On the rationality of positive mysterianism

In Paradox in Christian Theology (2007) I argued that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are paradoxical—that is, they appear to involve implicit contradictions—yet Christians can still be rational in affirming and believing those doctrines. Dale Tuggy has characterized my theory of theological paradox as a form of “positive mysterianism” and argues that the theory “faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance.” After summarizing my proposed model for the rational affirmation of theological paradox and considering whether my proposal is indeed a form of “positive mysterianism” as Tuggy defines the term, I address the two main criticisms raised in Tuggy’s paper: first, that the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility cannot bear the weight required by my defense of paradox; and second, that my proposed model is afflicted with epistemic instability. I conclude that Tuggy has failed to show that a mysterian stance with respect to paradoxical Christian doctrines is in principle unreasonable, unnatural, or unsustainable.     

ROBERT JENSON ON THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST

In his recent two‐volume Systematic Theology, Robert Jenson offers an account of Christ's pre‐existence that is, in several important respects, an original contribution to the literature. In this article, I offer a critical interaction with Jenson's doctrine. In particular, I show that what Jenson has to say about (a) divine eternity and (b) the relationship between philosophy and theology, have important bearings on his construal of Christ's pre‐existence and, in the final analysis, skew what he has to say on the matter. I conclude that Jenson's account of this doctrine, though suggestive and insightful in several respects, is unsuccessful, indeed, incoherent, as it stands.     

Thomas Aquinas Holds Fast: Objections to Aquinas within Today's Debate on Divine Action

Various authors within the contemporary debate on divine action in nature and contemporary science argue both for and against a Thomistic account of divine action through the notions of primary and secondary causes. In this paper I argue that those who support a Thomistic account of divine action often fail to explain Aquinas' doctrine in full, while those who argue against it base their objections on an incomplete knowledge of this doctrine, or identify it with Austin Farrer's doctrine of double agency – again failing to do Aquinas justice. I analyse these objections, indicating how they do not address Aquinas' doctrine by offering a brief but full account of the latter.     

What's Not to Love? Rethinking Appeals to Tradition in Contemporary Debates in Trinitarian Theology

Contemporary discussions of the doctrine of the Trinity are sometimes centered on debates between ‘Social Trinitarians’ and ‘Classical Trinitarians.’ Those who align with ‘Social Trinitarianism’ usually insist that an adequate doctrine of the Trinity demands an affirmation of intra-Trinitarian mutual love – and thus reject the doctrine of divine simplicity and numerical sameness out of a commitment to being fully Trinitarian. Meanwhile, those who want to recover ‘Classical Trinitarianism’ insist that the doctrine of divine simplicity is true and salutary – and thus reject any notion of love shared between the Father and Son within the divine life. I argue that both alternatives are profoundly out of step with the theological tradition they claim to retrieve and represent, for simultaneous affirmations of divine simplicity and mutual love are found all across the tradition of Latin scholastic theology. Constructive Trinitarian theology that makes appeal to the ‘classical’ tradition should take this diversity and complexity into account.     

CONSUETUDO CARNALIS IN AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS: Confessing Identity/Belonging to Difference

The political theorist William E. Connolly reads Augustine's Confessions as an exhortation to deny the paradox of identity/difference. The paradox for Connolly is this: if one confesses a true identity, one must be false to difference, but if one is true to difference, one must sacrifice the promise of true identity. I revisit Augustine's Confessions here in order to offer a reading of their paradoxical character that contrasts with Connolly's. I will argue that Augustine's confession does not deny the paradox of identity/difference but exemplifies what it means to struggle within it. I turn to James Wetzel's work on Augustine's idea of free will and Catherine Keller's work on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo to suggest that treating Augustine's confession as confession reveals this struggle.     

Biased information and the exchange paradox

This paper presents a new solution to the well-known exchange paradox, or what is sometimes referred to as the two-envelope paradox. Many recent commentators have analyzed the paradox in terms of the agent’s biased concern for the contents of his own arbitrarily chosen envelope, claiming that such bias violates the manifest symmetry of the situation. Such analyses, however, fail to make clear exactly how the symmetry of the situation is violated by the agent’s hypothetical conclusion that he ought to switch envelopes on the assumption that his own envelope contains some specific amount of money. In this paper, I offer an explanation of this fact based on the idea that the agent’s deliberations are not only constrained by the epistemic symmetry reflected in the agent’s uniform ignorance as to the contents of the two envelopes, but also by a deeper methodological symmetry that manifests itself in the intuition that the two envelopes constitute equally legitimate sources of potential information. I interpret this intuition as implying that the agent’s final decision should reflect a point of rational equilibrium arrived at through an iterated process of counterfactual self-reflection, whereby the agent takes account of what he would have thought had he instead chosen the other envelope. I provide a formal model of this method of counterfactual self-reflection and show, in particular, that it cannot issue in the paradoxical conclusion that the agent ought to switch regardless of how much money is in his envelope. In this way, by correcting for the bias in the agent’s reasoning, the paradox is resolved.

