幸福的体验效用与非理性决策行为的偏差机制

基于体验效用的幸福包括预期幸福、即时幸福和回忆幸福,这三者有极其重要的本质差异,导致决策偏差和非理性。本研究运用行为科学和认知神经科学相结合的研究方法,首次从行为层次—信息加工层次—脑神经层次三个层面,立体地开展幸福感的体验效用与非理性决策行为研究。研究计划分为三个部分:(1)预期幸福、即时幸福和回忆幸福的本质特点和行为规律;(2)三种体验效用产生偏差的认知心理机制;(3)体验效用与非理性决策偏差的脑神经机制。通过系列研究,拟解决三个关键问题:(1)在人类判断与决策过程中,预期、即时和回忆三种效用是如何影响人们的判断与决策?(2)三种体验效用出现偏差的信息加工特点和脑神经机制究竟是什么?(3)三种效用的偏差规律及对政府公共政策的启示。对这些问题的深入探讨,不仅对决策理论研究的发展是一个贡献;对政府管理制定有效的公共政策,避免"牺牲体验追求指标",解决"幸福悖论",同样有很强的实践指导意义。     

Strength of Preference and Effects of Valence in the Domains of Gains and Losses

In comparative judgments that follow binary choices, judgments of “How much better is a preferred option?” and “How much worse is a less preferred option?” may differ in their magnitudes (“valence effects”). This paper analyzed cognitive processes that underlie positive valence effects (“Better” exceeding “Worse”) and negative valence effects (Worse exceeding Better). My analyses used a “focus shift model.” The focus shift model postulates that choice options are represented as sets of desirable and undesirable features. Difference judgments are reached by assigning subjective weights onto such features and integrating weighted feature contributions. Positive and negative valence effects reflect the differences in subjective weighting depending on valence of judgments. Experiments 1 through 3 showed that systematic positive valence effects were observed in the domain of gains, whereas negative valence effects were observed in the domain of losses. Estimates of subjective weights showed that valence effects occurred when participants heavily weighted desirable features in preferred options and undesirable features in less preferred options. These patterns of subjective weighting for positive and negative valence effects were consistent with the focus shift model. Data were more consistent with the focus shift model over alternative explanations of valence effects. Relationship with relevant economic and psychological phenomena are discussed.     

Probabilistic models of set-dependent and attribute-level best-worst choice

We characterize a class of probabilistic choice models where the choice probabilities depend on two scales, one with a value for each available option and the other with a value for the set of available options. Then, we develop similar results for a task in which a person is presented with a profile of attributes, each at a pre-specified level, and chooses the best or the best and the worst of those attribute-levels. The latter design is an important variant on previous designs using best-worst choice to elicit preference information, and there is various evidence that it yields reliable interpretable data. Nonetheless, the data from a single such task cannot yield separate measures of the “importance” of an attribute and the “utility” of an attribute-level. We discuss various empirical designs, involving more than one task of the above general type, that may allow such separation of importance and utility.     

Consciousness lost and found: subjective experiences in an unresponsive state

Anesthetic-induced changes in the neural activity of the brain have been recently utilized as a research model to investigate the neural mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness. However, the anesthesiologic definition of consciousness as “responsiveness to the environment” seems to sidestep the possibility that an unresponsive individual may have subjective experiences. The aim of the present study was to analyze subjective reports in sessions where sedation and the loss of responsiveness were induced by dexmedetomidine, propofol, sevoflurane or xenon in a nonsurgical experimental setting. After regaining responsiveness, participants recalled subjective experiences in almost 60% of sessions. During dexmedetomidine sessions, subjective experiences were associated with shallower “depth of sedation” as measured by an electroencephalography-derived anesthesia depth monitor. Results confirm that subjective experiences may occur during clinically defined unresponsiveness, and that studies aiming to investigate phenomenal consciousness under sedative and anesthetic effects should control the subjective state of unresponsive participants with post-recovery interviews.     

Eating disorder NOS (EDNOS): an example of the troublesome "not otherwise specified" (NOS) category in DSM-IV

The “Not Otherwise Specified” (NOS) category within DSM-IV is designed for disorders of clinical severity that are not specified within broad diagnostic classes. “NOS” diagnoses are intended to be residual categories and they tend to be neglected by researchers. This can be inappropriate. The problems associated with certain NOS diagnoses are well illustrated by “Eating Disorder NOS” (sometimes termed EDNOS), which is the most common category of eating disorder encountered in routine clinical practice yet it has barely been studied. Indeed, there has been no research on its treatment. Interim and longer-term conceptual and practical solutions to the anomalous status of eating disorder NOS are proposed including the creation of a new diagnosis termed “mixed eating disorder”. Several of these solutions are of relevance to NOS categories in general. All the solutions should fulfil criteria for clinical utility.     

