Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

Response speeding mediates the contributions of cue familiarity and target retrievability to metamnemonic judgments

Metamnemonic judgments are influenced by the retrievability of the target memory in question, but also by the familiarity of the cue used to elicit such judgments. However, there have been few suggestions as to what factors mediate the influence of these different sources of information on metamnemonic judgments. In this experiment, I examined the interactions between prediction time pressure and variables that promote either cue familiarity or target retrievability. The data reveal that target retrievability plays a larger role than does cue familiarity in fostering predictions of future recall made under unpressured conditions, but that cue familiarity influences predictions that are speeded. This pattern is interpreted by analogy with recognition memory: Mnemonic evidence based on familiarity is more impervious to the demands of time pressure than are the products of deliberative retrieval. Several explanations for this effect are suggested.     

The Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect: Evidence for an Artifactual Interpretation

ABSTRACT— Proponents of unconscious-thought theory assert that letting the unconscious "mull it over" can enhance decisions. In a series of recent studies, researchers demonstrated that participants whose attention was focused on solving a complex problem (i.e., those using conscious thought) made poorer choices, decisions, and judgments than participants whose attention was distracted from the problem (i.e., those purportedly using unconscious thought). We argue that this finding, rather than establishing the existence of a deliberation-without-attention effect, is explained more compellingly in terms of the well-established distinction between on-line and memory-based judgments. In Experiment 1 , we reversed the recent finding by simply changing participants' on-line processing goal from impression formation to memorization. Experiment 2 provided a replication and further established that some cognitive effort appears necessary to produce both the original pattern of results and its reversal, suggesting that such judgments are ultimately a product of conscious, rather than unconscious, thinking.     

Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Expectations of consistency about the self: Consequences for self-concept formation

This study proposes that the on-line versus memory-based judgment distinction has important implications for understanding self-concept formation and content. Past research has shown that perceivers form on-line judgments of targets who are expected to display a great deal of behavioral consistency (e.g., individuals) but form memory-based judgments of targets who are expected to display less behavioral consistency (e.g., groups). Experiment 1 found that perceptions of behavioral consistency for the self were strong and closer to perceptions of consistency for individuals than for groups. Thus, we predicted that self-concepts should, by default, be formed on-line. Experiment 2 supported this prediction. Experiment 3 manipulated participants’ expectations of behavior consistency and found that those expecting greater consistency in their behaviors formed on-line self-concepts. Experiment 4 used a different methodology and behavioral domain, and it collected more direct process data that further supported the importance of the on-line versus memory-based distinction for the self. Implications for understanding self-concepts and for comparing self-knowledge to how people understand other types of social entities are discussed.     

An exemplar-retrieval model of speeded same--different judgments

R. M. Nosofsky and T. J. Palmeri's (1997) exemplar-based random-walk (EBRW) model of speeded classification is extended to account for speeded same--different judgments among integral-dimension stimuli. According to the model, an important component process of same--different judgments is that people store individual examples of experienced same and different pairs of objects in memory. These exemplar pairs are retrieved from memory on the basis of how similar they are to a currently presented pair of objects. The retrieved pairs drive a random-walk process for making same--different decisions. The EBRW predicts correctly that same responses are faster for objects lying in isolated than in dense regions of similarity space. The model also predicts correctly effects of same-identity versus same-category instructions and is sensitive to observers' past experiences with specific same and different pairs of objects.     

Task preparation based on precues versus memory: Precues lead to superior performance with two tasks but not with four tasks

There is considerable evidence that task switching proceeds more efficiently with preparation based on explicit precues than on the basis of a learned sequence of tasks. However, this evidence stems almost exclusively from experiments in which participants switched between only two tasks. In two experiments stronger preparation effects with explicit precues compared to memory-based preparation was replicated with two tasks. With four tasks, however, preparation based on memory was at least as efficient as preparation based on precues. A third experiment ruled out the possibility that this latter finding was due to increased difficulty of cue processing with two-dimensional cues. These findings question the generalisability of observations regarding preparation effects that are based on two-task situations. It is suggested that one crucial factor regarding the relative efficiency of precue-based and memory-based preparation pertains to the fact that with two tasks, the relevant task can be determined by knowing only the previous task and whether a switch is required or not. This is not possible with four tasks that require a more elaborated task representation at the outset, which in turn may be more apt to support memory-based preparation.     

On-line and memory-based modification of attitudes: determinants of message recall-attitude change correspondence

Experiments investigated the impact of message elaboration on attitude change-message recall correspondence when attitude change occurs in an on-line (as attitude-relevant information is received), or memory-based (on the basis of retrieved attitude-relevant information) fashion. In 2 experiments, Ss' processing goals were manipulated to increase or inhibit on-line change and message elaboration. As predicted, Ss reported postexposure attitudes more rapidly in on-line vs memory-based conditions. Decreased message elaboration increased attitude-recall correspondence, regardless of when attitude change occurred. Increased elaboration produced elaboration-attitude judgment correspondence. Results suggest that recall of message content will best predict persuasion when message content is encoded free of elaborations, regardless of when attitude change occurs.     