     

The logic of Simpson’s paradox

There are three distinct questions associated with Simpson’s paradox. (i) Why or in what sense is Simpson’s paradox a paradox? (ii) What is the proper analysis of the paradox? (iii) How one should proceed when confronted with a typical case of the paradox? We propose a “formal” answer to the first two questions which, among other things, includes deductive proofs for important theorems regarding Simpson’s paradox. Our account contrasts sharply with Pearl’s causal (and questionable) account of the first two questions. We argue that the “how to proceed question?” does not have a unique response, and that it depends on the context of the problem. We evaluate an objection to our account by comparing ours with Blyth’s account of the paradox. Our research on the paradox suggests that the “how to proceed question” needs to be divorced from what makes Simpson’s paradox “paradoxical.”     

Paradox and Mystery in Theology

The question of paradox in Christian theology continues to attract attention in contemporary philosophical theology. Much of this attention understandably centers on the epistemological problems paradoxical claims pose for Christian faith. But even among those who conclude that certain points of Christian theology are paradoxical and that belief in paradoxical points of doctrine is epistemically supportable, concepts of the nature and function of paradox in Christian theology differ significantly. In this essay, after briefly noting the diversity of phenomena that count as paradoxes in contemporary discourse, I critique two of the most helpful accounts of paradox in Christian theology available – James Anderson's and C. Stephen Evans's – on the way to proposing an alternative definition. That definition combines the most helpful features of those two accounts while correcting certain weaknesses in each. The result is a definition of paradox as a particular kind of mystery that fits the Reformed strand of Christian theology particularly well and involves a compelling analysis of the spirituality of the phenomenon of paradox in theology.     

'One Commixture of Light': Rethinking some Modern Uses and Critiques of Gregory of Nazianzus on the Unity and Equality of the Divine Persons

Gregory of Nazianzus' doctrine of the Trinity is both a constructive source and an object of critique for Leonardo Boff's account of the Trinity. I argue that Gregory's account of the unity of the Trinity in the monarchy of the Father does not entail the ontological subordination of Son and Spirit nor otherwise obviate the equality of the divine persons. On Gregory's account, the unity and equality of the divine persons is bound up with that of their distinct identities in the very particular modes in which they relate to one another: a unity transcending all human commonality. By contrast, Boff's theology of the Trinity seems to elide the real distinction between God and creatures and erode the differences between the divine persons, so subverting the social programme he derives from his doctrine.     

Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism

The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure the only thing that we desire for its own sake can be self-defeating. Why would this be true? In this paper, I survey two prominent explanations, then develop a third possible explanation, inspired by Joseph Butler's classic discussion of the paradox. The existing accounts claim that the paradox arises because we are systematically incompetent at predicting what will make us happy, or because the greatest pleasures for human beings are found in certain special goods which hedonists cannot enjoy. On the account that I develop, the paradox is a consequence of a theory about the nature of pleasure, together with a view about the requirements of rational belief. Which of these explanations is correct, I argue, bears on central questions about how to understand the nature and extent of the paradox.     

Remembering War: Fabre on Remembrance

Following wars, what requirements, if any, of remembrance do we – those who live in peacetime – have? On whom do they fall? Who must be remembered? How should they be remembered? Fabre offers us an account of remembrance that answers some of those questions and provides a helpful framework for working through the others. It is philosophically nuanced as well as attuned to the complexity of war and informed by actual commemorative practices. In this article, however, I expand Fabre's list of desiderata that a good account of war remembrance must meet. I argue that Fabre's account needs to be refined and, at least in one respect, revised in light of these new desiderata.     

St. Gregory Palamas on the Divine Simplicity

Plested focuses on the doctrine of divine simplicity according to Gregory Palamas (1296‐1357/9). He is well aware of the long tradition in the West of considering Palamas's distinction between the divine essence and the energies to do harm to the reality of divine simplicity—even if many recent books on divine simplicity ignore Palamas. Plested thinks that this is in part due to the selectivity of Western readings of Palamas's corpus. Although for Palamas the divine essence is truly (not merely conceptually) distinct from what Plested terms the divine “actualizations,” Palamas insists repeatedly that his point does not undermine absolute divine simplicity. In fact, as Plested shows, Palamas considers that the real distinction between essence and energies not only supports, but indeed flows from, the doctrine of divine simplicity properly understood. Plested admits that recent Orthodox interpreters of Palamas, such as John Meyendorff and Vladimir Lossky, tend to give little attention to divine simplicity except by way of contrast with Western accounts of the doctrine. But Plested argues that Palamas's doctrine of divine simplicity is better interpreted as in accord with the fundamental intuitions of his Latin contemporaries, even if expressed in a different metaphysical framework. Examining certain lesser‐known works of Palamas, Plested identifies a set of important interpretative keys for understanding Palamas's account of divine simplicity, including the normative role of the principles of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680‐1) and the necessity of appreciating the historical contexts in which he wrote specific works.     

