共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
2.
Gunderson M 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(2):87-102
It is tempting to argue that Kantian moral philosophy justifies prohibiting both human germ-line genetic engineering and non-therapeutic
genetic engineering because they fail to respect human dignity. There are, however, good reasons for resisting this temptation.
In fact, Kant’s moral philosophy provides reasons that support genetic engineering—even germ-line and non-therapeutic. This
is true of Kant’s imperfect duties to seek one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. It is also true of the categorical
imperative. Kant’s moral philosophy does, however, provide limits to justifiable genetic engineering. 相似文献
3.
John A. Schuster 《Synthese》2012,185(3):467-499
One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed “physico-mathematics”. This signalled
a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy,
non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related
to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more ’physicalised’, more closely intertwined
with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous
epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes’ physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the
mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases
one could literally “see the causes”. Optics took pride of place within Descartes’ physico-mathematics project, because he
believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes’ early physico-mathematical
program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes resources for his later
work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an
achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—causal
knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular
motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system. 相似文献
4.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献
5.
Aud Sissel Hoel 《Synthese》2011,179(1):75-91
Cassirer’s approach to symbolic mediation differs in some important ways from currently prevailing approaches to meaning and
signification such as semiology and its more recent poststructuralist varieties. Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms offers
a theory of symbols that does not amount to a sign theory or semiology. It sketches out, rather, a dynamic and nonrepresentational
framework in which an alternative notion of difference takes centre stage. In order to make the original features of Cassirer’s
approach stand out, I will compare it with the approach of the perhaps most influential differential thinker of our day, Jacques
Derrida. The philosophy of symbolic forms explicitly prefigures a great many of the insights and concerns of poststructuralism.
Yet, there are some critical differences. Rather than rejecting the concepts of objectivity, identity, and truth on the premises
established by traditional metaphysics, Cassirer chooses to redefine these concepts through a radical conceptual reframing.
The result is a doctrine that—in Derridean parlance—neither jumps beyond the oppositions of metaphysics, nor tries to resolve
them in a Hegelian synthesis—a doctrine, that is, that even though it appeals to origins, cannot so easily be dismissed as
yet another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence. 相似文献
6.
Damon A. Young 《Sexuality & culture》2005,9(4):58-79
Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities.
Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory
character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt
to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual
onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is
not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development
of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges,
this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed.
“Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger
“I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche 相似文献
7.
Christians commonly speak of and to God as ‘a person’. The propriety of such talk depends on how the concept of a person is
being used and understood, and that concept is much contested in contemporary analytic philosophy. In this article, I note
the presuppositions of one current debate about what it is to be a human person, and then propose an alternative approach
to persons—both human and divine—that draws upon the Thomistic philosophical and theological tradition. In this tradition,
‘person’ is neither an essence-determining kind term, nor a merely nominal or functional kind term, but is applicable analogously
to entities of various ‘kinds’ (e.g. humans, angels and God). The origins of this account in Aquinas’ theology of the Trinity
will be examined, and I will conclude by noting a recent development of Thomas’ thought in relation to what it is to be a
human person. 相似文献
8.
E. M. Swiderski 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(4):329-343
Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation.
A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski
appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself.
I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this
account, labour in Brzozowski’s idiom turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves
and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought
for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that
is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted
human power. 相似文献
9.
Jon Roffe 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(4):389-406
Although Alain Badiou dedicates a number of texts to the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza throughout his work—after all,
the author of a systematic philosophy of being more geometrico must be a point of reference for the philosopher who claims
that “mathematics = ontology”—the reading offered in Meditation Ten of his key work Being and Event presents the most significant
moment of this engagement. Here, Badiou proposes a reading of Spinoza’s ontology that foregrounds a concept that is as central
to, and celebrated in, his philosophy as it is strictly excluded by Spinoza: the void. In nuce, Badiou contends that for all
of Spinoza’s efforts to offer an ontology of total plenitude, the void returns in his philosophy under the (at first sight)
unlikely name of infinite mode. The presence of this errant name in Spinoza’s philosophy bears witness to the failure of
his most profound intellectual endeavour. However striking Badiou’s reading of Spinoza, this paper argues that it fails to
adequately grasp Spinoza’s metaphysics, particularly with respect to the central concept of modal essence, a concept which
does not appear at all in the Badiouian text. By introducing a consideration of this concept, it becomes able to resolve the
status of infinite modes, and to account for the move across the notorious finite–infinite divide. Thus the argument turns
to the reading of Spinoza offered by Gilles Deleuze for a more thorough-going and nuanced approach, much superior to Badiou’s
procrustean critique.
相似文献
Jon RoffeEmail: |
10.
