共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Carl Baker 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(4):445-455
Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically
valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for
the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds
of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires
an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against Marino’s arguments, I contend that expressivists following Blackburn are able to show how we appreciate the validity of arguments found in dilemma-contexts, and that Marino’s argument concerning
the distinction between contingent moral dilemmas and logical moral dilemmas rests on a mistake concerning the logical representation
of a contingent dilemma. 相似文献
2.
In the 1967 version of Fishbein's model of the attitude-behaviour relationship a distinction was drawn between personal and social normative beliefs. Personal normative beliefs were later removed from the model on the grounds that they act as an alternative measure of behavioural intention. It is argued that the existing literature does not support this hypothesis and data is presented which indicates that personal normative beliefs are not an alternative measure of behavioural intention. It is argued that personal normative beliefs can be reconceptualized as measuring a person's ideal behavioural intention; a variable which mediates the relationship between attitudes, subjective norms and intentions, Evidence is presented which supports this hypothesis, but it is further demonstrated that an alternative model can be fitted to the present data. It is argued that it is impossible to discriminate between these alternative models on the basis of path analytic techniques, and the implications that this finding has for attitude research are discussed. 相似文献
3.
Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional
fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades
several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which
slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against SSA use that itself invokes a slippery slope. Specifically, he argued that
the very reasons that can make SSAs strong arguments mean that we should be poor at abiding by the distinction between good
and bad SSAs, making SSAs inherently undesirable. We argue that Enoch’s meta-level SSA fails on both conceptual and empirical
grounds. 相似文献
4.
Brad Armendt 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(1):71-87
The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what
the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and
other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically
exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant, though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees
of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments. 相似文献
5.
Doren Recker 《Zygon》2010,45(3):647-664
Why do design arguments—particularly those emphasizing machine metaphors such as “Organisms and/or their parts are machines”—continue to be so convincing to so many people after they have been repeatedly refuted? In this essay I review various interpretations and refutations of design arguments and make a distinction between rationally refuting such arguments (RefutingR) and rendering them psychologically unconvincing (RefutingP). Expanding on this distinction, I provide support from recent work on the cognitive power of metaphors and developmental psychological work indicating a basic human propensity toward attributing agency to natural events, to show that design arguments “make sense”unless one is cued to look more closely. As with visual illusions, such as the Müller‐Lyer arrow illusion, there is nothing wrong with a believer's cognitive apparatus any more than with their visual apparatus when they judge the lines in the illusion to be of unequal length. It takes training or a dissonance between design beliefs and other beliefs or experiences to play the role that a ruler does in the visual case. Unless people are cued to “look again” at what initially makes perfect sense, they are not inclined to apply more sophisticated evaluative procedures. 相似文献
6.
Eric Barendt 《Res Publica》2011,17(1):41-53
This article examines the issues raised by recent legislation proscribing incitement to religious hatred. In particular, it
examines how far arguments for prohibiting racist hate speech apply also to the prohibition of religious hate speech. It identifies
a number of significant differences between race and religion. It also examines several questions raised by the prohibition
of religious hate speech, including the meaning and scope of religious identity, why that identity should receive special
protection, and whether protection should be directed to religious groups as groups or to their individual members. The central
argument of the article is that the distinction between protecting religious groups from vilification and protecting their
beliefs and practices from criticism—a distinction on which the British Government placed great emphasis in defending its
legislation—is unsustainable. That conclusion is supported by the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in cases
in which it has upheld the curtailing of freedom of expression for the sake of protecting religion. 相似文献
7.
John M. DePoe 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(3):347-359
Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental
argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution
presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting
Huemer’s account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests
some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer’s premise that all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings. In
the second argument I contend that phenomenal conservativism is not a well-motivated account of internal justification, which
is a further reason to reject the self-defeat argument. Consequently, the self-defeat argument fails to show that rejecting
phenomenal conservativism inevitably leads one to a self-defeating position. 相似文献
8.
Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen that the belief revision operators on which the postulational theories are based are ill-defined. It is further argued that there is no way to repair the definitions so as to retain the spirit of those theory. Belief revision is better studied from within an independently motivated epistemological theory. 相似文献
9.
Karen Green 《Synthese》2006,150(2):209-228
Michael Dummett has argued that a formal semantics for our language is inadequate unless it can be shown to illuminate to
our actual practice of speaking and understanding. This paper argues that Frege’s account of the semantics of predicate expressions
according to which the reference of a predicate is a concept (a function from objects to truth values) has exactly the required
characteristics. The first part of the paper develops a model for understanding the distinction between objects and concepts
as an ontological distinction. It argues that, ontologically, we can take a Fregean function to be generated by a property
detection device that can register for any object the presence or absence of that property. This provides a direct connection
between the semantics of sentences and the structure of perceptual judgment. The second part of the paper deals with arguments
that have been mounted against the coherence of Frege’s semantics. It argues that some of these are question begging, while
others are correct in so far as Frege’s claim is untenable if we assume that the syntactic categories singular term and predicate
are primary, and the ontological categories are simply projections of these syntactic categories. However, the objections
dissipate once we recognize that an independent ontological characterization of the distinction is available. 相似文献
10.
Benoni B. Edin 《Synthese》2008,161(2):203-218
A meaningful distinction can be made between functions and mere effects in biological systems without resorting to teleological
arguments: (i) biological systems must cope with a multitude of problems or they will cease to exist; (ii) the solutions to
these problems invariably depend on circular causal chains (“feedback loops”); and (iii) biological functions are attributes
of elements in biological systems that have an effect which, by contributing to the correcting behavior of a feedback control
system, assists in solving a biological problem. The analysis is applied to several biological systems. The proposed solution
is discussed primarily in its relation to two popular approaches to the concept of biological function, i.e., the “causal
role accounts” and the “selected effect accounts”. 相似文献
11.
Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
DON LOEB 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2005,70(1):193-208
Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory. 相似文献
12.
Alexei Angelides 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(2):147-169
In sections 18 and 73 of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap famously presents what he understands to be decisive objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractarian distinction between
saying and showing. However, Carnap has been criticized in recent literature for severely misinterpreting that distinction.
Against this criticism it is argued that Carnap reads that distinction as applying to two distinct classes of expressions
(Unsinn and sinnlos) that he holds to emerge from his reading of Tractatus 4.1212 and related Tractarian theses. It is then argued that Carnap’s counterexamples to Wittgenstein’s theses are successful
given his reading, and that our analysis of his counterexamples puts us in a unique position to reevaluate his conventionalism. 相似文献
13.
Robert P. Farell 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2001,32(2):351-369
John Preston has contended that Paul Feyerabend retreated from his earlier commitment to realism and consciously embraced
a ‘voluntarist’, social constructionist, idealism. Though there seems to be unmistakable subjective idealist statements in
some of Feyerabend's writings, it will be argued that Feyerabend's idealistic period was short-lived, and that he returned
to a form of realism in his later writings. Specifically, Feyerabend's distinction between theoretical/abstract and empirical/historical
traditions of thought, when understood with Feyerabend's re evaluation of Bohr's philosophy of quantum physics in mind, is
most aptly interpreted as aprocess realist position. Preston, in interpreting Feyerabend as a voluntarist, social constructionist,
subjective idealist, fails to distinguish the ever-present rhetorical and provocative statements of Feyerabend's from the
core arguments being presented.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
14.
Christian Kietzmann 《European Journal of Philosophy》2019,27(2):426-440
Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first‐personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between “ordinary” and “first‐personal beliefs.” In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first‐personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them. 相似文献
15.
