Marco Conci interviews Stefano Bolognini

Abstract

This paper suggests that the understanding of intersubjectivity, which refers to “the dynamic interplay between the analyst's and the patient's subjective experiences in the clinical situation”, is crucial for psychoanalytic work. The analyst's inner experiences, from the first moment that he or she thinks about or meets the patient, belong to an intersubjective situation. Not only are these experiences a valuable channel through which the inner experiences of the patient can be understood, but—as Theodore Jacobs puts it—they are often complementary to that which comes from the patient. The author tries to illustrate the above through the study of the analytic process in the psychoanalytic therapy of a severely disturbed patient. This therapy from its very early phase led to the reawakening of some of the analyst's old conflicts. The patient's difficulties in tolerating the limits of the analytic setting and using free association are discussed, as are his enactments. The analyst's close observation of the interaction between her and the patient, the permanent engagement with her countertransference, and the use of her inner experiences with the patient helped her to contain the enactments, defined the nature of her interventions, and contributed to the analytic process.     

Thought as action: inner speech, self-monitoring, and auditory verbal hallucinations

Passivity experiences in schizophrenia are thought to be due to a failure in a neurocognitive action self-monitoring system (NASS). Drawing on the assumption that inner speech is a form of action, a recent model of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) has proposed that AVHs can be explained by a failure in the NASS. In this article, we offer an alternative application of the NASS to AVHs, with separate mechanisms creating the emotion of self-as-agent and other-as-agent. We defend the assumption that inner speech can be considered as a form of action, and show how a number of previous criticisms of applying the NASS to AVHs can be refuted. This is achieved in part through taking a Vygotskian developmental perspective on inner speech. It is suggested that more research into the nature and development of inner speech is needed to further our understanding of AVHs.     

The time of trauma: Husserl's phenomenology and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

The phenomenology of inner temporalizing developed by Edmund Husserl provides a helpful framework for understanding a type of experiencing that can be part of the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). My paper extrapolates hints from Husserl's work in order to describe those memories — flashbacks — that come so strongly to consciousness as to overtake the experiencer. Husserl's work offers several clues: his view of inner temporalization by which conscious experiences flow in both a serial and a nonserial manner; a characterization of process memory as distinct from representational memory; and the notion of telos, which takes human subjectivity as intrinsically changeable, for example, by means of a retroactive cancellation that would allow the PTSD experiencer to re-process the original meaning of the traumatic experience into a meaning that fits the current situation and thus allows a recovery.     

Wittgenstein Studies and Contemporary Pyrrhonism

Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s statement ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ and consequences of rule-following paradox is the topic of this article. The revision of Wittgensteinian approach to the relations between speech and mind, and approaches to the speech by Vygotsky and Austin allow approving the disagreement with Wittgenstein and exhibit the cases when is necessary ‘to break silence and speak’. Argument is based on the hermeneutical approach to the skeptical image of Wittgenstein studies that disclose the meaning of hypothetic relevance between performative utterances and impulses generated by inner speech. Wittgenstein’s ideas are demonstrated as the contemporary version of a Pyrrhonism. Classical skepticism intensifies procedures for justification of philosophical knowledge, because philosophy tries to disprove skeptical claims. Wittgenstein studies play approximately the same role. Interpretation of the proposition ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ in a view of performative utterance allow coordinating the inner philosophical speech made by Wittgenstein, and the speech made by his commentators and critics.     

On the metapsychology of schizophrenia.

The author's point of departure is schizophrenic fragmentation, which has been considered here from a drive-economic and structural point of view, starting from Freud's prestructural conceptions and Jacobson's metapsychological formulations. The view is arrived at in the essay that the central psychological mechanism in the schizophrenic disorder is a drive-energetic decathexis of the basic psychic tissue, or the primal representative matrix, which has far-reaching consequences within the entire psychic organization. The basic psychic tissue corresponds to that area of inner reality which, according to Freud, remains beyond the primal repression and is made up of the first representations of the instinctual drive. The entire psychic organization has then been woven out of this representational tissue, binding drive energies in a preliminary way. According to the view put forward here, schizophrenic fragmentation does not primarily represent a disintegration of the psychic macrostructures or a consequence of the ego's resorting to primitive defences but is a consequence of a drive-energetic crisis at the level of the basic psychic tissue. The disorder manifests itself as the disappearance of inner liveliness and as a diffuse dissociation of the entire representional world, which I have characterized as the disappearance of psychic transparence. Its influences naturally also extend to the realm of the more advanced psychic functions and macrostructures and will invalidate in a radical way the person's drive economy. Reference is made in the article to the possibility that the central task of the primal representative matrix may be the creation of lively connexions and a striving for synthesis throughout the entire psychic organization and that the schizophrenic disorder may be intimately related to the decathexis of this function.     

