Causal uncertainty and correction of judgments

We examined whether raising uncertainty about the causes of one’s judgments motivates correction. Specifically, we examined whether activating chronically accessible causal uncertainty (CU) beliefs with a conditional warning about possible bias enhances correction of weather judgments for tropical weather primes and of word frequency judgments for the availability bias. In two studies we showed that activating chronic beliefs led to careful correction of target judgments. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that chronically high-CU individuals who received a conditional warning felt more uncertain than did other participants, but that this uncertainty was suppressed somewhat by adjusting for the bias. Results are discussed in light of recent models of judgment correction (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1997), and the causal uncertainty model (Weary & Edwards, 1996).     

Causal uncertainty as a chronically accessible construct

Causal uncertainty refers to feelings that one may not understand the causes of events. A number of studies have shown that causal uncertainty has significant effects on people's processing of information and on important life outcomes. Weary and Edwards have postulated that causal uncertainty is, in part, a cognitive construct that can vary in its accessibility. This assumption has allowed for a variety of predictions to be made about the causes and consequences of causal uncertainty. However, this accessibility assumption has never been directly tested. To do this, in Study 1 an emotional Stroop procedure was used. Higher causal uncertainty was associated with longer latencies to name the color in which causal uncertainty‐related words were written compared to uncertainty‐irrelevant words. In Study 2, both manipulated and chronic causal uncertainty led to faster times to respond to causal uncertainty‐related stimuli in an attitude accessibility task. Both studies are consistent with the theoretically predicted chronic accessibility of causal uncertainty beliefs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage

In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage.     

Causal uncertainty during initial interactions

Causal uncertainty (CU) refers to persistent doubts people have about their ability to understand causes of social events. Although such confusion about social dynamics should affect social exchanges, previous research has been limited to the realm of social cognition (i.e., computer‐based studies exploring perceptions of hypothetical others). In three studies, we explored CU effects during real‐time social interactions with unacquainted conversational partners. We found that high CU participants perceived their conversations and conversational partners more negatively than did low CU participants and that these negative social perceptions stemmed from an inability to sufficiently reduce their cognitive uncertainty. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uncertainty and prejudice: The role of religiosity in shaping group attitudes

Past research indicates that being religious is frequently motivated by the need to avoid uncertainty and associated with prejudice against value‐violating groups. The present research clarifies these previous findings and shows for the first time a causal link between a sense of uncertainty and group attitudes through religiosity and the perception of the target group's mindset. Study 1 demonstrates that belief in God is associated with uncertainty avoidance and increases prejudice against value‐violating groups, but simultaneously increases positive attitudes towards value‐consistent groups. Study 2 demonstrates experimentally that a sense of uncertainty shapes intergroup attitudes when the relationship is mediated through the belief in God and the perception that a target group actually violated perceivers' values. The results corroborate and broaden previous findings on religiosity, ambiguity avoidance, and prejudice and, for the first time, show a causal link between a sense of uncertainty and attitudes towards value‐violating and value‐consistent groups.     

Empowering leadership,uncertainty avoidance,trust, and employee creativity: Interaction effects and a mediating mechanism

Taking an interactional approach, we hypothesized that (a) there is an interaction between empowering leadership, uncertainty avoidance, and trust that affects creativity, such that empowering leadership has the strongest positive relationship with creativity when the employees have high levels of uncertainty avoidance and trust their supervisors; and (b) creative self-efficacy mediates the effect that this three-way interaction between empowering leadership, uncertainty avoidance and trust has on creativity. In Study 1, we used a time-lagged research design, collecting multi-source data from 322 employees and their supervisors. The results of Study 1 supported our hypotheses. In Study 2, we used a more temporally rigorous research design in which data were collected in three stages, with a two-month time interval separating Stages 1 and 2, and Stages 2 and 3. On the basis of the time-lagged and multi-source data from 199 employees and their supervisors, Study 2 produced the same results as Study 1. We discuss the implications of these results for future research and practice.     

Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; [Weary and Edwards, 1994] and [Weary and Edwards, 1996]) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target’s behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models.     

环境无序性对消费者多样化寻求的影响及作用机制

在日常生活和购物环境中, 混乱无序无处不在。然而, 关于环境无序性对消费者产品选择行为的影响研究却十分有限, 本文试图填补这一不足。具体而言, 本文创新性地提出环境无序性与多样化寻求行为之间存在着因果关系, 且自我效能威胁和未来偏好不确定感在其中发挥链式中介作用。通过1个预实验和4个实验, 本文发现无论在真实环境、线下购物环境、工作环境, 还是线上产品陈列情境下, 环境无序性均可提升多样化寻求行为; 无序的环境会对消费者的自我效能产生威胁, 进而增强其对未来产品偏好的不确定性感知, 最终促使其通过增加多样化寻求行为来应对未来可能变化的产品偏好。     

Subjectivity uncertainty theory of objectification: Compensating for uncertainty about how to positively relate to others by downplaying their subjective attributes

