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1.
Eva M. Krockow Andrew M. Colman Briony D. Pulford 《European Review of Social Psychology》2016,27(1):231-282
Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction (BI) argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several game, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group vs. individual decisions, and players’ social value orientations (SVOs). Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation. 相似文献
2.
Eva M. Krockow Andrew M. Colman Briony D. Pulford 《European journal of social psychology》2016,46(6):746-761
The Centipede game is an abstract model of reciprocal relationships in which two individuals alternate in helping each other at relatively small personal cost. Whereas mutual cooperation can benefit both individuals in the long run, a paradoxical but logically compelling backward induction argument suggests that cooperation is irrational. Empirical studies have reported reliable deviations from the non‐cooperative backward induction solution, but their exclusively quantitative methods allow only a limited range of predefined motives to be explored. Our study uses verbal (‘think aloud’) protocols and qualitative data analysis to identify motives for cooperation in the Centipede game. The results provide little evidence for sophisticated backward induction reasoning. Instead, a wide range of motives emerged, their relative saliences varying according to the stage of the game. Activity bias affected decisions mainly at the beginning of the game, whereas cooperative and altruistic social value orientations most frequently accounted for cooperation towards its natural end. 相似文献
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David Sklar 《Theoria》2024,90(2):225-239
This study analyses behaviour in non-zero-sum finite multi-stage games, particularly the Centipede Game. The classical Nash Equilibrium fails to explain empirical behaviour and intuitive logic and has therefore been challenged. This paper introduces the ‘Pure Collective Equilibrium’, or PCE, which describes the equilibrium reached when agents assess their utility not by their own payoffs but by the mean collective payoff of the team, as outlined by some team-reasoning hypotheses. Classical behaviour and purely collective team reasoning then both represent special cases—the first in which agents and their counterparts are on the Nash Equilibrium path, and the second in which agents and their counterparts are purely collective team reasoners. It is argued that agents intentionally and consistently deviate from classical rationality in the Centipede Game, even in the absence of philanthropic altruists or error-plagued populations. 相似文献
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A common solution to mitigate risk is to buy insurance. Employing the trust game, we find that buying insurance against the risk of betrayal has a hidden cost: trustees are more likely to act opportunistically when trustors choose to be insured against the breach of trust. Supposedly, trustees are less likely to cooperate when trustors buy insurance because choosing insurance implicitly signals that the trustor expects the trustee to behave opportunistically, paradoxically encouraging trustees not to cooperate. These results shed new light on the potential drawbacks of financial safeguards that are intended to minimize the risky nature of trust taking: the presumed safeguard against the risk of betrayal may, under certain circumstances, increase the probability of betrayal. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Standard economic models assume people exclusively pursue material self‐interests in social interactions. However, people exhibit social preferences; that is, they base their choices partly on the outcomes others obtained in a social interaction. People care about fairness, and reciprocity affects behavior. This study examines the differences in negative reciprocity (costly punishment for unfair divisions) as a function of age. Sixty‐one kindergarteners (5‐year‐olds), 53 second graders (8‐year‐olds), and 57 sixth graders (12‐year‐olds) played a dictator game or a mini–ultimatum game either with a human proposer or with a random machine that determined the division between the two players. By keeping the divisions between the players constant and varying the source of the unfair proposal, we were able to differentiate between reciprocity‐based and inequality‐aversion preferences. We found that kindergarteners proposed and accepted unfair divisions regardless of the source of the offer, behaving according to the standard economic model. Children in the sixth grade tended to reject unfair offers from a human proposer but accept unfair divisions from a random device, indicating the emergence of negative reciprocity preferences by age eight (and contrary to inequality aversion). Children at this age also tended to give more fair offers in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game, indicating the emergence of strategic thinking. