情绪智力技能问卷(中文版)试用报告

1　引言1.1　试用的意义　　情绪智力技能问卷是由美国德克萨斯州Ａ＆Ｍ大学金斯威尔分校 (ＴｅｘａｓＡ＆ＭＵｎｉｖｅｒｓｉｔｙａｔＫｉｎｇｓｖｉｌｌｅ)的纳尔逊和洛 (ＤａｒｗｉｎＢ .Ｎｅｌｓｏｎ＆ＧａｒｙＲ .Ｌｏｗ)两位博士于 1998年编制而成。本研究将该问卷的英文版转换成中文版 ,并进行试用分析。本次试用鉴于以下两点考虑 :其一 ,情绪智力已成为一个热点论题 ,问卷的试用可以加深对这一论题的认识。其二 ,问卷试用可以为编制适用于我国学生的情绪智力测量工具奠定基础。本项研究可以填补这一空白 ,为以后的以后的正式修订做…     

情绪智力的负面效应及机制

情绪智力是知觉、使用、理解与管理情绪的一组能力。既有研究常将情绪智力与其亲社会性联系起来, 却忽视了它可能存在的负面效应。工作场所中情绪智力的负面效应体现为对内有损身心健康和工作绩效, 对外导致情绪操控和消极行为, 其内在机制可结合自我损耗效应与情绪智力策略模型进行探讨。未来研究应进一步探讨情绪智力负面效应的内在心理机制和特定情境机制, 以及开展群体层次的情绪智力负面效应研究。     

情绪智力研究的现状及发展趋势

自从 1990年心理学家梅耶和萨拉维 (Mayer&Salovey)首次提出“情绪智力”的概念后 ,情绪智力的研究受到广泛重视 ,其重点是情绪智力理论模型和量表的开发研究。至今已有 7本情绪智力专著出版 ,情绪智力量表已有近十个版本。本文简要介绍目前占主导地位的情绪智力模型以及基于这些模型所开发的情绪智力量表。1　“情绪智力”模型1.1　梅耶和萨拉维 (Mayer&Salovey) 1990模型1990年梅耶和萨拉维首次提出“情绪智力”的概念 ,指出情绪智力应包括区分和调节自己与他人的情绪 ,以及运用情绪信息引导思维的能力。其中区分自己与他人的情绪包括两…     

员工负性情绪对情绪劳动策略的影响

情绪劳动指的是员工在工作中按照组织的要求来调节自己的情绪感受和表达, 是服务行业普遍关注的问题。本研究基于自我调节理论(Self-Regulation Theory), 探讨了员工个体内负性情绪对情绪劳动策略的影响效应, 以及个体间水平上员工工作年限和情绪智力对该效应的跨层次调节作用。通过分析收集自210名呼叫中心员工14个工作日的追踪数据, 本研究发现员工每天的负性情绪显著抑制了深层动作; 工作年限和情绪智力显著调节了个体内负性情绪对情绪劳动策略的影响效应。数据分析结果支持了情绪劳动的研究中自我调节理论的作用, 本研究也据此讨论了理论意义和实践应用价值。     

22年情绪智力研究的现状、特点及趋势

运用文献研究法,对情绪智力理论提出22年以来的国内外情绪智力文献进行系统研究,其中国际文献1582篇/部,中国文献1130篇（含港、澳、台）,尝试从宏观的、大视角的学术角度出发,（1）对情绪智力研究文献的地域分布、时间分布、领域分布,分国际和国内两大部分进行比较研究;（2）总结情绪智力理论、实证和应用3大领域22年的研究特点,（3）分析今后情绪智力理论、实证和应用3大领域今后的研究发展趋势。     

对情绪智力概念的探讨

人们对情绪智力研究的兴趣渐起．但围绕情绪智力的基本概念仍存在着一些值得探讨的问题。本文对情绪智力的术语本身、概念内涵和外延以及与非智力因素、社会智力的关系进行了探讨．以冀更好地确立其在心理学中的科学地位,促进这方面理论与实践的研究。     

领导者情绪智力对领导力效能影响的元分析

以往领导者情绪智力和领导力效能之间关系的研究存在很大分歧。运用元分析方法考察了领导者情绪智力对领导力效能的影响及其组织情境和研究方法调节变量。通过纳入98篇中英文文献和110个效应量(n = 27330), 结果表明：(1)领导者情绪智力与领导力效能存在中等程度的正相关(r = 0.39)。(2)组织情境因素的调节作用检验发现, 高层领导者的情绪智力对领导力效能的影响明显高于中层和基层领导者, 非营利性组织中的领导者情绪智力对领导力效能的影响比营利组织中的影响更强, 东方文化背景下的领导者情绪智力对领导力效能的影响比西方文化背景下更强。(3)方法因素的调节作用检验发现, 采用混合模型测量的领导者情绪智力对领导力效能的影响高于采用能力模型测量的结果, 采用客观指标衡量领导力效能的相关系数比主观指标更大, 领导者情绪智力对工作态度指标的影响弱于工作绩效指标, 领导者情绪智力对群体层次效能的影响强于个体层次。从研究设计和出版标准等方面探究领导者情绪智力和领导力效能之间关系的调节变量是未来研究的重点。     

