Risk preferences in young children: early evidence of individual differences in reaction to potential gains and losses

New methods were developed for studying risky decision making in children as young as age five. Each child was given a block of ‘gain’ trials, for example, a choice between a sure gain of one prize and a 50:50 chance of gaining either two prizes or no prize, and a block of ‘loss’ trials, for example, a choice between a sure loss of one prize and a 50:50 chance of losing either two prizes or no prize. We were thus able to compare risky choice for gains and losses at the level of the individual child. In each of two experiments a variety of individual difference variables were measured, including in Experiment 2, the child's parent's scores on the same task. Across experiments, the preponderance of choices was of the risky option. However, most children and adults made more risky choices in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. Predictors of individual differences in children included shyness, impulsivity, and the risk taking of the child's parent. We suggest that methods are now in place to encourage further studies of decision processes in young children. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Detecting children's true and false denials of wrongdoing: Effects of question type and base rate knowledge

One common and unfortunately overlooked obstacle to the detection of sexual abuse is non-disclosure by children. Non-disclosure in forensic interviews may be expressed via concealment in response to recall questions or via active denials in response to recognition (e.g., yes/no) questions. In two studies, we evaluated whether adults' ability to discern true and false denials of wrongdoing by children varied as a function of the types of interview question the children were asked. Results suggest that adults are not good at detecting deceptive denials of wrongdoing by children, even when the adults view children narrate their experiences in response to recall questions rather than provide one word answers to recognition questions. In Study 1, adults exhibited a consistent “truth bias,” leading them toward believing children, regardless of whether the children's denials were true or false. In Study 2, adults were given base-rate information about the occurrence of true and false denials (50% of each). The information eliminated the adults' truth bias but did not improve their overall detection accuracy, which still hovered near chance. Adults did, however, perceive children's denials as slightly more credible when they emerged in response to recall rather than recognition questions, especially when children were honestly denying wrongdoing. Results suggest the need for caution when evaluating adults' judgments of children's veracity when the children fail to disclose abuse.     

Melting Lizards and Crying Mailboxes: Children's Preferential Recall of Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts

Previous research with adults suggests that a catalog of minimally counterintuitive concepts, which underlies supernatural or religious concepts, may constitute a cognitive optimum and is therefore cognitively encoded and culturally transmitted more successfully than either entirely intuitive concepts or maximally counterintuitive concepts. This study examines whether children's concept recall similarly is sensitive to the degree of conceptual counterintuitiveness (operationalized as a concept's number of ontological domain violations) for items presented in the context of a fictional narrative. Seven‐ to nine‐year‐old children who listened to a story including both intuitive and counterintuitive concepts recalled the counterintuitive concepts containing one (Experiment 1) or two (Experiment 2), but not three (Experiment 3), violations of intuitive ontological expectations significantly more and in greater detail than the intuitive concepts, both immediately after hearing the story and 1 week later. We conclude that one or two violations of expectation may be a cognitive optimum for children: They are more inferentially rich and therefore more memorable, whereas three or more violations diminish memorability for target concepts. These results suggest that the cognitive bias for minimally counterintuitive ideas is present and active early in human development, near the start of formal religious instruction. This finding supports a growing literature suggesting that diverse, early‐emerging, evolved psychological biases predispose humans to hold and perform religious beliefs and practices whose primary form and content is not derived from arbitrary custom or the social environment alone.     

Decision-making processes: sensitivity to sequentially experienced outcome probabilities

A computerized sequential event sampling decision-making task was administered to 187 5- to 10-year-olds and adults Participants made a series of choices between alternatives that differed in win probability (Study 1) or win and loss probability (Study 2). Intuitive and more explicit measures were used. Study 1 revealed that, across ages, participants demonstrated intuitive sensitivity to probability; however, adult participants evidenced greater sensitivity than did children, and younger children failed to demonstrate more explicit understanding of probability. Study 2 also revealed that children were intuitively sensitive to probability; however, the inclusion of loss had limited impact on decision processes. These findings and their relevance to cognitive developmental theory are discussed.     

Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices

Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others’ irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.     