Peter Jilks 《Sophia》2008,47(1):79-82
Siderits’ book is a welcome contribution to the ongoing dialogue between Buddhism and Western analytic philosophy. It covers
the three main areas of philosophical enquiry—metaphysics, ethics and epistemology. Although conceptually quite challenging
in places, the information is always presented in a pedagogic, evolutionary and highly readable manner. There are occasional
problems with Siderits’ approach of isolating Buddhism as philosophy from Buddhism as religion, particularly in his chapter
on ethics, which cannot avoid being somewhat unbalanced, and possibly misrepresentational, as it skirts around the major role
that the doctrines of karma and rebirth play in Buddhist ethics. Although Siderits’ approach inevitably leaves some gaps,
it manages to fill another important gap left by other books on Buddhism aimed either at the lay practitioner or specialist
scholar. For those looking for a serious yet concise presentation of Buddhist philosophy, unencumbered with religious baggage,
this is a rewarding resource for both personal and classroom study. 相似文献
11.
Jan Krasicki 《Studies in East European Thought》2010,62(1):63-70
The article deals with Bulgakov’s critique of Hegel’s monistic system. For Bulgakov, Hegelian monism is an example of philosophical
reductionism which aims at reducing the question of Being, the latter expressed by a proposition and constituted by the inseparable
unity of three elements (person as hypostasis, its meaning and the essence of Being), to its second principle. Contrary to
Hegel, Bulgakov claims that no philosophy can begin with and as itself—it has to be initiated with a datum. This is in fact
where the tragedy of German philosophy, and each monistic philosophy, starts. 相似文献
12.
Thing, Value, Time, and Freedom: A Consideration of Some Key Concepts in Marx’s Philosophical System
Wujin Yu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):114-123
Criticizing the misunderstanding and wrong explanation of Marx’s philosophical system made by recent Chinese textbooks on
Marxist philosophy, the author argues that Marx’s philosophy has practical, economical-philosophical, and ontological dimensions
and stresses on reconstructing Marx’s philosophical system through synthesizing the above three dimensions. This paper intends
to set up a new outline of Marx’s philosophical system, in terms of the following four concepts—thing, value, time, and freedom.
Translated by Tang Jie from Zhexue Yanjiu, 2004:11 相似文献
13.
Richard Routley 《Synthese》2010,173(1):107-122
The paper seeks a perfectly general argument regarding the non-contingent limits to any (human or non-human) knowledge. After
expressing disappointment with the history of philosophy on this score, an argument is grounded in Fitch’s proof, which demonstrates
the unknowability of some truths. The necessity of this unknowability is then defended by arguing for the necessity of Fitch’s
premise—viz., there this is in fact some ignorance. 相似文献
14.
Daniel Tröhler 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2000,19(1-2):159-186
As a starting point this paper takes Dewey’s nowadays often stressed modernity and examines his social philosophy against
the background of the current debates on republicanism and communitarianism. Particularly, the anaysis of Dewey’sThe Public and its Problem (1927) concludes that the attention being paid to Dewey is problematic as specific religious assumptions — explicitly developed
inA Common Faith (1934) -lie in the background of his social philosophy, and are hardly being recognized. However, as it shall be shown, without
considering the religious basis, neither Dewey’s social philosophy nor his educational theory can be properly understood. 相似文献
15.
Ulrich Charpa 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(1):61-84
This paper discusses some philosophical and historical connections between, and within, nineteenth century evolutionism and
microscopical research. The principal actors are mainly Darwin, Schleiden, Whewell and the “London Doctors,” Arthur Henfrey
and Edwin Lankester. I demonstrate that the apparent alliances—particularly Darwin/Schleiden (through evolutionism) and Schleiden/Whewell
(through Kantian philosophy of science)—obscure the deep methodological differences between evolutionist and microscopical
biology that lingered on until the mid-twentieth century. Through an understanding of the little known significance of Schleiden’s
programme of microscopical research and by comparing certain features of his methodology to the activities of the “London
Doctors,” we can identify the origin of this state of affairs. In addition, the outcome provides an insight into a critique
of Buchdahl’s view on Schleiden’s philosophical conception. 相似文献
16.
Jan-H. Schneider 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2000,19(1-2):69-82
The present article on John Dewey aims at pursuing the traces of the reception of Dewey’s work in France. It is intended as
a survey of the writers who have taken note of Dewey and his ideas, and is meant to function as a sort of additive inventory,
with no claim to comprehensiveness. Some of the articles mentioned were unfortunately unavailable for direct examination and
are thus listed merely for purposes of information.
Although the educational and philosophical writings of John Dewey are actually indivisible, Dewey’s oeuvre has not been read
in France and Europe generally as of a piece, but has largely been registered in terms of those parts which have relevance
to education and teaching. Indicative of this is the fact that it took until 1975 forDemocracy and Education (1916)-the book which, in Dewey’s own view, most clearly presented his linking of pedagogy and philosophy (Delledalle, 1975;
Suhr, 1994) — to be published in France. Gérard Delledalle, the translator ofDemocracy and Education, is the only person so far in France to have dealt systematically with the whole of Dewey’s writings. He has translated other
works by Dewey and has written several books on him, dealing expressly with Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism as the foundation
of his theory of education.
