Distinguishing the subjective and the objective aspects of self‐concept clarity

Since its introduction, self‐concept clarity has been viewed as a construct related to the structure and organization of a person's self‐concept. We argue, however, that self‐concept clarity may best be understood as a combination of subjective, metacognitive beliefs about the self‐concept and objective structure and organization. We consider the unique influences of both objective and subjective clarity and offer some suggestions and novel hypotheses for investigating this proposed distinction.     

Commentary on Meehl and Waller's (2002) path analysis and verisimilitude

P. E. Meehl and N. G. Waller's (2002) proposed method may not yield unique solutions for model parameters nor unique solutions for model lack of fit. The author argues from a naturalistic-cognitive philosophy of science that science seeks objective knowledge and that hypothesis testing is central to achieving that goal. It is also argued that P. E. Meehl and N. G. Waller's proposal blurs the distinction between hypothesis testing and explorations of the data seeking an optimal model to serve as a prospective inductive generalization. But it is noted that inductive generalizations are never unique and must be tested to eliminate those that reflect subjective aspects of the researcher's methods and points of view.     

Pavlov in America: a heterodox approach to the study of his influence

This work presents a critical analysis of Pavlov's influence that goes beyond the conventional view: that which reduces his influence in American psychology to the behaviorism of Watson and Hull. In order to understand the nature of the Russian physiologist's influence in American psychology, we propose a distinction between three approaches to it: 1) the symbolic approach, on representing a model of the possibility of constructing an objective psychology; 2) the methodological approach, given the importance of the technique of conditional reflexes; and 3) the theoretical approach, which is derived from his theory of higher nervous activity. This perspective permits us to suggest that most of Pavlov's influence on behaviorism was of a symbolic and methodological nature--though the methodological influence also reached other authors that did not belong to the behaviorist traditions, as was the case of Mateer. As far as the theoretical influence is concerned, our work proposes that it is more visible in authors such as Gantt and Liddell, or even in authors such as Boldirev, Director of the Pavlovian Laboratory at the Battle Creek Sanitarium in Michigan. The case of Gantt is especially interesting because, in addition to his important contributions, he played an essential role in the foundation of the Pavlovian Society, and the journal Conditional Reflex. What our work proposes is that to understand the nature of Pavlov's influence in American psychology it is necessary to take into account the very characteristics of that psychology: its pragmatic interests, its methodological rigor, the dominant systems of neo-behavioral theory and the changes that occurred after the Second World War.     

Review Of The War Between Mentalism and Behaviorism: On the Accessibility of Mental Processes By William R. Utall.

Uttal's goals in writing this book are (a) to demonstrate that the war between mentalism and behaviorism is unwinnable because both sides are fundamentally flawed and (b) to describe a new version of behaviorism that resolves the conflict. The book is generally well written and contains many interesting and important points, but the goals are not attained because of weaknesses in some of the crucial analyses. For example, key terms such as mind and behavior are not defined; the scientific admissibility of inference is denied for philosophical reasons that are not relevant to inference as actually used; the accessibility of mind is both explicitly denied and implicitly assumed; two kinds of reductionism—between and within domains—are acknowledged but the distinction is not consistently maintained; and the proposed new behaviorism ignores rather than solves the old problems.     

Pavlov's position toward American behaviorism

Pavlov's development of the conditional reflex theory coincided with the rise of American behaviorism. Substituting an objective physiology for a subjective psychology, Pavlov saw in the rise of American behaviorism a clear confirmation of his method and theory. But in the early 1930s, Lashley attacked Pavlov's theory of specific cerebral localization of function, proposing instead the concept of an internal cerebral organization; Guthrie objected to Pavlov's centralist interpretation of conditioning, proposing instead a peripheralist interpretation; while Hull challenged Pavlov's theory of sleep and hypnosis as the manifestations of inhibition. Pavlov replied with critiques of Lashley's, Guthrie's, and Hull's views, and, convinced that Lashley and Guthrie misunderstood his position, repeated his method's and theory's basic propositions. Yet, Pavlov never gave up the expectation that American behaviorism would accept his conditional reflex theory and saw in Hunter's 1932 statements a support of his assumptions.     

Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location1

There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling‐out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get.     

Dissociating electrophysiological correlates of subjective,objective, and correct memory in investigating the emotion-induced recognition bias

Performance on tasks requiring discrimination of at least two stimuli can be viewed either from an objective perspective (referring to actual stimulus differences), or from a subjective perspective (corresponding to participant’s responses). Using event-related potentials recorded during an old/new recognition memory test involving emotionally laden and neutral words studied either blockwise or randomly intermixed, we show here how the objective perspective (old versus new items) yields late effects of blockwise emotional item presentation at parietal sites that the subjective perspective fails to find, whereas the subjective perspective (“old” versus “new” responses) is more sensitive to early effects of emotion at anterior sites than the objective perspective. Our results demonstrate the potential advantage of dissociating the subjective and the objective perspective onto task performance (in addition to analyzing trials with correct responses), especially for investigations of illusions and information processing biases, in behavioral and cognitive neuroscience studies.     