The development of regret

In two experiments, 4- to 9-year-olds played a game in which they selected one of two boxes to win a prize. On regret trials the unchosen box contained a better prize than the prize children actually won, and on baseline trials the other box contained a prize of the same value. Children rated their feelings about their prize before and after seeing what they could have won if they had chosen the other box and were asked to provide an explanation if their feelings had changed. Patterns of responding suggested that regret was experienced by 6 or 7 years of age; children of this age could also explain why they felt worse in regret trials by referring to the counterfactual situation in which the prize was better. No evidence of regret was found in 4- and 5-year-olds. Additional findings suggested that by 6 or 7 years, children's emotions were determined by a consideration of two different counterfactual scenarios.     

The elusive wishful thinking effect

Abstract

We define a desirability effect as the inflation of the judged probability of desirable events or the diminution of the judged probability of undersirable events. A series of studies of this effect are reported. In the first four experiments, subjects were presented with visual stimuli (a grid matrix in two colours, or a jar containing beads in two colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours. The estimated probabilities for a defined draw were not higher when the draw entailed a gain than when it entailed a loss. In the fifth and sixth experiments, subjects read short stories each describing two contestants competing for some desirable outcome (e.g. parents fighting for child custody, or firms bidding for a contract). Some judged the probability that A would win, others judged the Desirability that A would win. Story elements that enhanced a contestant's desirability did not cause the favoured contestant to be judged more likely to win. Only when a contestant's desirability was enhanced by promising the subject of payoff contingent on that contestant's victory was there some slight evidence for a desirability effect: contestants were judged more likely to win when the subject expected a monetary prize if they won than when the subject expected a prize if the other contestant won. In the last experiment, subjects estimated the probability of an over-20-point weekly change in the Dow Jones average, and were promised prizes contingent on such a change either occurring, or failing to occur. They were also given a monetary incentive for accuracy. Subjects who desired a small change. We conclude that desirability effects, when they exist, operate by biasing the evidence brought to mind regarding the event in question, but when a given body of evidence is considered, its judged probability is not influenced by desirability considerations.     

6~8岁儿童公平行为的内在动机：社会信号的作用

公平行为是个体对自己或别人不偏不倚的行为,存在本质公平与表现公平。本质公平,即个体本身渴望公平,能够依据某种公平原则做出公平行为;表现公平,即个体在行为上做出公平的表现而实质并非来自本身的意愿。研究1选取270名6~8岁儿童,采用资源分配任务考察儿童在有无社会信号作用下表现公平行为的发展特点,研究2选取300名6~8岁儿童,采用抛硬币任务来考察儿童是否会用公平程序来掩盖其不公平行为。结果表明：(1)有无社会信号条件对儿童公平行为存在显著影响,并存在显著的年龄差异。有社会信号条件下,儿童更多选择公平行为,无社会信号条件下,儿童更多选择对自己有利的不公平分配。(2)儿童选择通过抛硬币的方式来获取奖品的人数随着年龄增长显著上升,抛硬币的儿童报告自己得到好的奖品的概率显著多于得到不好奖品的概率。结论：社会信号作用下儿童更多会做出表现公平而非本质公平。     

A behavioral analysis of incentive prompts for motivating seat belt use

The seat belt usage of drivers was observed at the entrance to two campus parking lots during morning arrival times. After 11 days of baseline, fliers which prompted seat belt wearing were handed to drivers of incoming vehicles. At one parking lot all fliers offered a chance to win a prize (noncontingent rewards); while at the second lot only those fliers given to seat belt wearers included a chance to win a prize (contingent rewards). After 24 consecutive observation days, these interventions were removed for 14 days of withdrawal. The recording of vehicle license plates enabled an analysis of belt usage per individual over repeated exposures to the experimental conditions. At the lot with the contingent reward intervention, mean belt usage was 26.3% during baseline, 45.7% during treatment, and 37.9% during withdrawal. At the noncontingent reward lot, the mean percentage of belt wearing was 22.2% during baseline, 24.1% during treatment, and 21.8% during withdrawal. The analysis of repeated exposures per individual verified that only contingent rewards influenced substantial increases in belt wearing, and showed that most of the influence occurred after the initial incentive prompt.     

