Children’s use of phonological encoding when reading for meaning

The role of phonological recoding in children’s reading was investigated by means of a task requiring comprehension of sentence meaning: The child’s task was to decide whether a sequence of printed letter strings was a meaningful sentence or not. Meaningless sentences that are meaningful when phonologically recoded (e.g., “He ran threw the street”) produced more incorrect responses than did meaningless sentences that remain meaningless when phonologically recoded (e.g., “He ran sew the street”). The difference in error rates between the two sentence types diminished as a function of age. Control experiments showed that these results were not due to visual similarity effects, nor to imperfect ability to spell homophones. It was concluded that very young readers rely extensively on phonological recoding when reading for meaning; as they grow older, reliance on visual encoding becomes progressively more important.     

Development of comprehension of sentences with “because” or “if”

The comprehension of sentences with “because” or “if” was investigated in children aged 2;9–11;11. Imitation, comprehension (choosing one of two picture sequences to go with a sentence), recognition (judging sentences with connective or structure differences as heard before or not), and synonymy (judging equivalence of meaning in sentences with different connectives or structures) tasks were administered, along with logical ordering, reversibility, and classification tasks. Above-chance responding in the comprehension task occurred by age 8, and in recognition and synonymy by age 10. Cognitive performance predicted 28.4% of the variance in the linguistic scores and cognitive success was concurrent with or preceded linguistic success. Comprehension of “because” and “if” appears to develop gradually, and is related to the development of certain operative rules.     

Pronoun disambiguation: Accessing potential antecedents

Two general classes of pronoun disambiguation processes are considered. In reading “Jack threw a snowball at Phil, but he missed,” both possible antecedents of “he” (“Jack” and “Phil”) may be accessed initially. Or, the actual antecedent alone may be accessed after sufficient semantic context is encoded. To evaluate these alternatives, a yes-no-probe recognition task was used to measure priming of the potential antecedents in sentence comprehension. Subjects read sentences similar to the example and were presented a test word immediately following each sentence. Response times for the actual antecedent (“Jack”) and nonantecedent (“Phil”) probes were obtained. Results indicated that the nonantecedent as well as the antecedent was activated (accessed) in pronoun disambiguation. This conclusion was not affected by the ordering of the antecedent and nonantecedent in the first clause.     

A Multiple‐Channel Model of Task‐Dependent Ambiguity Resolution in Sentence Comprehension

Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton (1998) found that ambiguous sentences are read faster than their unambiguous counterparts. This so‐called ambiguity advantage has presented a major challenge to classical theories of human sentence comprehension (parsing) because its most prominent explanation, in the form of the unrestricted race model (URM), assumes that parsing is non‐deterministic. Recently, Swets, Desmet, Clifton, and Ferreira (2008) have challenged the URM. They argue that readers strategically underspecify the representation of ambiguous sentences to save time, unless disambiguation is required by task demands. When disambiguation is required, however, readers assign sentences full structure—and Swets et al. provide experimental evidence to this end. On the basis of their findings, they argue against the URM and in favor of a model of task‐dependent sentence comprehension. We show through simulations that the Swets et al. data do not constitute evidence for task‐dependent parsing because they can be explained by the URM. However, we provide decisive evidence from a German self‐paced reading study consistent with Swets et al.'s general claim about task‐dependent parsing. Specifically, we show that under certain conditions, ambiguous sentences can be read more slowly than their unambiguous counterparts, suggesting that the parser may create several parses, when required. Finally, we present the first quantitative model of task‐driven disambiguation that subsumes the URM, and we show that it can explain both Swets et al.'s results and our findings.     

With the past behind and the future ahead: Back-to-front representation of past and future sentences

Several studies support the psychological reality of a mental timeline that runs from the left to the right and may strongly affect our thinking about time. Ulrich and Maienborn (Cognition 117:126–138, 2010) examined the linguistic relevance of this timeline during the processing of past- and future-related sentences. Their results indicate that the timeline is not activated automatically during sentence comprehension. While no explicit reference of temporal expressions to the left–right axis has been attested (e.g., *the meeting was moved to the left), natural languages refer to the back–front axis in order to encode temporal information (e.g., the meeting was moved forward). Therefore, the present study examines whether a back–frontal timeline becomes automatically activated during the processing of past- and future-related sentences. The results demonstrate a clear effect on reaction time that emerges from a time–space association along the frontal timeline (Experiment 1). However, this activation seems to be nonautomatic (Experiment 2), rendering it unlikely that this frontal timeline is involved in comprehension of the temporal content of sentences.     

