De Finettian Logics of Indicative Conditionals Part I: Trivalent Semantics and Validity

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper explores trivalent truth conditions for indicative conditionals, examining the “defective” truth table proposed by de Finetti (1936) and...     

Objecting Vaguely to Pascal's Wager

Philosophical Studies -     

Semantics and the sacred

ABSTRACT

This article looks at four different scholarly perspectives on ‘sacred’ – the ineffable sacred, the experienced sacred, the polarized sacred and the contextualized sacred – in order to draw out their implicit presuppositions about meaning. The first two stances presuppose that meaning depends on what bits of language are about (referentialism), and the other two stances presuppose that meaning depends on relations between bits of language (holism). The article concludes three things: these prominent views of ‘sacred’ rest on usually implicit or unrecognized assumptions about the nature of meaning; some of those assumptions explain why certain theories are contentious and problematic and others ground more promising and productive approaches.     

Kripke Bundle Semantics and C-set Semantics

Kripke bundle [3] and C-set semantics [1] [2] are known as semantics which generalize standard Kripke semantics. In [3] and in [1], [2] it is shown that Kripke bundle and C-set semantics are stronger than standard Kripke semantics. Also it is true that C-set semantics for superintuitionistic logics is stronger than Kripke bundle semantics [5].In this paper, we show that Q-S4.1 is not Kripke bundle complete via C-set models. As a corollary we can give a simple proof showing that C-set semantics for modal logics are stronger than Kripke bundle semantics.     

On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics

In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate all these theories in terms of lower bounds on partial preorders, conceived of as maximal antichains, and I show that treating lower bounds as cutsets does strictly better at capturing our intuitions about the semantics of modals, counterfactuals, and deontic conditionals.     

Relational Semantics and Domain Semantics for Epistemic Modals

The standard account of modal expressions in natural language analyzes them as quantifiers over a set of possible worlds determined by the evaluation world and an accessibility relation. A number of authors have recently argued for an alternative account according to which modals are analyzed as quantifying over a domain of possible worlds that is specified directly in the points of evaluation. But the new approach only handles the data motivating it if it is supplemented with a non-standard account of attitude verbs and conditionals. It can be shown the the relational account handles the same data equally well if it too is supplemented with a non-standard account of such expressions.     

Intransitivity and Vague Preferences

This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none of them provide a justification for the transitivity axiom. For helpful comments on earlier drafts and discussions of this material, I am very grateful to John Broome, Rosanna Keefe, Matthew Kramer, Stuart Rachels, Jochen Runde and Adrian Walsh. I owe a large debt to John O’Neill, who suggested an earlier version of the “Tragedy of the Disappearing Commons” example.     

Vague Value

You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations.     

Semantics and supervenience

I have presented much of this research in talks at the University of Costa Rica and the University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to my audiences for their comments and advice. I would like especially to thank Luis Camacho, Nicholas Asher, and Robert Koons. Many of the ideas in the paper stem from an informal seminar on type-free theories held at the University of Texas's Center for Cognitive Science from 1984 to 1987. I am grateful to the participants in that seminar — Ignacio Angelelli, Nicholas Asher, Herbert Hochberg, Hans Kamp, Frederick Kronz, Per Lindström and Mark Sainsbury — for their many insights into type-free semantics, and to the Center for Cognitive Science for providing such a hospitable environment for this work. I have also profited from the criticisms of two anonymous referees. Finally, I am indebted to the University of Texas's University Research Institute and to the National Science Foundation's Information Science and History and Philosophy of Science programs for grant support.     

模糊对象和模糊性的逻辑

本文最初写于2001年,旨在探究语言上的、概念上的与本体论中的模糊性问题。文章始于这样一个问题,即模糊性仅仅是一个词的特征,抑或它也是我们的概念的特征,甚或是实在的特征？其中主要的关注点在于模糊对象的问题和相关的模糊同一性的问题。本文首先论证,即便模糊概念总可以得到进一步澄清,每个概念工具也必定是模糊的。其次,本文认为,如果不仅仅是词语,而且这些词语所表达的概念也是模糊的,那么可以论证,对象也必定是模糊的。第三,那种认为模糊对象必定具有模糊的同一性的思路是一种误解。最后一点尤为重要,因为对于模糊对象的抵制部分就来自于下述观念,即这种对象是不可能的,因为它们不遵守逻辑的同一律。本文也论述了,通过放弃二值原则以使得模糊陈述具有真和假之间的某个值或根本就没有真值的办法,也无助于解决模糊性问题,而且恰恰会造成相反的情况,即妨碍我们找到问题的解决之道。本文表明,在为真和既不真又不假之间,难以清晰地划分界限,正如在模糊的情形下要在真和假之间划界一样困难。本文的方法是利用量化模态逻辑的框架和语义学来处理这些问题。基于哥德尔模式的模态逻辑系统T,本文提出了一种关于清晰性和模糊性的量化逻辑,其中利用清晰性算子来代替必然性算子。文章还进一步讨论了模糊性和概念工具的发展之间的关联。     

Vague fictional objects

ABSTRACT

I propose a different account of fictional objects from the ones already present in the literature. According to my account, fictional objects are culturally created abstract objects dependent for their existence on the pretence attitude adopted by a group of people towards a single fictional content. My work is divided into three parts: in the first one, I present how fictional objects come into existence according to my proposal; in the second part, I illustrate how the existence of fictional objects so conceived may be ontically indeterminate; in the last part, I consider what happens when vague existence and indeterminate identity are claimed within fictional texts.     

Referentiality and Matrix Semantics

Referential semantics importantly subscribes to the programme of theory of logical calculi. Defined by Wójcicki in [8], it has been subsequently studied in a series of papers of the author, till the full exposition of the framework in [9] and its intuitive characterisation in [10].     

Against Vague Existence

Philosophical Studies -     

Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics

Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the interpretation is kept constant. However, the received conception of an interpretation as a mapping from language to a model frame hinders keeping the interpretation constant while varying other components of the model. To make room for analyticity, the concept of an interpretation should therefore be revised. The latter should be made richer in content than it has usually been assumed. As a by-product, this revision also gives us a one-dimensional analogue of the influential two-dimensional account of a priori. We are thus able to map out the network of formal connections between the notions of analyticity, apriority, logical truth and necessity.