The Value of Social Constructionism for the Counseling Profession: A Reply to Hansen

The authors reply to J. T. Hansen's (2005) call for the profession to revalue the inner subjective experiences (ISE) of clients. Hansen argued that social constructionism has influenced the decline of the counseling profession by obscuring its unique focus on ISE. The authors maintain that social constructionism is a useful framework for counseling, and they articulate a social constructionist position for counseling. Hansen's reasons for arguing that ISE must be revalued are discussed along with future directions for social constructionism and counseling.     

‘Essentially Social’? A Discussion of the Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato

Abstract: The spirited part, thumos, plays a complex and often disputed role in Plato's account of the soul. The doctrine of the soul as specifically tri‐partitioned seems to depend on a substantial conception of thumos as fundamental and non‐reducible. Building on John Cooper's contribution in the discussion of the topic, this article aims to show that the role of thumos is characterised by an indispensable, deep‐rooted urge for dignified self‐preservation. The view is supported by Plato's own examples, and discussed with regards to Myles Burnyeat's account of thumos as an essentially social phenomenon. The main claim is that in order to preserve the Platonist idea of thumos as fundamental one should discard Burnyeat's characterisation of thumos as unequivocally social, and instead advocate a view of thumos as concerned with a particular form of self‐preservation, which Cooper's account suggests, but does not fully elaborate.     

Sartre and Bergson: A Disagreement about Nothingness

Abstract

Henri Bergson's philosophy, which Sartre studied as a student, had a profound but largely neglected influence on his thinking. In this paper I focus on the new light that recognition of this influence throws on Sartre's central argument about the relationship between negation and nothingness in his Being and Nothingness. Sartre's argument is in part a response to Bergson's dismissive, eliminativist account of nothingness in Creative Evolution (1907): the objections to the concept of nothingness with which Sartre engages are precisely those raised by Bergson. Even if Sartre's account of nothingness in its entirety is found to be flawed, I argue that the points he makes specifically against Bergson are powerful.

My discussion concludes with a brief examination of the wider philosophical background to Sartre's and Bergson's discussion of nothingness: here I point to some important aspects of Sartre's early philosophy, including some features of his conception of nothingness, that may testify to Bergson's positive influence on his thought.     

Do Rawls's theories of justice fit together? A reply to Pogge

In my reply to Pogge's critique of Rawls's international relations theory, I will try to show two things: (1) that Pogge's account of the public criterion of domestic social justice endorsed by Rawls is a partial one and (2) that this leads him to wrongly postulate a significant asymmetry between Rawls's domestic and international theories of justice. In the end, I hope to show that the domestic and international accounts are characterized by a significant degree of symmetry – that both accounts are motivated by Rawls's fundamental concern with self-respect. In other words, a more expansive, complete account of the domestic public criterion of social justice necessarily leads us (contra Pogge) to affirm a significant degree of continuity between the domestic and international accounts.     

The ‘three knowledges’ of Buddhism: Implications of Buddhadasa's interpretation of rebirth

Said's Orientalism has been called an ‘epoch-making’ and ‘paradigm constitutive’ book. While it undoubtedly caused a stir on its appearance and proved an important influence upon post-colonial studies and other developments in literary and cultural theory, a careful re-reading of it reveals a deeply flawed work that offers a confused analysis of human representations and realities, a highly selective and partial engagement with Western and Middle Eastern history and scholarship, and a particularly unhelpful approach to religion. The argument offered here is that Said's claims about ‘Orientalism’ are actually incoherent, veering between Foucauldian social constructionism and references to trans-cultural human realities; that the theoretical approaches to religion are inconsistent and highly selective; that the account of human agency is entirely inadequate; and that, although Said condemns entire generations of Orientalist scholars as racist, imperialist and ethnocentric, he is insufficiently reflective about his own scholarly position and the implications of its inconsistencies. Although Orientalism has been hailed as a book that ‘breathed insurgency’, it actually offers a vision of human beings as remarkably powerless in the face of arbitrary and abstract discourses that define their lives as oppressors or oppressed. Said sought to demonstrate that the reality behind the myth of scholarly impartiality was a racist and ethnocentric exercise of control and authority over the Orient, but the reality behind the myth of Orientalism is a theoretically flawed work offering a reductive account of religion and an impoverished view of human beings.     

