Supracompact inference operations

When a proposition is cumulatively entailed by a finite setA of premisses, there exists, trivially, a finite subsetB ofA such thatB B entails for all finite subsetsB that are entailed byA. This property is no longer valid whenA is taken to be an arbitrary infinite set, even when the considered inference operation is supposed to be compact. This leads to a refinement of the classical definition of compactness. We call supracompact the inference operations that satisfy the non-finitary analogue of the above property. We show that for any arbitrary cumulative operationC, there exists a supracompact cumulative operationK(C) that is smaller thenC and agrees withC on finite sets. Moreover,K(C) inherits most of the properties thatC may enjoy, like monotonicity, distributivity or disjunctive rationality. The main part of the paper concerns distributive supracompact operations. These operations satisfy a simple functional equation, and there exists a representation theorem that provides a semantic characterization for this family of operations. We examine finally the case of rational operations and show that they can be represented by a specific kind of model particularly easy to handle.     

Interpretations of the first-order theory of diagonalizable algebras in peano arithmetic

For every sequence |p _n } _n of formulas of Peano ArithmeticPA with, every formulaA of the first-order theory diagonalizable algebras, we associate a formula ⁰ A, called the value ofA inPA with respect to the interpretation. We show that, ifA is true in every diagonalizable algebra, then, for every, ⁰ A is a theorem ofPA.     

On sensitive rank tests for comparing the effects of two treatments on a single group

The rank testR _n of Cronholm and Revusky [1965] in effect doubles the number of comparisons carried out in the Mann-Whitney test between Treated and Control subjects chosen from a single group ofn and triples the asymptotic Pitman efficiency against shift alternatives by using a series ofn — 1 subexperiments. However, the full series can be too costly or time-consuming. It is shown thatj appropriately chosen subexperiments will permit one to make at leastj/(j+1) of the number of comparisons possible underR _n, with large sample efficiency ofj/(j+2) relative toR _n against shift alternatives and small sample efficiency greater than that,j=2, 3, ...,n — 2. The resulting test criterion is a sum ofj independent Mann-Whitney test statistics. Its null distribution is tabulated forn10 and small sample efficiency comparisons are carried out forn=10.     

A New Representation Theorem for Contranegative Deontic Logic

The logic of an ought operator O is contranegative with respect to an underlying preference relation if it satisfies the property Op & (¬p)(¬q) Oq. Here the condition that is interpolative ((p (pq) q) (q (pq) p)) is shown to be necessary and sufficient for all -contranegative preference relations to satisfy the plausible deontic postulates agglomeration (Op & OqO(p&q)) and disjunctive division (O(p&q) Op Oq).     

Rules in relevant logic — II: Formula representation

This paper surveys the various forms of Deduction Theorem for a broad range of relevant logics. The logics range from the basic system B of Routley-Meyer through to the system R of relevant implication, and the forms of Deduction Theorem are characterized by the various formula representations of rules that are either unrestricted or restricted in certain ways. The formula representations cover the iterated form,A ₁ .A ₂ . ... .A _n B, the conjunctive form,A ₁&A ₂ & ...A _n B, the combined conjunctive and iterated form, enthymematic version of these three forms, and the classical implicational form,A ₁&A ₂& ...A _n B. The concept of general enthymeme is introduced and the Deduction Theorem is shown to apply for rules essentially derived using Modus Ponens and Adjunction only, with logics containing either (A B)&(B C) .A C orA B .B C .A C.I acknowledge help from anonymous referees for guidance in preparing Part II, and especially for the suggestion that Theorem 9 could be expanded to fully contraction-less logics.     

Intuitionistic uniformity principles for propositions and some applications

This note deals with the prepositional uniformity principlep-UP: p x N A (p, x) x N p A (p, x) ( species of all propositions) in intuitionistic mathematics.p-UP is implied by WC and KS. But there are interestingp-UP-cases which require weak KS resp. WC only. UP for number species follows fromp-UP by extended bar-induction (ranging over propositions) and suitable weak continuity. As corollaries we have the disjunction property and the existential definability w.r.t. concrete objects. Other consequences are: there is no non-trivial countable partition of;id is the only injective function from to; there are no many-place injective prepositional functions; card () is incomparable with the cardinality of all metric spaces containing at least three elements.     

On the logic of conscious belief

In this paper we are discussing a version of propositional belief logic, denoted by LB, in which so-called axioms of introspection (B BB and B B B) are added to the usual ones. LB is proved to be sound and complete with respect to Boolean algebras equipped with proper filters (Theorem 5). Interpretations in classical theories (Theorem 4) are also considered. A few modifications of LB are further dealt with, one of which turns out to be S5.     

