Top-down and bottom-up control of visual selection

The present paper argues for the notion that when attention is spread across the visual field in the first sweep of information through the brain visual selection is completely stimulus-driven. Only later in time, through recurrent feedback processing, volitional control based on expectancy and goal set will bias visual selection in a top-down manner. Here we review behavioral evidence as well as evidence from ERP, fMRI, TMS and single cell recording consistent with stimulus-driven selection. Alternative viewpoints that assume a large role for top-down processing are discussed. It is argued that in most cases evidence supporting top-down control on visual selection in fact demonstrates top-down control on processes occurring later in time, following initial selection. We conclude that top-down knowledge regarding non-spatial features of the objects cannot alter the initial selection priority. Only by adjusting the size of the attentional window, the initial sweep of information through the brain may be altered in a top-down way.     

Working memory capacity and visual attention: Top-down and bottom-up guidance

Previous studies have indicated that working memory capacity (WMC) is related to visual attention when selection of critical information must be made in the face of distraction. The present study examines whether WMC-related differences in flanker task performance might be decreased by displays that are designed to support bottom-up guidance of attention. Participants were required to respond to a centrally located target while ignoring a peripheral flanker. In one condition, bottom-up support was provided by embedding the target in a row of zeros. In another condition, the zeros were removed, thus emphasizing the role of top-down attention in selecting spatially defined information. It was found that the inclusion of zeros led to the elimination of WMC-related flanker effects. We conclude that bottom-up attentional guidance can attenuate the role of WMC in selective attention.     

The effects of a salient self-schema on the evaluation of proattitudinal editorials: Top-down versus bottom-up message processing

The effects of a salient self-schema on message evaluation were studied. Subjects were identified who characterized themselves using trait adjectives that reflected the prototype of either a “religious” or a “legalistic” person. Equally persuasive sets of proattitudinal messages were developed empirically using weak arguments. Half of the messages were developed to reflect a “religious” perspective on the issue (capital punishment, abortion) whereas half were developed to reflect a “legalistic” perspective on the issue. Religious and legalistic subjects were then exposed to religious or legalistic arguments supporting an equally acceptable position (e.g., eliminating capital punishment). Afterward, subjects evaluated the persuasiveness of the communication and listed their thoughts as part of a “curriculum development project.” Results suggested that subjects when exposed to a schema-relevant message arguments for a position in which they believed were more positive about the quality of the message arguments and in their cognitive responding. These data extend the heuristic value of selfschemata to the area of attitudes and suggest that cognitive responses in persuasion are subjectively rather than objectively rational.     

Defining the cortical visual systems: "what", "where", and "how"

The visual system historically has been defined as consisting of at least two broad subsystems subserving object and spatial vision. These visual processing streams have been organized both structurally as two distinct pathways in the brain, and functionally for the types of tasks that they mediate. The classic definition by Ungerleider and Mishkin labeled a ventral "what" stream to process object information and a dorsal "where" stream to process spatial information. More recently, Goodale and Milner redefined the two visual systems with a focus on the different ways in which visual information is transformed for different goals. They relabeled the dorsal stream as a "how" system for transforming visual information using an egocentric frame of reference in preparation for direct action. This paper reviews recent research from psychophysics, neurophysiology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging to define the roles of the ventral and dorsal visual processing streams. We discuss a possible solution that allows for both "where" and "how" systems that are functionally and structurally organized within the posterior parietal lobe.     

Attentional sensitization of unconscious visual processing: Top-down influences on masked priming

Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of unconscious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, unconscious visual processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process. We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. We argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional sensitization model. We conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regar-ding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.     

Efficient visual search without top-down or bottom-up guidance

Two types of mechanisms have dominated theoretical accounts of efficient visual search. The first are bottom-up processes related to the characteristics of retinotopic feature maps. The second are top-down mechanisms related to feature selection. To expose the potential involvement of other mechanisms, we introduce a new search paradigm whereby a target is defined only in a context-dependent manner by multiple conjunctions of feature dimensions. Because targets in a multiconjunction task cannot be distinguished from distractors either by bottom-up guidance or top-down guidance, current theories of visual search predict inefficient search. While inefficient search does occur for the multiple conjunctions of orientation with color or luminance, we find efficient search for multiple conjunctions of luminance/size, luminance/shape, and luminance/topology. We also show that repeated presentations of either targets or a set of distractors result in much faster performance and that bottom-up feature extraction and top-down selection cannot account for efficient search on their own. In light of this, we discuss the possible role of perceptual organization in visual search. Furthermore, multiconjunction search could provide a new method for investigating perceptual grouping in visual search.     

