Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil,or Part of the Problem?

Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God’s permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This ‘anti-theodical’ view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral reasons, the project of ‘justifying the ways of God to men’. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such anti-theodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world’s evils, not remove or illuminate them.

Can Evil Attract?

It has sometimes been claimed that the perceived badness of an act can in some circumstances, or for some agents, be a reason for performing it. The present paper challenges this claim, arguing that it is hard to make sense of the idea that a negative evaluation of an action can provide an intelligible reason for doing it. Apparent counter-examples are discussed and dismissed and the paper concludes with some general reflections on the relationship between evaluation and motivation.     

Constructive or cruel? Positive or patronizing? Reactions to expressions of positive and negative stereotypes of the mentally ill

Previous research has shown that people respond with greater sensitivity to negative stereotypical comments about a group that are made from someone outside the group in question than from someone who belongs to the group. In this paper, we investigated if the same effect occurs in response to comments made about stigmatized groups. Specifically, we examined how people react to comments made about the mentally ill. The conditions under which people accept or reject stereotypes of the mentally ill may shed light on the conditions necessary for effective anti-discrimination campaigns. In the current study, participants responded to positive or negative stereotypes of the mentally ill voiced by either someone who has, or has not, suffered from a mental illness. Participants were more sensitive, agreed less, and evaluated the speaker less favourably when comments came from the out-group rather than the in-group source. The effects were strongest for negative comments, however contrary to previous research participants also responded less favourably to positive comments from the out-group source. These reactions were mediated by the perceived constructiveness of the speaker's motives. Implications for the effectiveness of anti-discrimination campaigns are discussed.     

Terror management among Taiwanese: Worldview defence or resigning to fate?

Terror management theory (TMT) proposes that people who are reminded of their mortality should be motivated to defend their cultural worldview. Studies 1 and 2 examined whether the TMT worldview defence‐buffering effect found in Western cultures could be generalized to Asians in Taiwan. No such effect was found in the present studies. This non‐significant result was robust when either a stronger distraction task was used (study 1) or when a subliminal manipulation of mortality salience was utilized (study 2). A meta‐analysis, including 24 TMT experiments in East Asia, was also conducted (study 3). The average effect size (d = 0.11, r = 0.055) of worldview defence among these experiments was not significantly different from zero. Study 4 found that mortality salience manipulation also did not change Taiwanese participants' view of reincarnation; however, it did make them more inclined to resign to fate, suggesting that they might be using this symbolic means to defend their anxiety of death. The issue of the generality of TMT to Asians was discussed.     

Surprise, defence, or making sense: what removes hindsight bias?

This paper examines predictions concerning the absence of hindsight bias. Some hypothesise that because hindsight bias increases with outcome "surprisingness", only unsurprising outcomes will remove it. Others suggest the opposite-that very surprising outcomes will reduce or reverse the bias. A proposed sense-making model suggests that unexpected outcomes (i.e., initially surprising) invoke greater sensemaking, which typically produces greater hindsight bias. If the process is not successful, however, the bias may be reduced or reversed. Expected outcomes will also produce little hindsight bias, but only because they invoke relatively little sensemaking in the first place. Feelings of surprise arising from sensemaking (i.e., resultant surprise) should be inversely related to hindsight bias. Results of four experiments provide support for the model. A secondary goal was to determine the boundaries of a defensive-processing mechanism also thought to reduce hindsight bias for negative, self-relevant outcomes. Results suggest that a sense of responsibility for the outcome may be necessary for defensive processing to be activated.     

Surprise,defence, or making sense: What removes hindsight bias?

This paper examines predictions concerning the absence of hindsight bias. Some hypothesise that because hindsight bias increases with outcome "surprisingness", only unsurprising outcomes will remove it. Others suggest the opposite--that very surprising outcomes will reduce or reverse the bias. A proposed sense-making model suggests that unexpected outcomes (i.e., initially surprising) invoke greater sensemaking, which typically produces greater hindsight bias. If the process is not successful, however, the bias may be reduced or reversed. Expected outcomes will also produce little hindsight bias, but only because they invoke relatively little sensemaking in the first place. Feelings of surprise arising from sensemaking (i.e., resultant surprise) should be inversely related to hindsight bias. Results of four experiments provide support for the model. A secondary goal was to determine the boundaries of a defensive-processing mechanism also thought to reduce hindsight bias for negative, self-relevant outcomes. Results suggest that a sense of responsibility for the outcome may be necessary for defensive processing to be activated.     