Reading minds: Mentalization,irony and literary engagement

The concept of ‘mentalization’ has recently provided a fertile resource for thinking about various issues in psychoanalysis, including attachment, children’s play, personality disorders and the work of interpretation within the analytic setting. Mentalization also provides fruitful ways of thinking about how we read. This paper will suggest that book reading is akin to mind reading: engaging with certain literary texts is akin to understanding the minds of others from the subjective perspective required by mentalization. This way of thinking about literature provides a useful way of understanding its value. The paper will focus specifically on the uses of irony and free indirect speech in Jane Austen’s novel Persuasion. Austen’s use of literary techniques provides a way of understanding the inner lives of her characters via the ironic voice of the implied author, and requires the reader to engage in the kinds of understanding and insight required for mentalization.     

Semiotic transformations in psychoanalysis with infants and adults

The author addresses issues that emerge when we compare psychoanalytic experiences with adults and with infants. Two analyses-one with a 35 year-old woman and one with a 2 week-old boy and his mother-illustrate that infant psychoanalytic experiences help us understand and handle adult transference. However, we cannot extrapolate infant experiences to adult work. Truly, witnessing the baby's communication widens our sensitivity to non-verbal layers of the adult's communication. Infant work also offers a direct encounter with the container and the contained personified by a mother with her baby. But we need to conceptualize carefully the links between clinical experiences with babies and adults. When we call an adult transference pattern 'infantile', we imply that primeval experience has been transformed into present behaviour. However, if we view the analytical situation as one in which infantile invariants have transformed into adult symptoms, we face the impossible task of indicating the roots of the present symptoms. The author rather suggests that what is transformed is not an invariant infantile essence but signs denoting the patient's inner reality. He proposes we define transformation as a semiotic process instead of building it on an essentialist grounding. If we view the analytic situation as a map of signs that we translate during our psychoanalytic work, we can proceed into defining containment as a semiotic process. This idea will be linked with a conceptualization of the mother-infant relation in semiotic terms.     

The Relational–Linguistic Spiral: A Model of Language for Theology

This article attempts to sketch out a view of language as a relational–linguistic spiral by discussing some implications of the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein for language in general. Language is cast as a spiral which revolves around a center of 'human relationality' that anchors all our speech and concepts but which revolves in an ever–widening way into an arena of meaning we call language. Language creates linguistic space for experience and invites one into these new experiences. The borders of our language are thus not the absolute limits of our world but the admitted limits of our experience. Because the enterprise of language is inherently open, there must be a space for theological language and for the possibility at least of the kind of experiences described therein. Tracing the relational 'vectors' involved in language can also provide a platform for theological and even inter–religious dialogue.     

Power in methods: language to infants in structured and naturalistic contexts

Methods can powerfully affect conclusions about infant experiences and learning. Data from naturalistic observations may paint a very different picture of learning and development from those based on structured tasks, as illustrated in studies of infant walking, object permanence, intention understanding, and so forth. Using language as a model system, we compared the speech of 40 mothers to their 13‐month‐old infants during structured play and naturalistic home routines. The contrasting methods yielded unique portrayals of infant language experiences, while simultaneously underscoring cross‐situational correspondence at an individual level. Infants experienced substantially more total words and different words per minute during structured play than they did during naturalistic routines. Language input during structured play was consistently dense from minute to minute, whereas language during naturalistic routines showed striking fluctuations interspersed with silence. Despite these differences, infants' language experiences during structured play mirrored the peak language interactions infants experienced during naturalistic routines, and correlations between language inputs in the two conditions were strong. The implications of developmental methods for documenting the nature of experiences and individual differences are discussed.     

What do bilingual infants actually hear? Evaluating measures of language input to bilingual‐learning 10‐month‐olds

Examining how bilingual infants experience their dual language input is important for understanding bilingual language acquisition. To assess these language experiences, researchers typically conduct language interviews with caregivers. However, little is known about the reliability of these parent reports in describing how bilingual children actually experience dual language input. Here, we explored the quantitative nature of dual language input to bilingual infants. Furthermore, we described some of the heterogeneity of bilingual exposure in a sample of French–English bilingual families. Participants were 21 families with a 10‐month‐old infant residing in Montréal, Canada. First, we conducted language interviews with the caregivers. Then, each family completed three full‐day recordings at home using the Language Environment Analysis recording system. Results showed that children’s proportion exposure to each language was consistent across the two measurement approaches, indicating that parent reports are reliable for assessing a bilingual child’s language experiences. Further exploratory analyses revealed three unique findings: (a) there can be considerable variability in the absolute amount of input among infants hearing the same proportion of input, (b) infants can hear different proportions of language input when considering infant‐directed versus overheard speech, (c) proportion of language input can vary by day, depending on who is caring for the infant. We conclude that collecting naturalistic recordings is complementary to parent‐report measures for assessing infant’s language experiences and for establishing bilingual profiles.     