Why do people sometimes view others as objects rather than complete persons? We propose that when people desire successful interactions with others, yet feel uncertain about their ability to navigate others' subjectivity, they downplay others' subjective attributes, focusing instead on their concrete attributes. This account suggests that objectification represents a response to uncertainty about one's ability to successfully interact with others distinct from: instrumentalizing others in response to power; dehumanizing others in response to threat; and simplifying others in response to general uncertainty. Supporting this account: When uncertainty about navigating women's subjectivity was salient, men showed increased sexual objectification to the extent that they desired successful interactions with women (Study 1) and were primed to view such interactions as self-esteem relevant (Study 2). In a workplace scenario, participants made uncertain about their managerial ability felt less confident about their ability to navigate employees' subjectivity and, consequently, role-objectified employees (Study 3).     

Decision deadlines and uncertainty monitoring: the effect of time constraints on uncertainty and perceptual responses

The behavioral uncertainty response has grounded the study of animal metacognition and influenced the study of human psychophysics. However, the interpretation of this response is debated—especially whether it is a behavioral index of metacognition. The authors advanced this interpretation using the dissociative technique of response deadlines. Uncertainty responding, if it is higher level or metacognitive, should depend on a slower, more controlled decisional process and be more vulnerable to time constraints. Humans performed sparse–uncertain–dense or sparse–middle–dense discriminations in which, respectively, they could decline difficult trials or positively identify middle stimuli. Uncertainty responses were sharply and selectively reduced under a decision deadline, as compared to primary perceptual responses (i.e., “sparse,” “middle,” and “dense” responses). This dissociation suggests that the uncertainty response does reflect a higher-level, decisional response. It grants the uncertainty response a distinctive psychological role in its task and encourages an interpretation of this response as an elemental behavioral index of uncertainty that deserves continuing research.     

Intolerance of uncertainty and insula activation during uncertain reward

Individuals with high intolerance of uncertainty (IU) have been shown to exhibit abnormal threat responding, which may be mediated by hyperactive anterior insula (aINS) response to uncertainty. Research has indicated that individuals with high IU also exhibit abnormal positive valence responding, suggesting that IU may impact responding to uncertainty regardless of the valence of the potential outcome. To date, no study has investigated the neural processes associated with IU and response to uncertain positive stimuli, such as rewards. Therefore, this study was designed to examine the association between individual differences in IU and neural activation during uncertain reward using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Thirty-seven adults completed a self-report measure of IU and a reward task during fMRI. Consistent with the threat literature, greater IU was associated with increased aINS activation during uncertain reward. This association was more robust for the prospective IU subscale, a dimension characterized by worry about future events. Together with prior studies, these findings provide evidence that IU is related to abnormal threat and reward responding, and that these deficits may be similarly linked to hyperactive aINS response to uncertainty.     

Analogy as a strategy for supporting complex problem solving under uncertainty

Complex problem solving in naturalistic environments is fraught with uncertainty, which has significant impacts on problem-solving behavior. Thus, theories of human problem solving should include accounts of the cognitive strategies people bring to bear to deal with uncertainty during problem solving. In this article, we present evidence that analogy is one such strategy. Using statistical analyses of the temporal dynamics between analogy and expressed uncertainty in the naturalistic problem-solving conversations among scientists on the Mars Rover Mission, we show that spikes in expressed uncertainty reliably predict analogy use (Study 1) and that expressed uncertainty reduces to baseline levels following analogy use (Study 2). In addition, in Study 3, we show with qualitative analyses that this relationship between uncertainty and analogy is not due to miscommunication-related uncertainty but, rather, is primarily concentrated on substantive problem-solving issues. Finally, we discuss a hypothesis about how analogy might serve as an uncertainty reduction strategy in naturalistic complex problem solving.     

Language and interpersonal cognition: causal effects of variations in pronoun usage on perceptions of closeness

Four studies examined the hypothesis that subtle language variations can have a causal impact on perceptions of relationships. In interpersonal interactions, language can function implicitly to reflect, perpetuate, and communicate relationship perceptions. Previous research has shown that interpersonal closeness and plural pronoun use are correlated; the current research demonstrates that manipulating pronoun use can lead people to perceive their own and other relationships as closer and higher in quality. In Study 1, participants who read about a relationship that was described using the pronoun we versus she and I perceived the relationship to be closer and of higher quality. Study 2 showed that pronoun variations similarly affected perceptions of participants' own ongoing relationships; Study 3 showed similar effects for perceptions of an actual interpersonal interaction. Study 4 examined potential mechanisms of this effect.     