Intuitive Political Theory: People's Judgments About How Groups Should Decide

Societies must make collective decisions even when citizens disagree, and they use many different political processes to do so. But how do people choose one way to make a group decision over another? We propose that the human mind contains an intuitive political theory about how to make collective decisions, analogous to people's intuitive theories about language, physics, number, minds, and morality. We outline a simple method for studying people's intuitive political theory using scenarios about group decisions, and we begin to apply this approach in three experiments. Participants read scenarios in which individuals in a group have conflicting information (Experiment 1), conflicting interests (Experiment 2), and conflicting interests between a majority and a vulnerable minority who have more at stake (Experiment 3). Participants judged whether the group should decide by voting, consensus, leadership, or chance. Overall, we find that participants prefer majority‐rule voting over consensus, leadership, and chance when a group has conflicting interests or information. However, participants' support for voting is considerably diminished when the group includes a vulnerable minority. Hence, participants showed an intuitive understanding of Madison's concerns about tyranny of the majority.     

Justifying Optimistic Predictions With Minimally Diagnostic Information Under Conditions of Outcome Dependency

Participants in 2 studies received information varying in diagnosticity about another person whom they were motivated to view positively or negatively. In Study 1, participants' chances of winning a prize depended on whether another player won or lost an 11-trial game. Although estimates of this player's chances of winning were identical prior to the game, participants who wanted him to win were more optimistic than those who wanted him to lose after he was said to have won the first trial. Predictions following later trials also showed evidence of motivation, but only when participants had not made pregame predictions. Ratings after individual trials were also sensitive to whether the yoked player won or lost. In Study 2, participants received information that did or did not relate to the probable performance of their partner, opponent, or a control target in an upcoming creativity game. After receiving the information, participants rated their opponent more negatively than they did the control target, regardless of information diagnosticity, and despite the fact that participants acknowledged the difference in diagnosticity. Evidently, when seeking evidence for optimistic predictions, people may apply different standards to minimally diagnostic information depending on its favorability, despite understanding the information's low utility.     

Cognitive strategies for coping with uncertain outcomes

It was proposed that, when faced with highly desirable but uncertain outcomes, people may employ cognitive strategies in an attempt to influence their future affective responses to the outcomes in question. The present study attempted to demonstrate the use of two such strategies. First, it was hypothesized that when people are faced with a low probability of obtaining a highly desirable outcome, they tend to derogate that outcome by perceiving it as less attractive. Second, it was proposed that when people are faced with uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a highly desirable outcome, they tend to underestimate the likelihood of its occurrence, in an attempt to avoid future disappointment. These hypotheses were tested within the context of a lottery in which subjects were given a low, moderate, or high chance of winning a prize that was either high or low in attractiveness. As predicted, subjects viewed the highly attractive prize as less valuable and attractive when they had a low probability of winning than when the probability of winning was moderate or high. Subjects also perceived themselves as less likely to win when the prize was high in attractiveness than when it was low in attractiveness. The relationship of these findings to studies of self-handicapping and attribute ambiguity is discussed.     

Two‐year‐olds use adults' but not peers' points

In the current study, 24‐ to 27‐month‐old children (N = 37) used pointing gestures in a cooperative object choice task with either peer or adult partners. When indicating the location of a hidden toy, children pointed equally accurately for adult and peer partners but more often for adult partners. When choosing from one of three hiding places, children used adults’ pointing to find a hidden toy significantly more often than they used peers’. In interaction with peers, children's choice behavior was at chance level. These results suggest that toddlers ascribe informative value to adults’ but not peers’ pointing gestures, and highlight the role of children's social expectations in their communicative development.     

