A Neo-Confucian Criticism of Daoism: Wang Fuzhi’s Contradictory Remarks on the Laozi

Based on Zhu Xi’s statement that Laozi’s teachings were very cruel, Wang Fuzhi condemned Laozi as a crafty, petty person in his Confucian commentaries. Yet, he had to understand the Laozi or Daodejing sympathetically when he commented on it in Laozi Yan老子衍 (Extended Commentary on the Laozi). As a result, he showed inconsistency in his criticism and evaluation of the author. Some scholars have noted this problem but have not shed ink analyzing it. This essay finds that Wang Fuzhi’s ambiguous attitude toward Laozi results from his Confucian prejudice against other schools and his failure to grasp the breadth and depth of Laozi’s thought. From the perspective of Heaven, Laozi promoted accommodation and non-interference in self-cultivation and governance, summed up by the maxim that “the sage manages affairs without deliberation, and spreads teachings without words.” In contrast, Wang Fuzhi stuck to the distinction between Confucianism and Daoism, and tried to use humanity and ritual propriety to supplement that which Heaven does not provide; as such, he criticized Laozi as crafty and irresponsible. Wang Fuzhi’s criticism neither hits the mark regarding Laozi’s weakness nor maintains a concordance with his earlier sympathetic appraisal in Laozi Yan; the reason for this is that Wang Fuzhi could not fully grasp Laozi’s thought from a Confucian and anthropocentric perspective.     

A Reconsideration of the Characteristics of Song-Ming Li Xue

By analyzing Zhu Xi and Zhang Zai’s three representative explanatory paradigms—that of Feng Youlan, Mou Zongsan and Zhang Dainian, the paper tries to show that studying Chinese philosophy in a Western way and emphasizing logical consistency will unavoidably lead to the defects of simplicity and partiality. In addition to Buddhism and Daoism, Song-Ming philosophy had also absorbed thoughts from the Pre-Qin, Han, Wei and Jin dynasties. The existence of multiple philosophical thoughts and their new synthesis lead to internal contradictions in Song-Ming philosophy and Li Xue 理学 (Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties). The contradiction between the doctrine of tiandao 天道 (the way in which the world runs) and that of xinxing 心性 (mind and human nature) was even sharper. Li Xue and Xin Xue also overlapped one another. The transition from the doctrine of tiandao to that of xinxing was a long journey. It was begun by Zhu Xi in his later years, and was finally completed by Wang Yangming. Unveiling the complexity and special characteristics of Song-Ming philosophy is a task for scholars on the history of Chinese philosophy.     

Between Mind and Trace — A Research into the Theories on Xin 心 (Mind) of Early Song Confucianism and Buddhism

From Han Yu’s yuan Dao 原道 (retracing the Dao) to Ouyang Xiu’s lun ben 论本 (discussing the root), the conflicts arising from Confucianists’ rejection of Buddhism were focused on one point, namely, the examination of zhongxin suo shou 中心所守 (something kept in mind). The attitude towards the distinction between mind and trace, and the proper approach to erase the gap between emptiness and being, as well as that between the expedient and the true, became the major concerns unavoidable for various thinkers to integrate the two teachings and to propel academic development. “To understand by mind” and “to blame for matter” were of crucial methodological significance for transcendence in both Confucianism and Buddhism. The arguments of Confucian scholars like Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers on the identity of mind and trace and the unity of void and solid are mutually manifested. The same mind with the same principle means “mind is principle.” The “common axis of Confucianism and Buddhism” exists in the emphasis on mind beyond trace. The unification of mind and trace or the accordance of body and function has actually become the cardinal foundation for the possible mergence of the Three Teachings.     

Socrates’ Humaneness: What His Last Words Meant

Confucius emphasises the importance of humaneness (ren 仁) and rites (li 禮). Socrates, on the other hand, is often interpreted as a person who places far more importance on rational thinking, even to the exclusion of natural human feelings, especially on the ground of his attitude towards the sorrow of his wife and friends on his last day as described in Plato’s Phaedo. Through clarifying two long-time riddles in this dialogue—namely, “What did Socrates mean by his last words, requesting Crito to offer a cock to Asclepius?” and “Was Plato really absent from the prison on Socrates’ last day, due to illness, as is mentioned by Phaedo?”—this paper argues that Socrates kept in mind the best interest of his wife and friends even at the moment of his death, and that his humane attitude is expressed in his last words, which were not only an expression of gratitude for Plato’s recovery from a critical illness but also an exhortation to his friends to continue their care of the soul.     