Subjective Reasons

In recent years, the notion of a reason has come to occupy a central place in both metaethics and normative theory more broadly. Indeed, many philosophers have come to view reasons as providing the basis of normativity itself . The common conception is that reasons are facts that count in favor of some act or attitude. More recently, philosophers have begun to appreciate a distinction between objective and subjective reasons, where (roughly) objective reasons are determined by the facts, while subjective reasons are determined by one's beliefs. My goal in this paper is to offer a plausible theory of subjective reasons. Although much attention has been focused on theories of objective reasons, very little has been offered in the literature regarding what sort of account of subjective reasons we should adopt; and what has been offered is rather perfunctory, and requires filling-out. Taking what has been said thus far as a starting point, I will consider several putative theories of subjective reasons, offering objections and amendments along the way, will settle on what I take to be a highly plausible account, and will defend that account against objections.     

Radical behaviorism and scientific frameworks. From mechanistic to relational accounts.

A substantial portion of B. F. Skinner's scholarship was devoted to developing methods and terms for a scientific study of behavior. Three concepts central to scientific accounts--cause, explanation, and theory--are examined to illustrate the distinction between mechanistic and relational frameworks and radical behaviorism's relationship to those frameworks. Informed by a scientific tradition that explicitly rejects mechanistic interpretations, radical behaviorism provides a distinctive stance in contemporary psychology. The present analysis suggests that radical behaviorism makes closer contact with the "new world view" advocated by physicists and philosophers of science than does much of contemporary psychology.     

Goal orientation and performance adaptation: A meta-analysis

The relationship between goal orientation and performance adaptation across studies was assessed in the present article. The relevance of performance adaptation can be exemplified by the desire to optimize performance and mitigate the negative effects of change in organizational and educational contexts (i.e. new co-workers, new software, emergencies). Three-level meta-analyses were conducted for learning goal orientation (LGO) and performance goal orientation (PGO). Furthermore, within PGO a distinction between avoid performance goal orientation (APGO) and prove performance goal orientation (PPGO) could be made. In moderator analyses the influence of measurement method of performance adaptation (subjective ratings vs objective scores) was assessed amongst others. Although significant effects were found they were primarily visible for subjective ratings and not objective scores.     

Contingency Horizon: on Private Events and the Analysis of Behavior

Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism and Baum’s molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all “mental” phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment–behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.     

The temporality of illness: Four levels of experience

This essay argues that, while much has been gained by medicine's focus on the spatial aspects of disease in light of developments in modern pathology, too little attention has been given to the temporal experience of illness at the subjective level of the patient. In particular, it is noted that there is a radical distinction between subjective and objective time. Whereas the patient experiences his immediate illness in terms of the ongoing flux of subjective time, the physician conceptualizes the illness as a disease state according to the measurements of objective time. A greater understanding of this disparity in temporal experiencing provides insights into the lived experience of illness and can preclude difficulties in communication between physician and patient.     

Radical behaviorism: A productive and needed philosophy for education

Radical behaviorism is the philosophy of the science of behavior originating in the work of B. F. Skinner and elaborated over the years by a community of researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Radical behaviorism is a complete, or thoroughgoing behaviorism in that all human behavior, public and private, is explained in terms of its functional relations with environmental events. Radical behaviorism is often misrepresented in the literatures of education and psychology. Two fundamental misconceptions of radical behaviorism are that its followers (1) are logical positivists who require that a phenomenon be observed by two or more people before it qualifies for scientific analysis, and (2) either will not or cannot incorporate private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings) into their analyses of human behavior. This paper offers an advocacy perspective on contemporary radical behaviorism. In particular, we define radical behaviorism and briefly outline the history of the term's use in psychological literature, discuss the scientific practice of behavior analysts, explain the intolerance exhibited by radical behaviorists, and comment on the use of popularity as a criterion for good science. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent shift in educational research and practice from empiricism and outcome-oriented intervention toward a holistic/constructivist philosophy described by its advocates as incompatible with behaviorally-based instruction.     

Emotion Regulation Frequency and Success: Separating Constructs from Methods and Time Scale

Research on emotion regulation (ER) has largely focused upon two related lines of inquiry: ER frequency and ER success. First, research on ER frequency has focused upon the relationship between how often individuals attempt to use ER strategies in everyday life which is typically measured by subjective reports on questionnaires and interpreted as trait ER. Second, research on ER success has focused on the degree to which experimentally instructed use of different strategies results in change of one or more measures of affect as measured by relatively objective measures. Therefore, distinctions between ER frequency and success are very often confounded by time scale (ER frequency measured in the long‐term, ER success measured in the short‐term) and methods (ER frequency measured with subjective questionnaires, ER success measured with more objective affective variables). I offer examples from the literature on ER and offer suggestions for ways to uncouple ER frequency and success from the methods that are currently being used to measure them. Clarity on the distinction between these constructs should lead to the most appropriate interpretation of results from current studies and more precisely inform clinical interventions that target one or more ER process.     

