Writing the history of Russian philosophy

This article addresses the writing of the history of Russian philosophy from the first of such works—Archimandrite Gavriil’s Russian Philosophy [Russkaja filosofija, 1840]—to philosophical histories/textbooks in the twenty-first century. In the majority of these histories, both past and present, we find a relentless insistence on the delineation of “characterizing traits” of Russian philosophy and appeals to “historiosophy,” where historiosophy is employed as being distinct from the historiographical method. In the 1990s and 2000s, the genre of the history of Russian philosophy has grown increasingly conservative with regards to content, with histories from this period demonstrating an almost exclusive Orthodox focus. This conservatism, in turn, has contributed to widespread contention in recent years over the status of these philosophical textbooks—disagreements that often lead to either (1) further appeals to “historiosophical” methods; or (2) denials of the domestic philosophical tradition altogether, where the response to the query “Is there philosophy in Russia?” is emphatically negative. This article argues that the contemporary disputes over the development and preservation of the Russian philosophical canon are in many ways part of a larger debate over the roles of Orthodoxy and the history of philosophy in post-Soviet philosophical thought.     

Investigating Psychology and Transcendence

Psychology has not fully engaged with the possible reality of transcendence, spirit, or the divine, largely due to unexamined assumptions that prevent taking religious experience and transcendence seriously. Eugene Long’s reflections on experience and transcendence, key ideas from hermeneutic philosophy, including Brent Slife’s conception of “strong relationality,” Peter Berger’s analysis of modern dilemmas and “many realities,” Louis Dupré’s discussion of an ingrained “objectivism” that has long colored and probably distorted Western philosophy, theology, and the social sciences, and Vaclav Havel’s suggestion of a “need for transcendence” in a postmodern world roughly cohere and go a long way toward dismantling the “encapsulated self” that must either reject transcendence altogether or reach it only by way of a blind and indefensible “leap” out of the modern situation.     

Passing‐over: The Death of the Author in Hegel's Philosophy

Criticism of Hegel has been a central preoccupation of “postmodern” philosophy, from critical theory and deconstruction to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and Foucauldian “archaeology.” One of the most frequent criticisms is that Hegel's invocation of “absolute knowledge” installs him in a position of authorial arrogance, of God‐like authority, leaving the reader in a position of subservience to the Sage's perfect wisdom. The argument of this article is that this sort of criticism is profoundly ironic, since Hegel's construction of the role of the Sage possessing absolute knowledge is in fact an elaborate mask covering over a radical project of disappearance of the author by which it becomes the reader who is left to author the text. The article explores Hegel's commitment to his own death as an author in his invention of a new method of demonstration, his epistemology, his philosophy of language, his theory of desire, and even in the seemingly least likely place of all, his portrait of “absolute knowledge.”     

Praxis and Structure: Conflicting Models in the Science of Man

In his Fifth Meditation, Husserl appears to confront the problem of solipsism. As a number of commentators have suggested, however, since it arises from within phenomenology itself and the existence of the other is never in doubt, it is not a solipsism in the traditional Cartesian sense. Alfred Schutz, however, appears to understand Husserl's inquiry in precisely these terms. As such, his critical discussions of the Fifth Meditation, as well as his subsequent rejection of transcendental philosophy, might not be well-founded. Yet in spite of this misconstrual, Schutz's criticisms do highlight the problematic relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity in Husserl's late phenomenology, and albeit misplaced, ironically, his rejection of the Fifth Meditation forms a coherent response to Husserl's call for a “science of the life-world.” Intersubjectivity, Schutz concludes, must be assumed as a basis for phenomenological investigation rather than derived as a result of philosophical inquiry. “Negatively,” this is clearly a departure from Husserl's project since Schutz inevitably negates the “radical” motif under which phenomenological inquiry ostensibly proceeds. “Positively,” however, the project to which this criticism leads—a “phenomenology of the natural attitude”—represents a legitimate direction for phenomenological study as well as a radical turn within the theory and practice of social science.     