Quantum information in an evolutionary perspective

An approach to quantum phenomena is reviewed that deals with the possibility of their realistic interpretation in the sense that they represent manifestations of hermeneutic circles between quantum “objects” and their experimental boundary conditions. Quantum cybernetics provides an evolutionary perspective in that all higher‐level organizations like molecules, cells, living systems, etc., can be discussed under one and the same systemic viewpoint: a hermeneutic circularity between a “core” (or “nucleus") and a relevant “periphery” (or “environment") which constitutes the systems’ organization and information potential.

Generally, in realistic theories, an individual quantum system is analyzable into a local “particle‐like” nonlinearity of a generally nonlocal “wave‐like” mode of some sub‐quantum structure of the vacuum ("Dirac ether"). In this view, a “particle” can be considered as being “guided” along one specific route by the (generally nonlocal) configurations of superimposed waves, which spread along all possible paths of an experimental setup. Moreover, in the approach of Quantum Cybernetics, an additional focus is given on the fact that the energy and momentum of a particle also determine the wave behavior. Thus, “waves” and “particles” are mutually and self‐consistently defined, and Quantum Cybernetics puts particular emphasis on the circular relationship—mediated by plane waves—between a quantum system and its macroscopically defined boundary conditions.     

Effort toward comprehension: Elaboration or “aha”?

Auble and Franks (1978) found that a process termed “effort toward comprehension” was important in facilitating recall of sentences. Four experiments were conducted to further elucidate the nature of this process. Two hypotheses were considered: (1)Effort toward comprehension involves greater elaboration or deeper processing of the sentence; (2)effort toward comprehension can be viewed as an “aha” experience (i.e., a state of noncomprehension followed by comprehension of the sentence). Results indicated that recall was significantly greater for subjects in conditions producing “aha” reactions. No support was found for the elaboration interpretation of effort toward comprehension.     

Embodiment Effects and Language Comprehension in Alzheimer's Disease

It has been shown that when participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences that describe a transfer of an object toward or away from their body, they are faster to respond when the response requires a movement in the same direction as the transfer described in the sentence. This phenomenon is known as the action compatibility effect (ACE). This study investigates whether the ACE exists for volunteers with Alzheimer's disease (AD), whether the ACE can facilitate language comprehension, and also whether the ACE can still be produced if the order of the two events is inverted, that is, whether overt movement can prime comprehension of transfer sentences. In Study 1, participants with AD, younger, and older adults were tested on an adaptation of the ACE Paradigm. In Study 2, the same paradigm was modified to include an arm movement that participants had to perform prior to sentence exposure on screen. In Study 1, young, older adults, and individuals with AD were faster to respond when the direction of the response movement matched the directionality implied by the sentence (ACE). In Study 2, no traditional ACE was found; participants were faster when the direction of the movement immediately preceding the sentence matched the directionality of the sentence. It was found that compatibility effects generated a relative advantage, that transfer schemata are easier to process, and that an ACE‐like effect can be the result of mutual priming between language and movement. Results suggested preservation in AD of the neural systems for action engaged during language comprehension, and conditions under which comprehension in AD can be facilitated in real life may be identified.     

Sensuality and venality in Bangkok: The dynamics of cross‐cultural mapping of prostitution

The dynamics of cross‐cultural cognitive mapping is examined, from a Schuetzian perspective, on the example of the changing images formed by farangs (white foreigners) of Thai girls engaged in “open‐ended” tourist‐oriented prostitution, a vaguely‐defined, gray area lying between “full‐fledged prostitution” and “straight” sexuality. The newcomer farang, unable to grasp this culture‐specific category, initially tends to refuse to label the girls as “prostitutes,” but, with growing experience, tends to apply that label to them, without, however, thereby resetting the boundaries of his cognitive map. He thus fails to make the transition from strangeness to familiarity with the host culture, as conceived by Schuetz—since he continues to impose the crisp categorizations prevalent in his culture of origin, on a situation which is fuzzily conceived in different categories by the hosts. The case study exemplifies the difficulties of a cross‐cultural definition and identification of prostitution.     

