概率的不同表征对贝叶斯推理的影响的研究

该研究以贝叶斯推算、判断为实验任务,探讨了三种概率表征(百分比、自然频率、概率词)、三种概率规则认识水平对贝叶斯推理的影响,结果表明:1)概率词表征的贝叶斯推算实质是判断过程。2)在三种概率表征中,频率表征更适合于正确完成贝叶斯推理,但存在学科背景的差异。3)贝叶斯推理使用的策略有正确规则、错误规则、命题知识、概率简捷式、直觉和个人意愿六种。4)贝叶斯判断的正确率高于贝叶斯推算,个体在贝叶斯判断上使用的正确规则多于贝叶斯推算过程。     

基础比率和认知风格对贝叶斯推理影响的眼动研究

选取35名本科生为被试,采用EyeLink II眼动仪,考察了基础比率和认知风格对贝叶斯推理的影响,探讨了基础比率作用机制的争论。实验采用2（基础比率：高、低）×2（认知风格：场依存、场独立）双因素被试间设计,要求每位被试完成一道贝叶斯推理题,问题内容为疾病情境。将推理材料划为AOI1（描述基础比率）、AOI2（描述击中率）、AOI3（描述虚报率）、AOI4（提问）4个兴趣区,分别记录被试的总注视时间、注视次数等。结果发现：（1）在总注视时间和注视次数指标上,基础比率和认知风格的主效应均不显著,两者的交互作用显著;（2）在总注视时间和回视次数指标上,各兴趣区差异显著,关注程度从高到低依次为：AOI2＞AOI3＞AOI1＞AOI4。这说明,在贝叶斯推理中,并没有完全忽视基础比率;对于不同认知风格的个体而言,基础比率所起的作用是不同的。这也给我们一点启示：或许我们不能单一地去考虑基础比率的作用机制,而应该将它与个体的某些因素结合起来综合加以讨论。     

问题类型和情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响

本研究以240名大学生为被试,探讨了问题类型和情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响。结果表明：(1)问题类型对贝叶斯推理有影响;(2)情绪状态对贝叶斯推理有影响;(3)问题类型与情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响存在交互作用。具体地,在经典乳癌问题中,被试在消极情绪状态下比在积极情绪状态下做出更高的概率估计,而在中彩问题中,被试在积极情绪状态下比在消极情绪状态下概率估计更高。     

主体关联性对贝叶斯推理概率估计的影响

用贝叶斯推理问题为实验材料,探讨了主体关联性对贝叶斯推理概率估计的影响。结果表明,当估计的事件与主体有关时,被试对消极事件概率估计较低,对积极事件概率估计值;当估计的事件与主体无关时,被试对消极事件和积极事件的概率估计无显著差异。反应时分析表明,被试对消极事件的概率估计比对积极事件的概率估计时间显著地长,当消极事件与主体有关时概率估计时间就更长;而对积极事件的概率估计,与主体有关和与主体无关时反应时差异不显著。这表明,被试对消极事件的概率估计(特别是消极事件与己有关时)更为慎重。     

因果信息和提示指导语对大学生贝叶斯推理的影响

基于三重加工心智模型,以大学生为被试,采用经典贝叶斯推理的文本范式,通过操纵自变量：因果信息（有或无）与提示指导语（提供或不提供）,试图探讨激发反省心智,消解理性障碍的情况下,因果贝叶斯框架的作用机制。估计正确率和准确性的结果都表明因果信息显著提高了贝叶斯推理成绩,准确性的结果也说明指导语可以提示被试放下既有观念,以无偏见的方式进行推理,从而有效促进了贝叶斯推理表现。而在提示条件下增加因果信息并没有促进作用,表明对于较高元认知的被试因果信息作用是有限的。     

因果信息和提示指导语对大学生贝叶斯推理的影响

基于三重加工心智模型,以大学生为被试,采用经典贝叶斯推理的文本范式,通过操纵自变量：因果信息（有或无）与提示指导语（提供或不提供）,试图探讨激发反省心智,消解理性障碍的情况下,因果贝叶斯框架的作用机制。估计正确率和准确性的结果都表明因果信息显著提高了贝叶斯推理成绩,准确性的结果也说明指导语可以提示被试放下既有观念,以无偏见的方式进行推理,从而有效促进了贝叶斯推理表现。而在提示条件下增加因果信息并没有促进作用,表明对于较高元认知的被试因果信息作用是有限的。     

信息表征形式对解决贝叶斯推理问题的影响

通过三个实验分别考察问题形式（一步问题,两步问题）、信息结构（分割结构,未分割结构）和辅助图形表征（条形图、饼图、结构图）对解决贝叶斯推理问题的影响。研究结果表明：(1)一步问题形式有时优于两步问题形式;(2)频率格式提问有时优于几率格式提问;(3)分割的信息结构明显优于未分割的信息结构;(4)与条形图和饼图形式的图形辅助表征相比,结构图形式的图形辅助表征显著提高了被试解决贝叶斯推理问题的成绩。     

分析性认知风格对偏差反应与冲突探查的影响

采用2Wingdings 2MC@2Wingdings 2MC@2混合设计和相关分析法,考察个体的分析性认知风格对其在完成有、无冲突的推理判断任务时的逻辑反应倾向和冲突探查过程的影响。结果表明分析性认知风格不会直接影响被试完成推理任务的逻辑反应倾向性,高、低分析性认知风格倾向组被试在逻辑反应正确率上不存在显著差异; 但对个体的冲突探查过程会有影响,高、低认知风格倾向组被试在反应自信率上存在显著差异,且冲突探查大小与分析性认知风格显著负相关,这一结果表明那些高分析性认知风格倾向的个体在完成冲突任务时,更可能探查到刻板反应与遵从逻辑规则做出的反应之间的冲突。     