A closer look at decisions to quit

Aspects of March and Simon’s (1958) subjective expected utility model and a prediction of Lee and Mitchell’s (1994) unfolding model of voluntary employee turnover were tested. A policy capturing simulation that varied high, moderate, and low levels of five job characteristics was used to model voluntary turnover decision processes for 532 nurses. Survey measures of these job characteristics obtained over the next 2 years were multiplied by weights derived from nurse simulations to yield turnover likelihood estimates. These estimates exhibited 80%, 127%, and 190% more predictive power (depending on turnover operationalization) than post-employment survey estimates of turnover intention, job satisfaction, and job availability. Groups of nurses with homogeneous voluntary turnover decision models were also identified, though no groups with homogeneous job perceptions were observed. Evidence suggested nurses responded to “shocks” as predicted. March and Simon’s model of voluntary turnover was supported and implications drawn for managing voluntary nursing turnover.     

消费者决策分析的新视角:双通道心理账户理论

双通道心理账户是指人们在购买决策时具有一个双向通道的心理账户,其中一个通道记录了付款后消费者剩余的正效用,而另一个通道则记录了除去消费后付款带来的负效用.当消费与支付联结紧密时,会让人们更易想起支付的痛苦,从而降低消费快感,此时快乐弱化系数(α)大;当消费与支付联结较弱时,人们更不易记起支付的金额,从而在消费时拥有更多快乐,此时痛苦钝化系数(β)大.文章通过整理已有研究发现:先付款后消费的α系数更小,而先消费后付款的β系数更小;奢侈品的α系数更大,而必需品的β系数更大;吝啬者的α系数更大,而挥霍者的β系数更大.文章进一步阐述了影响消费者购买联结的心理机制是债务规避和负的时间偏好、支付贬值等.在此基础上为消费者做出购买决策以及商家选择促销方式提出了建议.同时也为消费者决策行为研究提供了新的视角和研究课题.     

Self-esteem and higher-order factors of personality: A reply to Simsek

Simsek (2012) argued that earlier research by Erdle and colleagues on the relationship between self-esteem and higher-order factors of personality used “poor statistical methodology”, that “their results may be untenable”, and that the results of his “high-level data analysis” are “the first to show the importance of self-esteem in the differentiation between stability and plasticity”. In this rejoinder, it is argued that the statistical methodology used by Erdle and colleagues demonstrated the effect of controlling self-esteem on the relationship between stability and plasticity earlier and more accurately than that used by Simsek (2012). Moreover, it is argued that self-esteem might not be a biasing factor, but instead might be a theoretically expected substantive correlate of the Big Five and of higher-order factors of personality. Finally, it is argued that a hierarchical structure of personality, with a general factor of personality (GFP) at the apex, might have a neurological basis in the activity of the prefrontal cortices.     

Probability assessment with response times and confidence in perception and knowledge

In both a perceptual and a general knowledge comparison task, participants categorized the time they took to decide, selecting one of six categories ordered from “Slow” to Fast”. Subsequently, they rated confidence on a six-category scale ranging from “50%” to “100%”. Participants were able to accurately scale their response times thus enabling the treatment of the response time (RT) categories as potential confidence categories. Probability assessment analyses of RTs revealed indices of over/underconfidence, calibration, and resolution, each subject to the “hard-easy” effect, comparable to those obtained with the actual confidence ratings. However, in both the perceptual and knowledge domains, resolution (i.e., the ability to use the confidence categories to distinguish correct from incorrect decisions) was significantly better with confidence ratings than with RT categorization. Generally, comparable results were obtained with scaling of the objective RTs, although subjective categorization of RTs provided probability assessment indices superior to those obtained from objective RTs. Taken together, the findings do not support the view that confidence arises from a scaling of decision time.     

Diminishing Returns to Income, Companionship – and Happiness

From philosophical and intuitive sources, I find three goods that should serve as ultimate ends in assessing a high quality of life: subjective well-being, human development, and justice. With acknowledged plural ends (we use them whether we acknowledge them or not), each takes its value from its scarcity relative to the other two – a version of diminishing marginal utility. Contrary to economists' belief that income (together with leisure) is the source of all utility, evidence shows that companionship, which does not pass through the market, has higher utility and contributes more to well-being than does income. But if money income has diminishing marginal utility, so does this competing good, companionship. With arguments drawn from the meaning of happiness, I show that happiness, too, may have diminishing marginal utility and that often it must rely for its hedonic and social value on such other goods as human development and justice.     

Profiles of career adaptivity and their relations with adaptability,adapting, and adaptation

Career adaptivity is the first factor in a chain of putative effects posited in the career construction theory (CCT): Adaptivity → Adaptability → Adapting → Adaptation. Hitherto, research on adaptivity has chiefly used variable-centered strategies to investigate the independent effects of adaptivity-related traits on adaptability, adapting, and adaptation averaged over all individuals constituting a sample. The present research, comprising two studies, seeks to extend this work by using person-centered analytic strategies to identify distinct profiles of adaptivity based on combinations of the Big-Five personality dimensions. We also examine the associations of profile membership with adaptability, adapting, and adaptation from the CCT perspective. Latent profile analyses revealed that a comparable 3-profile solution, comprising so-called “adaptive ready”, “ordinary”, and “rigid” adaptivity profiles, fit best in both studies using distinct measures of the Big-Five. Furthermore, across both studies, the latent subgroups were found to differ on levels of adaptability measured using two distinct instruments. Adaptability was highest in the “adaptive ready” subgroup followed by the “ordinary” and “rigid” subgroups, respectively. Finally, Study 2 showed that the adaptivity profiles differed with respect to indices of adapting (viz., organized study behaviors) and adaptation (viz., academic and career-choice satisfaction) in line with expectations from the CCT. The present findings constitute the first evidence showing that career adaptivity can be adequately represented via trait interactions. The findings also add to the empirical literature underpinning the CCT. Furthermore, this research is an informative demonstration of the utility of finite mixture analyses.     