James Legge's Hermeneutical Methodology as Revealed in His Translation of the Daxue

With a focus on The Great Learning (Daxue大學),this paper explores the specific exegetical or hermeneutical methodology adopted by James Legge in his translation of this Confucian canonical text.It begins with an analysis of the translation theory endorsed by Legge,comparing his translation with those of Ku Hung-ming and Wing-tsit Chan.The second part aims to explicate the hermeneutic dilemma faced by Legge in his dealing with this text.It looks at the intellectual context in which Legge's scholarship on the Chinese classics had developed,as well as the academic standard he was required to maintain throughout his translation.Overall,Legge's familiarity with Qing scholarship makes it interesting to determine where and why he follows or rejects Zhu Xi.Given Legge's Christian missionary background and the sense of mission pervading Zhu Xi's commentary,we conclude that Legge's affinity with Zhu Xi is much more subtle and complex than previously speculated:the difference in their approach to Confucian texts cannot be reduced to a contrast between construction and deconstruction or between canonization and decanonization.     

Yin and Yang,and the Hot and the Cold

Yin and Yang are important concepts in ancient Chinese philosophy.Western scholars have become more familiar with these two concepts recently,but for a long time almost no one considered comparing them with their own tradition such as the ancient Greek philosophy,and especially with the ideas of the Hot and the Cold in Presocratic philosophy.In this paper,I make an attempt to do exactly that,and especially make a detailed comparison between the thoughts of two ancient thinkers:Laozi and Anaximander.I discuss the thought of Yin and Yang in Laozi-who was the earliest philosopher making use of the concepts Yin and Yang-to express his cosmological thought in ancient Chinese philosophy.Comparatively,I discuss the ideas of the Hot and the Cold in Anaximander,the earlier among Presocratic philosophers referring to the Hot and the Cold as fundamental concepts used to establish his cosmological system.Through this comparison,I indicate that the similarity between ancient Chinese and Western traditions is far more significant than what people are used to imagining.     

The Limits of a Confrontational Approach: Fabian Fukansai’s Critiques of Neo-Confucianism and Christianity

This paper analyzes the critique of Neo-Confucianism by the Japanese Jesuit Brother Fabian Fukansai (c. 1565–1621) in the Myōtei Dialogues (Myōtei Mondō 妙貞問答) (1605), as well as Fabian’s later critique of Christianity. It clarifies the author’s understanding of Neo-Confucian theory and his apology for Christianity by analyzing his explanation of the Great Ultimate (Tai’kyoku/Taiji 太極) and Principle (ri/li 理), which Fabian sees as nothing but an expression of Buddhist monistic mentalism. It also demonstrates that his explanations of the Great Ultimate and Principle have a crucial flaw: they do not sufficiently explain Zhu Xi’s metaphysics, which tried to make the immanent and transcendental characteristics of the Great Ultimate and Principle compatible. This is because Fabian addresses only the elements of “local” religions including Neo-Confucianism with novel keywords that support the framework of Christian Creationism and the Anima Rationalis theory. However, his later work Deus Destroyed (Ha Daius 破提宇子), written after he had rejected Christianity, overturned his former claim by accepting the Neo-Confucian concept of Principle. Fabian’s works are a historical example showing the potential limits of a confrontational approach toward other religions.     

Daoism and the German Mission in Martin Heidegger’s “The Thing”

In this article, I examine Martin Heidegger’s 1950 lecture/essay “The Thing” (Das Ding) in two ways. First, as a piece influenced by chapter 11 of the Daodejing. And second, as a postwar writing which can be interpreted vis-à-vis the Black Notebooks and his other writings. There are instances in “The Thing” which are analogous to his statements found in the Black Notebooks and his other writings which describe and clarify his controversial political affiliation. In brief, I suggest here that Heidegger’s articulation of the concept of wu 無 of chapter 11 of the Daodejing as the void of the jug in “The Thing” may potentially describe his controversial engagement with German National Socialism as part of his response to the call for German mission. Notably, the fundamentality of the void of the jug is comparable to the exclusivity and exceptionality of the Germans in their mission; and the use of the void of the jug as outpouring is an interesting way to emphasize his disagreement with the regime by pointing out that his support to German National Socialism is not to the extent of brutally annihilating the Jews.     