The probability of war in then-crises problem: Modeling new alternatives to Wright's solution

In hisStudy of War, Q. Wright considered a model for the probability of warP during a period ofn crises, and proposed the equationP=1–(1–p) ⁿ , wherep is the probability of war escalating at each individual crisis. This probability measure was formally derived recently by Cioffi-Revilla (1987), using the general theory of political reliability and an interpretation of the n-crises problem as a branching process. Two new, alternate solutions are presented here, one using D. Bernoulli's St. Petersburg Paradox as an analogue, the other based on the logic of conditional probabilities. Analysis shows that, while Wright's solution is robust with regard to the general overall behavior ofp andn, some significant qualitative and quantitative differences emerge from the alternative solutions. In particular,P converges to 1 only in a special case (Wright's) and not generally.C.C.-R. acknowledges support provided by the Merriam Laboratory for Analytic Political Research, the Research Board of the University of Illinois, and grant SES-84-00877 from the U.S. National Science Foundation.     

On a certain class ofm-address machines

Conclusion It follows from the proved theorems that ifM =Q, (whereQ={0,q ₁,q ₂,...,q }) is a machine of the classM _F then there exist machinesM _i such thatM _i(1,c)=M (q _i,c) andQ _i={0, 1, 2, ..., +1} (i=1, 2, ..., ).And thus, if the way in which to an initial function of content of memorycC a machine assigns a final onecC is regarded as the only essential property of the machine then we can deal with the machines of the formM ={0, 1, 2, ..., }, and processes (t) (wheret=1,c,cC) only.Such approach can simplify the problem of defining particular machines of the classM _F , composing and simplifying them.Allatum est die 19 Januarii 1970     

On the logic of nonmonotonic conditionals and conditional probabilities

I will describe the logics of a range of conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities at various levels of probabilistic support. Families of these conditionals will be characterized in terms of the rules that their members obey. I will show that for each conditional, , in a given family, there is a probabilistic support level r and a conditional probability function P such that, for all sentences C and B, CB holds just in case P[B|C]r. Thus, each conditional in a given family behaves like conditional probability above some specific support level.Chris Swoyer provided very helpful comments on drafts of this paper.     

Strong Boethius’ Thesis and Consequential Implication

The paper studies the relation between systems of modal logic and systems of consequential implication, a non-material form of implication satisfying Aristotle's Thesis (p does not imply not p ) and Weak Boethius' Thesis (if p implies q, then p does not imply not q ). Definitions are given of consequential implication in terms of modal operators and of modal operators in terms of consequential implication. The modal equivalent of Strong Boethius' Thesis (that p implies q implies that p does not imply not q) is identified.     

A consistent theory of attributes in a logic without contraction

This essay demonstrates proof-theoretically the consistency of a type-free theoryC with an unrestricted principle of comprehension and based on a predicate logic in which contraction (A (A B)) (A B), although it cannot holds in general, is provable for a wide range ofA's.C is presented as an axiomatic theoryCH (with a natural-deduction equivalentCS) as a finitary system, without formulas of infinite length. ThenCH is proved simply consistent by passing to a Gentzen-style natural-deduction systemCG that allows countably infinite conjunctions and in which all theorems ofCH are provable.CG is seen to be a consistent by a normalization argument. It also shown that in a senseC is highly non-extensional.     

Cut-free tableau calculi for some propositional normal modal logics

We give sound and complete tableau and sequent calculi for the prepositional normal modal logics S4.04, K4B and G ⁰(these logics are the smallest normal modal logics containing K and the schemata A A, A A and A ( A); A A and AA; A A and ((A A) A) A resp.) with the following properties: the calculi for S4.04 and G ⁰are cut-free and have the interpolation property, the calculus for K4B contains a restricted version of the cut-rule, the so-called analytical cut-rule.In addition we show that G ⁰is not compact (and therefore not canonical), and we proof with the tableau-method that G ⁰is characterised by the class of all finite, (transitive) trees of degenerate or simple clusters of worlds; therefore G ⁰is decidable and also characterised by the class of all frames for G ⁰.Research supported by Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung, project number P8495-PHY.Presented by W. Rautenberg     

On superintuitionistic logics as fragments of proof logic extensions

Coming fromI andCl, i.e. from intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi with the substitution rule postulated, and using the sign to add a new connective there have been considered here: Grzegorozyk's logicGrz, the proof logicG and the proof-intuitionistic logicI set up correspondingly by the calculiFor any calculus we denote by the set of all formulae of the calculus and by the lattice of all logics that are the extensions of the logic of the calculus, i.e. sets of formulae containing the axioms of and closed with respect to its rules of inference. In the logiclG the sign is decoded as follows: A = (A & A). The result of placing in the formulaA before each of its subformula is denoted byTrA. The maps are defined (in the definitions of x and the decoding of is meant), by virtue of which the diagram is constructedIn this diagram the maps, x and are isomorphisms, thereforex ^–1 = ; and the maps and are the semilattice epimorphisms that are not commutative with lattice operation +. Besides, the given diagram is commutative, and the next equalities take place: ^–1 = ^–1 and = ^–1 x. The latter implies in particular that any superintuitionistic logic is a superintuitionistic fragment of some proof logic extension.     