Tag, you're it: Tagging as an alternative to yes/no recognition in item method directed forgetting

The current study contrasted a standard yes/no recognition task with a tagging recognition task in the context of an item-method directed forgetting paradigm. During the study phase, a series of words was presented one at a time, each followed by an instruction to remember (R) or forget (F). The retention of R and F study words was tested using either a typical yes/no recognition task or a tagging recognition task in which participants labeled each word as “R”, “F” or “New”. The directed forgetting effect observed in each task was equivalent in magnitude. However, the tagging recognition task afforded an additional analysis of the errors of misattribution that was not possible with the more typical yes/no recognition task. Interestingly, when falsely recognizing a Foil word, participants were more likely to assign an “F” tag than an “R” tag. These errors of misattribution are consistent with existing accounts of directed forgetting that suggest R words are better encoded than F words. We argue for the utility of the tagging procedure, given it does not alter the directed forgetting effect normally seen with yes/no recognition but provides additional information about errors of misattribution.     

The embodied cognition theory and the motor component of “yes” and “no” verbal responses

Most of the experiments which give theories of embodied cognition their empirical anchorage only take into consideration the motor responses induced by the task or the motor component of the visual stimulus. And yet, these motor responses are often associated with a linguistic answer. Our hypothesis is that “YES” and “NO” verbal responses have a motor component. In a first experiment we showed that producing a verbal response (YES vs. NO) involves motor planning (pushing vs. pulling): participants push a lever more quickly when they have to answer “yes” than “no”, and conversely, they pull a lever more quickly when they have to answer “no” than “yes”. Moreover, in a second experiment, we showed that perceiving the words “YES” and “NO”, on its own, leads to the same motor planning than when “yes” and “no” answers actually have to be produced. Participants detect the word “YES” faster when they have to push a lever than when they have to pull it and conversely they detect the word “NO” faster when they have to pull the lever than when they have to push it down. These results are discussed in reference to “online” and “offline embodiment” concepts and to the cognitive linguistic theories.     

Reconsidering the “aspiration–expectation gap” and assumed gender differences among urban youth

The present study investigated the relevance of the “aspiration–expectation gap” and traditional gender differences among urban youth in middle school and high school (N = 294). Results failed to indicate a significant difference between the occupational prestige levels of aspired and expected careers, but did indicate a significant difference between aspired and expected levels of education. In general, the proportion of girls significantly outweighed the proportion of boys in traditionally “masculine” occupations with high levels of prestige; girls also had higher levels of occupational prestige than boys in terms of careers they hoped and expected to obtain. Black and bi/multi-racial youth expected to have higher levels of education than White youth.     

Subtyping eating disordered patients along drive for thinness and depression

Subtyping individuals who binge eat by “diet-DT” and “depression” has yielded two valid and clinically useful subtypes that predict eating severity, comorbid psychopathology and outcome. The present study aimed to find four subtypes based on these dimensions and test their validity. Besides, it explored the distribution of eating disorder (ED) diagnoses across subtypes given their known heterogeneity, crossover and binge-eating fluctuation.Cluster analysis grouped 1005 consecutively admitted ED adult women into four subtypes, those previously described “DT” (22%), “DT-depressive” (29%), and “mild DT” (25%) and “depressive-moderate DT” (24%). Overall “mild DT” presented lower and “DT-depressive” greater eating and comorbid psychopathology than the rest, whereas “pure DT” and “depressive-moderate DT” presented no differences on bulimic symptoms but in psychopathology (p < .01). Finally, while BN-P patients were mostly and similarly distributed in the “DT” and “DT-depressive” subtypes than in the other, AN were in the new “mild DT” and “depressive-moderate DT” (p < .01). However, BN-NP, BED and EDNOS were similarly represented across subtypes.Results are discussed with regard to 1) the newly emerged subtypes that may explain cases in which DT prevents or does not predict binge eating; 2) the confluence of DT-depression that signaled greater eating and comorbid pathology, particularly self-control problems; 3) ED-DSM-diagnostic criteria.     

Magic feathers, Wittgensteinian boxes and the politics of deeming

Religious Experience Reconsidered offers an “attribution theory of religion” which builds out from Emile Durkheim’s intuition that the sacred is just some aspect of the world that has been set apart. Despite this theoretical pedigree, however, the book violates the central Durkheimian insight when it goes on to ask whether some things are more likely to be set apart than others. I argue that this impulse is motivated by an unfortunate metaphysical desire to determine if some things really are special. Throwing my hat in with Durkheim, I maintain that the academic study of religion should rest content with analyzing the contested politics of “deeming” something special.