Evidence for decay in verbal short-term memory: a commentary on Berman, Jonides, and Lewis (2009)

M. G. Berman, J. Jonides, and R. L. Lewis (2009) adapted the recent-probes task to investigate the causes of forgetting in short-term memory. In 7 experiments, they studied the persistence of memory traces by assessing the level of proactive interference generated by previous-trial items over a range of intertrial intervals. None of the experiments found a reduction in proactive interference over time, which they interpreted as evidence against time-based decay. However, it is possible that decay actually occurred over a shorter time period than was tested in this study, wherein the shortest decay interval was 3,300 ms. By reducing the time scale, the 2 experiments reported in the current commentary revealed a sharp decrease in proactive interference over time, with this reduction reaching a plateau in less than 3 s. This pattern suggests that decay operates in the early stages, whereas subsequent forgetting is likely to be due to interference.     

Theoretical accounts of spatial learning: A neurobiological view (commentary on Pearce, 2009)

Theories of learning have historically taken, as their starting point, the assumption that learning processes have universal applicability. This position has been argued on grounds of parsimony, but has received two significant challenges: first, from the observation that some kinds of learning, such as spatial learning, seem to obey different rules from others, and second, that some kinds of learning take place in processing modules that are separate from each other. These challenges arose in the behavioural literature but have since received considerable support from neurobiological studies, particularly single neuron studies of spatial learning, confirming that there are indeed separable (albeit highly intercommunicating) processing modules in the brain, which may not always interact (within or between themselves) according to classic associative principles. On the basis of these neurobiological data, reviewed here, it is argued that rather than assuming universality of associative rules, it is more parsimonious to assume sets of locally operating rules, each specialized for a particular domain. By this view, although almost all learning is associative in one way or another, the behavioural-level characterization of the rules governing learning may vary depending on which neural modules are involved in a given behaviour. Neurobiological studies, in tandem with behavioural studies, can help reveal the nature of these modules and the local rules by which they interact.     

Outsourcing the deep self: Deep self discordance does not explain away intuitions in manipulation arguments

According to manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, manipulation might undermine an agent’s responsibility even when the agent satisfies plausible compatibilist conditions on responsibility. According to Sripada (2012 Sripada, C. (2012). What makes a manipulated agent unfree? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85, 563–593.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), however, empirical data suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility largely because they think that the manipulated act is in discord with the agent’s “deep self,” thus violating the plausible compatibilist condition of deep self concordance. This paper defends Sripada’s general methodological approach but presents data that strongly suggest that, contrary to Sripada’s contention, most of the effect of manipulation on attributions of moral responsibility is unmediated by worries about inadequate information or deep self discordance. Instead, it depends largely on worries that the action is ultimately explained by factors outside the agent’s control, just as proponents of manipulation arguments have proposed. More generally, data suggest that judgments of deep self discordance are themselves explained by worries about responsibility, and that the everyday notion of what an agent wants or is “deep down” is sensitive not only to the agent’s internal psychological structure, but also its source. This casts some doubt on recent claims about the explanatory role of deep self judgments.     

An ostrich on a rock: commentary on Christie and Barresi (2002)

There are problems with both the theoretical logic and the interpretation of data in Christie and Barresi's (2002) interesting article. The general pattern of results (described as Orwellian) is easily incorporated into an information-processing framework compatible with Dennett's analysis. In particular, different aspects of the illusory motion event are queried at different times and these aspects (line extent and manner of appearance) are not in conflict, so no revision of conscious content is necessary. Second, too much interpretive weight is placed on an anomalous pair of data points (described as Stalinesque) that do not seem fully interpretable within the author's framework and are probably susceptible to one of several alternative interpretations proposed here, though further investigation is necessary.     

Putting phonetic context effects into context: a commentary on Fowler (2006)

On the basis of a review of the literature and three new experiments, Fowler (2006) concludes that a contrast account for phonetic context effects is not tenable and is inferior to a gestural account. We believe that this conclusion is premature and that it is based on a restricted set of assumptions about a general perceptual account. Here, we briefly address the criticisms of Fowler (2006), with the intent of clarifying what a general auditory and learning approach to speech perception entails.     

Simulation (mostly) rules: A commentary

I consider three issues: children's attribution of belief‐based emotions, the contribution of language input to children's developing theory of mind, and the default settings we assume in our dealings with the world. I ask whether the proposals made by Mitchell, Currie and Ziegler can help throw light on each issue ( Mitchell, Currie, & Ziegler, 2009 ).     

Lexicons, contexts, events, and images: commentary on Elman (2009) from the perspective of dual coding theory

Elman (2009) proposed that the traditional role of the mental lexicon in language processing can largely be replaced by a theoretical model of schematic event knowledge founded on dynamic context-dependent variables. We evaluate Elman's approach and propose an alternative view, based on dual coding theory and evidence that modality-specific cognitive representations contribute strongly to word meaning and language performance across diverse contexts which also have effects predictable from dual coding theory.     