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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In this contribution the norm of reciprocity is defined as a basic internal motivation. Using formal tools of game theory, a model of social utility function is presented. The reciprocity model predicts that social actors should reciprocate costs and benefits they receive, even when there are costs in conforming to the norm. Hypotheses about actors' behavior, expectations and evaluations are derived from the model. The hypotheses were tested in an experimental situation, the reciprocity game, consisting of a prisoner's dilemma game (PD) followed by a dictator game (DG). The sample was composed of 74 Italian undergraduate students. In line with the model's predictions, the experimental results showed that participants reciprocate the behavior of the opponent in the PD. In the DG, if the opponent cooperated, participants gave back an almost equal share, whereas if the opponent defected, participants gave a minimal amount. These reciprocity effects are modulated by individual differences in the concern for reciprocity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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This study investigated state anger and individual differences in negative reciprocity orientation as predictors of individuals' willingness to cooperate with strangers. In order to observe real behaviour, we used a trust game that was played over six periods. In the trust game, a first player (sender) determines how much of a certain endowment she/he wants to share with a second player (trustee), who then can give something back. We varied whether participants received feedback [feedback (yes, no)] about the trustee's behavioural decision (amount sent back). Supporting our hypotheses, the results suggest that feedback compared with no feedback about the trustee's behaviour increased anger. Specifically, information about low back transfers triggered anger and non‐cooperation in return. Importantly, participants with a strong negative reciprocity orientation reported higher levels of anger and were less willing to cooperate with the trustee compared with those with low negative reciprocity orientation. Moreover, even when anger was low, individuals with a strong negative reciprocity orientation were less willing to cooperate compared with those with a low negative reciprocity orientation. Thus, negative reciprocity orientation seems to arouse a spiral of distrust. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. 相似文献
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In social interactions, decision makers are often unaware of their interdependence with others, precluding the realization of shared long‐term benefits. In an experiment, pairs of participants played an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under various conditions involving differing levels of interdependence information. Each pair was assigned to one of four conditions: “No‐Info” players saw their own actions and outcomes, but were not told that they interacted with another person; “Min‐Info” players knew they interacted with another person but still without seeing the other's actions or outcomes; “Mid‐Info” players discovered the other's actions and outcomes as they were revealed over time; and “Max‐Info” players were also shown a complete payoff matrix mapping actions to outcomes from the outset and throughout the game. With higher levels of interdependence information, we found increased individual cooperation and mutual cooperation, driven by increased reciprocating cooperation (in response to a counterpart's cooperation). Furthermore, joint performance and satisfaction were higher for pairs with more information. We discuss how awareness of interdependence may encourage cooperative behavior in real‐world interactions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Research suggests that benefiting from someone's voluntary, intentional, costly effort encourages reciprocal prosocial behavior, as well as promoting upstream reciprocity, that is, increases reciprocal actions by the recipient for the benefit of an unrelated third party. The current study examines the role of the identifiability of the benefactor in determining the extent to which people engage in direct and upstream reciprocity. Results of three studies reveal that while an identified benefactor tends to engender greater direct reciprocal reactions than an unidentified one, this strong reaction toward the identified benefactor does not hold to the same extent when upstream reciprocity is considered (regardless of identification of the third party). On the other hand, when the benefactor is unidentified, levels of direct and upstream reciprocity remain similar. Moderated‐mediation analysis suggests that ethical commitment associated with the universal norm of reciprocity explains the decrease in prosociality between reactions toward the benefactor himself or herself and toward a third party under the identified condition. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Ananish Chaudhuri Sarah Ali Khan Aishwarya Lakshmiratan Anne‐Laure Py Lisa Shah 《决策行为杂志》2003,16(5):331-340
We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ‘inconsistent trusters’ seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Trust is a vital element of any society. Previous studies using trust games have provided insight into understandings of trusting behavior. However, investors' behaviors can be confounded by their risk preferences in the game, and little is known about the relationship between stake size and beliefs of others' good intentions underlying trust. We thus used a variant of the trust game and conducted two experiments to examine how stake size affects investors' beliefs about receivers' trustworthiness, with model-based analyses. We showed that, when holding all else equal, investors trusted more, but their expectations of reciprocation declined as stake size increased. However, actual receivers' reciprocation rates showed the opposite trend to investors' pessimistic beliefs. Furthermore, following previous studies in social psychology, we hypothesized that investors' social preferences (social value orientation) moderated the beliefs underlying trust, but they had no explanatory powers in investors' expectations of reciprocation. These results suggest that peoples' naive beliefs about stake size play a more important role in trust decisions than expected. 相似文献
