The evolutionary significance of habituation and sensitization across phylogeny: A behavioral homeostasis model

The phenomenon of habituation may be interpreted as a process that has evolved for filtering out iterative stimuli of little present relevance. That habituation is seen in aneural as well as neural organisms throughout phylogeny with remarkably similar characteristics suggests that its role is an important one in animal survival. If habituation is to be viewed as a process to filter out iterative stimuli that have no significant consequences, then how is sensitization to be viewed? One way of viewing these two behavioral changes, i.e. habituation and sensitization, is that they are homeostatic processes which optimize an organism’s likelihood of detecting and assessing the significance of a stimulus in a new iterative series or a change in it. If one views the level of initial responsiveness to a new stimulus as a function of an organism’s threshold just prior to stimulus occurrence, then “high responders” (i.e. those who initially react more strongly) are assumed to have a lower threshold for detecting and assessing the significance of this stimulus than are the “low responders” (i.e. those who initially react more weakly). Thus, high-responders would initially receive more sensory input and progressively decrease their responsiveness to a non-threatening stimulus (habituation). Likewise, initial low-responders would receive less sensory input followed by a decreased threshold and an increased response to the next stimulus occurrence (sensitization). The level of responsiveness achieved in both habituaters and sensitizers, as an asymptote is approached, is a balance between being too sensitive to an unimportant stimulus (and possibly missing other significant stimuli) and being too insensitive, and missing a change in the relevance of the present stimulus. These response changes can be taken as indices of the organism’s mechanisms for achieving an appropriate threshold level to an iterative stimulus in order to accurately assess its present significance and then eventually to asymptote at an optimal stable response level. This approach toward an asymptote is a behavioral homeostatic process that reflects the accumulated significance of the iterative stimulus at each occurrence. The purpose of adding “behavioral” to the term “homeostasis” is to extend the usual meaning of the concept from primarily internal processes to also include (a) iterative external stimulation, (b) the organism’s initial threshold to the initial stimulus as well as (c) the behavior which results from it. Since we are discussing organisms that range from intact, single-celled protozoa to intact mammals, as well as surgically simplified preparations, the termsstimulus, response andbehavior will be used broadly. While other investigators have focused on specific cellular mechanisms underlying habituation and sensitization in a given organism, this paper focuses on the adaptive significance of these two behavioral processes viewed across phylogeny.     

On strong anticipation

We examine Dubois’s [Dubois, D., 2003. Mathematical foundations of discrete and functional systems with strong and weak anticipations. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2684, 110–132.] distinction between weak anticipation and strong anticipation. Anticipation is weak if it arises from a model of the system via internal simulations. Anticipation is strong if it arises from the system itself via lawful regularities embedded in the system’s ordinary mode of functioning. The assumption of weak anticipation dominates cognitive science and neuroscience and in particular the study of perception and action. The assumption of strong anticipation, however, seems to be required by anticipation’s ubiquity. It is, for example, characteristic of homeostatic processes at the level of the organism, organs, and cells. We develop the formal distinction between strong and weak anticipation by elaboration of anticipating synchronization, a phenomenon arising from time delays in appropriately coupled dynamical systems. The elaboration is conducted in respect to (a) strictly physical systems, (b) the defining features of circadian rhythms, often viewed as paradigmatic of biological behavior based in internal models, (c) Pavlovian learning, and (d) forward models in motor control. We identify the common thread of strongly anticipatory systems and argue for its significance in furthering understanding of notions such as “internal”, “model” and “prediction”.     

“Uterus Loquitur”: Trauma and the Human Organism in Ferenczi’s “Physiology of Pleasure”

The paper reconstructs Ferenczi’s unique and largely neglected physiology of pleasure. It highlights the prominent place of the libido in Ferenczi’s writings, the transition from the physiology of use to the physiology of pleasure and the role of trauma in Ferenczi’s work with a special emphasis on the beauty and plasticity of the body, the relations between its organs as well as the adaptive potential, the Orphic powers, and the natural vigor of the human organism. Ferenczi’s theoretical assumptions and his powerful images of the human organism are examined in the light of Goethe’s, Schopenhauer’s, and Nietzsche’s philosophies.     

