单个概率事件形式表述的MHD问题新质疑

以单个概率事件形式表述的“超级思维黑洞”MHD问题的学术价值在文章中遭到具体的质疑.文章首先介绍了Baumann基于一个以单个概率事件形式表述的“两嘉宾一轿车”版本的MHD问题对上述问题所展开的讨论、所引起的争论及其探讨所存在的缺陷;然后重点阐述了笔者以MHD问题中嘉宾最后选择策略的意义为基点所展开的新质疑.根据笔者的推导,在单个概率事件形式表述的MHD问题中将得出一个极端荒谬的结论:嘉宾获车的概率决定于嘉宾的主观意念.这一结论的出现显示出该形式的MHD问题应该遭受质疑.     

Linda问题的表象-命题双表征解释视角探究

本文首先提出了Linda问题的表象-命题双表征这一新的解释视角。该视角认为,Linda问题基于表象表征和命题表征可以有两种不同的解读与表征方式;而不同的被试在Linda问题上可能分别采取了上述表征方式之一;但由于Linda问题的特殊性,大多数被试采用了表象表征;大多数被试的这一表征取向则可能是所谓谬误判断出现的原因。本文通过4项研究,让被试在基于表象表征设计的转述版本与基于命题表征设计的转述版间选择接近自身理解的版本;并考察了将Linda问题修改成更符合命题表征的数学化表达形式能否降低所谓谬误水平;还考察了增加促使被试运用命题表征的排序项"Linda是全人类中的一员"能否降低所谓谬误水平。结果显示,在转述版本选择上,大多数被试选择了基于表象表征设计的版本;而上文所指的两个修正版Linda问题则都降低了被试的所谓谬误水平。这些结果支持了本文所提的视角。     

信息表征形式对初中生解决MHD问题的影响

研究以经典MHD问题作为实验任务,通过两个实验分别探讨了心理模型表征与条件关系表征、以及文字表述辅以图形的表征对初中生解决MHD问题的影响.结果发现:(1)心理模型表征与明确选手行为与主持人行为之间的条件关系表征都没有有效促进被试解决MHD问题;(2)文字表述辅以图形的表征显著提高了被试MHD问题的推理成绩.这似乎说明对初中生而言,适当的信息表征形式有助于促进其解决MHD问题.     

非参数认知诊断方法下诊断结果的概率化表征

非参数认知诊断分类方法非常适合课堂评估,其诊断结果采用0-1形式而缺乏概率化表征,不能精细地区分被试属性掌握程度的差异或变化,还缺乏可用于评价真实测验分类结果的信度和效度指标。要刻画被试属性掌握程度的差异,首要的问题是要为非参数认知诊断方法提供一种可以量化属性掌握概率的方法。针对此问题,基于二项分布和玻尔兹曼分布提出非参数认知诊断方法下诊断结果的概率化表征方法,并用于构建分类准确性和分类一致性指标。模拟研究与实测数据分析结果显示：概率化表征方法与非参数认知诊断方法的分类结果高度一致;概率化表征方法与认知诊断模型所得的属性掌握概率十分接近;概率化表征方法所得的属性（模式）掌握概率可用于计算属性（模式）分类准确性和分类一致性指标,在实际测验情景下可作为信度和效度指标,评价诊断结果的重测一致率和判准率。     

感知运动信息在概念表征中的作用

研究概念的表征问题对理解概念的本质非常重要,传统认知和具身认知视角下的概念表征理论争议的焦点在于感觉运动信息在表征中的作用。传统认知视角下的离身认知认为感知觉运动信息会转化成抽象的符号,概念表征不包含感知觉运动信息。概念表征的具身观点认为感知觉运动信息是概念表征的基础。对感知运动信息在概念表征中起作用这一命题已经达成共识。未来研究应该关注感知运动信息起作用的机制,以及抽象概念表征等问题,进一步完善发展概念表征理论。     