Hegel,Schelling and Laozi on Nothingness

This article looks at Hegel’s and Schelling’s discussions of Laozi’s wu 無 in History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Mythology respectively, and then relates them back to those two Western thinkers’ own understandings of the concept of nothingness. This exploration demonstrates that while Hegel sees nothingness more as a logical concept not different from being, Schelling equates Laozi’s wu with Nichtseiende of the first potency in his theory of the potencies of God. This article will further put the question in perspective by examining or speculating how the three philosophers would address the problem of ex nihilo nihil fit. Finally, it will highlight the striking similarity between the views of Schelling and Laozi regarding the role of the will or desire (yu 欲), in our knowledge about nothingness: While Schelling’s first potency, Nichtseiende, is a “not willing will,” the second potency is “willing” and therefore the beginning of existence. Laozi, on the other hand, believes that without desire we can discern the ultimate mystery, while with desire we can only see the outer fringe of things. However, Laozi differs from Schelling in that the latter’s willing God is absent in his philosophy.     

Introduction to the Special Theme： Finding out the Contemporary Value of Marx＇s Philosophy

Theorists in the period of the Second International mostly regarded Marx＇s theories as an empirical science but refused to admit the existence of ＂Marx＇s philosophy.＂ Marx himself also held the idea of ＂abolishing philosophy＂ and in The German Ideology, he even drew an analogy comparing the relationship between philosophy and empirical science and that between masturbation and actual sexual love. Since Plekhanov, and particularly since Lenin, Dialectical Materialism has been considered to be synonymous with Marx＇s philosophy. Early Marxists from Luk~ics and Gramsci to Korsch were all against the trend that theorists of the Second International consigning Marx＇s theories to empirical science, but, at the same time, they also objected to systemizing Marx＇s philosophy in terms of Dialectical Materialism （they even traced the origin of this approach back to Engels）, and, as the result, they created a new interpretive approach to Marx＇s ＂praxis philosophy.＂     

Structuring Reality: The Metaphysics of Harmony in Zhang Zai’s Zhengmeng Philosophical System

The essay aims to analyze the concept and the paradigm of harmony in the metaphysical system of the Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai. It argues that Zhang Zai’s concept of Great Harmony not only inherits the traditional centrality of this idea within the Confucian tradition, but actually presents the most advanced idea of harmony up to his time. In Zhang Zai’s philosophy, harmony becomes the Way itself, which includes the realm of principles and the outward and functional manifestations of reality. This essay will deal with harmony in two ways: first with Zhang Zai’s direct use of the concept in the Zhengmeng and second, applying the paradigm of harmony to other of Zhang Zai’s key concepts such as qi 氣, void (xu 虛) and natural dispositions (xing 性).     

Joseph Adler,Reconstructing the Confucian Dao: Zhu Xi's Appropriation of Zhou Dunyi.

Reconstructing the Confucian Dao offers up the carefully tended fruits of Joseph Adler's research and reflections on a long standing mystery in the annals of Song dynasty (960-1279) Neo-Confucianism (lixue).The mystery surrounds a striking addition Zhu Xi (1130-1200) made to the Confucian Dao succession (Daotong),1 an addition that augured far-reaching consequences for Neo-Confucianism.It must be stressed that the Dao succession not only served to define the orthodox tradition but also underscored the religious dimension of Confucianism by honoring those masters whose teachings most perfectly clove to,and expressed what was deemed to be Confucianism's essence.2 In Confucian the Dao,Adler brings the implications of this religious dimension,and related practice,into play.Zhu Xi's striking addition was not just his inclusion of Zhou Dunyi (1017-73) in the Confucian Dao succession;it was his identification of Zhou as the progenitor of the Song rebirth of the Dao succession,nearly 1,500 years after the passing of its last classical participant,Mencius (372-289 BCE).     