Development of affective decision making for self and other: evidence for the integration of first- and third-person perspectives

The role of perspective taking in affective decision making was studied in children at two ages (3 and 4 years) using a delay-of-gratification paradigm in which children chose between an immediate reward of lower value and a delayed reward of higher value. Half the children chose for themselves (self condition), and half chose for the experimenter (other condition). Three-year-olds chose delayed rewards in the other condition but made impulsive choices in the self condition. Compared with 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds performed better in the self condition and worse in the other condition. Results suggest that 3-year-olds took either a subjective, first-person perspective (for self) or an objective, third-person perspective (for other). Four-year-olds integrated these perspectives, considering a third-person perspective in the self condition and the experimenter's subjective perspective in the other condition (i.e., her desire for immediate gratification). This integration allowed reason to be tempered by emotion, and vice versa.     

Age effects on different components of theory of mind

The effects of aging on the cognitive and affective dimensions of theory of mind (ToM), and on the latter’s links with other cognitive processes, such as information processing speed, executive functions and episodic memory, are still unclear. We therefore investigated these effects in young (n = 25), middle-aged (n = 20) and older adults (n = 25), using separate subjective and objective assessment tasks. Furthermore, a novel composite task probed participants’ abilities to infer both cognitive and affective mental states in an interpersonal context. Although age affected the objective ToM tests, results revealed a direct aging effect on the second-order ToM, but an indirect one on the first-order cognitive ToM, mediated mainly by age-related declines in executive functions. This study supports the notion of an age-related distinction between subjective and objective assessments of ToM, and confirms that ToM is a complex mental ability with several characteristics reliant to some extent on executive processes.     

Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content

This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly's position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. the crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, between content which is objective and content which is also conceived of by its subject as objective.     

Psychopathology according to behaviorism: a radical restatement

This article is a radical restatement of the predominant psychopathology, which is characterized by nosological systems and by its approach towards a neurobiological conception of the so-called mental disorders. The "radical" sense of this restatement is that of radical behaviorism itself. As readers will recall, "radical" applied to behaviorism means total (not ignoring anything that interests psychology), pragmatic (referring to the practical sense of knowledge), and it also derives from the Latin word for "root" (and thus implies change beginning at a system's roots or getting to the root of things, in this case, of psychological disorders). Based on this, I introduce the Aristotelian distinction of material and form, which, besides being behaviorist avant la lettre, is used here as a critical instrument to unmask the hoax of psychopathology as it is presented. The implications of this restatement are discussed, some of them already prepared for clinical practice.     

Behavior analysts and cultural analysis: Troubles and issues

THREE STRATEGIC SUGGESTIONS ARE OFFERED TO BEHAVIOR ANALYSTS WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH EXTENDING THE INTERESTS OF OUR DISCIPLINE INTO DOMAINS TRADITIONALLY ASSIGNED TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: (1) to expand our world-view perspectives beyond the boundaries commonly accepted by psychologists in general; (2) to build a cultural analytic framework upon the foundations we have developed for the study of individuals; and (3) to study the works of those social scientists whose views are generally compatible with, and complementary to, our own. Sociologist C. Wright Mills' distinction between troubles and issues and anthropologist Marvin Harris's principles of cultural materialism are related to topics raised by these three strategies. The pervasiveness of the "psychocentric" world view within psychology and the social sciences, and throughout our culture at large, is discussed from the points of view of Skinner, Mills, and Harris. It is suggested that a thorough commitment to radical behaviorism, and continuation of interaction between radical behaviorism and cultural materialism, are necessary for maintaining and extending an issues orientation within the discipline of behavior analysis and for guarding against dilutions and subversions of that orientation by "deviation-dampening" contingencies that exist in our profession and in our culture at large.     

主观阶层研究取向的贡献与弊端

近年来社会阶层心理学研究领域对于主观阶层的研究取向高度重视,突出表现为强调社会阶层概念中的主观阶层成分,在理论阐述、概念测量、研究设计和研究问题选择上都倾向于关注主观阶层。这一取向为社会阶层心理学的发展奠定了基础,也扩展了该领域的研究方法及关注问题的视野。但它也造成了部分研究在理论层面与社会现实有所脱节、在概念层面过于忽视客观阶层、在方法层面过于依赖操纵主观阶层,以及在问题层面只关注高低二元阶层划分、对现实阶层多样性关注不足等弊端。未来应进一步深入开展基础研究以厘清客观阶层和主观阶层的关系及其不同的预测效应,在研究设计时对于客观阶层和主观阶层进行更细化的区分,同时可以更多关注于现实中的具体社会问题。