情绪对不同智力水平学生推理操作的影响

本研究试图探讨三种情绪状态(喜悦、中性、悲伤)对13岁不同智力水平学生思维推理操作(简单、一般、复杂)的影响及相互关系。研究表明,在简单和中等推理中,喜悦对优等、中等智力组的推理起更大的促进作用;在较高难度推理中,优等智力组受喜悦情绪的干扰,悲伤对不同智力组都产生干扰作用。对优等智力组而言,情绪强度(由负到正的变化)与智能操作活动效果之间的关系符合耶尔克斯—道森定律,即优等智力组在完成较复杂推理中以中性情绪为最佳;中等智力组和中下等智力组的操作效果不符合该定律。     

心理素质对高中艺体生应对方式的影响:多重中介效应分析

该研究以423名高中艺体生为被试,采用问卷法考察了元认知和情绪智力在心理素质与应对方式间的多重中介作用,结果表明:(1)元认知和情绪智力分别在心理素质与问题解决、求助的应对方式间起多重中介作用;(2)情绪智力在心理素质与退避应对间起完全中介作用;(3)相较于情绪智力,元认知在心理素质与问题解决间的中介效应更强。     

近十年来情绪研究的回顾与展望

本文主要综述了近10年来,情绪心理学研究中所取得的进展和将来的研究趋向。首先介绍了情绪实验研究中实验材料的标准化和成像技术应用的发展概况;其次讨论了情绪智力的构成成分和情绪调节研究的进展;再次分析了情绪和认知之间的交互作用关系;最后探讨了感情系统的加工特征。     

"情绪劳动"要求与情绪耗竭:情绪劳动策略的中介作用研究

文章目的是通过量表调查法来研究情绪劳动要求、情绪劳动策略和情绪耗竭之间的关系,以及验证情绪劳动要求和策略量表的结构维度.研究使用调查某大型公司营业厅和客服人员的424份有效问卷进行分析.验证性结构方程模型分析显示,情绪劳动要求和情绪劳动策略量表具有良好的结构效度;结构方程模型分析显示,情绪劳动策略在情绪劳动要求和情绪耗竭之间起到一定的中介作用.具体为:专注度分别通过表面行为、深度行为和中性调节影响情绪耗竭;规则性通过中性调节影响情绪耗竭;严格性通过表面行为和深度行为影响情绪耗竭;多样性可以直接或通过表面行为影响情绪耗竭.     

Affectivity,Emotional Labor,Emotional Exhaustion,and Emotional Intelligence in Coaching

This study investigated the relationship among affectivity, emotional labor strategies, and emotional exhaustion, and the moderating effect of emotional intelligence in that relationship. There were 430 NCAA Division I coaches who completed questionnaires measuring affectivity, the forms of emotional labor, emotional exhaustion, and emotional intelligence, which were modified to fit the coaching context. The result indicated that positive affectivity predicted 3 forms of emotional labor. In addition, coaches’ surface acting and genuine expression significantly predicted their emotional exhaustion. Furthermore, emotional intelligence moderated the relationship between surface acting and emotional exhaustion. These results reveal the important role of emotional labor on coaches’ well-being.     

Emotional introspection

One of the most vivid aspects of consciousness is the experience of emotion, yet this topic is given relatively little attention within consciousness studies. Emotions are crucial, for they provide quick and motivating assessments of value, without which action would be misdirected or absent. Emotions also involve linkages between phenomenal and intentional consciousness. This paper examines emotional consciousness from the standpoint of the representational theory of consciousness (RTC). Two interesting developments spring from this. The first is the need for the representation of value, which is distinctive of emotional experience. The second is an extension of RTC's theory of introspection to emotional states, revealing why emotional consciousness is so often introspective even though introspective abilities are not needed to experience emotions, and also explaining why introspection of emotional states is so much less reliable than that of other states of consciousness.     

Emotional Feelings

Abstract

There is a fear of death that persistently eludes adequate explanation from contemporary philosophers of death. The reason for this is their focus on mortal harm issues, such as why death is bad for the person who dies. Claims regarding the fear of death are assumed to be contingent on the resolution of questions about the badness of death. In practice, however, consensus on some mortal harm issues has not resulted in comparable clarity on mortal fear. I contend we cannot do justice to fear of death unless we detach it from theories about the badness of death, including the overwhelmingly popular deprivation theory. The case for this involves disambiguation of certain aspects of mortal harm, a broad conception of what is involved in accounting for an emotion, and close attention to the nature of the fear in question. The source of fear of death is our departure from a context in which self-directed emotions have coherent application; our attitudes become ‘unmoored’, in Samuel Scheffler’s phrase. While this does not result in a fear that is sui generis, it does demand that we remove the object of fear from the realm of well-being in order to make sense of it.     

Emotional Justification

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non‐basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties.