Rough Sets and 3-Valued Logics

In the paper we explore the idea of describing Pawlak’s rough sets using three-valued logic, whereby the value t corresponds to the positive region of a set, the value f — to the negative region, and the undefined value u — to the border of the set. Due to the properties of the above regions in rough set theory, the semantics of the logic is described using a non-deterministic matrix (Nmatrix). With the strong semantics, where only the value t is treated as designated, the above logic is a “common denominator” for Kleene and Łukasiewicz 3-valued logics, which represent its two different “determinizations”. In turn, the weak semantics—where both t and u are treated as designated—represents such a “common denominator” for two major 3-valued paraconsistent logics. We give sound and complete, cut-free sequent calculi for both versions of the logic generated by the rough set Nmatrix. Then we derive from these calculi sequent calculi with the same properties for the various “determinizations” of those two versions of the logic (including Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic). Finally, we show how to embed the four above-mentioned determinizations in extensions of the basic rough set logics obtained by adding to those logics a special two-valued “definedness” or “crispness” operator.     

Existential loneliness and end-of-life care: A systematic review

Patients with a life-threatening illness can be confronted with various types of loneliness, one of which is existential loneliness (EL). Since the experience of EL is extremely disruptive, the issue of EL is relevant for the practice of end-of-life care. Still, the literature on EL has generated little discussion and empirical substantiation and has never been systematically reviewed. In order to systematically review the literature, we (1) identified the existential loneliness literature; (2) established an organising framework for the review; (3) conducted a conceptual analysis of existential loneliness; and (4) discussed its relevance for end-of-life care. We found that the EL concept is profoundly unclear. Distinguishing between three dimensions of EL—as a condition, as an experience, and as a process of inner growth—leads to some conceptual clarification. Analysis of these dimensions on the basis of their respective key notions—everpresent, feeling, defence; death, awareness, difficult communication; and inner growth, giving meaning, authenticity—further clarifies the concept. Although none of the key notions are unambiguous, they may function as a starting point for the development of care strategies on EL at the end of life.     

A Few More Useful 8-valued Logics for Reasoning with Tetralattice <Emphasis Type="Italic">EIGHT</Emphasis><Subscript>4</Subscript>

In their useful logic for a computer network Shramko and Wansing generalize initial values of Belnap’s 4-valued logic to the set 16 to be the power-set of Belnap’s 4. This generalization results in a very specific algebraic structure — the trilattice SIXTEEN ₃ with three orderings: information, truth and falsity. In this paper, a slightly different way of generalization is presented. As a base for further generalization a set 3 is chosen, where initial values are a — incoming data is asserted, d — incoming data is denied, and u — incoming data is neither asserted nor denied, that corresponds to the answer “don’t know”. In so doing, the power-set of 3, that is the set 8 is considered. It turns out that there are not three but four orderings naturally defined on the set 8 that form the tetralattice EIGHT ₄. Besides three ordering relations mentioned above it is an extra uncertainty ordering. Quite predictably, the logics generated by a–order (truth order) and d–order (falsity order) coincide with first-degree entailment. Finally logic with two kinds of operations (a–connectives and d–connectives) and consequence relation defined via a–ordering is considered. An adequate axiomatization for this logic is proposed.     

Transformation of flow in rehabilitation: The role of advanced communication technologies

Authentic rehabilitation requires the active participation of patients and their involvement with opportunities for action and development. Within this framework, in this article we outline the possibility of using two emerging computing and communication technologies—ambient intelligence (AmI) and virtual reality (VR)—for a new breed of rehabilitative and clinical applications based on a strategy defined astransformation of flow. Transformation of flow is a person’s ability to exploit an optimal (flow) experience to identify and use new and unexpected psychological resources as sources of involvement. We identify the feeling ofpresence—the feeling of being in a world that exists outside oneself—as the theoretical link between the technology and rehabilitation. AmI and VR are used to trigger broad empowerment processes induced by a strong sense of presence, leading to greater agency and control over one’s actions and environment.     