It is actually inadequate to restrict the reception of Dewey’s work to France alone. Rather, one should speak of francophone
Europe, for the first translations of Dewey’s educational writings into French were made by Adolphe Ferrière, Ovide Decroly
and édouard Claparède — a Swiss, a Belgian, and a Frenchman. It was thanks to them that Dewey’s thoughts on education began
to make an impact on the francophone movement for school reform in the early twentieth century.
Discussion of his theory of education is typified in France as well by a division into proponents of a concept of ‘learning
by doing’ indebted to Dewey (particularly in France) and representatives of authoritarian forms of education, which reject
Dewey. Although French thought has not yet concerned itself closely with pragmatism, Dewey’s opponents believed (and still
believe) that they could denounce him and his theories simply by levelling the charge of “pragmatism.” This dualistic mode
of thinking which appears to be deeply rooted in France has proved to be an obstacle to the reception of Dewey and has led
to neglect and rejection of his theories. 相似文献
17.
This paper considers two differenttones of voice in philosophy and theology (‘liberal pluralism’ in contrast to ‘radical orthodoxy’) and relates it to a discussion about
the theology of religions. ‘Tone of voice’ in this context is intended to denote the affective potency (or not) of a theological
perspective as it impacts and influences religious attitudes. In addition, at a related level, ‘tone of voice’ is used when
speaking of first-order or second-order perspectives: for example, a first-orderconfessional tone in contrast to a second-ordernotional tone. The paper proceeds to critically engage with John Hick’s pluralism and John Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy particularly
from the point of view of considering thetone adopted by both perspectives. The conclusion is that both views are inadequate: Hick’s pluralism—as a second-order meta-theory—lacks
the first-order power that is needed to affect ‘hearts and minds’, Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy has rhetorical power but is
an ‘unfounded’ narrative which lacks the ability to rationally engage with thereal world. In the end, the suggestion is that the ‘right tone of voice’, in a religious context, ought to combine a realistic
enquiry concerning the order-of-things with a first-order rhetorical strength. 相似文献
18.
Many philosophers of education emphasise the impossibility to really ‘solve’ philosophical—and with that, educational—problems
these days. Philosophers have been trying to give philosophy a new, constructive turn in the face of this insolvability. This
paper focuses on irony-based approaches that try to exploit the very uncertainty of philosophical issues to further philosophical
understanding. We will first briefly discuss a few highlights of historical uses of irony as a philosophical tool. Then we
concentrate on two different interpretations of irony, formulated by Bransen and Rorty, that aim at gaining insight into how
we make meaning of the world, while at the same time recognising that such an understanding would be impossible. After discussing
some problematic aspects of these interpretations a third interpretation of irony is developed, based on a third view of the
nature of meaning-making. Following these three interpretations, we will discuss their philosophical merits and the different
kinds of insight they can produce for philosophy of education. 相似文献
19.
Adrian Johnston 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(3):345-366
Immanuel Kant is one of Alain Badiou’s principle philosophical enemies. Kant’s critical philosophy is anathema to Badiou not
only because of the latter’s openly aired hatred of the motif of finitude so omnipresent in post-Kantian European intellectual
traditions—Badiou blames Kant for inventing this motif—but also because of its idealism. For Badiou-the-materialist, as for
any serious philosophical materialist writing in Kant’s wake, transcendental idealism must be dismantled and overcome. In
his most recent works (especially 2006’s Logiques des mondes), Badiou attempts to invent a non-Kantian notion of the transcendental, a notion compatible with the basic tenets of materialism.
However, from 1988’s Being and Event up through the present, Badiou’s oeuvre contains indications that he hasn’t managed fully to purge the traces of Kantian transcendental idealism that arguably continue
to haunt his system—with these traces clustering around a concept Badiou christens “counting-for-one” (compter-pour-un). The result is that, in the end, Kant’s shadow still falls over Badiouian philosophy—this is despite Badiou’s admirable,
sophisticated, and instructive attempts to step out from under it—thus calling into question this philosophy’s self-proclaimed
status as materialist through and through.
相似文献
Adrian JohnstonEmail: |
20.
There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of
philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend—deferentialism, as we will call it—certain disciplines outside of philosophy make claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes,
where those claims are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations just because those claims are made
by those disciplines. Deferentialists believe that certain longstanding philosophical problems can be swiftly and decisively
dispatched by appeal to disciplines other than philosophy. In this paper we will argue that such an attitude of uncritical
deference to any non-philosophical discipline is badly misguided. With reference to the work of John Burgess and David Lewis,
we consider deference to mathematics. We show that deference to mathematics is implausible and that main arguments for it
fail. With reference to the work of Michael Blome-Tillmann, we consider deference to linguistics. We show that his arguments
appealing to deference to linguistics are unsuccessful. We then show that naturalism does not entail deferentialism and that
naturalistic considerations even motivate some anti-deferentialist views. Finally, we set out deferentialism’s failings and
present our own anti-deferentialist approach to philosophical inquiry. 相似文献