Gender and Transference

Despite an early interest, Freud explicitly rejected philosophy, because of its “speculative” character. He struggled with balancing the intellectual appeal of philosophy with the certainty he hoped to find in positivist science. Putting aside the scientific status of Freud's work, the author re-examines Freud's attitude towards philosophy. Failing to recognize the assumptions of his investigations, Freud segregated psychoanalysis from philosophy on the charge that philosophers equated mind with consciousness, putatively propounded unfounded speculations, and assumed false conclusions about comprehensiveness. However, Freud never completely abandoned his initial philosophical proclivities. His own contributions to cultural history, social philosophy, notions of personal identity, and the humanistic thrust of psychoanalysis, demonstrate that he continued to address his earliest interests in philosophical questions. The author elucidates the philosophical complexity of psychoanalysis and concludes that a reconsideration of Freud's self-appraisal of his intellectual commitments is warranted.     

Subjective reality, objective reality, modes of relatedness, and therapeutic action

This paper describes a dialectic believed to be at the heart of therapeutic interaction within a relational model. The dialectic consists of the interrelationship of two modes: the dyadic and the triadic. In the dyadic mode, the analyst responds with aspects of his or her self that singularly reflect the patient's subjectivity. This mode of attunement is uniquely suited to bringing the patient's experience into a place where it can then be seen and known. In the triadic mode, realities are recognized that are important to, but still outside of, the subjectivity of the patient. The analyst invites the patient to see him- or herself not only from inside his or her own space, but also from a point outside, through the perspective of others. The analyst is charged with asymmetric but not exclusive responsibility for negotiating and sustaining a fluid and flexible relationship between these modes. Optimally, this occurs through spontaneous and authentic engagement informed by intuition, empathy, and clinical judgment. However, when this dialectic loses its robust and kinetic quality (as frequently occurs in approaches ranging from the classical to the postmodern), an impermeable dyad is formed by extruding potentially triangulating aspects of reality (and subjectivity). This can result in curiosity and the openness of uncertainty being replaced by closed-mindedness and proclamation.     

Understanding Transference and Countertransference

Abstract

Professional misconduct-especially misconduct involving client-worker boundary violationsgenerates serious costs for clinical social workers. It harms the very clients we aim to help; it frequently tarnishes the reputation of not only the individual social worker involved but also the face of the entire profession; and, it adds significantly to the overall costs of malpractice insurance. This paper defines the scope of the problem and provides support for understanding transference and countertransference as important contributors to prevention.     

Transference symptom

Transference symptom is a hazy notion in Freud's writings. The notion is presented here as a particular moment in the crystallization of the transference neurosis. It results from a double cathexis of the analytic frame and the analyst resulting in a symbolic distortion that is represented plastically within the session, as occurs in dreams. The transference symptom proceeds from two different preconscious cathexes, one attached to the reality of the frame, the other to the drive linked to the analyst. A psychic space is thereby opened up for interpreting both the resistance and the unconscious derivatives of infantile conflict. The transference symptom is a compromise formation that includes the analyst and questions the countertransference stance. Three different analytic situations give rise to transference symptoms according to the relative balance between frame and process in the analytic encounter. The concept is compared with enactment.     

Concerning Transference and Countertransference

This paper is presented primarily for its historical interest. The author's first attempted publication in psychiatry or psychoanalysis, it was submitted successively to two publications in 1949, rejected by each, and filed away until now. In it, the author suggests that transference phenomena constitute projections, and that all projective manifestations—including transference reactions—have some real basis in the analyst's behavior and represent, therefore, distortions in degree only. The latter of these two suggestions implies a degree of emotional participation by the analyst which is not adequately described by the classical view of him as manifesting sympathetic interest, and nothing else, toward the patient. It has been the writer's experience that the analyst actually does feel, and manifest in various ways, a great variety of emotions during the analytic hour. The analytic usefulness of this actual richness of emotional participation, by the analyst, is detailed.     

Transference and counter-transference in counselling

Transference and counter-transference, along with the art of interpretation and the meeting of resistances, are fundamental concepts within psycho-analysis. The former refers to feelings directed by the patient to the analyst which do not belong to him; and the latter to feelings aroused in the analyst by the patient. Both are used therapeutically in psychoanalysis, but are they relevant in counselling? As an example of a school of counselling which does not use these concepts in any fundamental way, the position of Rogers is discussed along with that of Truax and Carkhuff, and various criticisms are made. Counselling which uses transference and counter-transference is then discussed – particularly work emanating from the Tavistock Clinic with Bowlby, Balint and Malan as its main advocates – and difficulties in this approach are noted. A claim is made for categorisation in therapeutic work as it can be useful in enriching rather than diminishing a relationship. Counsellors need to be trained experientially to understand transference and counter-transference phenomena, and suggestions are made as to how this may be done.     

Transference, taboo and truth

The author re-examines the development of the concept of transference in Freud's work. He gives special attention to Totem and Taboo published in 1912-13. He notes that Freud's totally unsupported hypotheses within this model become illuminating and intelligible if "totem" is translated as "psychoanalyst" and "taboo" as "transference (neurosis)".