Indiscriminate mothering as a contextual factor in aggressive-oppositional child behavior: “Damned if you do and damned if you don’t”

Fifty-two mother-child dyads took part in a parent training program to modify coercive, antisocial child behavior. Prior to intervention, scores on 14 measures of mother-child interaction and on an index of maternal community contacts (known as insularity) were obtained for each dyad. This index was used to divide the sample into two groups (noninsular) n=21; insular n=31). The interactional measures were then compared between the groups. Insular mothers were more aversive and indiscriminate than noninsular mothers in their use of aversive behavior toward their children, while their children were more aversive than noninsular children, especially in response to aversive maternal behavior. It was concluded that research and therapeutic work with deviant families should focus not only on immediate family interactions but also on the extrafamily environment in which these interactions take place.The research data reported in this paper were generated with support of Grant No. R01-1068-58 from the National Institute of Mental Health, Crime and Delinquency Section. The first author conducted the research while supported by a grant from the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, and the Swiss National Fund for Scientific Research.     

Damned if they do,Damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religion from Attack

The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to cases of religiously offensive expression is inconsistent and unsatisfactory. A critical analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on blasphemy, religious insult and religious hatred identifies three problems with its approach in this field. These are: the embellishment and over-emphasis of freedom of religion, the use of the margin of appreciation and the devaluing of some forms of offensive speech. Nevertheless, it is possible to defend a more coherent approach to the limitation of freedom of expression under the European Convention of Human Rights, designed to protect religious liberty in a narrower category of cases.     

Damned if You Do,Damned if You Don’t: The Stigma of Weight Loss Surgery

Willpower, as demonstrated through diet and exercise, is constructed as the only acceptable strategy for losing weight. While weight loss surgery (WLS) is an option for morbidly obese individuals, like obesity itself, WLS carries stigma. Using a 40-item survey, we measured 101 participants’ experiences with WLS stigma. We examined whether WLS is stigmatizing, how that stigma is perceived by patients, and tendencies to hide their surgery status in order to manage stigma. Results indicated evidence of perceived stigma despite support from significant others as well as a tendency to hide surgery status from some people as a stigma management technique.     

Helplessness: The inability to know-that you don’t know-how

The sense of helplessness stands at the very core of the traumatic experience. This paper suggests that a sense of helplessness arises when, despite the functioning of the cognitive system and awareness of circumstances and feelings, an individual is unable to access practical knowledge. As a result, the subject becomes a victim of one’s own inability to perform, or act, in the real world.     

What you don’t know can’t hurt you: realism and the unconceived

Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper, I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.

The effect of polysemy on lexical decision time: Now you see it,now you don’t

Gernsbacher (1984) found that number of word meanings (polysemy) did not influence lexical decision time when it was operationalized as number of dictionary definitions. This finding supports her contention that subjects do not store all possible dictionary meanings for words in memory. The present experiments extended Gernsbacher's research by determining whether more psychologically valid measures of polysemy affect lexical decision time. Three metrics were used to represent the meanings that subjects actually access from memory (accessible polysemy): (1) the first meanings subjects think of when asked to define stimulus words, (2) all the meanings subjects generate for words, and (3) the average number of meanings subjects generate. The results showed that the second and third metrics of polysemy influenced lexical decision time, whereas the first metric (representing mostly the access to dominant meanings for words) only approached significance.     

Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.     

The medical research council’s approach to allegations of scientific misconduct

The UK’s Medical Research Council (MRC) introduced a specific policy and procedure for inquiring into allegations of scientific misconduct in December 1997; previously cases had been considered under normal disciplinary procedures. The policy formally covers staff employed in MRC units, but those in receipt of MRC grants in universities and elsewhere are expected to operate under similar policies. The MRC’s approach is stepwise: preliminary action; assessment to establish prima facie evidence of misconduct; formal investigation; sanctions; and appeal. Strict time limits apply at all stages. The procedure will be evaluated after two years. The indications so far are that the procedure is robust, and its clarity and transparency have been an asset to all parties. The MRC is also convinced that it is equally important to achieve a working culture that fosters integrity. Thus education and training in good research practices are fundamental to the prevention of research misconduct. This paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct: An International Perspective, organized by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998.     

Aging: I don’t want to be a cyborg!

Examination is made of a range of cyborg solutions to bodily problems due to damage, but here with particular reference to aging. Both technological and animal implants, transplants and prosthetic devices are phenomenologically analyzed. The resultant trade-off phenomena are compared to popular culture technofantasies and desires and finally to human attitudes toward mortality and contingency. The parallelism of resistance to contingent existence and to becoming a cyborg is noted.     