Mental,behavioural and physiological nonlocal correlations within the Generalized Quantum Theory framework

Generalized Quantum Theory (GQT) seeks to explain and predict quantum-like phenomena in areas usually outside the scope of quantum physics, such as biology and psychology. It draws on fundamental theories and uses the algebraic formalism of quantum theory that is used in the study of observable physical matter such as photons, electrons, etc. In contrast to quantum theory proper, GQT is a very generalized form that does not allow for the full application of formalism. For instance neither a commutator, such as Planck’s constant, nor any additive operations are defined, which precludes the usage of a full Hilbert-space formalism. But it is a formalized phenomenological theory that is applicable whenever the core element of a quantum theory needs to be captured, namely in the presence of incompatible or non-commuting operations. As a consequence, it also predicts nonlocal, generalized entanglement correlations in systems other than proper quantum systems. In this paper we summarize the specific scientific evidence relating to the quantum-like mental, behavioral and physiological nonlocal correlations. Such non-local, generalized entanglement correlations are expected, both in space and time, between subsystems of a larger system, whenever observables pertaining to the global system are incompatible or complementary to observables pertaining to subsystems, as predicted by GQT. The result is a coherent explanation of a significant amount of controversial and seemingly weird occurrences that cannot be explained by classical physical laws. This review also offers a new perspective of the human mind’s potential.     

Indeterminacy and consciousness in the creative process: What quantum physics has to offer

The quantum view of creativity, based on Goswami's idealistic interpretation of quantum physics, is presented. It provides a resolution for two controversial areas of creativity theory and research: the “aha”; experience and the role of consciousness. According to the quantum model, the mind‐brain consists of classical and quantum functions and structures. The source for creative ideation lies in the quantum realm in the form of unlearned coherent superpositions or states of simultaneous multiple possibilities. While access of coherent superpositions (CohS) are susceptible to interference from classical domain functions, such as attention, the CohS itself is experienced as an altered state, facilitating creative ideation. The relationships among attention, self‐awareness, context, ambiguity, uncertainty, and conscious and unconscious perception in creative ideation are proposed to be experienced discontinuously due to an indeterminate element inherent in nature. Theoretical and empirical investigation of the above propositions is possible through quantum physics.     

Drawing the boundary between subject and object: Comments on the mind-brain problem

Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists (among others) still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes ‘objectivity’, especially in identifying it with what a ‘machine’ can do. I approach the problem in the light of two cognate circumstances: (a) the ‘measurement problem’ in quantum physics, and (b) the objectivity of standard mathematics, even though most of it is beyond the reach of ‘machines’. I argue that the only resolution to such problems is in the recognition that closed loops of causation are ‘objective’; i.e. legitimate objects of scientific scrutiny. These are explicitly forbidden in any machine or mechanism. A material system which contains such loops is called ‘complex’. Such complex systems thus must possess nonsimulable models; i.e. models which contain impredicativities or ‘self-references’ which cannot be removed, or faithfully mapped into a single coherent syntactic time-frame. I consider a few of the consequences of the above, in the context of thus redrawing the boundary between subject and object.     

Self across time: the diachronic unity of bodily existence

The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for someone’s persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person’s entire past in his present being and potentiality.     

Time's Arrow and Irreversibility in Time‐Asymmetric Quantum Mechanics

The aim of this paper is to analyze time‐asymmetric quantum mechanics with respect to the problems of irreversibility and of time’s arrow. We begin with arguing that both problems are conceptually different. Then, we show that, contrary to a common opinion, the theory’s ability to describe irreversible quantum processes is not a consequence of the semigroup evolution laws expressing the non‐time‐reversal invariance of the theory. Finally, we argue that time‐asymmetric quantum mechanics, either in Prigogine’s version or in Bohm’s version, does not solve the problem of the arrow of time because it does not supply a substantial and theoretically founded criterion for distinguishing between the two directions of time.     

Examining Positive and Negative Affect as Outcomes and Moderators of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for Social Anxiety Disorder

Traditional cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for anxiety disorders has been designed to target reductions in negative affect (NA) associated with defense-related processes. However, a subset of anxiety disorders, including social anxiety disorder (SAD), are also characterized by low positive affect (PA) resulting from separate deficits in appetitive-related processes. In contrast to CBT, “third-wave” approaches, such as acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), align more consistently with motivational processes and, as a result, PA. However, the differential effect of CBT and ACT on PA and NA has yet to be investigated. Using secondary data from a randomized controlled trial, the present study sought to compare CBT’s (n = 45) and ACT’s (n = 35) effect on PA and NA in SAD. Findings were compared to a wait-list (WL) control condition (n = 31), as well as normative data from a general adult sample. Baseline PA and NA were also examined as moderators and predictors of theory-relevant treatment outcomes. NA decreased significantly in both CBT and ACT from pre to posttreatment. Although ACT outperformed WL in reducing NA, this effect was not observed for CBT. PA increased significantly in both CBT and ACT from pre to posttreatment, with neither ACT nor CBT outperforming WL in increasing PA. Neither PA nor NA were found to moderate theoretically relevant treatment outcomes. Findings suggest that ACT and CBT share common treatment mechanisms, making them more similar than distinct. Further efforts should be focused on optimizing CBT’s and ACT’s influence on threat and reward learning, and elucidating common processes of change.     