Monty Hall Dilemma的困难原因探讨

采用Monty Hall Dilemma的经典研究范式,探讨了大学生被试在不同提示条件下对MHD问题的解决情况,结果发现只有在条件关系提示下,MHD的作业成绩才得到了明显的改善,但是正确率也只有35.7%。这表明MHD问题困难的原因很可能是多方面的,如认为主持人的行为完全是随机事件,很难意识到参与者的最初选择与主持人打开特定盒子间的三种条件关系;多数被试作出选择的理由是非理性的,如“坚持第一选择,相信自己的直觉”;不能正确判断MHD问题的内在概率关系以及缺乏认真思考的动力等。     

国外有关时间表征的研究

在时间认知的研究中,时间表征是人们研究较多的一个问题。在人的记忆系统中,人们是如何表征并储存时间信息的呢?对此心理学家提出了不同的看法,归结起来大约有四种理论观点:记忆组织理论;记忆强度理论、顺序编码理论和重建理论。J.F.William,把心理时间分为三种,即逻辑时间,经验时间和习俗时间。而习俗时间(诸如年、月、日等)与人们的关系最密切,他认为,人们主要有两种习俗时间的表征方式,即词表目录表征和意象表征,前者是言语编码,后者是表象编码,并且儿童习俗时间表征的发展也是从词表目录表征过渡到意象表征。     

来源检测对表象引发的错误记忆的影响

采用“学习-再认”模式,考察来源检测对表象引发的错误记忆的影响。结果发现,在再认任务中,正确再认观察项目与想象项目的反应时差异不显著,但在源检测中,正确再认观察项目显著快于正确再认想象项目; 再认时与源检测时的错误再认率差异不显著,但对想象项目的错误再认率显著高于对观察项目。这表明,表象会导致错误记忆发生,提高来源检测操纵并不能够削弱表象引发的错误记忆。根据研究结果提出“表象激活混淆假设”,认为人们虽然使用表象的信息表征方式,却无法获取与之联系的激活路径,容易混淆表象激活的来源。表象激活混淆是表象引发错误记忆的机制。     

抽象概念表征的具身认知观

抽象概念是否通过感知经验来表征以及如何被感知经验表征是具身认知面临的一大问题.在抽象概念表征是否具有感知经验基础的问题上,具身认知理论认为抽象概念通过情境模拟或隐喻与感知经验发生联系.在抽象概念如何与感知经验表征发生联系的问题上,概念模拟理论强调情景或运动模拟在抽象概念表征中的直接作用;概念隐喻理论则侧重具体经验或具体经验与抽象概念之间的共同结构关系在抽象概念表征中的间接作用.未来研究应改变概念表征的稳定的心理实体观,从语言和抽象表征的关系、正常儿童和特殊群体的抽象概念表征差异入手,整合不同的具身认知观点.     

表象表征的容量:组块4

该研究采用从1位数到9位数的数为刺激材料对58名年龄21.00±1.23岁的大学生进行心理旋转研究,从而探讨表象表征的容量,实验的刺激有四种类型:数字—数字对应、汉字—汉字对应、数字—汉字对应、汉字—数字对应,每种刺激类型呈现18次,共72试次随机呈现。心理旋转的角度有两个:45°、315°,实验中的数均包含正像和镜像两种形式。结果表明:(1)表象表征的容量是4个组块,以4为分界线,认知资源分配不同;(2)表象表征在容量小于4个组块时占优势,以4为分界线,表象表征与命题表征的作用不同,命题表征表现出较强的稳定性;(3)表象表征是自下而上的加工,受刺激物理特性的影响大。     

Evaluating the mind's eye: the metacognition of visual imagery

Can people evaluate phenomenal qualities of internally generated experiences, such as whether a mental image is vivid or detailed? This question exemplifies a problem of metacognition: How well do people know their own thoughts? In the study reported here, participants were instructed to imagine a specific visual pattern and rate its vividness, after which they were presented with an ambiguous rivalry display that consisted of the previously imagined pattern plus an orthogonal pattern. On individual trials, higher ratings of vividness predicted a greater likelihood that the imagined pattern would appear dominant when the participant was subsequently presented with the binocular rivalry display. Off-line self-report questionnaires measuring imagery vividness also predicted individual differences in the strength of imagery bias over the entire study. Perceptual bias due to mental imagery could not be attributed to demand characteristics, as no bias was observed on catch-trial presentations of mock rivalry displays. Our findings provide novel evidence that people have a good metacognitive understanding of their own mental imagery and can reliably evaluate the vividness of single episodes of imagination.     