Top-down and bottom-up sequential modulations of congruency effects

Several studies have demonstrated reduced congruency effects after incongruent trials. The conflict monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) assumes that this sequential modulation is based on top-down cognitive control and suggests that more control is engaged after the detection of conflict. An alternative account is based on repetition effects of stimulus and response features and can be considered bottom up. This study investigates both modulatory sources. In a Stroop task with two response-stimulus intervals (RSIs), we demonstrate that top-down modulation does not occur with a very short RSI, suggesting that it takes some time before the system can be reconfigured. Bottom-up modulation is observed for both RSIs. This finding demonstrates that two different sources simultaneously reduce congruency effects after incongruent trials.     

Top-down versus bottom-up attentional control: a failed theoretical dichotomy

Prominent models of attentional control assert a dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up control, with the former determined by current selection goals and the latter determined by physical salience. This theoretical dichotomy, however, fails to explain a growing number of cases in which neither current goals nor physical salience can account for strong selection biases. For example, equally salient stimuli associated with reward can capture attention, even when this contradicts current selection goals. Thus, although 'top-down' sources of bias are sometimes defined as those that are not due to physical salience, this conception conflates distinct--and sometimes contradictory--sources of selection bias. We describe an alternative framework, in which past selection history is integrated with current goals and physical salience to shape an integrated priority map.     

Visual search in children and adults: Top-down and bottom-up mechanisms

Three experiments investigated visual search for targets that differed from distractors in colour, size, or orientation. In one condition the target was defined by a conjunction of these features, while in the other condition the target was the odd one out. In all experiments, 6–7- and 9–10-year-old children were compared with young adults. Experiment 1 showed that children's search differed from adults' search in two ways. In conjunction searches children searched more slowly and took longer to reject trials when no target was present. In the odd-one-out experiments, 6–7-year-old children were slower to respond to size targets than to orientation targets, and slower for orientation targets than for colour targets. Both the other groups showed no difference in their rate of responding to colour and orientation. Experiments 2 and 3 highlighted that these results were not a function of either differential density across set sizes (Experiment 2) or discriminability of orientation and colour (Experiment 3). Across all three experiments, the results of both conjunction and odd-one-out searches highlighted a development in visual search from middle to late childhood.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and visual search: The roles of top-down and bottom-up processing

Individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) have been implicated in a variety of top-down, attention-control tasks: Higher WMC subjects better ignore irrelevant distractions and withhold habitual responses than do lower WMC subjects. Kane, Poole, Tuholski, and Engle (2006) recently attempted to extend these findings to visual search, but found no relation between WMC and search efficiency, even in difficult tasks yielding steep search slopes. Here we used a visual search task that isolated the contributions of top-down versus bottom-up mechanisms, and induced a habitual response via expectation. Searches that relied primarily on bottom-up mechanisms did not vary with WMC, but searches that relied primarily on top-down mechanisms showed an advantage for higher over lower WMC subjects.     

The hippocampus and memory for "what," "where," and "when"

Previous studies have indicated that nonhuman animals might have a capacity for episodic-like recall reflected in memory for "what" events that happened "where" and "when". These studies did not identify the brain structures that are critical to this capacity. Here we trained rats to remember single training episodes, each composed of a series of odors presented in different places on an open field. Additional assessments examined the individual contributions of odor and spatial cues to judgments about the order of events. The results indicated that normal rats used a combination of spatial ("where") and olfactory ("what") cues to distinguish "when" events occurred. Rats with lesions of the hippocampus failed in using combinations of spatial and olfactory cues, even as evidence from probe tests and initial sampling behavior indicated spared capacities for perception of spatial and odor cues, as well as some form of memory for those individual cues. These findings indicate that rats integrate "what," "where," and "when" information in memory for single experiences, and that the hippocampus is critical to this capacity.     

Top-down selective visual attention: A neurodynamical approach

We propose a system of interconnected modules consisting of populations of neurons for modelling the underlying mechanisms involved in selective visual attention. We demonstrate that it is plausible to build a neural system for visual search, which works across the visual field in parallel, but, due to the intrinsic dynamics of the system, resembles apparent modes of visual attention, namely the serial focal and the parallel spread over the space mode. Thus, neither explicit serial focal search nor saliency maps need to be assumed. A focal attentional spotlight is not included in the system but rather focal attention emerges due to the convergence of the dynamic behaviour of the neural networks. The dynamics of the system can be interpreted as a mechanism for routing information from the sensory input.     