Choosing Between Lotteries: Remarkable Coordination Without Communication

The current research examines tacit coordination behavior in a lottery selection task. Two hundred participants in each of three experiments and 100 in a fourth choose to participate in one of two lotteries, where one lottery has a larger prize than the other. Independent of variations in the complexity of the mechanism of prize allocation, the prize amounts, and whether the lottery is the participant's first or second choice, we typically find that the percentage of participants who choose the high versus low‐prize lotteries does not significantly differ from the equilibrium predictions. This coordination is achieved without communication or experience. We additionally find that participants with an analytical thinking style and a risk‐averse tendency are more likely to choose the low‐prize lottery over the high‐prize lottery. This tendency seems to be stable across choices. The pattern of our results suggests that to achieve tacit coordination, having a subset of individuals who attend to the choices of others is sufficient. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Correlation of the Response Potentials of the Skin with “Exciting” and Non-“Exciting” Stimuli

The relationship between psychological test performance and adult judgments of children's intelligence was explored in Guatemala and the U. S. A. In Guatemala, 15 male and 15 female children, age eight, were studied in each of two rural villages. In one village, 48 adult community members ranked the children on intelligence; in the other, 29 adults did the rankings. Male and female children were ranked separately. In the U. S., nine male children in a small New Jersey town were ranked by 25 adults. In a second U. S. community. a small California town, eight male children were ranked by 14 adults. In general, adult judgments were found to be congruent with children's test performance. In Guatemala, a simple family socioeconomic index was also related to both adult judgment and children's test performance. The implications of the results and the utility of these types of judgment techniques in cross-cultural research are discussed.     

How Children and Adults Represent God's Mind

For centuries, humans have contemplated the minds of gods. Research on religious cognition is spread across sub‐disciplines, making it difficult to gain a complete understanding of how people reason about gods' minds. We integrate approaches from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology and neuroscience to illuminate the origins of religious cognition. First, we show that although adults explicitly discriminate supernatural minds from human minds, their implicit responses reveal far less discrimination. Next, we demonstrate that children's religious cognition often matches adults' implicit responses, revealing anthropomorphic notions of God's mind. Together, data from children and adults suggest the intuitive nature of perceiving God's mind as human‐like. We then propose three complementary explanations for why anthropomorphism persists in adulthood, suggesting that anthropomorphism may be (a) an instance of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic; (b) a reflection of early testimony; and/or (c) an evolutionary byproduct.     

A “snapshot” of declarative memory: Differing developmental trajectories in episodic and autobiographical memory

Episodic and autobiographical memory are clearly related, yet in both the adult and developmental literatures it is difficult to compare them because of differences in how the constructs are assessed, including differences in content, levels of control, and time since experience. To address these issues, we directly compared children's and adults’ autobiographical and episodic memory using the same controlled paradigm. Participants engaged in a photo-taking activity in a museum (autobiographical encoding) and viewed others’ photographs of the same museum exhibits (episodic encoding). At test, participants classified photos as ones they took, viewed, or novel. In the autobiographical condition older children and adults performed similarly; younger children's performance was lower than adults’. In contrast, in the episodic condition both groups of children performed more poorly than adults. The findings suggest the developmental primacy of autobiographical relative to episodic memory, and that traditional episodic tasks may underestimate older children's declarative memory abilities.     

On the Interaction of Theory and Data in Concept Learning

Standard models of concept learning generally focus on deriving statistical properties of a category based on data (i.e., category members and the features that describe them) but fail to give appropriate weight to the contact between people's intuitive theories and these data. Two experiments explored the role of people's prior knowledge or intuitive theories on category learning by manipulating the labels associated with the category. Learning differed dramatically when categories of children's drawings were meaningfully labeled (e.g., “done by creative children”) compared to when they were labeled in a neutral manner. When categories are meaningfully labeled, people bring intuitive theories to the learning context. Learning then involves a process in which people search for evidence in the data that supports abstract features or hypotheses that have been activated by the intuitive theories. In contrast, when categories are labeled in a neutral manner, people search for simple features that distinguish one category from another. Importantly, the final study suggests that learning involves an interaction of people's intuitive theories with data, in which theories and data mutually influence each other. The results strongly suggest that straight-forward, relatively modular ways of incorporating prior knowledge into models of category learning are inadequate. More telling, the results suggest that standard models may have fundamental limitations. We outline a speculative model of learning in which the interaction of theory and data is tightly coupled. The article concludes by comparing the results to recent artificial intelligence systems that use prior knowledge during learning.