The world,the flesh and the argument from design

In the the passage just quoted from theDialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume developed a thought-experiment that contravened his better-known views about “chance” expressed in hisTreatise and firstEnquiry. For among other consequences of the ‘eternal-recurrence’ hypothesis Philo proposes in this passage, it may turn out that what the vulgar call cause is nothing but a secret and concealed chance. (In this sentence, I have simply reversed “cause” and “chance” in a well-known passage fromHume's Treatise, p. 130). In the first eight sections of this essay, I develop one topological and model-theoretic analogue of Hume's thought-experiment, in which ‘most’ (‘A-generic’) modelsM of a ‘scientific’ theoryU are both ‘eternally recurrent’ and topologically random (in a sense which will be made precise), even though they are ‘inductively’ defined, via a step-by-step (‘empirical’?) procedure that Hume might have been inclined to endorse. The last aspect of this model-theoretic thought-experiment also serves to distinguish it from simpler measure-theoretic prototypes that are known to follow from Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law (cf. the Introduction, 5.2, 6.1 and 6.7 below). In the last three sections, I will argue more informally

1. that the metamathematical thought-experiments just mentioned do have a genuine metaphysical relevance, and that this relevance is predominantly skeptical in its implications;
2. that such ‘nonstandard’ instances of semantic underdetermination and ‘pathology’ seem to be the metatheoretic rule rather than the exception; and therefore,
3. that metamathematical and metatheoretic ‘malign-genius’ arguments are quite coherent, contrary (e.g.) to assertions such as that of Putnam (1980), pp. 7–8.

In the essay's conclusion, finally, I assimilate (2) and (3) to the familiar datum that ‘simplicity’, rather than ‘pathology’, has more often than not turned out to be an anomalous ‘special case’ in the historical development of scientific and mathematical ontology.     

Forms of Quantum Nonseparability and Related Philosophical Consequences

Standard quantum mechanics unquestionably violates the separability principle that classical physics (be it point-like analytic, statistical, or field-theoretic) accustomed us to consider as valid. In this paper, quantum nonseparability is viewed as a consequence of the Hilbert-space quantum mechanical formalism, avoiding thus any direct recourse to the ramifications of Kochen-Specker’s argument or Bell’s inequality. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to physical systems – unit state vectors versus non-idempotent density operators – we distinguish between strong/relational and weak/deconstructional forms of quantum nonseparability. The origin of the latter is traced down and discussed at length, whereas its relation to the all important concept of potentiality in forming a coherent picture of the puzzling entangled interconnections among spatially separated systems is also considered. Finally, certain philosophical consequences of quantum non-separability concerning the nature of quantum objects, the question of realism in quantum mechanics, and possible limitations in revealing the actual character of physical reality in its entirety are explored.     

Kurt Gödel's Anticipation of the Turing Machine: A Vitalistic Approach

In 1935/1936 Kurt Gödel wrote three notebooks on the foundations of quantum mechanics, which have now been entirely transcribed for the first time. Whereas a lot of the material is rather technical in character, many of Gödel's remarks have a philosophical background and concentrate on Leibnizian monadology as well as on vitalism. Obviously influenced by the vitalistic writings of Hans Driesch and his ‘proofs’ for the existence of an entelechy in every living organism, Gödel briefly develops the idea of a computing machine which closely resembles Turing's groundbreaking conception. After introducing the notebooks on quantum mechanics, this article describes Gödel's vitalistic Weltbild and the ideas leading to the development of his computing machine. It investigates a notion of lawlike sequence which closely resembles Turing's concept of a computable number and which Gödel himself calls ‘problematic’, and compares it to the opposed concept of randomness, drawing upon the notion of program-size complexity. Finally, Gödel's machine is implemented in a dialect of the Lisp programing language.     

Suggested reading

The problem of mystical/meditational experience is discussed from the point of view of the neural network theory, considering also the approach to (sub) quantum physics by Bohm and Hiley. It has been argued that the appearance of global uniform neural patterns, i.e. those with coherent activities of constitutive neurons, function as the basis of mystical unity. Various processes occurring as the result of the collective dynamics of a complex neural system are compared and correlated with mystical phenomenology on the one hand, and with quantum processes or neurophysiological effects on the other. Awareness may be a quantum phenomenon, so some speculations about neural‐quantum interactions and analogies are presented. The contact with the symmetric subquantum “sea”, in which the brain is embedded, may provide the background for the most radical experiences. Special attention is devoted to implicit versus explicit mental and transcendental processes, and to their multi‐level parallelism. Evolution towards transcendental consciousness brings an alternative lifestyle for the future.     