SEMANTIC INTEGRATION: A COMPARISON OF NORMAL AND DISABLED READERS

Abstract

This study examined comprehension of sets of related sentences from which inferences could be drawn. Subjects were 40 disabled and 40 normal readers (C.A. 10‐10 ‐ 11‐11) who were asked to read short paragraphs suggesting spatial relationships. After reading, they were given a recognition test containing items not previously read but which were structured in their relationship to the semantic content of the texts. Analyses of within and between group errors reveal significant differences due to sentence type and a strong tendency for both groups to “misrecognize” semantically congruent inferences. The results are discussed in light of past research on the memory capabilities of disabled readers and with respect to techniques of remediation.     

“THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF EXPERTS”: IN DEFENSE OF THE “ELITES” OF THE SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION DEBATE

This article takes a critical stance on John H. Evans's 2018 book, Morals Not Knowledge: Recasting the Contemporary U.S. Conflict between Religion and Science. Highlighting the significance of the book for the science‐and‐religion debate, particularly the book's emphasis on moral questions over knowledge claims revealed in social‐scientific studies of the American public, I also suggest that the distinction between the “elites” of the academic science‐and‐religion field and the religious “public” is insufficiently drawn. I argue that various nuances should be taken into account concerning the portrayal of “elites,” nuances which potentially change the way that “conflict” between science and religion is envisaged, as well as the function of the field. Similarly, I examine the ways in which the book construes science and religion as distinct knowledge systems, and I suggest that, from a theological perspective—relevant for much academic activity in science and religion—there is value in seeing science and religion in terms of a single knowledge system. This perspective may not address the public's interest in moral questions directly—important as they are—but nevertheless it fulfils the academic function of advancing the frontiers of human knowledge and self‐understanding.     

Not Propositions

Current computational accounts of meaning in the cognitive sciences are based on abstract, amodal symbols (e.g., nodes, links, propositions) that are arbitrarily related to their referents. We argue that such accounts lack convincing empirical support and that they do not provide a satisfactory account for linguistic meaning. One historic set of results supporting the abstract symbol view has come from investigation into comprehension of negated sentences, such as “The buttons are not black.” These sentences are presumed to be understood as two propositions composed of abstract symbols. One proposition corresponds to “the buttons are black,” and it is embedded in another proposition corresponding to “it is not true.” Thus, the propositional account predicts (a) that comprehension of negated sentences should take longer than comprehension of the corresponding positive sentence (because of the time needed to construct the embedding), but (b) that the resulting embedded propositions are informationally equivalent (but of opposite valence) to the simple proposition underlying the positive sentence. Contrary to these predictions, Experiment 1 demonstrates that negated sentences out of context are interpreted as situationally ambiguous, that is, as conveying less specific information than positive sentences. Furthermore, Experiment 2 demonstrates that when negated sentences are used in an appropriate context, readers do not take longer to understand them. Thus, difficulty with negation is demonstrated to be an artifact of presentation out of context. After discussing other serious problems with the use of abstract symbols, we describe the Indexical Hypothesis. This embodied account of meaning does not depend on abstract symbols, and hence it provides a more satisfactory account of meaning.     

Depth of comprehension,effective elaboration,and memory for sentences

It was hypothesized that depth of comprehension is a function of the complexity of the meaning components of a sentence that are activated during initial encoding. In four experiments, subjects were presented sentences containing either transitive causative verbs (e.g., “John opened the door”) or their intransitive noncausative counterparts (e.g., “The door opened”) and were required to produce a continuation to each sentence. Based on the above hypothesis, sentences for which the continuations induced causative interpretations should be remembered better than sentences for which noncausitive interpretations were induced. The results confirmed this hypothesis, and they are considered in relation to depth of comprehension, effective elaboration, and the role of inferences in memory for sentences.     

Can “you” make a difference? Investigating whether perspective‐taking improves performance on inconsistent mathematical word problems

Pronouns encouraging a second‐person perspective (e.g., “you/your”) affect peoples' mental representations constructed while reading and improve learning. The present study applied these insights to a domain in that such pronoun effects have yet been unexplored: mathematical word problem solving. Specifically, we encouraged a second‐person perspective (using “your”) in an attempt to reduce the consistency effect, that is, the finding that more errors are made on word problems containing a relational keyword inconsistent rather than consistent with the required arithmetic operation. Primary school children solved consistent and inconsistent word problems (containing the relational keywords “less than”) presented in third‐person (i.e., store name) or second‐person (“your store”) perspective. Results demonstrated the consistency effect, but the perspective manipulation did not produce significant differences between conditions, that is, a second‐person perspective did not reduce the consistency effect. These findings suggest that reducing the consistency effect may require a less subtle approach than using personalized pronouns.     