SCIENCE AND RELIGION: AN ORIGINS STORY

In recent scholarship, the science and religion debate has been historicized, revealing the novelty of the concepts of science and religion and their complex connections to secularization and the birth of modernity. This article situates this historicist turn in the history of philosophy and its connections to theology and Scripture, showing that the science and religion concept derives from philosophy's earlier tension with theology as it became an academic discipline centered in the medieval, then research university, with the centrality of Scripture changing under the influence of historical criticism. Looking at Thomas Aquinas and Friedrich Schleiermacher on theology and Scripture's connection to science, it offers a new framework for theorizing science and religion as part of the history of philosophy.     

The End of the Supersensory World’s Mythology: Marx’s Ontological Revolution and Its Contemporary Significance

The whole of Western metaphysics, particularly Platonism, sets up a partition between the sensory world and the supersensory world, laying the foundation for the mythology of the supersensory world. After Descartes set contemporary metaphysics on its course, Feuerbach became the first to attack the essence of the supersensory world on an ontological level and to transfer the criticism of theology to that of metaphysics in general. While in the final analysis Feuerbach’s criticism fails, Marx’s revolution appeals to the ontological notion of “sensory activity” or “objective activity” (i.e., practice), the core of which rests in piercing and overturning the fundamental framework of contemporary metaphysics—“the immanence of consciousness.” It is this ontological revolution which reveals the camouflage of the supersensory world’s mythology (i.e., ideology) and which simultaneously establishes a solid foundation for the critical analysis of the latter. Marx’s “science of history” is based on this foundation and develops from it.     

Killing the father,Parmenides: On Lacan’s anti-philosophy

This paper examines the historical claims about philosophy, dating back to Parmenides, that we argue underlie Jacques Lacan’s polemical provocations in the mid-1970s that his position was an “anti-philosophie”. Following an introduction surveying the existing literature on the subject, in part ii, we systematically present the account of classical philosophy Lacan has in mind when he declares psychoanalysis to be an antiphilosophy after 1975, assembling his claims about the history of ideas in Seminars XVII and XX in ways earlier contributions of this subject have not systematically done. In part iii, focusing upon Lacan’s remarkable reading of Descartes’ break with premodern philosophy—but touching on Lacan’s readings of Hegel and (in a remarkable confirmation of Lacan’s “Parmenidean” conception of philosophy) the early Wittgenstein—we examine Lacan’s positioning of psychoanalysis as a legatee of the Cartesian moment in the history of western ideas, nearly-contemporary with Galileo’s mathematization of physics and carried forwards by Kant’s critical philosophy and account of the substanceless subject of apperception. In different terms than Slavoj ?i?ek, we propose that it is Lacan’s famous avowal that the subject of the psychoanalysis is the subject first essayed by Descartes in The Meditations on First Philosophy as confronting an other capable of deceit (as against mere illusion or falsity) that decisively measures the distance between Lacan’s unique “antiphilosophy” and the forms of later modern linguistic and cultural relativism whose hegemony Alain Badiou has decried, at the same time as it sets Lacan’s antiphilosophy apart from the Parmenidean legacy for which thinking and being could be the same.

     

Backlash,Repetition, Untimeliness: The Temporal Dynamics of Feminist Politics

Susan Faludi's Backlash, first published in 1991, offers a compelling account of feminism being forced to repeat itself in an era hostile to its transformative potentials and ambitions. Twenty years on, this paper offers a philosophical reading of Faludi's text, unpacking the model of social and historical change that underlies the “backlash” thesis. It focuses specifically on the tension between Faludi's ideal model of social change as a movement of linear, step‐by‐step, continuous progress, and her depiction of feminist history in terms of endless repetition. If we uphold a linear, teleological ideal of social change, I argue, repetition can only be thought of in negative terms—as a step backwards or a waste of time—which in turn has a negative and demoralizing impact within feminism itself. To explore an alternative model of historical time and change, I turn to the work of feminist philosopher Christine Battersby, who rethinks repetition through the Kierkegaardian mode of “recollecting forwards,” and the Nietzschean notion of “untimeliness.” I suggest that Battersby's philosophical reconceptualization of historical repetition, as a potentially creative, productive phenomenon, can be of great utility to feminists as we enact and negotiate the dynamics of backlash politics.     

WHY IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY WORTH OUR STUDY?

Abstract: Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where “doing philosophy” refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of “authorial” propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking that doing history of philosophy is valuable—specifically, valuable in such a way that its value does not reduce to the value of doing philosophy. Most such arguments proffered by historians of philosophy fail, as I show. I then offer a proposal about what makes doing history of philosophy uniquely valuable, but it is one that many historians will not find agreeable.     

