Risk

In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti‐risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti‐luck condition. Second, to legal theory, where it is shown that this account of risk can cast light on the debate regarding the extent to which a criminal justice system can countenance the possibility of wrongful convictions.     

Suicide Risk Assessment and Risk Formulation Part II: Suicide Risk Formulation and the Determination of Levels of Risk

The suicide risk formulation (SRF) is dependent on the data gathered in the suicide risk assessment. The SRF assigns a level of suicide risk that is intended to inform decisions about triage, treatment, management, and preventive interventions. However, there is little published about how to stratify and formulate suicide risk, what are the criteria for assigning levels of risk, and how triage and treatment decisions are correlated with levels of risk. The salient clinical issues that define an SRF are reviewed and modeling is suggested for an SRF that might guide clinical researchers toward the refinement of an SRF process.     

Risk and Religion: Toward a Theology of Risk Taking

Historically the concept of risk is rooted in Renaissance lifestyles, in which autonomous agents such as sailors, warriors, and tradesmen ventured upon dangerous enterprises. Thus, the concept of risk inseparably combines objective reality (nature) and social construction (culture): Risk = Danger + Venture. Mathematical probability theory was constructed in this social climate in order to provide a quantitative risk assessment in the face of indeterminate futures. Thus we have the famous formula: Risk = Probability (of events) × the Size (of future harms). Because the concept of harm is always observer relative, however, risk assessment cannot be purely quantitative. This leads to the question, What are the general conditions under which risks can be accepted? There is, after all, a difference between incurring a risk and bearing the costs of risks selected for by other agencies. Against this background, contours of a theology of risk emerge. If God creates a self‐organizing world of relatively autonomous agents, and if self‐organization is favored by cooperative networks of autopoietic processes, then the theological hypothesis of a risk‐taking God is at least initially plausible. Moreover, according to the Christian idea of incarnation, God is not only taking a risk but is also bearing the risks implied by the openness of creation. I thus argue for a twofold divine kenosis—in creation as well as in redemption. I discuss some objections to this view, including the serious counterargument that risk taking on behalf of others remains, even for God, a morally dubious task. What are the conditions under which the notion of a risk‐taking God can be affirmed without leaving us with the picture of God as an arbitrary, cosmic tyrant? And what are the practical implications for the ways in which human agents of faith, hope, and love can learn to cope with the risks of everyday life and of political decisions?     

Luck and Risk

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1 , the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event.     

Risk as feelings

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.     

Suicide Risk Assessment and Risk Formulation Part I: A Focus on Suicide Ideation in Assessing Suicide Risk

The main procedure used by clinicians to determine whether an individual may be at risk of suicidal behaviors is the suicide risk assessment (SRA). The purpose of the SRA is to identify risk and protective factors that then provide the data for the formulation of suicide risk. The suicide risk formulation (SRF) assigns a level of suicide risk that ideally leads to triage and treatment deemed appropriate for that level of risk. Some of the problems with the SRA are explored here, with an emphasis on addressing the over reliance on communicated suicide ideation, and recommendations are made for improvements. Part II of this article (Berman & Silverman, 2013, also appears in this issue of STLB) examines the process of an SRF and, similarly, makes recommendations to improve clinical practice toward the desired end of saving lives.     

Evidence for Risk Estimate Precision: Implications for Individual Risk Communication

Actuarial risk assessment instruments using well-established predictor variables measured at the individual level (e.g., age, criminal history, psychopathy) discriminate well between recidivists and non-recidivists across diverse samples. Data indicating the relative risk of recidivism can inform policy decisions about allocating resources according to risk within a correctional system, consistent with the first of the risk–need–responsivity (RNR) principles. Evidence for the precision of absolute risk as applied to an individual based on scores from many samples, however, has proven challenging. In this paper, we present a study examining the association of actuarial risk estimate precision with sample size using the Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA; Lowenkamp et al., 2013), in samples of up to 26,642 offenders. Results indicate that the precision of individual estimates can be demonstrated with sufficient sample size. We believe that the implications of absolute risk for the communication of an individual offender's risks have been poorly understood. We argue that the purpose of individual-level risk communication is to ensure the effective application of policy, which requires matching a new case to aggregate data. We illustrate how an offender's risk might thus be communicated, and conclude that this function is distinct from management of an individual's criminogenic needs and identification of effective and suitable treatments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk Perception Among Women at Risk for Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer

