Does a rat release a soaked conspecific due to empathy?

In Experiment 1, rats choosing in an E maze preferred to release a rat standing in a pool of water to dry ground over a rat already standing on dry ground. Five additional experiments showed that the choosing rat’s preference for releasing the wet rat was maintained by two separable outcomes: (1) the social contact offered by the released rat and (2) the reinforcing value of proximity to a pool of water. These results call into question Sato et al.’s (Anim Cogn 18:1039–1047, 2015) claim to have demonstrated that a rat’s releasing of a wet rat to dry ground is empathically motivated.     

Temporal alternation in the white rat?

Four white rats were reinforced after 15 then 45 then 15 then 135 (or 5) responses to a bar under a single exteroceptive stimulus condition. Three came to make long pauses before the longest ratio in the schedule but not before any of the others. Four other rats were reinforced after alternate response chains each made on two bars. The first chain was FR5FR5 for all subjects, the second FR5FR40 for two, and FR40FR5 and FR20FR5 for one subject each. Subjects reinforced on schedule mix (chain FR5FR5 chain FR5FR40) both paused longer after the first than after the second chain relatively early in training. Later, the subject reinforced on mix (chain FR5FR5 chain FR40FR5) also paused longer after the first chain, but pauses of the fourth subject were equally short after both chains. When the ratios in the second chain were reversed the two subjects now reinforced on mix (chain FR5FR5 chain FR40FR5) paused much longer after the first chain, but the other two paused only slightly longer after the first than after the second chain.     

Phosphorylation state of CREB in the rat hippocampus: a molecular switch between spatial novelty and spatial familiarity?

The activation of cAMP response element-binding protein (CREB) after a learning experience is a common feature in the formation of several associative memories. We recently demonstrated that the increase in the hippocampal phosphorylated CREB (pCREB) levels 1 h after a short exploration of an open field (OF) was associated to detection of spatial novelty and was not related to the memory formation of habituation in this non-associative learning paradigm. Moreover, after a long training of three OF sessions, hippocampal pCREB levels were below to that observed in control rats. The present results show that such decrease does not correlate with memory retrieval or improvement in long-term memory of habituation. Instead, it is associated with the familiarity to the arena. Our experiments revealed that the relevant variable to induce CREB deactivation was the prolonged exploration of the arena (30 min). A 15 min OF exploration was ineffective. Furthermore, the last 5 min period of a prolonged exploration was crucial to change CREB phosphorylation state: when exploration took place in a novel arena the level of pCREB increased; in contrast, when it was performed in the familiar OF, pCREB levels decreased. Taken as a whole, our results suggest that CREB phosphorylation state in the hippocampus switches in response to exposure to a novel or to a familiar spatial environment.     

Laboratorizing the wild rat (Rattus norvégiens)

Traditional difficulties in procuring wild rats can be overcome by trapping in an unstable environment (e.g., land-fill) where the natives do not fear strange objects such as traps. Techniques for trapping, transferring to, and maintaining in the laboratory are outlined, and apparatus for handling and housing, including the breeding situation, is described. Conclusion: Simple precautions render the wild rat nearly as easy to breed and use in conventional laboratory tasks as domesticated rats.     

Reflexive fighting in the albino rat: Aggressive or defensive behavior?

Specific agonistic responses of albino rats were compared for dominant colony rats and intruders, and for rats in a “reflexive fighting” task. The “reflexive fighters” showed high levels of defensive responses such as boxing and freezing, and very low levels of aggressive behaviors such as piloerection, biting, and the lateral display. This pattern clearly suggests that the behaviors measured in the reflexive fighting task reflect conspecific defensive reactions, rather than “shockelicited aggression.” Moreover, striking responses seen in the reflexive fighting task also occur at a high rate when footshock is given to a solitary rat held in a boxing posture. Thus it appears that “reflexive fighting” primarily involves defensive rather than aggressive responses.     

Are conditioned stimuli determinants of oriented exploratory behavior in the rat?

To test Bindra and Palfai's hypothesis about enhancing and inhibitory motivational effects of a conditioned stimulus on exploratory behavior, rats in a first experiment were submitted to pairings of a tone with (a) water, (b) intermittent deliveries of water after a period of constant pairing. In a control condition, the tone was presented alone. The tone was subsequently presented during oriented exploration of a novel stimulus, in the conditioning context. There was no difference in exploratory performance between conditions. In a second experiment with another kind of stimulus change and a larger number of training trials, exploration did not increase when occurring during CS presentation. The lack of facilitation which is possibly the product of competition between exploration and magazine-directed responses, can also be interpreted as indicating that the effects of a conditioned stimulus are reinforcer specific and that the diffuse activity it generates in a situation different from the training one is not equivalent, as concerns the processes involved, to oriented exploratory behavior.     

When is a Schema Not a Schema? On a Remark by Suszko

Studia Logica - A 1971 paper by Roman Suszko, ‘Identity Connective and Modality’, claimed that a certain identity-free schema expressed the condition that there are at most two objects...     

What is a family? a contemporary view

In the light of two cases that held the attention of the United States in mid-1993, family therapists as well as other professionals need to consider- or re-consider-what it is that constitutes a family. Is the family based on biological ties? On psychological bonds? On legal definitions? When a conflict arises as to the family with which a child should reside, what factors need to be considered? Contested adoption cases are rare but not unique; the legal “divorce” from biological parents in favor of psychological ties is a much newer phenomenon. These cases are central to the discussion of this contemporary view of what constitutes a family.     

Is Xunzi a utilitarian? Revisiting a disagreement

ABSTRACT

In Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts (e.g. Fung Yu-lan, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan). This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, and he evaluates all intellectual works and political behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies.     

Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist?

I clarify a widely accepted form of contemporary naturalism and argue that supervenient physicalism should not be considered an option for those who embrace this version of naturalism. Among other things, my thesis implies that if there are insuperable difficulties for strict physicalism, then the move toward supervenience views of the mind/body problem amounts to an abandonment of this version of naturalism and not a minor adjustment of it. More precisely, my argument is this: strict physicalism excludes both substance and property or event dualism. But the supervenience thesis entails some form of property or event dualism. So strict physicalism excludes the supervenience thesis. Moreover, given the nature of a widely accepted contemporary understanding of naturalism, it is best construed along strict physicalist lines and naturalists of this persuasion should not be supervenient physicalists. To make my case, I offer a characterization of a ubiquitous version of contemporary naturalism followed by an analysis of the most plausible version of supervenient physicalism consistent with this form of naturalism. I then try to show why this version of supervenient physicalism should not be an option for a naturalist of a certain persuasion.     

Self-analysis: a fool for a patient?

In this paper I first reviewed the scanty publications on the subject of self-analysis. Although it was recommended by Freud as early as 1910 for every analyst, self-analysis turns out to have many pitfalls and to be quite a complicated and controversial procedure. There is no agreement on the proper technique of self-analysis in the literature, nor is there any discussion of the determinants of the particular choice of technique of self-analysis that is employed, nor even of the reasons why some analysts do not engage in it at all. Using clinical data gathered from written material of many years of self-analysis following the termination of a successful training psychoanalysis, I have attempted to elucidate some of the problems posed by this procedure. These problems are in some ways similar to formal psychoanalysis, but are in some ways contingent on the fact that it is basically a different technique. It is a solitary occupation and therefore suffers from the dangers of disintegration into autism, narcissism, and obsessional rumination. There is no living presence of an analyst to serve either as a transference figure or to make interpretations and stimulate the production of material. The identification with the analyst's analyzing function is far from simple in self-analysis because of the complex nature of the various internalizations of the analyst that take place over years of a formal training analysis. Thus, Ticho (1967) is correct when she claimed that self-analysis is a skill that the analysand has to acquire by himself or herself. An important phase of the beginning of self-analysis involves the working through of the separation from the psychoanalyst and the re-evaluation of the analyst and the analytic process. This results in a heightened sense of independence and autonomy, increased cohesion of the self, and maturation--which is manifested by greater autonomous ego functioning, a more mature sense of identity, and continued transformations of narcissism which highly valuable goals, on the basis of the data I have presented, can be approached through the process of self-analysis. Above all this stands the most important goal of self-analysis, the understanding of one's countertransference reactions. This is especially important in the treatment of seriously disturbed patients who become disruptive, and thus get labeled borderline, often as a response to unconscious countertransference manifestations from the analyst which are then experienced in the self-object transference as failures in empathy.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Can a Robot Be a Good Colleague?

Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper discusses the robotization of the workplace, and particularly the question of whether robots can be good colleagues. This might appear to be a strange...     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

How does a word become a message? An illustration on a developmental time-scale

Recent changes in views on cognition underscore its embodied, situated and distributed character. These changes are compatible with the conceptual framework of ecological psychology. However for ecological psychology to propose explanations for a broad range of cognitive phenomena, including language, it needs an account of how to link the dynamics of coupling between the organism and the environment with the apparent symbolicity of informational structures. In this paper it is proposed that a theory of information in biological systems, advocated by Howard Pattee, may help forge this link. By treating informational structures as constraints on dynamics this approach helps to identify which processes, in which systems and on what time-scales are needed for structures to ‘become messages’. I will illustrate how these processes might work on developmental time-scale in the domain of language, building on the work by Edward Reed (1995, 1996) and extending it using the view of linguistic structures as constraints.     

A failure of dialogue? a critical reflection on a discussion between a teacher trainer and a pre-service second-language teacher

Reflective practice in teacher education often involves dialogic communication between teacher educators and teachers. This essay asks what constitutes authentic dialogic engagement in discussions between a pre-service second-language (SL) teacher and her university supervisor. Written as a self-critical reflection, the paper first describes the author’s thoughts and feelings about a post-teaching session he conducted with one of his supervisees and identifies possible disconnections existing between them. Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s of genuine dialogue, this paper reflects on the dispositions that foster a dialogic relationship between teacher educators and pre-service and in-service teachers.     

Selecting a patient or initiating a psychoanalytic process?

The defences provoked in the analyst by the anxieties associated with the difficult tasks of ‘assessment’ and ‘selection’ for psychoanalysis can result in a tendency to think in terms of ‘hurdles to be cleared’ by potential psychoanalytic patients, rather than ‘opening the gates’. This can result in a diminution of the analyst's capacity to enlist and sustain a psychoanalytic stance. Only within a psychoanalytic frame can a meaningful psychoanalytic process unfold, at all stages of a potential patient's movement from their first contact through to, possibly, entering into an analysis. The author illustrates the value of this thinking by describing the work of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis where there has been a shift of emphasis in psychoanalytic consultation towards working with individuals on their potential to initiate a psychoanalytic process, and away from the sole aim of ‘selection of a suitable patient’. In this paper, the author notes that when institutional culture and practice supports psychoanalytic identity, this makes it more possible to recognize and articulate the anxieties provoked by the ‘emotional storm’ inevitable in psychoanalytic consultation, and the draw towards unhelpful enactment that may otherwise obscure the initiation of a psychoanalytic process that may or may not result in analytic treatment. Illustrative case material from the Clinic is presented.