The World as Representation: Schopenhauer's Arguments for Transcendental Idealism

In this paper, I discuss Spinoza's conception of the cosmological argument for the existence of God (hereafter CA), as it can be reconstructed taking departure from Letter 12. By a CA, I understand, quite broadly, an argument which infers a posteriori the existence of a necessary being, usually identified as God, from the experience that there exists some other being, often oneself, the existence of which is contingent upon the existence of this necessary being. The difference between various versions of the CA stems from differences in the way in which the relation of existential dependence is understood. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a version of the CA which would be valid on Spinoza's principles. I argue that such a version must be understood in the context of Spinoza's causal rationalism. By such causal rationalism, I mean a doctrine committed to the idea that everything is rational and thus explicable and that causal explanations are somehow fundamental. Moreover, I hold that, in Spinoza's causal rationalism, there is one form of causation through which all other types of causation are ultimately understood. This ‘archetype’ of causation is self-causation.     

The Transcendental Nature of Mind and World

Critics of John McDowell's Mind and World have by and large failed to take sufficient notice of the transcendental context within which McDowell situates his work—a failure that has adversely affected their criticisms. In this paper, I make clear this transcendental context and show how it figures in the transcendental argument I see McDowell offering in Mind and World. Interpreting McDowell's argument in this way, I further argue, helps to answer some of the most pressing objections to what he is doing in Mind and World, particularly certain objections made by Robert Brandom and Hilary Putnam.     

Mind, World and Language: McDowell and Kovesi

The ideas of John McDowell concerning the relations between mind, world and language are brought into contact with those of Julius Kovesi, with a view to seeing whether the latter can illuminate and flesh out the former. McDowell's dialectic in Mind and World is expounded and reviewed, hinging on the notion of 'conceptual second nature' as his suggested way of showing that there is nothing mysteriously non–natural in human animals learning to find their way about both in a world characterised by lawlike connections and in one characterised by rational connections. Kovesi's redrawing, in Moral Notions , of the Aristotelian material/formal metaphysical distinction as one between the logical elements of concepts, is adduced to show how the world is 'shot through' with concepts and reasons: the formal elements of concepts are nothing other than the reasons we have for collecting varied features of the material world under a concept, to meet our bodily and social needs. The mind can then be treated as a set of acquired capacities and dispositions to become conversant with these features and with the corresponding needs. Some possible objections to this bringing together of the two sets of ideas are briefly examined, and overall conclusions drawn.     

Mind,Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds

The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation). On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different worlds. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Mind and Its Evolution: A Dual Coding Theoretical Approach

The Psychological Record -     

Homo Virtualis: Body,Mind, and Soul in a Virtual World

The virtual reality that stands in the center of the digital revolution is changing the bases of our lives today. This new reality is both a product of the basic human ability of imagination and an essential element of analytical psychology. The close relationship between the activity of imagination and its influence on the body is shown in research results from the oldest known prehistoric figures, dating back between 40,000–30,000 b.c.e., and the experiences derived from the work with robots at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Additionally, how this virtual, body-transforming power is reflected in the current ideas of the transhumanists is examined. In this perspective, the extension of physical abilities via technical skills is a necessary step in human evolution: to transfer the human mind onto a machine as a means of circumventing inherent physical limitations.

The psychodynamics of deep psychological needs, frustrations, and fears are discussed as the motors of technical development. An interpretation of this development, based on the mythological biography of the ancient god Hephaistos, is discussed as showing astonishing parallels to the characteristics of the digital revolution and the transhumanist ideas. Thus, Hephaistos can be understood as an archetypal manifestation of those impulses from the collective unconscious that are significantly affecting our present time. The potentialities as well as the dark sides that are hidden behind such “hephaistic” solutions to deep inner psychological and spiritual conflicts are explored.     

Mind,Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language

Dreyfus presents Todes's (2001 Todes S 2001 Body and World Cambridge MA MIT Press  ) republished Body and World as an anticipatory response to McDowell (1994 McDowell J 1994 Mind and World Cambridge MA Harvard University Press  ) which shows how preconceptual perception can ground conceptual thought. I argue that Dreyfus is mistaken on this point: Todes's claim that perceptual experience is preconceptual presupposes an untenable account of conceptual thought. I then show that Todes nevertheless makes two important contributions to McDowell's project. First, he develops an account of perception as bodily second nature, and as a practical‐perceptual openness to the world, which constructively develops McDowell's view. Second, and more important, this account highlights the practical and perceptual dimension of linguistic competence. The result is that perception is conceptual “all the way down” only because discursive conceptualization is perceptual and practical “all the way up”. This conjunction of McDowell and Todes on the bodily dimensions of discursive practice also vindicates Davidson's and Brandom's criticisms of McDowell's version of empiricism.     

Mind and World: From Soft Naturalism to Anti-naturalism

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This paper seeks to move from soft naturalism to anti-naturalism with regard to the understanding of mind and the world. John McDowell has...     

The Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Defies Replication, Medication, and Explanation

In The End of Science, I argued that particle physics, cosmology, evolutionary biology, and other fields of pure science have entered an era of diminishing returns (Horgan, 1997). Although scientists will continue refining and extending current theories and applying their knowledge in the realms of technology and medicine, they may never again achieve insights into nature as profound as quantum mechanics, relativity theory, the big bang theory, natural selection, and DNA-based genetics. One reasonable objection to the book was that mind-related research, of all current scientific enterprises, has the most revolutionary potential, and it deserves a more thorough treatment than it received in The End of Science. I responded to this objection by writing a book that focused on "mind-science"(Horgan, 1999). The Undiscovered Mind considered not only the debate over consciousness, which was the primary focus of The End of Science; it also reviewed the record of fields such as clinical psychology, psychiatry, behavioral genetics, evolutionary psychology, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience. I contended that there has been little progress in understanding the mind, replicating its properties, or treating its disorders—especially compared with the extravagant claims made by proponents of certain approaches. In this article, I summarize some of my book's main points.