When the Rule is Ruled Out: Exemplars and Rules in Decisions from Memory

What are the cognitive processes underlying people's decisions from memory? Previous research suggests that these processes can be best described by strategies that are based on abstract knowledge about the decision task (e.g., cue–criterion relations). However, recent results show that different cue presentation formats trigger the use of different decision strategies and that exemplar‐based strategies can account for memory‐based decisions as well. In three experiments, this effect was replicated, and mediation analyses identified the quality of the underlying knowledge representation as the critical variable that determines decision behavior. This supports the view that exemplar‐based reasoning is used as a backup system if cue abstraction is hindered. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Centering on Demonstrative Thought

The nature of perceptual demonstratives, the ‘that F’ component of judgments of the form ‘that F is G’ based on perceptual input, has been a topic of interest for many philosophers. Another related, though distinct, question concerns the nature of demonstrative judgments based not on current perceptual input, but instead derived from memory. I argue that the account put forward by John Campbell fails to adequately account for memory-based demonstrative thought.     

Text cohesion and metacomprehension: Immediate and delayed judgments

In three experiments, we examined comprehension judgments made after a piece of text had been read. We propose that such metacognitive judgments are based on the content of working memory at the exact moment of assessment. Generally speaking, this working metacognition hypothesis is in agreement with Koriat's cue utilization approach, which implies that different elements of information will be available (and used) depending on the moment at which a judgment is made. More specifically, our hypothesis focuses on the management of working memory during reading as a cause for cue (un)availability. In support of these views, the results of Experiment 1 showed that a cohesion manipulation affecting the comprehension of specific paragraphs influences judgments only on these paragraphs, and not on judgments on the whole text. In Experiment 2, we showed that an interfering task that takes place just before this paragraph judgment is made wipes out this cohesion effect. Experiment 3 showed, on the other hand, that the whole-text judgment may, nevertheless, be affected by text cohesion, provided that the readers keep an access to the text when the judgment is made. These results support the idea that working memory management makes different cues available for metacognitive ratings at different delays.     

Ambivalence, Uncertainty, and Processes of Candidate Evaluation

The on-line and memory-based processing models of candidate evaluation can be better understood by incorporating the concepts of ambivalence and uncertainty, both as subjective feeling states and as objective properties of information. An experiment was designed to address three questions: What are the relationships between ambivalence and uncertainty? What are the informational foundations of subjective ambivalence and uncertainty, and to what extent are they rooted in on-line (time of exposure) and memory-based (time of judgment) processes? What are the consequences of ambivalence and uncertainty for candidate evaluation? The results suggest that (1) subjective uncertainty is more strongly rooted in information about the candidate than is subjective ambivalence; (2) subjective uncertainty and (to a lesser extent) ambivalence are associated with an increased propensity to engage in memory-based processing; and (3) subjective ambivalence and uncertainty result in more negative evaluations, particularly among less sophisticated people. These results suggest ways in which the on-line and memory-based models might productively be combined.     

The use of cue familiarity during retrieval failure is affected by past versus future orientation

Cue familiarity that is brought on by cue resemblance to memory representations is useful for judging the likelihood of a past occurrence with an item that fails to actually be retrieved from memory. The present study examined the extent to which this type of resemblance-based cue familiarity is used in future-oriented judgments made during retrieval failure. Cue familiarity was manipulated using a previously-established method of creating differing degrees of feature overlap between the cue and studied items in memory, and the primary interest was in how these varying degrees of cue familiarity would influence future-oriented feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments given in instances of cued recall failure. The present results suggest that participants do use increases in resemblance-based cue familiarity to infer an increased likelihood of future recognition of an unretrieved target, but not to the extent that they use it to infer an increased likelihood of past experience with an unretrieved target. During retrieval failure, the increase in future-oriented FOK judgments with increasing cue familiarity was significantly less than the increase in past-oriented recognition judgments with increasing cue familiarity.     

Memory-based versus on-line processing: Implications for attitude strength

Three experiments tested whether the manner in which attitudes are created—through on-line or memory-based processing—can impact the resultant strength of those attitudes. In each study, participants were presented with 20 behavioral statements about a person named Marie. Whereas some participants were asked to continually evaluate Marie based upon each sentence and then report their overall evaluation (on-line processing), others were asked to focus on the sentence structure and to evaluate Marie only after they had read all the sentences (memory-based processing). Even when controlling for attitude accessibility, attitudes created through on-line processing were stronger than attitudes created through memory-based processing: Experiment 1 showed that participants in the on-line condition felt more certain of their attitudes, Experiment 2 showed that on-line attitudes were better predictors of participants’ evaluative preferences, while Experiment 3 showed that on-line attitudes manifested stronger attitude-behavioral intention correspondence.     