Plato on Necessity and Disorder

In the Timaeus, Plato makes a distinction between reason and necessity. This distinction is often accounted for as a distinction between two types of causation： purpose oriented causation and mechanistic causation. While reason is associated with the soul and taken to bring about its effects with the good and the beautiful as the end, necessity is understood in terms of a set of natural laws pertaining to material things. In this paper I shall suggest that there are reasons to reconsider the latter part of this account and argue for a non-mechanistic understanding of necessity. I will first outline how the notion of necessity is introduced in the dialogue. Next I will show how a mechanistic account of necessity fails to capture Plato＇s purpose of treating it as a causal factor; and, finally, I will argue that this purpose is better understood as an attempt, on Plato＇s part, to account for the causal origin of disorder and irrationality, an origin articulated in terms of a pre-cosmic situation and the notoriously difficult notion of the third kind.     

On the Philosophical Relevance of Marx＇s Views Today

This paper revisits some of Marx＇s central philosophical ideas with the attempt to understand the thinker＇s real place in the history of the Western philosophical tradition. It does not only show that the philosophical dimension is central to Marx＇s economic and political works, and therefore his contributions to philosophy merit special investigation, but it also argues that Marx is a descendant of classic German philosophy, and thus his views should be assessed in the context of the development of the philosophical ideas that emerged within that tradition.     

The Embodied Subjective Perspective

Perspective is a distinctive feature of external perception. There is a question of how to account for perceptual constancy in spite of changing perspectives. Alva Noe proposes the notion of ＂perspectival property＂ [P-property] and appeals to the perspectival aspect of perceptual content. His proposal conflicts with perceptual experiences and hence incurs many criticisms. Drawing on Husserl＇s phenomenology and Gibsonian psychology, I propose the notion of ＂perspectival awareness＂ [P-awareness]. I will argue that P-awareness is embodied pre-thematic self-awareness instead of the experience of a special kind of objective property. With the notion of P-awareness in mind, I then elaborate on the embodied subjective feature of perspective.     

马克思超越规范经济学与实证经济学对立的逻辑及其启示

In the process of criticism on political economics,Marx critically drew reasonable factors from positivism arisen at that time,so he can use empirical approach felicitously in the political economic research.Meanwhile,he can correctly use normative method because he transcended the limitations of positivism,and made it a complement to empirical approach.Marx’s critiques of political economy made normative method and empirical approach interdependence and become the methods as a subsystem in the political-ec...     

An Interview with David Alderson

<正>Wang Jie:Here are some questions that I think are very important to China's research on Marxism,so I'd like to know your opinions.I'd like to start with the research on Terry Eagleton.As far as I know,you are the first to have written a book on Terry.In China,there are also many scholars who are researching Terry and a group of articles are recently coming out in China's most important core journal,Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art.When I talked with Terry at the University of Manchester,he specially mentioned that he was a Marxist,instead of a Post-marxist.Later,he wrote me a letter to add that it was a matter of principle.For the relationship between Marxism and Postmarxism, there are still confusions among scholars in China,so can you make further clarifications in combination with Terry's situation? David:I would say that Terry is without doubt a Marxist,not a Post-Marxist. That is very clear to me.At a recent conference about Terry's career at Manchester University,there was discussion about the extent to which his thought had changed over years,and one of the comments that he made was that he believes roughly the same things as he used to believe in the 1960s.From having read and studied his work,I would say that there's overwhelmingly a sense of continuity through the work.     

Wang Fuzhi’s Interpretation of Spirit/Shen in His Annotation on the Zhuangzi

This essay systematically explores the concept “spirit” (shen 神) in Wang Fuzhi’s Annotation on the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi Jie 莊子解). Following Zhuangzi, Wang Fuzhi interprets spirit as a mass of vital force/jingqi, and regards spirit as the master of human life and human body. Through preserving one’s spirit, one will not only be able to preserve one’s body, but also keep all creatures immune from sickness and plague. This can be accomplished, since a well-preserved spirit will contribute harmonious and pure qi to the universe and make the whole universe more harmonious. In an effort to achieve this purpose, Wang Fuzhi proposes “forgetting all external things” and aiming for an empty and detached mind, on one hand, and asks a person to concentrate his spirit with a constant will, one the other hand. Once one’s spirit is well concentrated, one will be a spiritual person (shenren 神人), who will transcend life and death, fortune and misfortune, always living a leisurely and carefree life. One will also forget all cognitive distinctions and fully become one with the transformation of things and Heaven (tian 天). In this way, one’s spirit will achieve eternity, and fully realize the meaning of human life.