Applied orienting response research: Some examples

The development of orienting response (OR) theory has not been accompanied by many applications of the concept—most research still appears to be lab-based and “pure,” rather than “applied.” We present some examples from our own work in which the OR perspective has been applied in a wider context. These cover the exploration of processing deficits in autistic children, aspects of the “repression” of anxiety in elite athletes, and the locus of alcohol effects. Such applications of the OR concept in real-life situations seem a logical and, indeed,necessary step in the evolution of this area of psychophysiology. With a Comment by E. N. Sokolov     

The early Russell on the metaphysics of substance in Leibniz and Bradley

While considerable ink has been spilt over the rejection of idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the end of the 19th Century, relatively little attention has been directed at Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a work written in the early stages of Russell’s philosophical struggles with the metaphysics of Bradley, Bosanquet, and others. Though a sustained investigation of that work would be one of considerable scope, here I reconstruct and develop a two-pronged argument from the Philosophy of Leibniz that Russell fancied—as late as 1907—to be the downfall of the traditional category of substance. Here, I suggest, one can begin to see Russell’s own reasons—arguments largely independent of Moore—for the abandonment of idealism. Leibniz, no less than Bradley, adhered to an antiquated variety of logic: what Russell refers to as the subject-predicate doctrine of logic. Uniting this doctrine with a metaphysical principle of independence—that a substance is prior to and distinct from its properties—Russell is able to demonstrate that neither a substance pluralism nor a substance monism can be consistently maintained. As a result, Russell alleges that the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bradley has been undermined as ultimately incoherent. Russell’s remedy for this incoherence is the postulation of a bundle theory of substance, such that the category of “substance” reduces to the most basic entities—properties.     

Evaluation of unsupervised semantic mapping of natural language with Leximancer concept mapping

The Leximancer system is a relatively new method for transforming lexical co-occurrence information from natural language into semantic patterns in an unsupervised manner. It employs two stages of co-occurrence information extraction—semantic andrelational—using a different algorithm for each stage. The algorithms used are statistical, but they employ nonlinear dynamics and machine learning. This article is an attempt to validate the output of Leximancer, using a set of evaluation criteria taken from content analysis that are appropriate for knowledge discovery tasks.     

On logic of complex algorithms

An algebraic approach to programs called recursive coroutines — due to Janicki [3] — is based on the idea to consider certain complex algorithms as algebraics models of those programs. Complex algorithms are generalizations of pushdown algorithms being algebraic models of recursive procedures (see Mazurkiewicz [4]). LCA — logic of complex algorithms — was formulated in [11]. It formalizes algorithmic properties of a class of deterministic programs called here complex recursive ones or interacting stacks-programs, for which complex algorithms constitute mathematical models. LCA is in a sense an extension of algorithmic logic as initiated by Salwicki [14] and of extended algorithmic logic EAL as formulated and examined by the present author in [8], [9], [10]. In LCA — similarly as in EAL-ω ⁺ -valued logic is applied as a tool to construct control systems (stacks) occurring in corresponding algorithms. The aim of this paper is to give a complete axiomatization. of LCA and to prove a completeness theorem. Logic of complex algorithms was presented at FCT'79 (International Symposium on Fundamentals of Computation Theory, Berlin 1979)     

Knowledge representation,the World Wide Web,and the evolution of logic

It is almost universally acknowledged that first-order logic (FOL), with its clean, well-understood syntax and semantics, allows for the clear expression of philosophical arguments and ideas. Indeed, an argument or philosophical theory rendered in FOL is perhaps the cleanest example there is of “representing philosophy”. A number of prominent syntactic and semantic properties of FOL reflect metaphysical presuppositions that stem from its Fregean origins, particularly the idea of an inviolable divide between concept and object. These presuppositions, taken at face value, reflect a significant metaphysical viewpoint, one that can in fact hinder or prejudice the representation of philosophical ideas and arguments. Philosophers have of course noticed this and have, accordingly, sought to alter or extend traditional FOL in novel ways to reflect a more flexible and egalitarian metaphysical standpoint. The purpose of this paper, however, is to document and discuss how similar “adaptations” to FOL—culminating in a standardized framework known as Common Logic—have evolved out of the more practical and applied encounter of FOL with the problem of representing, sharing, and reasoning upon information on World Wide Web.     

The “Non-cuttable” Space in Between: Context,Boundaries and Their Natural Fluidity

The inherent open-ended nature of socio-cultural phenomena makes it necessary to create new theoretical frameworks that enable us to understand the fluidity of the relations between different parts of the dynamic system. Recent advance in modern biology seems to provide a set of heuristic concepts useful to investigate the complexity and fluidity of the relationship between different contexts. One of these is the Rayner’s logic of natural inclusionality. According whit Rayner’s evolutionary standpoint any living system is constantly in dialogue with its natural neighbourhood on the basis of an interdependent and co-evolutive process involved both the context and the organism. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the model proposed by Rayner in light of contextual perspective in development and educational psychology arguing as the space in between is neither a cuttable and divisible presence into discrete things, nor a mere “nothing” that could be cut off our conceptualization. Rather, it’s a ground (for a figure) in which flow and counter-flow in a fluid interplay amidst a distinct bounded context takes place.The interest for the boundary conditions calls for focusing on what happened on the border. By adopting a simultaneous perspective from two standpoints we are able to constantly focus on both aspects—what happens inside and outside different social settings—we became aware that the “walls” of the context of our living are much more permeable than has been until now theorized by psychological research.     