Ethics,Violence, and Counseling: Hear No Evil,See No Evil,Speak No Evil?

Situations involving violence directed either at a client or by a client pose ethical and legal dilemmas for the mental health professional. The authors present information concerning both ethical and legal aspects of violence as they relate to client welfare, dangerousness, confidentiality or duty to warn, and counselor violence. In certain situations, case material is used to illustrate both the ethical standards and the laws and statutes that provide directives for professional behavior.     

Moral duty or moral defence? The effects of perceiving shared humanity with the victims of ingroup perpetrated harm

Previous theory and research suggests that perceiving shared humanity with others should be a positive force for intergroup relations. The present research considers the alternative possibility, that notions of shared humanity might protect people from feelings of guilt over ingroup perpetrated harm by obscuring the ingroup's unique role in these events. Consistent with this idea, Study 1 (N = 58) found that perceiving shared humanity with a harmed outgroup was associated with less guilt and stronger expectations of forgiveness among members of the perpetrator group. Study 2 (N = 52) demonstrated that these effects only occurred when the moral integrity of the ingroup was open to question. When ingroup morality was instead secure, defensive use of humanity was not apparent. Together, these studies suggest that perceiving harmful ingroup actions as ‘only human’ can sometimes be a moral defence that absolves group members of feelings of responsibility for wrongdoing. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is Evil Good for Religion? The Link between Supernatural Evil and Religious Commitment

“The devil made me do it” is a familiar cliché often used to justify a bad decision. However, are beliefs in a devil or other evil supernatural beings actually beneficial for religion? Building upon Stark and Bainbridge (1987) and elements of the supernatural punishment hypothesis, this study proposes and tests the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between the belief in supernatural evil and religious commitment. Data from 2007 Baylor Religion Survey reveal a strong positive correlation between the belief in supernatural evil and four measures of religious commitment: church attendance, religious perception, tithing, and faith sharing. This study not only contributes to a long discussion of religious commitment, but it also has implications for the growing literature on god images and the supernatural punishment hypothesis.     

Mentally ill or mentally handicapped? A longitudinal study of severe learning disorder

SUMMARY

In the course of some eighteen months of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, a young woman of twenty-seven once deemed braindamaged at the age of seven years, has shown herself capable of sustaining once weekly psychotherapy. Against all expectations she has taken responsibility for her own attendance, travelling by public transport alone to her sessions. She has also taken initiatives in relation to finding work for herself.

Psychotherapy has disclosed a significant component of autism in the personality which is resorted to regularly and which seems to drag the patient into a passive acceptance of half-life which she tries not to mind. In the course of her sessions the patient has come to take more notice of her predicament and to mind more about the dissatisfactions which she experiences.

The case presented here is considered to have the characteristics of a particular group of adolescents. These are often described as “just slow” and are brought for psychiatric or psychological attention by desperate parents urgently concerned about the working future of their children.

These are individuals of whom the original definition of mental handicap contained in the Mental Health Act 1913 “a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind” would seem to offer as honest, appropriate and meaningful an assessment as the formal I.Q. score introduced in 1959. Unlike the latter, it is an assessment based on a concept of mental development. Assessment by I.Q. score has led to emphasis on training to compensate for the supposed loss of functioning and also to notions like “training for development” and “education from birth”.

In the case described here it was the abandonment of training aims and approaches which produced a dramatic improvement in the well-being of the patient and her family. Treatment is now fostering the potential in this woman to bring her own mind into action and to support in her, her own wish for personal development.     

The Desk or the Bed?

Assertions that studying is done best at a desk rather than on a bed are largely untested. In the present study the GPA of students working at their desks was compared with that of students studying on their beds. There was no difference in the GPA's of the two groups. The assumption that there is a single type of study environment optimal for all students appears unwarranted. Since a sizable number of college students use their beds and even the floor for studying, the use of softer and more comfortable furniture in libraries and study halls deserves consideration.     

Is paranoia a defence against or an expression of low self‐esteem?