This paper is a summation of selected history and literature on risk perception as it pertains to genetic counseling and testing, with a focus on hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, the area which has seen the greatest focus of research. Risk perception is a complex and incompletely understood concept which seeks to capture the myriad meanings that an individual attaches to the experience of being at increased risk. It is now evident that “risk”, as perceived by the patient, is different from the objective, quantifiable risk estimate often provided to them during genetic counseling. What is also clear is that the complicated set of factors influencing risk perception are not yet well understood, nor are the mechanisms the lead from perceived risk to behavioral change in the patient. In situations where specific behavioral changes such as increased cancer screening are an inherent goal of the genetic risk assessment and counseling process, gaining a better understanding of the specific factors motivating change will be essential.     

投资者风险感知与风险倾向对风险决策的影响——基于民间投资者的样本

采用模拟投资任务和问卷测查的方式,考察了投资者的风险感知、风险倾向对其风险决策的影响,并对风险感知与风险倾向的交互作用进行分析。结果发现：①投资者的风险感知对其风险决策有显著的负向作用;②投资者的风险倾向对其风险决策有显著的正向作用;③风险感知对风险决策的影响作用部分通过风险倾向这一中介完成。     

Biased Risk Perceptions Among Japanese: Illusion of Interdependence Among Risk Companions

In human history the unit of survival has often been the group rather than the individual. I hypothesized, therefore, that people would feel safer in the presence of risk companions (i.e., those who are exposed to the same risk source) than when they are on their own, even when such expectations are not justifiable on normative grounds. Two experiments lent support to the hypothesis. Participants were asked to estimate the risk level involved either in six hypothetical situa-tions (Experiment 1: N = 112) or real electric shocks (Experiment 2: N = 81) with varying numbers of risk companions. The participants' perceived risk level decreased as the number of risk companions increased. People appear to use a cognitive heuristic, which I term interdependence heuristic , in risk perception.     

Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism and Risk

In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson proposes a version of multi-dimensional consequentialism according to which risk is one among several dimensions. We argue that Peterson’s treatment of risk is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we discuss a number of major problems of one-dimensional (objective or subjective) consequentialism, and show that none of them disappears with Peterson’s proposal. In ending our paper, we address the objection that our discussion overlooks the fact that Peterson’s proposal is not the best version of multi-dimensional consequentialism. Our reply is that the possibilities of improving multi-dimensional consequentialism are very limited as far as risk is concerned.     

Risk perception in Taiwan

In a questionnaire study, 51 Taiwanese college students were asked to judge 48 natural and human-made hazards on nine risk characteristics. Another group of 61 students were asked to rate the magnitude of 80 hazards and their attitudes toward these hazards. To evaluate the dimensionality of risk perception, participants' ratings for the nine risk characteristics were analyzed using Profile Analysis via Multidimensional Scaling approach. Two dimensions of risk perception were identified: (i) Involuntary versus Immediate Effect; and (ii) Delayed Effect versus Known to Science and Chronic. The relationships of risk perceptions and perceived public and private responsibilities in risk management were examined. Catastrophic, certain-to-be-fatal, dreaded, and uncontrollable risks were perceived as more deserving of public risk management, while controllable risks that were known to science, known to those exposed, and chronic were perceived as more deserving of private management. In particular, diseases are perceived as most deserving of private risk management and least deserving of public risk management; and technologies are perceived as most deserving of public risk management and least deserving of private risk management.     

Risk as a Consequence

Expected-utility theory advances representation theorems that do not take the risk an act generates as a consequence of the act. However, a principle of expected-utility maximization that explains the rationality of preferences among acts must, for normative accuracy, take the act’s risk as a consequence of the act if the agent cares about the risk. I defend this conclusion against the charge that taking an act’s consequences to comprehend all the agent cares about trivializes the principle of expected-utility maximization.