Aristotle on Universal Quantification: A Study from the Point of View of Game Semantics

In this paper we provide an interpretation of Aristotle's rule for the universal quantifier in Topics Θ 157^a34–37 and 160^b1–6 in terms of Paul Lorenzen's dialogical logic. This is meant as a contribution to the rehabilitation of the role of dialectic within the Organon. After a review of earlier views of Aristotle on quantification, we argue that this rule is related to the dictum de omni in Prior Analytics A 24^b28–29. This would be an indication of the dictum’s origin in the context of dialectical games. One consequence of our approach is a novel explanation of the doctrine of the existential import of the quantifiers in dialectical terms. After a brief survey of Lorenzen's dialogical logic, we offer a set of rules for dialectical games based on previous work by Castelnérac and Marion, to which we add here the rule for the universal quantifier, as interpreted in terms of its counterpart in dialogical logic. We then give textual evidence of the use of that rule in Plato's dialogues, thus showing that Aristotle only made explicit a rule already implicit in practice, while providing a new interpretation of ‘epagogic’ arguments. Finally, we show how a proper understanding of that rule involves further rules concerning counterexamples and delaying tactics, stressing again the parallels with dialogical logic.     

Heidegger in Mexico: Emilio Uranga’s ontological hermeneutics

“Exiled” Spanish philosopher José Gaos was the first to translate, in its entirety, Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. Emilio Uranga, a student of Gaos in Mexico City (exiled since 1938), appropriates Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics in an effort to expose the historico-existential structures making up “lo mexicano,” or Mexicanness. Uranga’s Análisis del ser del mexicano (1952) freely and creatively employs the methods of existential analysis, suggesting that the being-there of the Mexican being is ontologically “insufficient” and “accidental”—modes of being reflected in existential expressions of sentimentality, indifference, and angst particular to this form of life. As a work indebted to Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, Analysis of the Being of the Mexican fails to be faithful to this method. This, however, is the source of its value. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: one, to introduce the Anglo–American philosophical readership to Uranga’s existential phenomenology; and, two, to disentangle the lines of thought that make up Uranga’s Análisis and in the process defend Uranga from the possible charge that he ignorantly misappropriates Heidegger’s method.

iMap: a novel method for statistical fixation mapping of eye movement data

Eye movement data analyses are commonly based on the probability of occurrence of saccades and fixations (and their characteristics) in given regions of interest (ROIs). In this article, we introduce an alternative method for computing statistical fixation maps of eye movements—iMap—based on an approach inspired by methods used in functional magnetic resonance imaging. Importantly, iMap does not require the a priori segmentation of the experimental images into ROIs. With iMap, fixation data are first smoothed by convolving Gaussian kernels to generate three-dimensional fixation maps. This procedure embodies eyetracker accuracy, but the Gaussian kernel can also be flexibly set to represent acuity or attentional constraints. In addition, the smoothed fixation data generated by iMap conform to the assumptions of the robust statistical random field theory (RFT) approach, which is applied thereafter to assess significant fixation spots and differences across the three-dimensional fixation maps. The RFT corrects for the multiple statistical comparisons generated by the numerous pixels constituting the digital images. To illustrate the processing steps of iMap, we provide sample analyses of real eye movement data from face, visual scene, and memory processing. The iMap MATLAB toolbox is editable and freely available for download online ().     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Metontology</Emphasis>, moral particularism,and the “art of existing:” a dialogue between Heidegger,Aristotle, and Bernard Williams

An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time, in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological level—to metontology. Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were excluded from Being and Time. It is within metontology, Heidegger states, that “the question of ethics may be raised for the first time.” This paper makes explicit both Heidegger’s argument for metontology, and the relation between metontology and ethics. In examining what he means by “the art of existing,” the paper argues that there is an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s thinking that corresponds to a moderate form of moral particularism. In order to justify this position, a comparative analysis is made between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams.     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.