The effects of uncertainty in error monitoring on associated ERPs

A series of experiments were conducted to address the effect of uncertainty regarding performance for predicting the likelihood of a correct-response negativity (CRN) in addition to error-related negativity (ERN). In Study 1, 18 healthy young adults completed letter discrimination tasks during single and dual attention conditions designed to manipulate response certainty. In the second study, the same participants completed easy and difficult tone discrimination tasks designed to influence stimulus certainty. In the third study, task difficulty was manipulated to produce different error rates without altering certainty. Studies 1 and 2 indicated that error and correct responses are processed more similarly when uncertainty is present (i.e., ERN approximately CRN). Furthermore, uncertainty was associated with attenuation of the ERN and enhancement of the CRN, consistent with an error detection hypothesis. Study 3 indicated that task difficulty alone does not influence the ERN or likelihood of a CRN. These results offer support for the error detection account of the ERN and establish the role of uncertainty in predicting the CRN, as postulated by .     

Temporal uncertainty degrades perceptual processing

When participants are required to react to a stimulus, reaction times (RTs) are usually reduced when temporal uncertainty about stimulus occurrence is minimized. Contrary to the common assumption attributing this RT benefit solely to the speeding of motor processes, recent evidence suggests that temporal uncertainty might rather influence premotoric processing levels. We employed a backward-masking procedure to further confine the locus of the temporal uncertainty effect. Participants performed a discrimination task and indicated whether a spatial gap within a square was on the right or the left side. In addition to the shorter RTs, visual discrimination accuracy was improved when temporal uncertainty was low. This result demonstrates that temporal uncertainty influences stimulus processing at a perceptual level.     

Leadership under uncertainty: When leaders who are non-prototypical group members can gain support

Social identity theory of leadership (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003) research confirms that group members support group prototypical leaders more strongly than non-prototypical leaders. Two studies examined the prediction derived from uncertainty–identity theory (Hogg, 2007) that this relationship between leader prototypicality and support weakens when group members have elevated self-related uncertainty, due to increased support for non-prototypical leaders. Student participants indicated their level of uncertainty and their support for a prospective student leader who was prototypical or non-prototypical of students at their university–prototypicality was a between-subjects variable in Study 1 (N = 98), and a within-subjects variable in Study 2 (N = 132). As predicted, participants supported the prototypical leader more strongly than the non-prototypical leader, but this effect was significantly weakened (Study 2) or disappeared (Study 1) under uncertainty, due to a significant increase in support for the non-prototypical leader. Implications for empowerment of non-prototypical leaders are discussed.     

Relatively certain! Comparative thinking reduces uncertainty

Comparison is one of the most ubiquitous and versatile mechanisms in human information processing. Previous research demonstrates that one consequence of comparative thinking is increased judgmental efficiency: comparison allows for quicker judgments without a loss in accuracy. We hypothesised that a second potential consequence of comparative thinking is reduced judgmental uncertainty. We examined this possibility in three experiments using three different domains of judgment and three different measures of uncertainty. Results consistently demonstrate that procedurally priming participants to rely more heavily on comparative thinking during judgment induces them to feel more certain about their judgment.     

Weighing the Evidence: A Systematic Review on Long-Term Neurocognitive Effects of Cannabis Use in Abstinent Adolescents and Adults

Findings on neurocognitive effects of sustained cannabis use are heterogeneous. Previous work has rarely taken time of abstinence into account. In this review, we focus on understanding sustained effects of cannabis, which begin when clinical symptoms of the drug have worn off after at least 14 days. We conducted a search between 2004 and 2015 and found 38 studies with such a prolonged abstinence phase. Study-design quality in terms of evidence-based medicine is similar among studies. Studies found some attention or concentration deficits in cannabis users (CU). There is evidence that chronic CU might experience sustained deficits in memory function. Findings are mixed regarding impairments in inhibition, impulsivity and decision making for CU, but there is a trend towards worse performance. Three out of four studies found evidence that motor function remains impaired even after a time of abstinence, while no impairments in visual spatial functioning can be concluded. Functional imaging demonstrates clear differences in activation patterns between CU and controls especially in hippocampal, prefrontal and cerebellar areas. Structural differences are found in cortical areas, especially the orbitofrontal region and the hippocampus. Twenty studies (57 %) reported data on outcome effects, leading to an overall effect size of r _mean?=?.378 (CI 95 %?=?[.342; .453]). Heavy use is found to be more consistently associated with effects in diverse domains than early age of onset. Questions of causality―in view of scarce longitudinal studies, especially those targeting co-occurring psychiatric disorders―are discussed.     

The influence of positive mood on different aspects of cognitive control

Some evidence suggests that positive mood influences cognitive control. The current research investigated whether positive mood has differential effects on two aspects of cognitive control, working memory and prepotent response inhibition. In Study 1, following either a positive or neutral mood induction, participants completed the Running Memory Span (RMS), a measure primarily of working memory storage capacity, and the Stroop task, a measure of prepotent response inhibition. Results were that the positive mood group performed worse on the RMS task but not on the Stroop task. In Study 2, participants completed the RMS and another measure of prepotent response inhibition, the Flanker task. Results were that when in a positive mood state participants performed worse on the RMS but not on the Flanker task. Overall, this research suggests that positive mood has differential effects on cognitive control, impairing working memory but having no effect on prepotent response inhibition.