Coherent Themes: Individuals’ Relationships with God,Their Early Childhood Experiences,Their Bonds with Significant Others,and Their Relational Delusions During Psychotic Episodes All Have Similar Holistic,Existential, and Relational Themes

An adult seems to articulate surprisingly similar meaning themes and similar processes about relationships in several widely disparate domains of behavior, domains of both non-pathological and pathological types. Whether the person is consciously describing early relationships with parental figures, unconsciously acting them out in current relationships, experiencing relationships with God or the Transcendent, or acting on the basis of relational delusions during psychotic episodes, his or his experienced relational reality seems to be filtered through a single, coherent, personally unique spiritual, existential, and epistemological relational lens. Conflicts may involve other relational meanings, but may be conflicts because of the existence of that dominant lens. Two parts of that dominant lens system, specifically the part relating the person’s concept of God to the other parts of the system and the part relating the specifics of psychotic breaks and spiritual emergence to other parts of the system, are seldom discussed. Both understanding the person’s dominant relational lens and the implications of that person’s using the lens to see reality, and sharing that knowledge with the individual (if he or he has stabilized to some degree) can help the troubled or disoriented individual. That person can gradually give a more adaptive meaning to consistent distortions in the many areas of meaning and behavior attached to relationships, and even to very skewed behavior such as hallucinations and delusions during psychotic breaks. Distortions during experiences of spiritual emergence also can be made clearer to the disturbed client if the therapist has a better understanding of the person’s overall coherent relational meaning system and its implications, and can translate the language of that system into spiritually transformative terms. A case is summarized and discussed as an example of these ideas. Then, two theories are described. A useful theory of human-felt connection and a cognitive developmental theory of Postformal Complex Thought have been developed by the author and described in earlier publications. These two theories help make sense of the multiple but coherent themes, cognitive dimensions of theme genesis and change, and the nature of the relational lenses used. Suggestions about interventions in the person’s system of coherently distorted relational themes, suggestions based on the two theories, are discussed. The recommendation is made that all therapists become fluent in the languages of, and especially the connections among, all of the relational areas named in the title of this paper that are part of the coherent relational theme.     

Heidegger’s thinking on the “Same” of science and technology

In this article, we trace and elucidate Heidegger’s radical re-thinking on the relation between science and technology from about 1940 until 1976. A range of passages from the Gesamtausgabe seem to articulate a reversal of the primacy of science and technology in claiming that “Science is applied technology.” After delving into Heidegger’s reflection on the being of science and technology and their “coordination,” we show that such a claim is essentially grounded in Heidegger’s idea that “Science and technology are the Same [das Selbe].” In addition, we argue that, although different ontic epochs can be distinguished in the evolvement of science and/or technology, for Heidegger there is only one unique ontological Epoch of modernity that encompasses various ontic epochs. Therefore, the change from an “epoch of objectivity” to an “epoch of orderability [Bestellbarkeit]” cannot be considered to be an ontological shift. Furthermore, it is not right to ascribe to Heidegger the view that the development of quantum physics signals the beginning of a new ontological Epoch.     

Robert Rosen’s Work and Complex Systems Biology

Complex Systems Biology approaches are here considered from the viewpoint of Robert Rosen’s (M,R)-systems, Relational Biology and Quantum theory, as well as from the standpoint of computer modeling. Realizability and Entailment of (M,R)-systems are two key aspects that relate the abstract, mathematical world of organizational structure introduced by Rosen to the various physicochemical structures of complex biological systems. Their importance for understanding biological function and life itself, as well as for designing new strategies for treating diseases such as cancers, is pointed out. The roles played by multiple metastable states in the “continuous uphill flow of Life” supported through internal bioenergetic processes that are coupled to essential inflows are also discussed in relation to dynamic realizations of (M,R)-systems. Furthermore, the roles played by the underlying, many-valued, quantum logics and symbolic computations for ultra-complex biological systems are also briefly discussed.     

Experiencing organisms: from mineness to subject of experience

Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, (1) to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, and that (2) the phenomenological subject of experience, as it is represented in conscious experience, is the organism. While many philosophers agree that the metaphysical subject of experience is the animal, this claim is much less widespread, maybe even counterintuitive. The argument for this claim alludes to the structure of phenomenal consciousness and to recent work in cognitive science concerning the embodied character of consciousness and cognition. To illustrate the problems of current controversies, not only several recent rejections of a subject of experience are critically discussed, but also Hume’s famous rejection of a subject is criticized making use of epistemological aspects from Kant’s philosophy of mind. The final section situates the present discussion in the context of recently popular predictive coding accounts of perception and perceptual experience.