LOCKE,SUSPENSION OF DESIRE,AND THE REMOTE GOOD

The chapter ‘Of power“ of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding is a very fine discussion of agency and a very complex piece of philosophy. It is the result of the superimposition of at least three layers of text (those of the first, second and fifth editions of the Essay), expressive of widely differing views of the same matters. The argument concerning agency and free will that it puts forward (as it now stands, reporting Locke's last word on the subject) is thus beset with problems, and even inconsistencies. But these textual and analytical difficulties should not hide from us the relevance and, in a way, the deep coherence of Locke's philosophy of action. In what follows, I will attempt to cast some light on this complicated interpretive and conceptual matter, by a careful reading of some parts of Locke's discussion. The first section shows how accounting for the evaluation and choice of remote goods, in terms of their real value and in preference to smaller, nearer ones, is a crucial problem for Locke's philosophy of action. The second section reads Locke's move from an internalist to an externalist view of motivation as a first, conceptually complex step towards such an account; and shows how this is linked to a change in the concept of will. The third and fourth sections reconstruct Locke's account (a pattern of suspension and examination of occurrent desire); discuss the role of the motivational and normative concept of happiness; and cast some doubt on the consistency of Locke's position.     

Art and the ‘Morality System’: The Case of Don Giovanni

Mozart's great opera, Don Giovanni, poses a number of significant philosophical and aesthetic challenges, and yet it remains, for the most part, little discussed by contemporary philosophers. A notable exception to this is Bernard Williams's important paper, ‘Don Juan as an Idea’, which contains an illuminating discussion of Kierkegaard's ground‐breaking interpretation of the opera, ‘The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical‐Erotic’, in Either/Or. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author's (A) approach here is, in some respects, reminiscent of a currently rather fashionable narrative‐inspired moral philosophy, of which Williams himself is perhaps the most impressive recent exponent. In the light of this apparent methodological confluence, Williams's disagreement with A about the meaning of Don Giovanni's final two scenes seems particularly significant. By offering an interpretation of Don Giovanni that both retains A's fundamental ideas and manages to get round the problems in Williams's account, I will show that the greatness of Mozart's opera is largely a function of the challenge it presents to the ‘morality system’.     

Agency and the theory of quantum vacuum interaction 1

Laszlo's theory of quantum vacuum interaction describes the evolution of all order in the universe as a result of the interaction between the holofield, a subquantum field of potential energy, and the multi‐level hierarchy of matter and living systems. A review of the scheme reveals two problems which question its application to psycho‐social interaction. One is the use of classical holography (image processing), which is inherently deterministic. The second is Laszlo's view of the brain as a passive processor of information. Both preclude human agency in the generation of psycho‐social organization. An alternative approach is developed here that aims to solve both of these problems. First, I draw on Piaget's work to show how thought and reason, and thus agency, is produced by the logic of cooperative interaction. And second, I use both classical holography and quantum holography (information processing) to develop a nondeterminist account of communication in social collectives. The principles of classical holography are used to describe how purposeful action is imaged and processed; and the principles of quantum holography are used to describe how a stable order of endogenous organization is generated by the processing of information about the interactions among members. By describing how the collective's normative order (the system of shared values, beliefs, and norms) operates to effect the construction and regulation of the collective's communicative structure, I show how indeterminacy is introduced and, hence, the potential for an active human agent in social life.     

Shadworth Hodgson and William James's formulation of space perception: Phenomenology and perceptual realism

This paper has two related goals. First, it seeks to show that the theory of perception found in William James's Principles of Psychology is thoroughly consistent if it is approached through the framework of perceptual realism versus constructionism rather than the nativism versus empiricism debate. As such, this paper offers an alternative to Nicholas Pastore's claim that there are two contradictory theories of perception in the Principles. James's commitment to perceptual realism is articulated within the contexts of his (1) critique of constructionist perception theories, (2) notion of the spatial quale, and (3) formulation of the role of knowledge in adult perception. The second goal of this paper deals with the historical development of James's perceptual realism. Here it is argued that Shadworth Hodgson's method of reflection–an anticipation of Husserl's phenomenological reduction–served as the basis of James's commitment to perceptual realism.     

Ressentiment and power: On Reginster's The Will to Nothingness

A critical discussion of Bernard Reginster's book The Will to Nothingness. The contribution engages with Reginster's interpretation of Nietzschean ressentiment, arguing that it is an essentially interpersonal attitude in two different senses. It is a response to a social situation of structural deprivation, and it involves an element of antagonism toward those who are better off within this social structure. The contribution then discusses Reginster's claim that modern morality restores the sense of power of the masses by adjusting the goals that they aim to pursue. I argue that this interesting interpretation does not do full justice to the themes of hostility or hatred that permeate the Genealogy of Morals, extending from Nietzsche's discussion of the slave revolt to his treatments of the bad conscience and of ascetic ideals.     

Fichte,Hegel, and the Life and Death Struggle

Several commentators have argued that Hegel's account of ‘self-consciousness’ in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as an ‘immanent critique’ of Fichte's idealism. If this is correct, it raises the question of whether Hegel's account of ‘recognition’ in Chapter IV can be interpreted as a critique of Fichte's conception of recognition as expounded in the Foundations of Natural Right. A satisfactory answer to this question will have to provide a plausible interpretation of the ‘life and death struggle’ as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition. This paper aims to provide such an interpretation. The first part of the paper provides a discussion of Fichte's account of recognition that emphasizes its ‘epistemic’ concerns. The second part argues that Hegel's account of the ‘life and death struggle’ can be read plausibly as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition.     

Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach

In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasa[mdot]vitti (‘self-awareness’, ‘self-cognition’) following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignāga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of svasamvitti as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness.     

The ego in Lucy R: notes on conflict in one of Freud's first cases

This paper focuses on Freud's discussion of the case of 'Lucy R' presented in Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and Freud, 1895). It is possible to see here a notion of the 'ego' being employed by Freud many years before the 1920 'turning point' in his work, and an account of the ego as a 'dominant mass of ideas' is used to explain how psychical conflicts for his patient are transformed into physical symptoms. The image of the ego defending itself against an 'incompatible' idea structures Freud's own account, and it also structures recent critical commentaries on Freud's work from within feminist writing and studies of rhetoric. Some consequences for present-day psychodynamic practice are reviewed in the course of the discussion.     

Heidegger à la Wittgenstein or ‘coping’ with Professor Dreyfus

This is a critique of the interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time that has been proposed by Hubert Dreyfus. Through an assimilation of much of Heidegger's thought to that of Wittgenstein, Dreyfus treats human being (Dasein) as being principally defined by its embeddedness in ‘shared social practices’ and claims that the mode of comportment he calls ‘coping’ is the source of the intelligibility of our world which he also identifies with being as such. Against this, I argue that unless it is brought into much closer contact with Heidegger's ontological account of the kind of entity Dasein is, ‘coping’ remains an ontic concept that cannot perform the function Dreyfus assigns to it. The thesis that Dasein is distinguished by the fact that it is self‐interpreting is also examined and found wanting for much the same reasons; and Dreyfus's conception of the larger design of Being and Time is shown to be seriously flawed by his failure to do justice to Heidegger's central theme ‐being as presence. In a final section, Heidegger's account of Das Man is reviewed as is Dreyfus's thesis that this anonymous modality of social existence is the master concept for understanding Dasein. This paradoxical magnification of the role of Das Man within human being is shown to fail because it does not distinguish between skills and social norms, and misses the fact that Das Man is a deformation of our social being (Mitsein), not its highest achievement as Dreyfus apparently supposed it to be.     

How the Good Obligates in Hegel's Conception of Sittlichkeit: A Response to Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation

Abstract

In Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Robert Stern argues that Hegel has a social command view of obligation. On this view, there is an element of social command or social sanction that must be added to a judgment of the good in order to bring about an obligation. I argue to the contrary that Hegel's conception of conscience, and thus the individual's role in obligation, is more central to his account than the social dimension. While agreeing with Stern that Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit does preserve a role for obligation, and that the social plays an important part in that account, I argue that there is no extra social component that converts the morally good into obligation. Rather, Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit as the “living good” means that judgments of the moral facts are simultaneously judgments of obligation.     

Reply to the Comments of Longuenesse and Ginsborg

In this discussion I respond to some of the criticisms raised by Béatrice Longuenesse and Hannah Ginsborg to my account of Kant's aesthetic theory presents in Kant's Theory of Taste.     

An Analysis of Intrinsicality

The leading account of intrinsicality over the last thirty years has arguably been David Lewis's account in terms of perfect naturalness. Lewis's account, however, has three serious problems: i) it cannot allow necessarily coextensive properties to differ in whether they are intrinsic; ii) it falsely classifies non‐qualitative properties like being Obama as non‐intrinsic; and iii) it is incompatible with a number of metaphysical theories that posit irreducibly non‐categorical properties. I argue that, as a result of these problems, Lewis's account should be rejected and replaced with an alternative account, which also analyses intrinsicality in terms of perfect naturalness, but which avoids these problems.     

HUME'S GENERAL POINT OF VIEW: A TWO-STAGE APPROACH

I offer a novel two-stage reconstruction of Hume's general-point-of-view account, modeled in part on his qualified-judges account in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. In particular, I argue that the general point of view needs to be jointly constructed by spectators who have sympathized with (at least some of) the agents in (at least some of) the actor's circles of influence. The upshot of the account is twofold. First, Hume's later thought developed in such a way that it can rectify the problems inherent in his Treatise account of the general point of view. Second, the proposed account provides the grounds for an adequate and well-motivated modest ideal observer theory of the standard of virtue.     

Otto Rank: Pioneering Ideas for Social Work Theory and Practice

This article examines Otto Rank's psychology and its profound implications for social work knowledge-building and practice. The paper begins with a brief biographical portrait, highlighting the significance of Rank's relationship and eventual break with Freud, and contextualizing the ideas that became the basis for the Functional Approach. We discuss Rank's conception of human functioning in the social environment, his influence on later theories, and a contemporary critique of Rank's ideas. The paper concludes with a discussion of Rank's contributions to the Functional Approach and to social work practice in general.