Paranoia has been hypothesized to be negatively correlated with self‐esteem. However, hypotheses differ about how low self‐esteem might produce paranoia. The paranoia as defense model views paranoia as a defensive reaction against low self‐esteem. In contrast, the paranoia as expression model views paranoia in part as a reflection of low self‐esteem. In the current study, paranoia was negatively associated with global explicit self‐esteem, self‐competence, self‐liking and self‐serving attributional style, but unassociated with implicit self‐esteem as measured with the Implicit Association Test. In contrast, facets of narcissism, which also have been hypothesized to be associated with defensive self‐processing, were associated with defensiveness. Overall, these results suggest that paranoia is better represented by the expression model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Does Corporeality Inform Theorizing? Revisiting Hannah Arendt and the Banality of Evil

The perplexing relationship between two of the twentieth century’s most important philosophers, Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, has been the subject of much speculation within academic circles. For Arendt, Heidegger was at once, her mentor, her lover, and her friend. In this paper, we juxtapose Arendt’s theory of the banality of evil against her relationship with Heidegger in an effort to consider the question: How does corporeality inform theorizing? In answering this question, we repudiate the conventional reading of the banality of evil, which attributes the theory to Arendt’s analysis of Adolf Eichmann during the latter’s criminal trial for the actions that he perpetrated in the operation of the Holocaust. Instead, we argue that the theory is, more compellingly, reflective of Arendt’s deeply personal attempts at making sense of Heidegger’s decision to affiliate himself with the German Nazi Party in the years preceding, and during, the Second World War. Through this revisionist account of the banality of evil, we animate the idea that theorizing is the discursive corollary, and belongs within the phenomenological parameters, of corporeality. Finally, we contend that any constructive understanding of how corporeality informs theorizing will only be realized, when there is a collapsing of the seemingly impervious philosophical boundaries that demarcate between ontology and epistemology.     

Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference?

In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some 'paradoxical' situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against Elga's indifference principle. There are also some difficulties with the concept of evidence that Elga uses, and these create further difficulties for the principle.     

Selling the War? System‐Justifying Effects of Commercial Advertising on Civilian Casualty Tolerance

In times of war, news media coverage of the plight of civilian casualties plays a critical role in shaping attitudes regarding war's human costs. We proposed that these attitudes may also be surreptitiously influenced by the commercial advertisements that often accompany this coverage. Specifically, we hypothesized that when newspaper articles pertaining to civilian victims of war are flanked by luxury ads, conservatives, relative to liberals, will subsequently exhibit less concern for these victims. This proposition was based on the notion that commercial ads, particularly those promoting luxury items, make salient the gap between the “haves” and the “have‐nots” and thereby, at least implicitly, threaten the legitimacy of the current socioeconomic system. Drawing upon system justification theory, we posited that this threat would lead individuals with stronger system‐justification tendencies (conservatives), relative to those more open to challenging the current system (liberals), to show greater tolerance for civilian war casualties in order to defend the system's integrity. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis was found in a quasi‐experimental study (n = 329).     

Is the unconscious smart or dumb?

How sophisticated is unconscious cognition? This is one of the most fundamental questions about the unconscious that has been posed by research psychologists over the past century. Anthony Greenwald takes a contemporary look at this classical problem and concludes that unconscious cognition is severely limited in its analytic capability. In response, other leading scholars agree that the reality of unconscious processes is no longer questionable. Although there is some disagreement about just how sophisticated these processes are, the consensus is that exciting times are ahead for both research and theory concerning the mental processes involved in unconscious cognition.     

Who or what is the preembryo?

...The moral status -- and specifically the controversial issue of personhood -- is related to attainment of developmental individuality...This contrasts with the view that holds that personhood occurs earlier, at the point of genetic uniqueness. I believe that an embryo that has developed to the point where it can be one individual and one individual only, differs in moral status from a preembryo that has not, even if in many cases we may choose to treat them similarly...In view of the conviction that the preembryo is not yet a person and that its statistical potential for becoming such is small, it is not clear that nontherapeutic experiments can be excluded in principle. However, because the preembryo does have intrinsic potential...the preembryo should be treated as a person...Any exceptions from the prima facie duty to treat the preembryo as a person should be based on criteria established at the national level....