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Summary The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization.In our discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of ‘causing’ in downward causation? We have concluded that the concept of ‘downward causation’ is muddled with regard to the meaning of causation and fuzzy with regard to the nature of the causes and the effects. Moreover, we have concluded that ‘causation’ in respect of ‘downward causation’ is usually understood in terms of explanation and determination rather than in terms of causation in the sense of ‘bringing about’. Thus, the term ‘downward causation’ is badly chosen. 相似文献
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Philosophia - If we lack deep free agency, like that supposed by metaphysical libertarianism, should we view life as meaningless, pointless, or not worth living? Here I present a new argument in... 相似文献
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Stephanie Collins 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2018,26(3):354-375
ABSTRACTThe Assistance Principle is common currency to a wide range of moral theories. Roughly, this principle states: if you can fulfil important interests, at not too high a cost, then you have a moral duty to do so. I argue that, in determining whether the ‘not too high a cost’ clause of this principle is met, we must consider three distinct costs: ‘agent-relative costs’, ‘recipient-relative costs’ and ‘ideal-relative costs’. 相似文献
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Clayton Littlejohn 《Philosophia》2012,40(4):821-828
According to ??ought?? implies ??can?? (OIC), your obligation can never be to do what you cannot do. In a recent attack on OIC, Graham has argued that intuitions about justified intervention can help us determine whether the agent whose actions we use force to prevent would have acted permissibly or not. These intuitions, he suggests, cause trouble for the idea that you can be obligated to refrain from doing what you can refrain from doing. I offer a defense of OIC and explain how non-consequentialists can accommodate his intuitions about his cases 相似文献
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Barbara H. Fried 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(1):39-66
This paper examines the efforts of contractualists to develop an alternative to aggregation to govern our duty not to harm
(duty to rescue) others. I conclude that many of the moral principles articulated in the literature seem to reduce to aggregation
by a different name. Those that do not are viable only as long as they are limited to a handful of oddball cases at the margins
of social life. If extended to run-of-the-mill conduct that accounts for virtually all unintended (in the sense of undesired)
harm to others—noncriminal activities that impose some risk of harm on others—they would rule out all action. Moreover, because
such conduct poses an irreducible conflict between freedom of action and freedom from expected harm, it can be regulated only
by principles that accept the necessity of making precisely the sorts of interpersonal trade-offs that contractualism is foundationally
committed to reject: trade-offs in which the numbers count, such that a risk of serious harm to one person can be justified
by small benefits to the many. 相似文献
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David Botting 《Argumentation》2011,25(1):23-36
Traditionally, logicians construed fallacies as mistakes in inference, as things that looked like good (i.e., deductively
valid) arguments but were not. Two fallacies stood out like a sore thumb on this view of fallacies: the fallacy of many questions
(because it does not even look like a good argument, or any kind of argument) and the fallacy of petitio principii (because
it looks like and is a good argument). The latter is the concern of this paper. One possible response is to say that the tradition
is right about the concept of fallacy but wrong about its extension: petitio principii is not a fallacy. If the only proper
ways to criticize an argument are to say that it is invalid or that it is unsound, and petitio principii is not criticisable
on either of these counts, then calling it a fallacy is tantamount to saying we should prefer invalid or unsound arguments
Robinson (Analysis, 31(4): 114 ,1971). I will present a third way to logically criticize arguments and show that fallacious instances of petitio principii are
so criticisable while other instances of petitio principii are non-fallacious; hence, this fallacy is not a reductio of the
Standard Treatment. It is not my intention in this paper to come out on the side of any of the competing theories—the Standard
Treatment, the dialectical theories, and the epistemic theories—as general theories of fallacy. I show only that petitio principii
can be handled by something closely resembling the Standard Treatment in so far as that, on entirely logistical principles,
there can be made a distinction such that circular arguments form at best a degenerate kind of argument. Circular arguments
look like good arguments but are not, not because they are deductively invalid (which they are not) but because they do not
deserve to be called arguments at all. 相似文献
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The Psychological Record - 相似文献
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Rob van Someren Greve 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2014,17(5):913-922
According to the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it is never the case that you ought to do something you cannot do. While many accept this principle in some form, it also has its share of critics, and thus it seems desirable if an argument can be offered in its support. The aim of this paper is to examine a particular way in which the principle has been defended, namely, by appeal to considerations of fairness. In a nutshell, the idea (due to David Copp) is that moral requirements we cannot comply with would be unfair, and there cannot be unfair moral requirements. I discuss several ways of spelling out the argument, and argue that all are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons. 相似文献
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Moti Mizrahi 《Philosophia》2012,40(4):829-840
In this paper, I argue that the ??Ought Implies Can?? (OIC) principle, as it is employed in epistemology, particularly in the literature on epistemic norms, is open to counterexamples. I present a counterexample to OIC and discuss several objections to it. If this counterexample works, then it shows that it is possible that S ought to believe that p, even though S cannot believe that p. If this is correct, then OIC, considered from an epistemic point of view, is false, since it is supposed to hold for any S and any p. 相似文献
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We examined the hypothesis that the conscious self-correction process in the models of lay citizens’ determination of punishment
could inhibit the retributive goal that was their instinctive default objective. In two experiments, we tested whether an
instruction to ignore the retributive goal could eliminate the influence of information about the seriousness of the crime
on the severity of the punishment. If the retributive goal can be inhibited, the instruction would eliminate the information’s
influence on the punishment’s severity. However, the persistence of the information’s influence would mean that the retributive
goal is not inhibited. The result showed that the instruction eliminated the influence of information that decreased the crime’s
seriousness but could barely reduce the influence of information that increased the seriousness. We concluded that self-correction
cannot inhibit the retributive goal when its inhibition would lead to a more lenient punishment. 相似文献
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Peter Schulte 《European Journal of Philosophy》2014,22(2):249-268
Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher‐level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower‐level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher‐level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some truthmaker theorists—most prominently David Armstrong—have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that these entities are ‘an ontological free lunch’, i.e. real existents that are still ‘no addition of being’. This answer is prima facie attractive, but I argue in this paper that the standard approaches to truthmaking—modal theories and grounding theories—are unable to vindicate the doctrine of the ontological free lunch, and thus fail to solve the problem of higher‐level entities. Fortunately, there is a non‐standard account of truthmaking available, the reductive explanation account, which succeeds where the standard approaches fail. 相似文献
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Anders Kraal 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2013,73(3):221-233
Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity (1974) contains a largely neglected argument for the claim that the proposition “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good” is logically consistent with “the vast amount and variety of evil the universe actually contains” (not to be confused with Plantinga’s famous “Free Will Defense,” which seeks to show that this same proposition is logically consistent with “some evil”). In this paper I explicate this argument, and argue that it assumes that there is more moral good than evil in the cosmos. I consider two arguments in favour of this assumption, proposed by William King and Plantinga respectively, and argue that they are flawed. I then consider a sceptical objection to the assumption due to David Hume, and argue that this objection is at least prima facie plausible. 相似文献
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Griet Vandermassen 《Sex roles》2008,59(7-8):482-491
As a Darwinian feminist I welcome any attempt at correcting the historical neglect of women’s roles in human evolution, as Rebecca J. Hannagan (2008, in this issue) does in her paper “Gendered Political Behavior: A Darwinian Feminist Approach.” There is much to be said for the view that women’s political agency in foraging societies has systematically been underestimated, due to a combination of researcher bias and the lesser visibility of women’s political strategies. As a feminist Darwinian, however, I must conclude that wishful thinking seems to have led Hannagan into overestimating the degree of female autonomy and leadership in these societies. 相似文献
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In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it. 相似文献
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