Rhetoric and the Unconscious

This paper develops the ideas of rhetorical psychology by applying them to some basic Freudian concepts. In so doing, the paper considers whether there might be a Dialogic Unconscious. So far rhetorical psychology has tended to concentrate upon conscious thought rather than on the unconscious. It has suggested that thinking is modelled on argument and dialogue, and that rhetoric provides the means of opening up matters for thought and discussion. However, rhetoric may also provide the means for closing down topics and, thereby, provide the means of repression. It will be suggested that language is not merely expressive but it is also repressive. Moreover, the repressive aspects of language are built into the very practices of dialogue. In learning language, we learn the codes for socially appropriate ways of speaking. These must be acquired as habits, so that we learn to repress routinely the desire to transgress the codes of appropriate speech. Thus, the routine use of language provides the resources for repression. If language is repressive, then this applies equally to the language of psycho-analysis itself. Freud's famous case histories, such as that of Dora, can be re-examined, in order to see what Freud's own theory of repression was itself repressing.     

Motor movement matters: The flexible abstractness of inner speech

Inner speech is typically characterized as either the activation of abstract linguistic representations or a detailed articulatory simulation that lacks only the production of sound. We present a study of the speech errors that occur during the inner recitation of tongue-twister-like phrases. Two forms of inner speech were tested: inner speech without articulatory movements and articulated (mouthed) inner speech. Although mouthing one’s inner speech could reasonably be assumed to require more articulatory planning, prominent theories assume that such planning should not affect the experience of inner speech and, consequently, the errors that are “heard” during its production. The errors occurring in articulated inner speech exhibited the phonemic similarity effect and the lexical bias effect—two speech-error phenomena that, in overt speech, have been localized to an articulatory-feature-processing level and a lexical—phonological level, respectively. In contrast, errors in unarticulated inner speech did not exhibit the phonemic similarity effect—just the lexical bias effect. The results are interpreted as support for a flexible abstraction account of inner speech. This conclusion has ramifications for the embodiment of language and speech and for the theories of speech production.     

Detection of errors during speech production: a review of speech monitoring models

In this paper three theories of speech monitoring are evaluated. The perception-based approach proposes that the same mechanism employed in understanding other-produced language, the speech comprehension system, is also used to monitor one's own speech production. A conceptual, an inner, and an auditory loop convey information to a central, conscious monitor which scrutinizes the adequacy of the ongoing speech flow. In this model, only the end-products in the speech production sequences, the preverbal (propositional) message, the phonetic plan, and the auditory results, are verified. The production-based account assumes multiple local, autonomous monitoring devices, which can look inside formulation components. Moreover, these devices might be tuned to various signals from the actual speech motor execution, e.g. efferent, tactile, and proprioceptive feedback. Finally, node structure theory views error detection as a natural outflow of the activation patterns in the node system for speech production. Errors result in prolonged activation of uncommitted nodes, which in turn may incite error awareness. The approaches differ on the points of consciousness, volition and control, the number of monitoring channels, and their speed, flexibility, and capacity, and whether they can account for concurrent language comprehension disorders. From the empirical evidence presently available, it is argued for a central perception-based monitor, potentially augmented with a few automatic, production-based error detection devices.     

An Independent Theory of Clinical Technique

The history of Independent analysis in the British Psychoanalytical Society is reviewed. The Independent Tradition, as an approach to psychoanalysis, is distinguished from the organisational grouping in the British Society that is the Independent Group. The Independent Tradition emphasises what differentiates human beings rather than how they exemplify general principles. This derives from Freud through Ferenczi. Ferenczi's stress on the quality of the patient's experience, on the need for analysts to be aware of the effect on themselves of the analytic process, and on the need for restraint in interpretation are all characteristically Independent aspects of analytic technique. Later Independent thinkers have developed these themes further. Especially important is Enid Balint's idea that theory mediates the analyst's creative imagination. The analytic setting infuses ordinary human interaction with psychoanalytic awareness, and another function of theory is to imbue with psychoanalytic understanding the use of everyday language. Independent clinical technique is primarily a way of listening. Regression is accepted, and free association valued as being in itself a vehicle of psychic growth. A central idea is that the analyst is an analytic object to be made use of by the patient. Several clinical examples illustrate the functioning in practice of these concepts.     

Why do Qualia and the Mind Seem Nonphysical?