Logics of some kripke frames connected with Medvedev notion of informational types

Intermediate prepositional logics we consider here describe the setI() of regular informational types introduced by Yu. T. Medvedev [7]. He showed thatI() is a Heyting algebra. This algebra gives rise to the logic of infinite problems from [13] denoted here asLM ₁. Some other definitions of negation inI() lead to logicsLM _n (n ). We study inclusions between these and other systems, proveLM _n to be non-finitely axiomatizable (n ) and recursively axiomatizable (n < ). We also show that formulas in one variable do not separateLM from Heyting's logicH, andLM _n (n < ) from Scott's logic (H+S).     

An effective fixed-point theorem in intuitionistic diagonalizable algebras

Summary Within the technical frame supplied by the algebraic variety of diagonalizable algebras, defined by R. Magari in [2], we prove the following:LetT be any first-order theory with a predicate Pr satisfying the canonical derivability conditions, including Löb's property. Then any formula inT built up from the propositional variables q, p₁, ..., p_n, using logical connectives and the predicate Pr, has the same fixed-points relative to q (that is, formulas (p₁ ..., p_n) for which for all p₁, ..., p_n T((p₁, ..., p_n), p₁, ..., p_n) (p₁, ..., p_n)) of a formula ^* of the same kind, obtained from in an effective way.Moreover, such ^* is provably equivalent to the formula obtained from substituting with ^* itself all the occurrences of q which are under Pr. In the particular case where q is always under Pr in , ^* is the unique (up to provable equivalence) fixedpoint of .Since this result is proved only assumingPr to be canonical, it can be deduced that Löb's property is, in a sense, equivalent to Gödel's diagonalization lemma.All the results are proved more generally in the intuitionistic case.The algebraization of the theories which express Theor, IXAllatum est die 19 Decembris 1975     

On a complexity-based way of constructivizing the recursive functions

Let g _E(m, n)=o mean that n is the Gödel-number of the shortest derivation from E of an equation of the form (m)=k. Hao Wang suggests that the condition for general recursiveness mn(g _E(m, n)=o) can be proved constructively if one can find a speedfunction _{s s}, with _s(m) bounding the number of steps for getting a value of (m), such that mn _s(m) s.t. g _E(m, n)=o. This idea, he thinks, yields a constructivist notion of an effectively computable function, one that doesn't get us into a vicious circle since we intuitively know, to begin with, that certain proofs are constructive and certain functions effectively computable. This paper gives a broad possibility proof for the existence of such classes of effectively computable functions, with Wang's idea of effective computability generalized along a number of dimensions.We are grateful to an anonymous referee for Studia Logica for valuable advice leading to substantial improvements in the presentation of the main definitions and theorem.     

Equivalents of Mingle and Positive Paradox

Relevant logic is a proper subset of classical logic. It does not include among its theorems any ofpositive paradox A (B A)mingle A (A A)linear order (A B) (B A)unrelated extremes (A ) (B B¯)This article shows that those four formulas have different effects when added to relevant logic, and then lists many formulas that have the same effect as positive paradox or mingle.     

Depression and Anxiety in Persons with Parkinson's Disease With and Without “On–Off” Phenomena

On–off phenomena in Parkinson's disease (PD) are unpredictable motor fluctuations associated with long-term levodopa use. Mood fluctuations have been found to coincide with the motor fluctuations in that depression and anxiety increase while the person with PD is in the off state. What has been relatively unexplored is whether those persons with PD who have on–off phenomena differ psychologically in fundamental ways from those who do not have on–off phenomena. In the present study, depression and anxiety symptoms were assessed in 36 persons with PD (n = 14 with on–off phenomena, n = 22 without on–off phenomena). All those with on–off phenomena were assessed in their on state. Those persons with PD with on–off phenomena had significantly higher levels of anxiety than those without on–off phenomena. However, both groups, regardless of on–off status, were mildly depressed. Neurobiological interpretations of the results implicate the locus coeruleus in the pathogenesis of both on–off phenomena and anxiety, whereas psychological interpretations of the results involve the issues of learned helplessness and control over health symptoms in PD.     

A note on the ω-incompleteness formalization

The paper studies two formal schemes related to -completeness.LetS be a suitable formal theory containing primitive recursive arithmetic and letT be a formal extension ofS. Denoted by (a), (b) and (c), respectively, are the following three propositions (where (x) is a formula with the only free variable x): (a) (for anyn) ( _T (n)), (b) _{T x} Pr _T (^–(x)^–) and (c) _T x(x) (the notational conventions are those of Smoryski [3]). The aim of this paper is to examine the meaning of the schemes which result from the formalizations, over the base theoryS, of the implications (b) (c) and (a) (b), where ranges over all formulae. The analysis yields two results overS : 1. the schema corresponding to (b) (c) is equivalent to ¬Cons _T and 2. the schema corresponding to (a) (b) is not consistent with 1-CON _T. The former result follows from a simple adaptation of the -incompleteness proof; the second is new and is based on a particular application of the diagonalization lemma.Presented byMelvin Fitting