Information search in the testing of quantified hypotheses: how "all," "most," "some," "few," and "none" hypotheses are tested

A series of experiments examined how the search for information in the testing of hypotheses is affected by quantifiers that specify the frequency of the test relation. The experiments showed that a positive search is used more in the testing of propositions in which some instances are predicted to have the test relation than in the testing of propositions in which most or few instances are predicted to have the test relation. In addition, the studies demonstrated that a negative or disconfirmatory search is more likely to characterize tests of absolute hypotheses than tests of hypotheses of the majority or minority form. Finally, the findings indicated that a negative search also is more common in tests of hypotheses predicting the absence rather than the presence of a phenomenon. Thus, as expected, participants generally engaged in a diagnostic search rather than the confirmatory search for information that has been so ubiquitous in previous research.     

The "I," the "we," and the "when": a meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition

What is the primary motivational basis of self-definition? The authors meta-analytically assessed 3 hypotheses: (a) The individual self is motivationally primary, (b) the collective self is motivationally primary, and (c) neither self is inherently primary; instead, motivational primacy depends on which self becomes accessible through contextual features. Results identified the individual self as the primary motivational basis of self-definition. People react more strongly to threat and enhancement of the individual than the collective self. Additionally, people more readily deny threatening information and more readily accept enhancing information when it pertains to the individual rather than the collective self, regardless of contextual influences. The individual self is the psychological home base, a stable system that can react flexibly to contextual influences.     

Top-down and bottom-up attentional control: On the nature of interference from a salient distractor

In two experiments using spatial probes, we measured the temporal and spatial interactions between top-down control of attention and bottom-up interference from a salient distractor in visual search. The subjects searched for a square among circles, ignoring color. Probe response times showed that a color singleton distractor could draw attention to its location in the early stage of visual processing (before a 100-msec stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA]), but only when the color singleton distractor was located far from the target. Apparently the bottom-up activation of the singleton distractor’s location is affected early on by local interactions with nearby stimulus locations. Moreover, probe results showed that a singleton distractor did not receive attention after extended practice. These results suggest that top-down control of attention is possible at an early stage of visual processing. In the long-SOA condition (150-msec SOA), spatial attention selected the target location over distractor locations, and this tendency occurred with or without extended practice.     

Top-down control of visual perception: attention in natural vision

Top-down perceptual influences can bias (or pre-empt) perception. In natural scenes, the receptive fields of neurons in the inferior temporal visual cortex (IT) shrink to become close to the size of objects. This facilitates the read-out of information from the ventral visual system, because the information is primarily about the object at the fovea. Top-down attentional influences are much less evident in natural scenes than when objects are shown against blank backgrounds, though are still present. It is suggested that the reduced receptive-field size in natural scenes, and the effects of top-down attention contribute to change blindness. The receptive fields of IT neurons in complex scenes, though including the fovea, are frequently asymmetric around the fovea, and it is proposed that this is the solution the IT uses to represent multiple objects and their relative spatial positions in a scene. Networks that implement probabilistic decision-making are described, and it is suggested that, when in perceptual systems they take decisions (or 'test hypotheses'), they influence lower-level networks to bias visual perception. Finally, it is shown that similar processes extend to systems involved in the processing of emotion-provoking sensory stimuli, in that word-level cognitive states provide top-down biasing that reaches as far down as the orbitofrontal cortex, where, at the first stage of affective representations, olfactory, taste, flavour, and touch processing is biased (or pre-empted) in humans.     

The role of information about "convention," "design," and "goal" in representing artificial kinds

In this chapter, we have considered the nature and development of our capacities for the representation of artificial kinds. We have presented a range of evidence collected using varying methods and from our own laboratories and those of others that speaks to the question of the kinds of information that might be central to knowledge of artifacts and their functions in human semantic memory. One key argument here has been that despite the fact that information about shared convention has been argued to play an important role in understanding of the "proper" uses of artifacts, just as it does in the case of the use of linguistic symbols within language communities, there are important differences between the two cases, and indeed across development, decisions about categories and functions dissociate. We have argued here that the nonarbitrary relationship between the material kind and mechanical structure of artifacts and the functions that can be supported undercuts the force of information about convention as important to determining proper artifact function. Shared convention appears less important for determining this facet of our semantic memory for artifacts than it does in supporting the proper relationship between linguistic symbols and the categories of artifact to which they refer.