context in which they were made; stronger attributions to ignorance, fear, and greed, and weaker attributions to concern for others were made when the resource pool was rapidly depleted than when it was managed efficiently.     

Intuitions about situational correction in self and others

People's attributional phenomenology is likely to be characterized by effortful situational correction. Drawing on this phenomenology and on people's desire to view themselves more favorably than others, the authors hypothesized that people expect others to engage in less situational correction than themselves and to make more extreme dispositional attributions for constrained actors' behavior. In 2 studies, people expected their peers to make more extreme dispositional inferences than they did themselves for a situationally constrained actor's behavior. People's expectation that they engage in more situational correction than their peers was diminished among Japanese participants, who have less desire to view themselves as superior to their peers (Study 3), and among participants who were led to view dispositional attributions more favorably than situational attributions (Study 4).     

Attributions and other inferences: Processing information about the self versus others

This study focuses on the attributional inferences involved in the comprehension of behaviors and on possible differences between the process of comprehending one's own behaviors and those of another person. Both the content of attributional judgments and the time taken to make the judgments were measured, in a design involving the comprehension of behaviors that were high or low in desirability and distinctiveness and that were understood as the subject's own versus another person's. Results show that the inferential processes in the comprehension of one's own and another's behavior are generally similar. Exceptions are where organized knowledge about the self (a self-schema) is brought into use and where differences in “perspective” between self and other influence processing. Discussion centers on the implications of the results for theories of comprehension and inference, including extensions needed to handle the self/other distinction.     

Bayesian inferences about the self (and others): A review

Viewing the brain as an organ of approximate Bayesian inference can help us understand how it represents the self. We suggest that inferred representations of the self have a normative function: to predict and optimise the likely outcomes of social interactions. Technically, we cast this predict-and-optimise as maximising the chance of favourable outcomes through active inference. Here the utility of outcomes can be conceptualised as prior beliefs about final states. Actions based on interpersonal representations can therefore be understood as minimising surprise – under the prior belief that one will end up in states with high utility. Interpersonal representations thus serve to render interactions more predictable, while the affective valence of interpersonal inference renders self-perception evaluative. Distortions of self-representation contribute to major psychiatric disorders such as depression, personality disorder and paranoia. The approach we review may therefore operationalise the study of interpersonal representations in pathological states.     

Beliefs about birth control: a consistency theory analysis

201 lower income women aged 20-40 were interviewed in a large midwestern city in December 1967 and January 1968 to determine attitudes towards, beliefs about, and use of birth control. Those who approved of birth control had more positive beliefs about the consequences of birth control than those with less favorable attitudes. Users of reliable methods also held more positive attitudes about birth control consequences than nonusers or users of nonreliable methods although this relationship was weak. Strategies for improving family planning behavioral predictions are suggested as well as implications of this for family planning communication programs.     

Modeling self on others: An import theory of subjectivity and selfhood

This paper outlines an Import Theory of subjectivity and selfhood. Import theory claims that subjectivity is initially perceived as a key feature of other minds before it then becomes imported from other minds to own minds whereby it lays the ground for mental selfhood. Import theory builds on perception-production matching, which in turn draws on both representational mechanisms and social practices. Representational mechanisms rely on common coding of perception and production. Social practices rely on action mirroring in dyadic interactions. The interplay between mechanisms and practices gives rise to model self on others. Individuals become intentional agents in virtue of perceiving others mirroring themselves. The outline of the theory is preceded by an introductory section that locates import theory in the broader context of competing approaches, and it is followed by a concluding section that assesses import theory in terms of empirical evidence and explanatory power.     

Pride and prejudice: how feelings about the self influence judgments of others

The present research demonstrates that pride has divergent effects on prejudice, exacerbating or attenuating evaluative biases against stigmatized groups, depending on the form of pride experienced. Specifically, three experiments found that hubristic pride--associated with arrogance and self-aggrandizement--promotes prejudice and discrimination, whereas authentic pride--associated with self-confidence and accomplishment--promotes more positive attitudes toward outgroups and stigmatized individuals. Findings generalized to discriminatory judgments (Experiment 2) and were found to be mediated by empathic concern for the evaluative target. Together, these experiments suggest that pride may be a cause of everyday prejudice and discrimination but that these social consequences depend on whether hubristic or authentic pride is experienced, and the degree to which empathic concern is subsequently aroused.     

Beliefs about the social orientations of others: A parametric test of the triangle,false consensus,and cone hypotheses

This study tests a number of hypotheses proposed in the literature concerning the relationship between an actor's social orientation and her beliefs about the social orientations of others. In contrast to the existing literature, this study employs a parametric approach with an innovative methodology. First, the social orientation parameters of actors are estimated: the weights respondents add to (1) the outcomes of Alter and to (2) the absolute difference between the outcomes for Ego and Alter. Then, the mean and the variance of the distribution of beliefs about the social orientation parameters of others are estimated, conditional on the actor's social orientation parameters. The results show that (1) there is a positive association between an actor's social orientation and her belief about the mean of the social orientations of others and (2) those who have approximately zero social orientation parameter values (individualists) expect the variation of others' social orientations to be lower than those with smaller (competitors) or larger (cooperators/egalitarians) social orientation parameter values. These results support the cone model, which models the “false” consensus effect where the “false” consensus is highest for individualists.     