In this article, I discuss several of the factors that jeopardize our understanding of the nature of qualitative experiences and the mind. I incorporate the view from neuroscience to clarify the naïve view from the first person perspective. I suggest that the most misleading factor in the understanding the nature of the mind and conscious processes is the transparency of experiences and the imperceptibility of the neurobiological processes that realize them. Transparency reflects the biological advantages provided to organisms by avoiding the proliferation of superfluous sensing and the regress implied in sensing the sensors and analyzers ad infinitum. The downside of simplicity and the price for biological efficiency is that through introspection, we cannot perceive the inner workings of the brain. Thus, the view from the first person perspective creates the pervasive illusion that the mind is nonphysical. Sensing the environment requires encoding information into neural surrogates, which I conceive as contingent processes that when incorporated into conscious processes become qualitative experiences. They are cognitive shortcuts with a variable degree of isomorphism, which partially falsify reality. Thus, the what-it-is-like is not the what-it-is. The first person perspective seemings should be corrected by the objective approach provided by neuroscience. To compensate for the contingency of experiences, organisms learn to rely on the aboutness of associated phenomenal concepts. Experiences have high biological value, because even in the absence of language, they allow organisms to make intelligent choices. Qualia are also necessary to ground words and language, which are essential to develop higher forms of cognition.     

Linking mind,body and language: free association revisited

Psychoanalysis differs from other theories because of the great significance it attributes to a man's unconscious. Psychoanalysis differs fundamentally from other therapeutic methods in its use of free association and the significance and power it gives to this method when investigating unconscious phenomena. The present article begins with a brief review of the history of free association and its use as a method. After that, I discuss the relationship between free association and memory, neuropsychoanalysis and semiotics. Free association is linked with implicit memory and seen as a way of remembering; unconscious experiences are given a verbal form with the help of free association. The psychoanalytical setting and transference together constitute a psychic space, in which it becomes possible for the patient to get into touch with his or her bodily, psychic and verbal experiences and material simultaneously. The author sees free association specifically as a form of mental processing which is typical to psychoanalysis; it is a core process where the experiences of mind, body and language and their expressions link together. Free association is simultaneously the result of a memory activity and creative activity and, above all, a combination or synthesis of these two processes.     

Private and inner speech and the regulation of social speech communication

To further investigate the possible regulatory role of private and inner speech in the context of referential social speech communications, a set of clear and systematically applied measures is needed. This study addresses this need by introducing a rigorous method for identifying private speech and certain sharply defined instances of inaudible inner speech. Using this classification system, longitudinal data were gathered from 10 pairs of children performing a referential communication task at 4.5, 6.5, and 8.5 years of age. Results demonstrated children's substantial production of private and inner speech in this communicative situation, with speech forms varying in amount and type as a function of age, communicative role (speaker or listener), and the complexity of the material to be communicated. It is suggested that private and inner speech embedded in discourse may serve a regulatory role in social speech communication.     

Psychic reality in the psychoanalytic process.

The case is made for regarding psychic reality as synonymous with subjective (conscious) experience, which is inherently open to, but not reducible to, unconscious determinants. Both analyst and analysand engage in the analytic relation and interaction from the perspective of their respective psychic realities. Thus, components of the analytic relation--transference/countertransference, alliance, and real relation--are forms of psychic reality. The tensions of subjectivity and objectivity are discussed in relation to the analytic situation, especially with regard to whether the patient's or the analyst's psychic reality is to be given priority or preference. The same reality, situation, or relationship can be viewed from different perspectives and subjected to varying interpretations without any one being exclusively true or false-each may be partially true and/or partially false. The patient's recounting of his history is a part of the patient's psychic reality that intersects with a necessarily divergent account constructed by the analyst. The ensuing dialogue seeks a form of real coherence that is mutually realistic and makes realistic sense for both parties. Reliance on subjective psychic reality becomes a possible, but precarious and potentially misleading, basis for analytic understanding without other observational (verbal and behavioral) or objective data.     

The Analytic Encounter,a Scene of Clashing Cultures

Three wars (WWII, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War) as well as the experience of immigration impacted on the analytic situation as described in this paper. A first generation immigrant patient, who was also a Vietnam veteran, and the immigrant analyst came together in harmony and in discord, around the issues of their common experiences of war and being an immigrant. The onset of the Iraq war brought these issues into a sharp focus in the mid-phase of an on-going analysis. The paper explores how countertransferential experiences of war and immigration were used to further analytic work. It is often assumed that analogous external experiences can give rise to greater empathic understanding on the part of the analyst. In this paper,I hope to demonstrate that there are both advantages and serious pitfalls in experiential overlaps between the cultural experiences of the analyst and patient.