THE ONE STORY: A CRITIQUE OF DAVID KELSEY'S THEOLOGICAL ROBOTICS

In this article I argue that David Kelsey's approach to theological anthropology is problematic. I argue that a narrative basis proves inadequate to establish the doctrine of the Trinity and its relationship to human beings. Similarly, a Reformed humanist starting point, together with a Reformed extrinsicist account of revelation, I argue, cannot arrive at an orthodox Christology or an account of humanity as a divine gift. By bypassing ontology in favour of narrative and positivity, Kelsey is ironically forced to deny the truth of many passages of the Bible, especially the opening of Genesis, and to reject the Biblical doctrine of the image of God in humanity.     

A Parsimonious Model of Divine Simplicity

Many recent treatments of divine simplicity have been highly critical of traditional accounts of the doctrine. Critics have challenged whether the doctrine is coherent and whether it can be squared with a robust theology of the triune God. Yet the theological tradition is largely persuaded that the doctrine of divine simplicity is not only coherent and true, but also that the doctrine of divine simplicity is needed for an account of the Trinity that does not fall into the trap of tritheism. In addition, both Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions include conciliar and confessional support for the doctrine, and allow for more than one way of accounting for the doctrine. This essay offers a constructive account that seeks to avoid some of the most significant concerns raised in the recent theological and philosophical literature. It depends in important respects upon work being done in analytic theology on the use of models in theology, adopted (with suitable amendments) from the philosophy of science. After giving some dogmatic context, three versions of divine simplicity are laid out. Then, a parsimonious version of the doctrine is set forth and considered as a potentially fruitful model, which may have theological utility. The essay ends with some remarks about the way in which this new model of the doctrine may have value in ecumenical theology.     

Contemplating the One who Remains the Same: Augustine,Swinburne, and Psalm 102 on the Relation between Divine Immutability and Theological Reason

This article defends a classical doctrine of divine immutability by contending that the most influential objections lodged against it by theologians and philosophers such as Richard Swinburne–i.e. that divine immutability is speculative rather than practical, is philosophical rather than biblical, and fails to cohere with a ‘personal’ God who relates to creatures–are rooted in a particular construal of theological reason. I diagnose Swinburne’s account of theological reason with the help of Karl Barth’s interpretation of Anselm, and put forth a contrasting account of divine immutability, rooted in a distinct approach to theological reason, through a theological interpretation of Psalm 102, an analysis of the Creator/creature distinction, and an examination of Augustine’s De trinitate.     

Bocheński on divine providence and human freedom

Prior to his ‘naturalistic turn’, Bocheński was a Thomist and defended the Thomist doctrine as a logically consistent and attractive philosophical system. Some opponents of Thomism interpreted this doctrine, Aquinas’s conception of divine providence included, as a kind of theological fatalism (or theological determinism) incompatible with human freedom. Bocheński dismissed such interpretations as based on “a superficial misunderstanding.” I will try to demonstrate that his criticism of deterministic interpretations of Thomism was not quite justified. The article will present, first, Bocheński’s account of the Thomist doctrine of divine providence, next, the arguments for theological fatalism leading to the conclusion that there is no freedom if Aquinas’s conception of divine nature is assumed. Finally, I will try to show how the dispute between Thomism and its opponents is rooted in some fundamental differences concerning the very concept of human freedom.     

THE OBJECTIVITY OF OBLIGATIONS IN DIVINE MOTIVATION THEORY: On Imitation and Submission

To support her divine motivation theory of the good, which seeks to ground ethics in motives and emphasize the attractiveness of morality over against the compulsion of morality, Linda Zagzebski has proposed an original account of obligations which grounds them in motives. I argue that her account renders obligations objectionably person‐relative and that the most promising way to avoid my criticism is to embrace something quite close to a divine command theory of obligation. This requires her to combine her desired emphasis on the imitation of God with a contrasting emphasis on submission to God. I conclude that her divine motivation theory of the good, if it is to have an adequate account of obligation, is dependent on a divine will or divine command theory of obligation.     

Divine simplicity

According to a doctrine widely held by most medieval philosophers and theologians, whether in the Muslim or Christian world, there are no metaphysical distinctions in God whatsoever. As a result of the compendious theorizing that has been done on this issue, the doctrine, usually called the doctrine of divine simplicity, has been bestowed a prominent status in both Islamic and Christian philosophical theology. In Islamic philosophy some well-known philosophers, such as Ibn Sina (980–1037) and Mulla Sadra (1571–1640), developed this doctrine through a metaphysical approach. In this paper, considering the historical order, I shall first concentrate on Ibn Sina’s view. Then I shall turn to the theory of divine simplicity of Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274), as the most developed and comprehensive version of the medieval theories in Christian world. Finally, I will return to Islamic philosophy and explore the more complicated and mature account of the doctrine as it was introduced by Mulla Sadra according to his own philosophical principles.     

Christ, Spirit and Atonement

The Christian doctrine of the atonement is complex, not least in part because it must hold together the integrity of both divine and human being. Too often attempts to expound theologies of atonement have foundered because they have pitted divine and human action in competition one with the other. This article addresses itself to this problematic by suggesting three minimum conditions which must be met if this doctrine is to a give a theologically plausible account of salvation: first, that divine and human activity not be identified; second, that divine and human activity not be co-ordinated so as to complete or complement each other; and third, that neither divine nor human activity be rendered superfluous. The article elaborates upon these conditions by taking as its test case the Christian claim: God was in Christ.