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Younbo Jung Jeff Hall Renyi Hong Tiffany Goh Natalynn Ong Nathanael Tan 《Asian Journal of Social Psychology》2014,17(3):160-172
This experimental investigation explores differences in reciprocal norms between friends and strangers and the effects of culture on reciprocity. Based on altruistic and strong reciprocity theories, a hybrid trust‐dictator game tested the influence of relationship (i.e. friends vs. strangers), treatment (i.e. positive vs. negative) and culture (i.e. collectivistic vs. individualistic) on reciprocation. The results show that participants reciprocated more positively when treated positively in general. However, the results demonstrate intercultural differences in reciprocal norms, specifically in the negative treatment condition. Participants from the individualistic culture provided stronger punishment to the norm violator, compared to participants from the collectivistic culture. We discuss implications of the impact of relationship and culture on reciprocation with respect to the olive branch response. 相似文献
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Jan Keil Sonja Perren Andrea Schlesier‐Michel Fabio Sticca Susan Sierau Annette M. Klein Nikolaus Steinbeis Kai von Klitzing Lars O. White 《Developmental science》2019,22(3)
Human cooperative behavior has long been thought to decline under adversity. However, studies have primarily examined perceived patterns of cooperation, with little eye to actual cooperative behavior embedded within social interaction. Game‐theoretical paradigms can help close this gap by unpacking subtle differences in how cooperation unfolds during initial encounters. This study is the first to use a child‐appropriate, virtual, public goods game to study actual cooperative behavior in 329 participants aged 9–16 years with histories of maltreatment (n = 99) and no maltreatment (n = 230) while controlling for psychiatric symptoms. Unlike work on perceived patterns of cooperation, we found that maltreated participants actually contribute more resources to a public good during peer interaction than their nonmaltreated counterparts. This effect was robust when controlling for psychiatric symptoms and peer problems as well as demographic variables. We conclude that maltreatment may engender a hyper‐cooperative strategy to minimize the odds of hostility and preserve positive interaction during initial encounters. This, however, comes at the cost of potential exploitation by others. 相似文献
15.
Kai Dou Yu‐Jie Wang Jian‐Bin Li Jing‐Jing Li Yan‐Gang Nie 《Asian Journal of Social Psychology》2018,21(1-2):97-106
Social mindfulness refers to individual's respect and protection of others’ options in interpersonal interaction. The object‐choosing task is a traditional paradigm to assess social mindfulness. Individuals with high social mindfulness would choose the nonunique object so that others would have more options; on the contrary, individuals with low social mindfulness would choose the unique object, which limits others’ choices. No prior study has examined whether perceiving people with different levels of social mindfulness affects one's cooperation. Based on this background, two experiments were conducted to address this question. In both experiments, a confederate participant's (Player A's) social mindfulness was manipulated by setting the frequency that Player A chose the unique and the nonunique objects. Then, participants were asked to interact with Player A in the public goods game (Experiment 1) or in the centipede game (Experiment 2). Convergent results showed that compared to those interacting with a socially unmindful person, participants interacting with a person perceived as socially mindful contributed more resources in the public goods game and chose to pass on more rounds in the centipede game. These findings suggest that perception of others’ high social mindfulness enhances one's own cooperative behaviour. 相似文献
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Oleg Smirnov Christopher T. Dawes James H. Fowler Tim Johnson Richard McElreath 《Political psychology》2010,31(4):595-616
Laboratory experiments indicate that many people willingly contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a personal cost. We hypothesize that these individuals, called strong reciprocators, allow political parties to overcome collective action problems, thereby allowing those organizations to compete for scarce resources and to produce public goods for like‐minded individuals. Using a series of laboratory games, we examine whether partisans contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a greater rate than nonpartisans. The results show that partisans are more likely than nonpartisans to contribute to public goods and to engage in costly punishment. Given the broad theoretical literature on altruistic punishment and group selection as well as our own formal evolutionary model, we hypothesize that it is being a partisan that makes an individual more likely to be a strong reciprocator and not vice versa. 相似文献
17.
