"A coherent datum of perception": Gordon Allport, Floyd Allport, and the politics of "personality"

This paper examines Floyd and Gordon Allport's early work on "personality" psychology. In the early 1920s, personality was an unorthodox topic, and for the Allports it initially served as an intellectual and personal bond. Floyd proposed the subject to his brother as a dissertation topic, and the two worked closely on developing personality tests. By 1924, however, "personality" had become the site of a dispute between the two brothers over the intellectual and methodological character of American psychology. The present study examines the origins of this dispute, while gauging the personal and professional ramifications of the dispute. On a larger level, this essay explores the role and meaning of "personality" in the academic culture of 1920s America.     

Individualism and the social in early American social psychology

In this paper an attempt is made to specify the original conception of the social dimensions of cognition, emotion and behavior-and of a distinctively social psychology-that was held by early American social psychologists, but abandoned by later generations of social psychologists committed to Floyd Allport's individualistic experimental program. Two influential forms of "individualism" in the work of Floyd Allport are distinguished and detailed.     

Social citizenship and social psychology

This paper outlines the concept of social citizenship, which was first theorized in the late 1940s alongside the creation of the UK welfare state and concerns citizens' rights to a basic income and standard of living. It suggests that social citizenship—particularly welfare provision—is a useful and important topic for social psychological research, albeit one that has been largely overlooked. We provide an overview of key developments in social citizenship and consider the impact of 30‐plus years of neoliberal governance in Western democracies, which has resulted in ongoing changes to how welfare rights and responsibilities are configured, such as policies that make social citizenship rights contingent on conduct. We outline social scientific work that examines these shifting ideas of citizenship, personhood, welfare, and conditionality and make the case for a critical discursive psychological approach, which we illustrate with a brief empirical example. We suggest that critical discursive social psychology is particularly well‐placed to examine how psychological assumptions are built into both policy and lay discourse and how these can legitimate interventions designed to work on the conduct of the unemployed, such as therapeutic and behavior change initiatives. Finally, we argue that psychology is faced with a choice; while there are opportunities for the discipline to contribute to the design and implementation of such initiatives, to do so requires accepting the basic values of the underpinning neoliberal agenda. Instead, it is vital to place these assumptions under the critical microscope and explore how they work to obscure structural disadvantage.     

Distinguishing social and individual psychology

Abstract.— The problem analyzed is how (according to what rules) to disentangle social and individual aspects in, e.g., an act of communication. Taking as point of departure the everyday fact that social relationships as well as individuals may be assessed across variables, an attempt was made to classify variables as either social or individual. It was found, however, that they seem to be distributed along a continuum from individual via relational to social variables; that all variables seem to have both a social and an individual aspect; and that they may be classified along a continuum accordning to how easily they can be made socially relevant or salient. Instead of concluding either that a social psychology proper is impossible, since all variables can be ascribed to the individual(s), or that we are dealing only with social psychology, since all variables have a social potential, a pragmatic solution may be to make clear at each stage of research from which perspective, the social or the individual, one is exploring the variable in focus.     

Contributions to the history of psychology: XLVIII. Ancient Greek roots of the assumptions of modern clinical psychology

This paper is an account of studies of the linguistic transformation that took place in ancient Greece between the eighth and fourth centuries B.C., searching for factors which contribute to the shift in how humans perceived themselves. The group or force-field consciousness of the men of the Iliad and the linguistic factors which allowed "individuality" to emerge by the time of Plato is explored. The account relates the emergence of the notion of "madness" to the development of the individual and asks whether madness is an artifact of individuality and explores the relationship of these developments to our present underlying assumption of a duality in human nature composed of the rational and the irrational.     

Complexity and social psychology of organizations

This article presents complexity (nonlinearity, chaos, self-organisation, fractals...) as a new and emerging epistemological paradigm, an alternative to an old, simpler, and reductionist paradigm. According to this point of view, we try to view work organizations as complex adaptive systems (CAS). Lastly, we offer a review of the literature on the applications of complexity to Organizational Social Psychology.     

Understanding and using the history of social psychology

Authors in this collection offer both critique and contextualist counterpoint to the standard, "official" histories of the field-successive editions of the Handbook of Social Psychology in 1954, 1968, 1985, and 1998. Unlike mainstream histories, the collected studies do not together constitute a seamless chronicle of continual progress for practitioners in a research area seeking social science status, viability, and legitimacy. Rather the authors focus on choice points, crises, and debates (some still ongoing), pay special heed to non-mainstream branches and voices, question numerous assumptions concerning the interrelationships among social psychological methodology, ontology (Danziger; MacMartin & Winston; Stam, Radtke, & Lubek), boundaries (Good), and individualisms (moral, political, and/or methodological). The specific contributions of Floyd and Gordon Allport are discussed from several perspectives as they helped define and shape and write the history of the field (Lubek & Apfelbaum; Parkovnick; Greenwood; Chung), and bridge it to neighboring areas (personality) and disciplines (psychology and sociology) (Nicholson; Barenbaum; Cherry). The constraints, origin myths, insensitivities, and omissions of standard histories are pointed out (Samelson), some partial correctives are advanced, and a more generative role for future historical studies is suggested.