任务情境和证据信息对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响研究

采用生活情境测查任务和经典测查任务探讨了任务情境对青少年贝叶斯推理的影响,以及生活情境测查任务中不同证据信息对青少年贝叶斯判断的影响作用.结果表明:(1)在生活情境测查任务中,从小学六年级到大学二年级,被试的贝叶斯推理能力稳步缓慢提升(相邻的两个被试组之间差异不显著,而不相邻的两个被试组之间差异更容易达到显著水平),发展没有出现加速期,而经典测查任务情境下没有表现出年龄差异;(2)贝叶斯推理作为条件概率的判断不仅受任务情境的影响,而且同一任务情境中不同证据信息也会影响贝叶斯判断.当证据信息与先验信念一致时,被试可以充分利用线索进行推理.     

“直觉调整差误”偏向对贝叶斯推理成绩的影响

采用贝叶斯推理问题作为实验材料,探讨被试解决贝叶斯推理问题的启发式策略,从认知偏向的角度分析该问题的困难原因。结果发现:(1)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中的可得性启发与后验概率估计过程中的直觉调整差误密切相关;(2)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中文、理科被试都同样会产生直觉调整差误偏向;(3)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中的后验概率估计值和对推理问题中包括虚报率信息的命题的可得性测量所得主观概率之间存在显著的负相关。     

Which statistical formats facilitate what decisions? The perception and influence of different statistical information formats

Research suggesting both a superiority of frequencies over single‐event probabilities and of smaller reference classes over very large reference classes have utilized tasks that vary in computational complexity. The present research sought to simply and directly evaluate if—apart from simplifying statistical inference tasks—frequencies and small reference classes are clearer than other formats. After eliminating possible computational confounds, simple frequencies (based on small reference classes, e.g. 1/3) and to some extent relative frequencies (percentages, e.g. 33%) were perceived as clearer than absolute frequencies (based on very large reference classes, e.g. 90 million Americans) and single‐event probabilities (e.g. 0.33). Concurrently, these different formats were evaluated in terms of their relative influence. Absolute frequencies were relatively more persuasive for smaller magnitudes (e.g. 2.7 million) but less persuasive for larger magnitudes (e.g. 267 million), as compared to analogous presentations. Single‐event probabilities were judged to minimize the significance of information. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

If Mozart had Died at Your Age: Psychologic Versus Statistical Interence

In an alternative world, Mozart lived to 65 and, as a result, neither World War nor the Holocaust happened. Two contemporary Germans in this world debate the implications of the counterfactual of Mozart dying young and cannot begin to conceive of the horrors of our twentieth century. A imaginary critic with a structural orientation reviews the story and challenges its premise. He denies that artistic changes could have far-reaching political implications and uses the laws of probability to show the vanishingly low likelihood of the alternate future described by the main character of the story. The author responds with a defense of his counterfactual as an exercise in psychologic, where credibility is achieved through vividness.     

The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

When and for whom do frequencies facilitate performance? On the role of numerical literacy

The thesis that the mind is better prepared to process frequencies—as compared to other numerical formats—continues to be debated. A recent aspect of this issue is the role of numeracy (numerical literacy; one's ability to understand and work with numerical information) and specifically the argument that individual differences in numeracy interact with numerical formats. This interaction, either that frequencies improve performance only for those of low numeracy or that frequencies work only for those of high numeracy, would suggest that better performance using frequencies could be due to (nonevolutionary) numeracy effects. The three present studies revisited prior work with cumulative probability, Bayesian reasoning, and scenario risk assessments to study the effects of numeracy on frequency facilitation. Results from these experiments consistently failed to replicate previous findings of interactions; however, a more consistent finding emerged of a straightforward frequency effect. The lack of interactions and observations of frequency main effects lend support to the evolutionary explanation of the frequency effect. In addition, some possible statistical processes are proposed to explain the observation of interactions in past studies.     

Familiarity Bias and Belief Reversal in Relative Likelihood Judgment

People are often called on to make an assessment of the relative likelihood of events (e.g., which of two investments is more likely to outperform the market?) and their complements (which of the two investments is more likely to perform no better than the market?). Probability theory assumes that belief orderings over events and their complements should mirror each other (i.e., P(A) >/= P(B) iff P (not-A) 相似文献   

The desirability bias in predictions: Going optimistic without leaving realism

Does desire for an outcome inflate optimism? Previous experiments have produced mixed results regarding the desirability bias, with the bulk of supportive findings coming from one paradigm—the classic marked-card paradigm in which people make discrete predictions about desirable or undesirable cards being drawn from decks. We introduce a biased-guessing account for the effects from this paradigm, which posits that people are often realistic in their likelihood assessments, but when making a subjectively arbitrary prediction (a guess), they will tend to guess in a desired direction. In order to establish the validity of the biased-guessing account and to distinguish it from other accounts, we conducted five experiments that tested the desirability bias within the paradigm and novel extensions of it. In addition to supporting the biased-guessing account, the findings illustrate the critical role of moderators (e.g., type of outcome, type of forecast) for fully understanding and predicting desirability biases.     

道德理论的新进展--道德判断的社会直觉模式

道德判断的研究一直遵循皮亚杰和柯尔伯格的理性主义模式．但随着人们对认知双重过程论的逐渐认可,传统的道德判断理论受到了挑战。本文介绍了道德判断的一种新的理论模式——道德判断的社会直觉模式。该理论认为,道德判断是由迅速、自动的评价(直觉)所导致。