Doing and refraining from refraining

The main purpose of this paper is to prove that in everystit semantic structure that contains a busy choice sequence, neither does doing imply refraining from refraining from doing, nor does refraining from refraining from doing imply doing.     

Concepts about agency constrain beliefs about visual experience

Recent research exploring phenomena such as change blindness, inattentional blindness, attentional blink and repetition blindness has revealed a number of counterintuitive ways in which apparently salient visual stimuli often go unnoticed. In fact, large majorities of subjects sometimes predict that they would detect visual changes that actually are rarely noticed, suggesting that people have strong beliefs about visual experience that are demonstrably incorrect. However, for other kinds of visual metacognition, such as picture memory, people underpredict performance. This paper describes two experiments demonstrating that both these overpredictions of change detection, and underpredictions of visual memory can be linked with intuitions about the visual experience of different kinds of agents. Subjects predicted more visual change detection and poorer visual memory for mechanical representational systems (e.g. computer programs) when these were anthropomorphized using intentional terminology.     

Busy choice sequences refraining formulas and modalities

The purpose of this paper is to present some results instit theory, a theory of agency proposed by N. Belnap and M. Perloff. We will establish a correspondence between the numbers ofstit modalities and the complexity degrees ofbusy choice sequences in semantic structures, and consequently, a correspondence between the number of modes of actions/inactions instit theory and the complexity degrees ofbusy choice sequences in semantic structures.I would like to give thanks to professor N. Belnap for his special help and encouragement, and to the referees provided by this journal for their helpful suggestions in improving this paper.Presented byMelvin Fitting     

Discrepancy between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency: Implications for sense of agency and its disorders

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that “I am the one who is controlling external events through my own action”. A distinction between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency has been proposed theoretically. However, there has not been sufficient experimental evidence to support this distinction. We have assessed separate explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population and investigated their relationships. Intentional binding task was employed as an implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an explicit measure, which are known to reflect clinical symptoms of disorders in the sense of agency. The results of the implicit measure and explicit measure were not correlated, suggesting dissociation of the explicit judgement of agency and the implicit feeling of agency.     

Concepts of bounded agency in education,work, and the personal lives of young adults

This paper traces the development of a series of Anglo‐German studies on how young adults experience control and exercise personal agency as they pass through periods of transition in education and training, work, unemployment, and in their personal lives. The overarching aim has been to develop an extended dialogue between ideas and evidence to explore the beliefs and actions associated with life‐chances under differing structural and cultural conditions. What kinds of beliefs and perspectives do people have on their future possibilities? How far do they feel in control of their lives? How does people's belief in what is possible for them (their personal horizons developed within cultural and structural influences) determine their behaviours and what they perceive to be “choices”? This research contributes to the re‐conceptualization of agency as a process in which past habits and routines are contextualized and future possibilities envisaged in the contingencies of the present moment. The paper concludes by explaining the concept of “bounded agency” as an alternative to “structured individualization” as a way of understanding the experiences of people in changing social landscapes.     

Grounding principles for inferring agency: Two cultural perspectives

The present research investigates cultural variation in grounding principles for inferring agency in order to address an important theoretical debate: does cultural diversity in agency concepts reflect an animistic overextension of (universal) folkpsychology, as many have argued, or an alternative theory of folkcommunication based on relational principles? In two experiments, mind perception measures were adapted to assess beliefs concerning the agency of non-animal kinds (plants, abiotic kinds, complex artifacts) among Indigenous Ngöbe adults in Panama and US college students. Agency attributions varied systematically, with Ngöbe ascribing greater agency to non-animal natural kinds and US college participants ascribing greater agency to complex artifacts. Analysis of explanations revealed divergent interpretations of agency as a prototypically human capacity requiring consciousness (US), versus a relational capacity expressed in directed interactions (Ngöbe). Converging measures further illuminated the inferential principles underlying these agency attributions. (1) An experimental relational framing of agency probes facilitated Ngöbe but not US agency attributions. (2) Further analysis showed that three key dimensions of agency attribution (experience, cognition, animacy) are organized differently across cultures. (3) A Bayesian approach to cultural consensus modeling confirmed the presence of two distinct consensus models rather than variations on a single (universal) model. Together, these results indicate that conceptual frameworks for agency differ across US college and Ngöbe communities. We conclude that Ngöbe concepts of agency derive from a distinct theory of folkcommunication based on an ecocentric prototype rather than overextensions of an anthropocentric folkpsychology. These observations suggest that folkpsychology and mind perception represent culture specific frameworks for agency, with significant implications for domain-specificity theory and our understanding of cognitive diversity.     

Agency without autonomy: valuational agency

National minority women's defense of non-liberal minority cultures that encompass sexist customs and rules has greatly perplexed liberal theorists. Many attempted to resolve this puzzle by attributing constrained agency to such women and dismissing their defense as unreasonable. This article argues that this liberal assessment of minority women's position is philosophically indefensible and that the failure of mainstream liberalism to make sense of these women's response indicates not that these women's agency is compromised but rather that the liberal conception of agency as autonomy has limits in its cross-cultural applicability. An alternative conception of agency, valuational agency, that illuminates minority women's agency is proposed as a more plausible alternative for radically pluralistic societies.     

Concepts: a potboiler

An informal, but revisionist, discussion of the role that the concept of a concept plays in recent theories of the cognitive mind. It is argued that the practically universal assumption that concepts are (at least partially) individuated by their roles in inferences is probably mistaken. A revival of conceptual atomism appears to be the indicated alternative.     

Mars: Science Before Settlement

I review Mars science goals, including those associated with the study of Mars’ past and present habitability, as well as those associated with understanding Mars’ atmosphere and climate. I argue that Mars settlement initiatives would likely frustrate attempts to satisfy many of these goals, and therefore that it would be prudent for the Mars science community to prioritize those investigations most threatened by human settlement of Mars.     

Educating Semiosis: Foundational Concepts for an Ecological Edusemiotic

Studies in Philosophy and Education - Many edusemiotic writers have begun to closely align edusemitoics to biosemiotics; the basic logic being that, if the life process can be defined through the...     

Plasticity in development: Concepts and issues for intervention

Because of its pertinence both to key theoretical issues and to applied concerns, plasticity is a central concept within developmental psychology. Our concept of plasticity derives from a comparative developmental, probabilistic epigenetic perspective: Plasticity is the relative flexibility, or capacity to modify behavior to fit contextual demands, shown by a species (or individual) at its most advanced level of development. We argue that processes of development should be conceived of as plastic, and that they should be studied in relation to constancies and constraints on change. Finally, we indicate that, for intervenors, plasticity represents a double-edged sword: Processes available to be changed for the better may be also changed for tho worse. As such, we discuss several developmental and contextual issues that must be confronted by intervenors if a person's potential plasticity across life is to be actualized in the service of enhancing or optimizing the life course.     

Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite

Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, group identification and team reasoning. I argue that the account of shared intentions this approach yields is less cognitively and conceptually demanding than other accounts and is thus applicable to the intentional joint actions performed by young children. I also argue that it has limitations of its own and that considering what these limitations are may help us understand why we sometimes need to take other routes to shared intentions.