社会善念是个体在人际互动中充满善意地关注、尊重并保护他人选择的需要和权利的行为,通过实施社会善念有助于提升他人的合作行为。为检验这一假设,本实验设置了“施—受”双方的互动博弈情境,采用“物品选择游戏”操纵实施者的社会善念水平,分别利用信任博弈和公共物品游戏测查接受者在互动过程中的信任水平和合作行为。结果发现：相比于低社会善念组,被试在高社会善念组中表现出更高的信任水平和合作行为。进一步路径分析也发现,信任在感知社会善念与合作行为间发挥着部分中介作用。由此可见,社会善念行为的实施为互动双方建立信任关系提供了重要线索,降低了人们时时“设防”的监控动机,使合作带来的利益双赢成为可能。 相似文献
18.
采用2（加工方式：直觉加工vs.深思加工）×3（信任水平：低vs.中vs.高）被试内设计,探讨双响应范式中直觉加工和深思加工下积极互惠行为存在差异的原因。结果发现,（1）在直觉加工中,处于低、中信任时被试更为利己,高信任时更为利他;深思加工中,信任水平越高利他行为越明显。（2）在低信任时,被试深思后呈现利己行为;中信任、高信任时,深思后呈现利他行为。这表明是信任水平的差异决定了被试在直觉和深思阶段的利己或利他倾向。 相似文献
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人类的生存繁衍依赖于人们之间的相互合作,合作与冲突行为的研究近年来成为心理学的研究热点。本研究通过实验程序操纵Chicken Game中博弈同伴的特点,考察个体在社会困境中面对不同特点同伴时的合作行为。结果发现：(1)同伴道义论组和功利论组总和解率没有显著差异,同伴竞争组和合作组的总和解率也没有显著差异。(2)在与道义论以及合作型的同伴互动时,个体的行为没有明显受到上次博弈反馈的影响。(3)当同伴为功利论时,相比于上次博弈个体选择和解而同伴选择进攻,双方都选择和解时个体在当前博弈中更倾向于和解;(4)在同伴竞争组中,相比于上次博弈个体选择进攻而同伴选择和解,双方都选择和解时被试在当前博弈中会更倾向于和解。实验结果表明个体在博弈任务中会受到同伴特点的影响,并且同伴在博弈中的行为特点的影响更为显著。本研究从同伴特点来考察个体的合作行为,揭示了影响个体博弈行为的一种因素。 相似文献
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以38名大学生和研究生为被试,采用Chicken Game实验范式测量合作行为,考察了单人和双人合作模式游戏后,性别和游戏习惯对玩家在博弈决策中合作行为的影响。结果表明：（1）双人合作模式游戏可以促进玩家在博弈决策中的合作行为;（2）双人合作模式游戏后,男玩家（相比女玩家）在博弈决策中的合作行为更多;（3）玩游戏的习惯影响博弈决策中的合作行为,相比于经常习惯与现实朋友玩游戏和独自玩游戏的玩家,经常习惯与网友玩游戏的玩家在双人合作模式游戏后的合作行为更多。本研究不仅证实了一般学习模型,也证实了亲社会合作类视频游戏可以有效促进博弈决策中的合作行为。 相似文献