Evidence for the Role of Shape in Mental Representations of Similes

People mentally represent the shapes of objects. For instance, the mental representation of an eagle is different when one thinks about a flying or resting eagle. This study examined the role of shape in mental representations of similes (i.e., metaphoric comparisons). We tested the prediction that when people process a simile they will mentally represent the entities of the comparison as having a similar shape. We conducted two experiments in which participants read sentences that either did (experimental sentences) or did not (control sentences) invite comparing two entities. For the experimental sentences, the ground of the comparison was explicit in Experiment 1 (“X has the ability to Z, just like Y”) and implicit in Experiment 2 (“X is like Y”). After having read the sentence, participants were presented with line drawings of the two objects, which were either similarly or dissimilarly shaped. They judged whether both objects were mentioned in the preceding sentence. For the experimental sentences, recognition latencies were shorter for similarly shaped objects than for dissimilarly shaped objects. For the control sentences, we did not find such an effect of similarity in shape. These findings suggest that a perceptual symbol of shape is activated when processing similes.     

A Critical Test of Self‐Enhancement,Exposure, and Self‐Categorization Explanations for First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

The third‐person perception is the tendency for people to believe that others are more influenced by media content than themselves (W. P. Davison, 1983 ). The current study provides a critical test of self‐enhancement, exposure, and self‐categorization explanations for first‐ (i.e., self more influenced than others) and third‐person perceptions. Male and female participants (N = 323) judged the extent to which pornography elicited“aroused and excited” (i.e., male normative) versus“repulsed and offended” (i.e., female normative) reactions in themselves relative to average men and women. Men perceived an average woman to be more repulsed and offended by pornography than themselves, and women perceived an average man to be more aroused and excited than themselves (i.e., large third‐person perceptions). Further, men perceived themselves to be more aroused and excited by pornography than an average woman (independent of the degree to which pornography was judged as antisocial), and women perceived themselves to be more repulsed and offended than an average man (i.e., large first‐person perceptions). There were relatively small effects for same sex comparisons independent of norm. The pattern and magnitude of first‐ and third‐person perceptions are consistent with self‐categorization theory, irreconcilable with the exposure hypothesis, and difficult to reconcile with the self‐enhancement explanation.     

Young children's comprehension of number markers

Young children's comprehension of four number markers (demonstratives, regular nouns, third person of the auxiliary be, and regular present tense verbs) was investigated through their presentation in sentences conveying non-redundant information about number. Comprehension of each sentence was tested in two tasks: pointing to one of a pair of line drawings and acting out with toys the action described by a sentence. The results indicated that, firstly, the number information carried by the verb is rarely attended to or mastered before some component of the noun phrase; and, secondly, that the is/are allomorphs of the auxiliary be are mastered much earlier than the singular and plural forms of third-person regular present tense verbs. Both the overall order of difficulty in understanding the four number markers investigated and the analysis of individual data were consistent with the developmental sequence reported by several authors for the acquisition of grammatical morphemes in spontaneous speech production.     

What “you” and “we” say about me: How small shifts in language reveal and empower fundamental shifts in perspective

One of the most fundamental, yet often overlooked, components of language is the personal pronoun system. Pronouns reveal and empower different perspectives, providing insight into and even altering how a person is conceptualizing the self. Here, we illustrate how the pronouns “I,” “you,” and “we” can enable shifts in perspective that bring a person further from, or closer to, others. We additionally highlight the implications of these pronoun shifts on the addressee(s). We review a growing body of research that focuses on how these words can function as both windows—providing insight into the thoughts and emotions of a speaker, and levers—that can subtly alter the speaker's and addressee(s)’ thoughts, emotions, and even behaviors, across a range of domains. We conclude by discussing possibilities for future research.     

The comprehension of action-related sentences may cause interference rather than facilitation on matching actions

This study used a dual-task paradigm to analyze the time course of motor resonance during the comprehension of action language. In the study, participants read sentences describing a transfer either away from (“I threw the tennis ball to my rival”) or toward themselves (“My rival threw me the tennis ball”). When the transfer verb appeared on the screen, and after a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), a visual motion cue (Experiment 1) or a static cue (Experiment 2) prompted participants to move their hand either away from or toward themselves to press a button. The results showed meaning–action interference at short SOAs and facilitation at the longest SOA for the matching conditions. These results support the hypothesis that motor processes associated with the comprehension of action-related language interfere with an overlapping motor task, whereas they facilitate a delayed motor task. These effects are discussed in terms of resonance processes in the motor cortex.