顿悟问题思维僵局早期觉察的脑电研究

思维僵局不仅是顿悟问题有别于常规问题的重要要素, 而且是顿悟赖以实现的基础。先前研究虽对顿悟瞬间的脑认知活动进行了较充分的探讨, 但却较少对思维僵局的有关过程进行研究。思维僵局究竟是源于早期的知觉阶段还是晚期的问题加工阶段至今仍是未解之谜, 但它却是人们认识顿悟过程所必需的。只有充分认识和理解了该过程, 才可能更全面地理解顿悟究竟建立在怎样的脑认知表征的基础之上。研究运用ERPs技术, 采用猜谜任务范式对顿悟中思维僵局产生的阶段及其脑认知活动进行了探讨。研究发现, 在120~210 ms和620~800 ms内, “有僵局”谜题较之“无僵局”谜题在额-中央区分别诱发了一个更正的P170和晚期LPC。其中, P170主要反映人脑对思维僵局的早期觉察, LPC则主要表征人脑经过一定解题尝试后对前期预评估僵局的修正和有意识反思。这些结果挑战了传统的思维僵局的晚期产生假说, 支持思维僵局的“早期产生机制”假说, 表明人脑在早期知觉阶段就能直觉地觉察思维僵局的存在。     

Are we free to imagine what we choose?

It has long been recognized that we have a great deal of freedom to imagine what we choose. This paper explores a thesis—what we call “intentionalism (about the imagination)”—that provides a way of making this evident (if vague) truism precise. According to intentionalism, the contents of your imaginings are simply determined by whatever contents you intend to imagine. Thus, for example, when you visualize a building and intend it to be of King’s College rather than a replica of the college you have imagined the former rather than the latter because you intended to imagine King’s College. This is so even if the visual image you conjure up equally resembles either. This paper proposes two kinds of counterexamples to intentionalism and discusses their significance. In particular, it sketches a positive account of how many sensory imaginings get to be about what they are about, which explains how the causal history of our mental imagery can prevent us from succeeding in imagining what we intended.

     

Einstein’s jacket: Evidence for long-term perceptual specificity in mental imagery

To what extent are visual fantasies constrained by our perceptual experience of the real world? Our study exploits the fact that people’s knowledge of the appearance of individuals from the early 20th Century (e.g., Albert Einstein, Winston Churchill) derives predominantly from viewing black-and-white media images. An initial experiment shows that mental imagery for individuals from this period are experienced as significantly less colourful than imagery for individuals from the era of colour media. A second experiment manipulated whether participants were instructed to explicitly imagine using colour or not (i.e., “imagine Albert Einstein wearing a green jacket” vs. “imagine Albert Einstein wearing a jacket”). Results show that colour manipulation only influences imagery for black-and-white era individuals, with no comparable effect on imagery for colour era individuals. This finding is replicated in a third experiment that includes an additional control condition of imagining generic characters (i.e., “Imagine a knight wearing a cloak” vs. “imagine a knight wearing a red cloak”). Again, only imagery for black-and-white era individuals is affected by the colour manipulation. Overall these results provide evidence for long-term perceptual specificity effects in mental imagery. We argue that visual fantasies can be constrained by surface features of underlying representations in memory, even when imagining something we have never directly perceived.     

Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.     

When 9 is not on the right: Implications from number-form synesthesia

Number-form synesthetes consciously experience numbers in spatially-defined locations. For non-synesthete individuals, a similar association of numbers and space appears in the form of an implicit mental number line as signified by the distance effect–reaction time decreases as the numerical distance between compared numbers increases. In the current experiment, three number-form synesthetes and two different non-synesthete control groups (Hebrew speaking and English speaking) performed a number comparison task. Synesthete participants exhibited a sizeable distance effect only when presented numbers were congruent with their number-form. In contrast, the controls exhibited a distance effect regardless of congruency or presentation type. The findings suggest that: (a) number-form synesthesia impairs the ability to represent numbers in a flexible manner according to task demands; (b) number-form synesthesia is a genuine tangible experience, triggered involuntarily; and (c) the classic mental number line can be more pliable than previously thought and appears to be independent of cultural-lingo direction.     

Mental representations of obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs

Every traffic sign conveys a single proposition about traffic conditions. Drivers must integrate this proposition with their goals and other known facts to decide on an appropriate action in what amounts to a deduction task. For example, imagine that you are driving a car and you want to turn right at an intersection but there is a no right turn sign. You have to assess the options and make a decision (reach a conclusion). Theoretical accounts from research about reasoning can be applied to how we understand traffic signs and make inferences from them. This study includes two experiments that analysed how people decide whether a situation is allowed or not, taking into account the information provided by one sign - obligatory or prohibitory - or two signs - two obligatory or two prohibitory signs. The number of signs, that is, the complexity of the driving scene, was a key factor in this study. The two experiments differ in the presentation format of the two-sign experimental condition. In the first experiment, the signs were presented as two isolated signs. In the second experiment, the two signs were embedded in one. Equivalent results were found whether two isolated signs or two embedded signs were shown. When an obligatory sign was used at the junction, faster responses were obtained for allowed manoeuvres than for those not allowed. When a prohibitory sign was used, the results were the opposite. However, the advantage of prohibitory signs in the not-allowed situation was not replicated when people had to collect information from two prohibitory signs. Results showed that people integrate two obligatory sign messages - informing where one can go - more easily than two prohibitory sign messages - informing where not to go. Therefore, it could be said that each traffic sign elicits an internal mental model elaboration in which forbidden actions are explicitly labelled by means of attached "mental footnotes" indicating the epistemic status of "prohibitory information."     

Treatment Participation among Children with Conduct Problems and the Role of Telephone Reminders

Children with antisocial, aggressive and disruptive behaviour problems are among the most frequent referrals to mental health services. These young people and their families present with a range of adverse contextual factors and can prove challenging to engage. We examined the characteristics of children with conduct problems, treatment participation, and the impact of telephone reminder calls. Consecutive referrals (N=262) to two child and youth mental health services were randomly assigned to either a reminder call condition or service as usual. In comparison to referrals without conduct problems, conduct problem children presented with greater sources of psychosocial adversity, attended fewer initial appointments and were at greater risk of treatment refusal. Importantly, telephone reminder calls significantly increased treatment attendance, though only for participants with elevated conduct problems. Telephone reminder calls, however, had no impact on treatment refusal, regardless of conduct problem status. The findings highlight a straightforward approach for enhancing treatment participation among a group that has been challenging for mental health services.     

表征影响三门问题解决的实验研究

本实验选取120名大一学生,设计了四种不同的处理,研究表征对解决三门问题及其迁移问题的影响,结果表明:(1)三门问题困难原因有害怕后悔、控制错觉和错误表征问题空间等,其中错误表征问题空间是主要原因。(2)清晰表征选手行为和主持人行为的逻辑关系显著地促进了三门问题的解决,而只有在逻辑关系基础上的频率表征才能够更进一步地促进三门问题的解决,在此基础上概率形式的信息表征没有更显著的促进作用。(3)在逻辑关系分解基础上的频率表征无论对结构相似还是内容相似的迁移问题的解决都有最好的正迁移效果。     

A randomised Monty Hall experiment: The positive effect of conditional frequency feedback

The Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) is a notorious probability problem with a counterintuitive solution. There is a strong tendency to stay with the initial choice, despite the fact that switching doubles the probability of winning. The current randomised experiment investigates whether feedback in a series of trials improves behavioural performance on the MHD and increases the level of understanding of the problem. Feedback was either conditional or non-conditional, and was given either in frequency format or in percentage format. Results show that people learn to switch most when receiving conditional feedback in frequency format. However, problem understanding does not improve as a consequence of receiving feedback. Our study confirms the dissociation between behavioural performance on the MHD, on one hand, and actual understanding of the MHD, on the other. We discuss how this dissociation can be understood.