Through the looking glass: self and others

In the present article we discuss the relevance of the mirror mechanism for our sense of self and our sense of others. We argue that, by providing us with an understanding from the inside of actions, the mirror mechanism radically challenges the traditional view of the self and of the others. Indeed, this mechanism not only reveals the common ground on the basis of which we become aware of ourselves as selves distinct from other selves, but also sheds new light on the content of our self and other experience, showing that we primarily experience ourselves and the others in terms of our own and of their motor possibilities respectively.     

The role of construal processes in overconfident predictions about the self and others

Overconfident behavioral predictions and trait inferences may occur because people make inadequate allowance for the uncertainties of situational construal. In Studies 1-3, Ss estimated how much time or money they would spend in various hypothetical, incompletely specified situations. Ss then offered associated "confidence limits" under different "construal conditions". In Study 4, Ss made trait inferences about someone they believed had responded "deviantly"--again with situational details unspecified and construal conditions manipulated. In all 4 studies, Ss who made predictions or trait inferences without being able to assume the accuracy of their situational construals offered confidence limits no broader than those of Ss who made their responses contingent on such accuracy. Only in conditions where Ss were obliged to offer alternative construals did they appropriately broaden their confidence limits or weaken their trait inferences.     

Including others in the self

We propose that to some extent, people treat the resources, perspectives, and identities of close others as their own. This proposal is supported by allocation, attribution, response time, and memory experiments. Recently, we have applied this idea to deepening understanding of feeling “too close” (including too much of the other in the self leading to feeling controlled or a loss of identity), the effects of relationship loss (it is distressing to the extent that the former partner was included in the self, liberating to the extent that the former partner was preventing self-expansion), ingroup identification (including ingroup in the self), and the effect of outgroup friendships on outgroup attitudes (including outgroup member in the self entails including outgroup member's identity in the self).     

Conceptions of the self and others across time

People are full of plans, goals, hopes, and fears-future-oriented thoughts that constitute a significant part of the self-concept. But are representations of others similarly future oriented? Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the future is seen as a larger component of the self than of another person. Study 2 found that because self-identity is tied to an unrealized future, the self is thought to be less knowable than others in the present. Study 3 indicates that people believe that others need to know who they are striving to be in order to be understood-more so than they believe they need to know others' strivings to understand them. Studies 4a and 4b tested an important implication of these findings, that because so much of who they are is tied to the future, people believe they are further from their ideal selves than others are. Implications for judgment and decision making are discussed.     

Watching Eyes effects: When others meet the self

The perception of direct gaze—that is, of another individual’s gaze directed at the observer—is known to influence a wide range of cognitive processes and behaviors. We present a new theoretical proposal to provide a unified account of these effects. We argue that direct gaze first captures the beholder’s attention and then triggers self-referential processing, i.e., a heightened processing of stimuli in relation with the self. Self-referential processing modulates incoming information processing and leads to the Watching Eyes effects, which we classify into four main categories: the enhancement of self-awareness, memory effects, the activation of pro-social behavior, and positive appraisals of others. We advance that the belief to be the object of another’s attention is embedded in direct gaze perception and gives direct gaze its self-referential power. Finally, we stress that the Watching Eyes effects reflect a positive impact on human cognition; therefore, they may have a therapeutic potential, which future research should delineate.     

The effects of feedback about self and others on the recall and judgments of feedback-relevant information

After people have received feedback about the outcome of their behavior, their responses to information bearing on the validity of this feedback may be influenced by their desire to maintain a favorable self-image. This experiment investigated the cognitive mediators of these responses. Subjects who received negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence test disparaged intelligence tests in general and judged a report they had read to be unfavorable to intelligence tests. Nevertheless, they recalled more arguments in the report that were favorable to intelligence tests than did positive feedback recipients. These results contradicted the hypothesis that subjects selectively attend to information that helps them to maintain a positive self-concept in light of negative information about themselves. Rather, they may attempt to refute arguments that support the validity of the negative feedback they receive, and this relatively greater processing may facilitate the recall of these arguments later on. In contrast, there was no evidence that subjects try to refute information that calls the validity of positive feedback into question. Results had implications for two additional issues: first, whether the effect of performance feedback depends on whether it is received before or after information bearing on its validity; second, whether feedback has similar effects on recall and judgments by persons to whom it does not directly pertain.     

The self and others in the experience of pride

Pride is seen as both a self-conscious emotion as well as a social emotion. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but have brought forth different ideas about pride as either revolving around the self or as revolving around one’s relationship with others. Current measures of pride do not include intrapersonal elements of pride experiences. Social comparisons, which often cause experiences of pride, contain three elements: the self, the relationship between the self and another person, and the other person. From the literature on pride, we distilled three related elements; perceptions and feelings of self-inflation, other-distancing, and other-devaluation. In four studies, we explored whether these elements were present in pride experiences. We did so at an implicit (Experiment 1; N?=?218) and explicit level (Experiment 2; N?=?125), in an academic setting with in vivo (Experiment 3; N?=?203) and imagined pride experiences (Experiment 4; N?=?126). The data consistently revealed that the experience of pride is characterised by self-inflation, not by other-distancing nor other-devaluation.