A POSTMODERN READING OF BRENNER'S LAST STORY: MEHATHALA AS PARODIC HOMAGE

In this article, I seek to examine the story “From the Beginning” from its central poetic feature, that of a congestion of literary references. These references are drawn from other Hebrew stories—from the late 1800s and the beginning of the twentieth century—about rootless male characters and their “erotic failures.” The degree of concentration of literary innuendoes, the context and the method with which they are brought to bear on Brenner's narrative, result in a deliberate exaggeration that makes “From the Beginning” a “parodic homage” of these earlier texts and their characters, including types and situations previously encountered in Brenner's other stories. “From the Beginning,” with its features of intertextuality and irony, has the characteristics of a postmodern parody, or, at the very least, invites a postmodern re-reading.     

心理学的历史编纂学：后现代主义的挑战

后现代主义思潮深刻影响了心理学史的研究与写作。传统的心理学历史编纂学接受真理的符合论,认为心理学的发展史是一维的和历时的。它习惯于在心理学的发展史中寻找某些“中心”或“标志”,并假定了不同的国家和民族、不同历史时期的心理学所面对的是同一主题。但是后现代主义的心理学历史编纂学强调了历史的社会建构特性,认为心理学史叙述的并非一种“客观实在”,而是史学家的一种话语建构。后现代主义的心理学历史编纂学使得心理学史家更明确的意识到历史知识的主观性,有助于心理学史家认识历史研究中的价值和意识形态问题,正视文化视角造成的认识差异,因而是有着积极意义的     

Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?

Abstract: This article first surveys the established views on Wittgenstein's relation to analytic philosophy. Next it distinguishes among different ways of defining analytic philosophy—topical, doctrinal, methodological, stylistic, historical, and the idea that it is a family‐resemblance concept. It argues that while certain stylistic features are important, the historical and the family‐resemblance conceptions are the most auspicious, especially in combination. The answer to the title question is given in section 3. Contrary to currently popular “irrationalist” interpretations, Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher in all phases of his career, albeit an exceedingly exotic one whose style transcends the limits of academic philosophy in general. On the historical understanding he qualifies because he was influenced by and in turn influenced mainly analytic philosophers. On the family‐resemblance conception he qualifies both because he developed and employed logico‐linguistic analysis and because he initiated the linguistic turn and the distinction between philosophy and science that characterizes one important strand in analytic philosophy.     

Postmodernism: A Feminist Critique

In this article the author suggests that progress in philosophy can be conceived through contemporary French theories that propose a new, polysemantic way of thinking. Postmodern philosophy has tried to renew the meaning of the subject, of the subject's identity, and of language and communication. The author believes that the postmodern, feminist approach to those concepts represents significant progress in philosophy. It is, in fact, exactly in the context of feminism—conceived of not just as a women's sociopolitical or scientific activity but as a broad theoretical approach to many areas—that Western philosophy has acquired its most explicit and adequate meaning. A crucial example here is the new historicophilosophical analysis of the concept of gender. The author appeals to Lipovetsky, Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva, and other thinkers to show how postmodern feminism helps to overcome the binary vision of the contemporary world and the dichotomic composition of earlier philosophical thought.     

Doing African political philosophy from a universalist perspective

There has been a strong impetus to set the definitional parameters of study in African political philosophy and theory. Many scholars advance the idea of a discipline intended to provide lessons that stem from “original” African moral, ideological, and political traditions. Often, these traditions and their ideas are presented as holding categorical moral substance in so far as they are seen to be specific to a culturally essentialist understanding of “Africa.” In turn, an influential part of the literature estimates the normative value of the intellectual ideas and arguments afforded by a varied historical, socio-cultural and economic African geography by the degree to which, in being tethered to a seemingly homogenous, “culturally African” influence, these ideas can be opposed to a “Western” equivalent. In this article, I argue that the effects on the discipline of attending to, and being defined by, this cultural essentialism are at best unclear, at worst detrimental. I aim to contribute to the side of those who advocate a universalist perspective to the study of African political philosophy and thought, and who argue for jettisoning an unhelpful dichotomy between “West” and “African,” in favour of a methodological, conceptual and historical specificity that allows the discipline to be truly useful to itself and to others.     

