In defense of naturalism

History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism” that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical commitment is naturalistic, but is both a posteriori and provisional, arising from the fact that for more than 400 years no proposed theistic explanation has been shown capable of meeting the procedural requirement. I argue that there is nothing to prevent religious thinkers from seeking to overturn this metaphysically naturalistic stance. But in order to do so they would need to show that their proposed theistic explanations are the best available explanations of a range of phenomena. Until this has been done, the metaphysical naturalism of history and the sciences remains defensible.     

In defense of nativism

This paper takes a fresh look at the nativism–empiricism debate, presenting and defending a nativist perspective on the mind. Empiricism is often taken to be the default view both in philosophy and in cognitive science. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there should be no presumption in favor of empiricism (or nativism), but that the existing evidence suggests that nativism is the most promising framework for the scientific study of the mind. Our case on behalf of nativism has four parts. (1) We characterize nativism’s core commitments relative to the contemporary debate between empiricists and nativists, (2) we present the positive case for nativism in terms of two central nativist arguments (the poverty of the stimulus argument and the argument from animals), (3) we respond to a number of influential objections to nativist theories, and (4) we explain the nativist approach to the conceptual system.     

In defense of representation

The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis suggests that all theorists accept the idea that cognitive processing involves internal information-carrying states that mediate cognitive processing. These mediating states are a superordinate category of representations. We discuss five properties that can be added to mediating states and examine their importance in various cognitive models. Finally, three methodological lessons are drawn from our analysis and discussion.     

In defense of caring

I hope to persuade Hilde L. Nelson that she is wrong about an ethics of caring....In conclusion, caring is an "ethics of attention," but it includes more than attention. 'Carers' must respond as well as attend. Much more needs to be done in describing caring responses, especially when social problems are involved. I agree with Nelson that an ethics or a moral orientation must deal with social problems. I also agree that, to date, most of us working on caring have written little on the subject. However, I do not agree that an ethics of caring is unable to address social problems. We have to work at showing that it can.     

In defense of reliabilism

Objections to reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have looked insuperable. Reliability is a property of the process of belief formation. But the generality problem apparently makes the specification of any such process ambiguous. The externalism of reliability theories clashes with strongly internalist intuitions. The reliability property does not appear closed under truth-preserving inference, whereas closure principles have strong intuitive appeal. And epistemic paradoxes, like the preface and the lottery, seem unavoidable if knowledge or justification depends on the frequency with which a process generates true beliefs. The present theory has the conceptual resources to meet these challenges. It requires that a justificatory belief-formation process be intentionally applied. It distinguishes the justification of beliefs from that of the believer. And it avoids a frequency interpretation of reliability by introducing a notion of the normalcy of conditions under which processes are intentionally used.     

Adolescent-specific patterns of behavior and neural activity during social reinforcement learning

Humans are sophisticated social beings. Social cues from others are exceptionally salient, particularly during adolescence. Understanding how adolescents interpret and learn from variable social signals can provide insight into the observed shift in social sensitivity during this period. The present study tested 120 participants between the ages of 8 and 25 years on a social reinforcement learning task where the probability of receiving positive social feedback was parametrically manipulated. Seventy-eight of these participants completed the task during fMRI scanning. Modeling trial-by-trial learning, children and adults showed higher positive learning rates than did adolescents, suggesting that adolescents demonstrated less differentiation in their reaction times for peers who provided more positive feedback. Forming expectations about receiving positive social reinforcement correlated with neural activity within the medial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum across age. Adolescents, unlike children and adults, showed greater insular activity during positive prediction error learning and increased activity in the supplementary motor cortex and the putamen when receiving positive social feedback regardless of the expected outcome, suggesting that peer approval may motivate adolescents toward action. While different amounts of positive social reinforcement enhanced learning in children and adults, all positive social reinforcement equally motivated adolescents. Together, these findings indicate that sensitivity to peer approval during adolescence goes beyond simple reinforcement theory accounts and suggest possible explanations for how peers may motivate adolescent behavior.     

In defense of psychological laws

It is argued that psychological explanations involve psychological generalizations that exhibit the same features as laws of physics. On the basis of the “systematic theory of lawhood”, characteristic features of laws of nature are elaborated. Investigating some examples of explanations taken from cognitive psychology shows that these features can also be identified in psychological generalizations. Particular attention is devoted to the notion of “ccteris‐paribus laws”. It is argued that laws of psychology are indeed ceteris‐paribus laws. However, this feature does not distinguish them from the laws of physics, because such laws are found in physics as well. Moreover, the laws invoked in psychological explanations are genuine laws of psychology; they are not laws of other disciplines that are brought to bear on psychological problems. The conclusion is that if there are laws of physics then laws of psychology exist as well.