Immediate judgments of learning are insensitive to implicit interference effects at retrieval

We conducted three experiments to determine whether metamemory predictions at encoding, immediate judgments of learning (IJOLs) are sensitive to implicit interference effects that will occur at retrieval. Implicit interference was manipulated by varying the association set size of the cue (Experiments 1 and 2) or the target (Experiment 3). The typical finding is that memory is worse for large-set-size cues and targets, but only when the target is studied alone and later prompted with a related cue (extralist). When the pairs are studied together (intralist), recall is the same regardless of set size; set size effects are eliminated. Metamemory predictions at retrieval, such as delayed JOLs (DJOLs) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments accurately reflect implicit interference effects (e.g., Eakin & Hertzog, 2006. In all three experiments, we found that DJOLs and FOKs accurately predicted set size effects on retrieval but that IJOLs did not. The findings provide further evidence that metamemory predictions are inferred from information other than direct access to the state of the memory trace, as well as indicate that inferences are based on different sources depending on when in the memory process predictions are made.     

The generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition: cooperation and competition

Like all probabilistic decisions, recognition memory judgments are based on inferences about the strength and quality of stimulus familiarity. In recent articles, B. W. A. Whittlesea and J. Leboe (2000; J. Leboe & B. W. A. Whittlesea, 2002) proposed that such memory decisions entail various heuristics, similar to well-known heuristics in overt decision making. Using verbal stimulus materials, Whittlesea and Leboe illustrated 3 separate memory heuristics: fluency, generation, and resemblance. In the present investigation, the authors examined the generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition. In 12 experiments, people memorized faces and later performed exclusion (source memory) tasks. Every experiment contained natural groups of facial photographs (e.g., Caucasian vs. Asian faces), but such groups were not always valid source-memory predictors. Instead, across experiments, the potential utility of generation and resemblance strategies was systematically varied. People were quite sensitive to such variations, changing from one heuristic to another as needed. However, they also combined heuristics, both improving and damaging performance across conditions. The relevance of recognition decision heuristics to eyewitness memory is considered.     

Episodic feeling-of-knowing relies on noncriterial recollection and familiarity: Evidence using an online remember-know procedure

We examined the hypothesis that feeling-of-knowing judgments rely on recollection as well as on familiarity prompted by the cue presentation. A remember-know-no memory procedure was combined with the episodic FOK procedure employing a cue–target pair memory task. The magnitude of FOK judgments and FOK accuracy were examined as a function of recollection, familiarity, or the “no memory” option. Results showed that the proportion of R and K responses was similar. FOK accuracy and magnitude of FOK judgments were higher for R and K responses than for N responses. FOK accuracy related to R and K responses were above chance level, but FOK was not accurate in the “no memory” condition. Finally, both FOK magnitude and FOK accuracy were related more to recollection than to familiarity. These results support the hypothesis that both recollection and familiarity are determinants of the FOK process, although they suggest that recollection has a stronger influence.     

The effect of attribute order on judgment in Chinese and English

The authors found that the order of attribute presentation had a stronger effect on judgment in English than in Chinese. In Experiment 1, with a sample of 102 female and 63 male bilingual Singaporeans, the authors found that participants' memory-based judgments showed a stronger primacy effect in English than in Chinese that was mediated by recall from long-term memory. In contrast, participants' online (immediate) judgments showed a primacy effect in both languages that was unmediated by recall from short-term memory. In Experiment 2, with a sample of 67 female and 53 male bilingual Singaporeans, the authors found that participants' online judgments were more influenced by the attribute order of a previously seen competitive advertisement in English than in Chinese. A cross-cultural field study in Mainland China and the United Kingdom provided external validity for the experimental results.     

Strategy shifts in classification skill acquisition: Does memory retrieval dominate rule use?

In two experiments, we demonstrated two types of strategies (rule-based and memory-based) and strategy transitions within the same binary classification task. The strategy that dominated later in practice depended on the difficulty of the operative classification rule and on the salience of the cue for that rule. Accuracy increased over practice trials, and response times were faster for the dominant strategy, either rule or memory. Rule retention was superior to stimulus item retention, so that, even for participants who preferred a memory-based strategy, a rule-based strategy dominated at least temporarily after a 1-week interval. Strategy use over trials and the retention interval reflected a given task's affordance of a shift between rule- and memory-based processes.     

Cue abstraction and exemplar memory in categorization

In this article, the authors compare 3 generic models of the cognitive processes in a categorization task. The cue abstraction model implies abstraction in training of explicit cue-criterion relations that are mentally integrated to form a judgment, the lexicographic heuristic uses only the most valid cue, and the exemplar-based model relies on retrieval of exemplars. The results from 2 experiments showed that, in lieu of the lexicographic heuristic, most participants spontaneously integrate cues. In contrast to single-system views, exemplar memory appeared to dominate when the feedback was poor, but when the feedback was rich enough to allow the participants to discern the task structure, it was exploited for abstraction of explicit cue-criterion relations.