Christopher C. Knight 《Zygon》2016,51(3):573-591
On the basis of both philosophical arguments and the theological perspectives of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, a critique of two beliefs that are common within the mainstream science–theology dialogue is outlined. These relate to critical realism in understanding language usage and to naturalistic perspectives in relation to divine action. While the naturalistic perspectives on the history of the cosmos that are predominant within the dialogue are seen as generally acceptable from an Orthodox perspective, it is argued that they require theological expansion. This expansion suggests an understanding other than the “causal joint” model commonly adopted in relation to “special” divine action. This alternative model renders the distinction between “special” and “general” divine action redundant, and is based on what has been called a “teleological‐Christological” understanding of the cosmos, rooted in the fourth gospel's notion of the divine Logos. The relevance of this critique to scholars outside of the Orthodox community is urged. 相似文献
16.
John Eriksson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2014,17(2):253-267
According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper I argue that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg’s arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausible. 相似文献
17.
Robert M. Baird Ph.D. 《Journal of religion and health》1980,19(3):172-179
This essay contains four arguments in defense of the creative role of doubt in religion. Within a specified framework or context it is argued that: 1) creative doubt is a means of constructively acknowledging human finitude, 2) creative doubt can play a role in keeping one's fundamental beliefs alive and vital, 3) creative doubt, by continually challenging the full adequacy of religious symbols, serves as a check against the idolatrous worship of one's own religious language, and 4) the avoidance of doubt may reflect a relinquishing of freedom and a dehumanizing quest for certainty. 相似文献
18.
Maartje Schermer 《Nanoethics》2009,3(3):217-230
Brain-machine interfaces are a growing field of research and application. The increasing possibilities to connect the human
brain to electronic devices and computer software can be put to use in medicine, the military, and entertainment. Concrete
technologies include cochlear implants, Deep Brain Stimulation, neurofeedback and neuroprosthesis. The expectations for the
near and further future are high, though it is difficult to separate hope from hype. The focus in this paper is on the effects
that these new technologies may have on our ‘symbolic order’—on the ways in which popular categories and concepts may change
or be reinterpreted. First, the blurring distinction between man and machine and the idea of the cyborg are discussed. It
is argued that the morally relevant difference is that between persons and non-persons, which does not necessarily coincide
with the distinction between man and machine. The concept of the person remains useful. It may, however, become more difficult
to assess the limits of the human body. Next, the distinction between body and mind is discussed. The mind is increasingly
seen as a function of the brain, and thus understood in bodily and mechanical terms. This raises questions concerning concepts
of free will and moral responsibility that may have far reaching consequences in the field of law, where some have argued
for a revision of our criminal justice system, from retributivist to consequentialist. Even without such a (unlikely and unwarranted)
revision occurring, brain-machine interactions raise many interesting questions regarding distribution and attribution of
responsibility. 相似文献
19.
Summary This article is an investigation of parallel themes in Heinrich Hertz’s philosophy science and Kant’s theory of schemata, symbols and regulative ideas. It is argued that Hertz’s “pictures” bears close similarities to Kantian “schemata”, that is, they are rules linking concepts to intuitions and provide them with their meaning. Kant’s distinction between symbols and schemata is discussed and related to Hertz’s three pictures of mechanics. It is argued that Hertz considered his own picture of mechanics (the “hidden mass” picture) as symbolic in a different way than the force and energy pictures. In the final part of the article it is described how Harald H?ffding soon after the publication of Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics developed a general theory of analogical reasoning, relying on the ideas of Hertz and Kant. 相似文献
20.
Mariette Hellemans 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(5):499-504
After integrating the main lines of argumentation developed in the special issue, this paper makes a balance of the question
on the public role of the university. Furthermore, the paper focuses on the discussion underlying the articles collected in
the issue. A distinction is made between “comprehending” the past and present of the university on the one hand and “justifying”
the university and its public role on the other hand. In view of this distinction, it is argued that the question concerning
the value of a (normative) idea of the university and its public role is related to the question of democracy. The question
is, however, not only whether we live in a democracy, but whether we may still speak of a “commitment to democracy”. An inquiry
into the meaningfulness of a (normative) “idea” of the university arises directly from this question. At this point, the viewpoint
of Derrida is introduced to discuss the question of the democracy and university of the future. 相似文献