The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: a psychological perspective

The paper argues that Zahavi's defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. "identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena", and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object "feels" like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal core self and the explanation of the unity and identity of the self through time give rise to intractable problems.     

New displays and new emotions: a commentary on Rozin and Cohen (2003)

In this article, the authors elaborate on 3 ideas advanced in P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen's (2003) innovative study of facial expression. Taking a cue from their discovery of new expressive behaviors (e.g., the narrowed eyebrows), the authors review recent studies showing that emotions are conveyed in more channels than usually studied, including posture, gaze patterns, voice, and touch. Building on their claim that confusion has a distinct display, the authors review evidence showing distinct displays for 3 self-conscious emotions (embarrassment, shame, and pride), 5 positive emotions (amusement, desire, happiness, love, interest), and sympathy and compassion. Finally, the authors offer a functional definition of emotion to integrate these findings on "new" displays and emotions.     

Bad arguments against a good case (Laudan's attack on the strong programme)

This paper deals with Larry Laudan's attack on the symmetry thesis of Bloor's “strong programme”. It will be shown that Laudan's argumentation is fallacious and, therefore, his attempt at refuting the symmetry thesis has failed.     

Towards a broader scope of biomechanics in developmental studies: a commentary on Jensen (2005)

In this article, we discuss where biomechanical analysis can contribute to our understanding of motor development, and more particularly in what ways biomechanics can contribute to (1) explaining the universal sequence in motor milestones; (2) explaining variations in developmental sequence between individuals; (3) understanding the impact of context on the actions of an individual; and (4) understanding, preventing, and managing chronic disabilities. In our view, biomechanics is concerned with the dynamics of the musculo‐skeletal system (MSS) and thus provides insights in the way motion is affected by the activation of muscles and the mechanical interaction between the MSS and the environment. Biomechanical analysis is important in understanding the development of actions that depend on the perceptual‐motor loop although it cannot provide a full account of the changes in the behaviour. The contributions and limitations of specific biomechanical analyses such as the inverse and forward dynamical models are discussed in the light of the article of Jensen (2005). Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Methods for obtaining menstrual-cycle data in menstrual-synchrony studies: commentary on Schank (2001)

J. C. Schank (2001) claimed to identify 2 categories of error-measurement error and recall biases-in the methodology used in studies of menstrual synchrony. This commentary focuses on the 2nd of these, recall biases, and other errors that he argued may result from "allowing participants to fill out menstrual-cycle-onset calendars" (p. 3). J. C. Schank's detailed discussion of various types of recall biases is inappropriate and misleading given that the majority of menstrual-synchrony studies have used prospective menstrual calendars. The use of menstrual calendars is a well-accepted method in a number of research areas and demands little of participants. J. C. Schank questioned the validity of menstrual calendar data on the basis of assumptions about recall bias for which he had no evidence.     

Synchronistic mind‐matter correlations in therapeutic practice: a commentary on Connolly (2015)

This commentary adds some ideas and refinements to the inspiring discussion in a recent paper by Connolly ( 2015 ) that makes use of a dual‐aspect framework developed by us earlier. One key point is that exceptional experiences (of which synchronicities are a special case) cannot in general be identified with experiences of non‐categorial or acategorial mental states. In fact, most exceptional experiences reported in the literature are experiences of categorial states. Conversely, there are non‐categorial and acategorial states whose experience is not exceptional. Moreover, the psychodynamics of a synchronistic experience contain a subtle mesh of interacting processes pertaining to categorial, non‐categorial and acategorial domains. We outline how this mesh may be addressed in particular cases of synchronicity described by Connolly.     

The functional independence of trait self-knowledge: commentary on Sakaki (2007)

In a recent paper, Sakaki (2007) proposed that Klein and Loftus's conclusion that semantic and episodic trait self-knowledge are functionally independent (e.g., Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992b) was based on questionable assumptions and not supported by the available evidence. In this paper we show that Sakaki (2007) has misinterpreted our position on the independence of self-knowledge, omitted mention of large portions of the relevant research at odds with her contention, and conducted her studies with procedures we explicitly warned against due to interpretive ambiguities associated with their use.     

The law of categorical judgment (corrected) extended: a note on Rosner and Kochanski (2009)

Rosner and Kochanski (2009) noticed an inconsistency in the mathematical statement of the Law of Categorical Judgment and derived "the valid equation, the Law of Categorical Judgment (Corrected)" (p. 125). The purpose of this comment is to point out that the law can be corrected in many different ways, leading to substantially different equations. The different versions have different consequences for the predicted distributions of the responses and, hence, for fitting real data. Some of these consequences are unexpected and sometimes undesirable. Researchers should be aware of the different possibilities as they may lead to pronouncedly different accounts of given data.