Examining the Relationships Between Voting Behavior, Intention, Perceived Behavioral Control, and Expectation

The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) are compared in terms of predictive validity and a comparison between behavioral expectation (BE) and behavioral intention (BI) as the immediate antecedent of behavior is offered. In addition, the relationships between attitude-toward-the-act (Aacf), subjective norm (SN), and perceived behavioral control (PBC) as predictors of BE are examined. Results indicate that the theory of planned behavior is a better predictor of intention than the theory of reasoned action and that BI is a stronger predictor of behavior than BE. The results also suggest that Aact, SN, and PBC are better predictors of BI than of BE and that development of a behavioral plan moderates the Aact-BI-B relations.     

Intention,Emotion, and Action: A Neural Theory Based on Semantic Pointers

We propose a unified theory of intentions as neural processes that integrate representations of states of affairs, actions, and emotional evaluation. We show how this theory provides answers to philosophical questions about the concept of intention, psychological questions about human behavior, computational questions about the relations between belief and action, and neuroscientific questions about how the brain produces actions. Our theory of intention ties together biologically plausible mechanisms for belief, planning, and motor control. The computational feasibility of these mechanisms is shown by a model that simulates psychologically important cases of intention.     

Intention and Expectation Measures as Predictors of Academic Performance1

The predictive validity of intention and expectation measures was examined by comparing subjects' intentions and expectations of their academic performance with their actual class performance. A total of 166 subjects were randomly assigned to respond to an intention or expectation version of a questionnaire. The instrument asked for intentions or expectations regarding performance on the next test, final examination, and final course grade. Expectations were found to be better predictors of academic performance. Expectation responses were also found to explain significant amounts of variance in the dependent measures after the effect of subjects' prior class performance (their first test score) had been taken into consideration. Additional types of outcomes and goals for which expectation measures are likely to provide more accurate prediction are discussed.     

Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions

Common-sense folk psychology and mainstream philosophy of action agree about decisions: these are under an agent's direct control, and are thus intentional actions for which agents can be held responsible. I begin this paper by presenting a problem for this view. In short, since the content of the motivational attitudes that drive deliberation and decision remains open-ended until the moment of decision, it is unclear how agents can be thought to exercise control over what they decide at the moment of deciding. I note that this problem might motivate a non-actional view of deciding—a view that decisions are not actions, but are instead passive events of intention acquisition. For without an understanding of how an agent might exercise control over what is decided at the moment of deciding, we lack a good reason for maintaining commitment to an actional view of deciding. However, I then offer the required account of how agents exercise control over decisions at the moment of deciding. Crucial to this account is an understanding of the relation of practical deliberation to deciding, an understanding of skilled deliberative activity, and the role of attention in the mental action of deciding.     

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content‐determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.     

Self-Presentation,Reasoned Action,and Adolescents' Decisions to Smoke Cigarettes1

The effectiveness of a one-shot intervention on the social, medical or medical/social consequences of smoking in deterring adolescent smoking was evaluated. Four hundred twenty adolescents completed surveys which measured attitudes, subjective norms, stereotypes, self-presentational beliefs regarding smoking, intentions to smoke, and smoking status at three points in time. The predictive ability of a Theory of Reasoned Behavior and of Impression Management Theory in determining adolescent smoking decisions was also assessed.     

Racial Prototypicality,Affirmative Action,and Hiring Decisions in a Multiracial World

This research examined how the racial prototypicality of minority job applicants' faces influenced hiring decisions under different affirmative action (AA) policies: no AA, soft AA (recruitment of minorities with merit‐based hiring), and hard AA (race as a tie‐break factor in hiring). Participants (N=252) evaluated resume/photograph pairs, each containing a Caucasian and a Black applicant, with minority applicants representing three levels of racial prototypicality. The number of jobs awarded to minorities increased as Black racial prototypicality increased. Each level of AA policy strength increased the number of minority hires, but these increases came with a price: AA directives decreased the percentage of minority hires attributed to higher qualifications and increased perceptions that hires were due to AA more than was actually the case.     

Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention

In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate than the irrational ones? My aim is to turn this challenge on its head and argue that, actually, those who deny permissivism will have a harder time responding to such a challenge than those who accept it.     

The Accuracy of Behavioral Intention Versus Behavioral Expectation for Predicting Behavioral Goals

Researchers have largely overlooked the distinction between behavioral intention and behavioral expectation as predictors of one's own behavior. Moreover, the distinction between purely volitional behavior and behavioral goals, the latter of which may be impeded by such nonvolitional factors as lack of ability, lack of opportunity, habit, and environmental impediments, has also been blurred in the literature. Behavioral expectation is theorized to be based on a cognitive appraisal of one's behavioral intention and all other behavioral determinants of which one is aware. The present study argues and gives evidence that, although behavioral expectation and behavioral intention may have similar predictive accuracy for volitional behaviors, behavioral expectation is adequate, but behavioral intention may be inadequate for prediction of the accomplishment of behavioral goals.     

Social Value Orientations and Decisions to Take Proenvironmental Action1

This study assessed whether social value orientations influence decisions to actively support a proposal for a transportation pollution reduction program. Participants with prosocial or proself orientations were given the opportunity to send letters of support or opposition to the program director. Proself participants were more likely to send letters opposing the program, whereas prosocial participants were more likely to send letters of support. Although proself and prosocial participants reported equivalent support for the program and equivalent perceptions of the program's environmental benefits, proself participants reported higher perceptions of personal costs associated with the program. Social value orientations may lead to differences in environmental behaviors, primarily because of differences in perceptions of the personal costs incurred from engaging in these behaviors.     

Strategic Maneuvering with the Intention of the Legislator in the Justification of Judicial Decisions

The author gives an analysis of the strategic manoeuvring in the justification of legal decisions from a pragma-dialectical perspective by showing how a judge tries to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical aims. On the basis of an analysis and evaluation of the argumentation given by the US Supreme Court in the famous Holy Trinity case, it is shown how in a case in which the judge wants to make an exception to a legal rule for the concrete case tries to meet the dialectical reasonableness norm by seeing to it that his standpoint is sufficiently defended according to the requirements of the burden of proof of a judge in a rational critical discussion and how he tries at the same time to be rhetorically convincing for the legal audience by presenting the decision as a choice that is in line with the argumentation schemes and starting points that can be considered as accepted by the legal community in the US and by the US community as a whole.

Jobs,Institutions, and Beneficial Retirement

According to Saul Smilansky's ‘Paradox of Beneficial Retirement’, many serving members of professions may have decisive integrity‐based reasons for retiring immediately. The Paradox of Beneficial Retirement holds that a below‐par performance in one's job does not require any outright incompetence, but may take a purely relational form, in which a good performance is not good enough if it would be improved upon by someone else who would be appointed instead. It is argued, in response, that jobs in the sectors Smilansky mentions are not merely positions to optimize the goals of the profession, but are professional careers in which there is the possibility of security and personal fulfilment. The article also explores connections between Smilansky's argument and G. A. Cohen's anti‐incentives argument against Rawls. It is suggested that both thinkers underappreciate the relationship between personal reasons and institutional reasons. ¹      

幼儿对假装游戏中意图和行为作用的理解

关于儿童如何理解假装存在两种观点:一种观点认为幼儿能够从心理角度理解假装。另一种观点认为,幼儿只能从假装行为角度理解假装。本研究通过自制录像,考查了3～5岁幼儿对假装游戏中意图和行为作用的理解。实验中,给幼儿呈现3种不同类型的录像情境:有意图-有行为、有意图-无行为和无意图-有行为,要求幼儿回答录像中的主人公是否在假装。实验结果表明,随着幼儿年龄的增长,在录像中主人公明确表达其假装意图的情境下,幼儿能够从心理层面理解假装,并且3～4岁幼儿存在一个快速发展期;同时,假装实体的熟悉度可能影响幼儿对假装的理解。