Universalism in cultural history and the meaning of the Russian Revolution: on some aspects of cultural theory in the work of Mikhail Lifšic

Mikhail Lif?ic (1905–1983) is one of the most contradictory and to this date poorly understood authors of the Soviet era. He represented an independent Marxist position, but one internally characterized by the tense relationship between Marxism and the philosophy of Hegel. This relationship, concerning historical philosophical questions, is the subject of this essay. In the 1930s, as “historical materialism” was canonized in the USSR, a development that Soviet civilization understood as the “beginning of the end of (universal) history”, Lif?ic drafted a different, skeptical summary of the revolutionary era. However, he remained loyal to both the concept of universal history and the examination of Russian-Soviet cultural history within the framework of this concept. With the help of a text from Lif?ic from the 1930s as well as his later (early 1980s) reflection and remembrance of the ideological debates of the 1930s, this essay will show that Lif?ic’ reconstruction of idealism in Marxism was no accident, but rather a necessary movement in thought. This, in turn, enabled him to give a new account of the historical experience of the October Revolution.     

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: THINKING THE CORPOREAL WITH THE POLITICAL

This paper provides a genealogy of the emergence of one thread of continental philosophy—“thinking the corporeal with the political”—from its roots in the “French readings” of key philosophers during the 1960s and 1970s to its development outside of Europe. This involves characterizing continental philosophy as a style of thinking that is historical, creative, and ontological. As the genealogy takes in the French readings of Nietzsche and a range of developments such as corporeal feminisms, biopolitical analysis, and conceptions of political community, the analysis demonstrates that continental philosophy, even when confined to one line of inquiry, is a collaborative effort energized by Anglophone philosophy and that it is multifaceted, dynamic, and fecund.     

The Qualitative Revolution and Psychology: Science,Politics, and Ethics

Growing interest in qualitative research methods and methodological pluralism in psychology since the 1990s is placed in the historical contexts of long-standing philosophical and scientific rationales and the more recent “qualitative revolution” in other social sciences that began in the 1970s. An examination of areas in which qualitative methods have become most strongly established—applied, feminist, and multicultural psychologies—suggests practical and social motivations as primary and as energizing renewed expression of previously ignored ontological, epistemological, and scientific reasoning in the turn to qualitative methods. Methodological diversification in the arenas of human suffering, women's issues, and cultural politics is traced to psychologists' deeply rooted ethical obligations. The existential philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas articulates an implicit ethics at the heart psychology's increasing acceptance of qualitative methods and provides an understanding of how the emerging methodological diversity can contribute to social justice and human liberation as well as to an enhancement of rigorous scientific knowledge.     

‘Strange epoch!’

The present era is one of disarray. The familiar ways of knowing, representing and reading have changed unrecognisably, but there is no agreement as to the new direction in which either Western culture or Western philosophy is heading. A main reason for this situation is Heidegger's criticism of modern philosophy which shatters the very foundations of modern philosophy, without establishing the hoped for continuity. This paper examines Heidegger's critique of modern philosophy and evaluates the rereading of the history of philosophy that he undertakes in developing his critique, showing that it is incomplete in that his reconstruction of traditional philosophy has left some important chapters untouched, and that he has overlooked the ethical realm. Following this, the paper briefly ex-plores Levinas' relation to the tradition and his efforts to fill in the ethical and historical gaps that Heidegger had left.     

Why Talk about Chinese Metaphysics?

Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century has often been related to some sort of cultural or other particularism or some sort of philosophical universalism. By and large, these still seem to be the terms along which academic debates are carried out. The tension is particularly manifest in notions such as “Chinese philosophy,” “Daoist cosmology,” “Neo-Confucian idealism,” or “Chinese metaphysics.” For some, “Chinese metaphysics” may be a blatant contradictio in adiecto, while others may find it a most ordinary topic to be discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this article, I set out to examine two major discourses in which talk about “metaphysics” is frequent and popular and to which talk of “Chinese metaphysics” may wish to contribute: the history of philosophy and analytic philosophy. My contention is that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting “Chinese metaphysics” on the academic agenda and to what precise purpose this is done. What my discussion seeks to highlight is the as yet often largely unarticulated dimension of the politics of comparative philosophy—of which talk about “Chinese metaphysics” may but need not be an example.