Now you see me,now you don’t: Adapting practice through target exclusion negatively impacts motor learning

How to optimize practice through scheduling of different task components or skills is a question that has received a lot of attention in motor learning research. Consistently, schedules with high variability in the order that skills are practiced elicit better learning outcomes than schedules with low variability. Another idea is that learners should seek to reduce the uncertainty of practice outcomes, by avoiding well-learned, low error components in acquisition. To test this idea, we used a target exclusion method to prevent learners from returning to task components with low error and studied how individuals given choice over practice choose to allocate time to components of varying difficulty. In a multi-target adaptation paradigm, we compared exclusion with no exclusion methods in random-schedule, self-control and yoked, matched-schedule groups (6 groups total). To manipulate uncertainty, we excluded targets from practice once participants attained a criterion error score (mean < 5^o) from the last 5 trials to the same target. Contrary to our predictions, groups that practiced without target exclusion were more accurate in retention compared to exclusion groups; irrespective of practice schedule. Self-control groups adopted uncertainty-based practice, spending more time at difficult targets and less time at easier targets. However, there were no group differences in error, based on schedule-type (random, self-control and yoked). In conclusion, target exclusion was not an effective method for learning and did not support the efficacy of uncertainty-based practice for learning novel skills. There were benefits from keeping easier/low error skills in practice for later retention. These benefits did not appear to be related to the increased switching between skills, but could be related to increased task engagement and more optimal challenge associated with practice on a range of target difficulties, rather than the most difficult.     

It’s not what you do,it’s why you do it: Motives for disclosure and concealment decisions among employees with depression

This multi-method study examined disclosure decisions made by employees with depression as well as their motives for those decisions. In Study 1, we conducted in-depth interviews with employees who had been diagnosed with depression to better understand why they chose to disclose or conceal their depression at work. Based on the results of the interviews, both approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealment emerged in the analysis. Further, these motives were influenced by multiple organizational factors including social support, stigma, and diversity climate. In Study 2, we developed and validated a scale to measure approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealement. In Study 3, we tested approach and avoid motives as mediators of the relationships between organizational factors and employee outcomes (i.e., engagement and presenteeism). We tested our model among 223 working adults with depression. Our results provided support for the hypothesized relationships among those who disclosed but not those who concealed, suggesting that when employees disclosed for approach reasons they were more likely to be engaged, and when they disclosed for avoid reasons they were more likely to engage in presenteeism. These findings provide both theoretical and practical contributions to the study of concealable identity management and to employees with mental illness.     

Just another article on Moore’s paradox,but we don’t believe that

We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rationally asserted. We then explain why Moorean assertions of the sort we discuss do not incur the irrationality charge. Our argument involves an appeal to the dual-process theory of the mind and a contrast between the conditions for ascribing beliefs to oneself and the conditions for making assertions about independently existing states of affairs. We conclude by contrasting beliefs of the sort we discuss with the structurally similar but rationally impermissible beliefs of certain psychiatric patients.

     

When meaning matters,look but don’t touch: The effects of posture on reading

Much of the reading that we do occurs near our hands. Previous research has revealed that spatial processing is enhanced near the hands, potentially benefiting several processes involved in reading; however, it is unknown whether semantic processing—another critical aspect of reading—is affected near the hands. While holding their hands either near to or far from a visual display, our subjects performed two tasks that drew on semantic processing: evaluation of the sensibleness of sentences, and the Stroop color-word interference task. We found evidence for impoverished semantic processing near the hands in both tasks. These results suggest a trade-off between spatial processing and semantic processing for the visual space around the hands. Readers are encouraged to be aware of this trade-off when choosing how to read a text, since both kinds of processing can be beneficial for reading.     

Oh,the things you don’t know: awe promotes awareness of knowledge gaps and science interest

ABSTRACT

Awe is described as an a “epistemic emotion” because it is hypothesised to make gaps in one’s knowledge salient. However, no empirical evidence for this yet exists. Awe is also hypothesised to be an antecedent to interest in science because science is one way to fill those knowledge gaps. Results from four pre-registered studies (N?=?1518) indicate that manipulating awe through online (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c) and virtual reality (Study 2) videos, led to greater awareness of knowledge gaps. Awareness of knowledge gaps was consistently associated with greater science interest and to choosing tickets to a science museum over tickets to an art museum (Study 1b). These effects were not consistently observed on, nor moderated by, other measures related to cognition, religion, and spirituality. However, exploratory analyses showed that science interest was better predicted by positive emotions than by awe. Still, these results provide the first empirical evidence of awe as an “epistemic emotion” by demonstrating its effects on awareness of knowledge gaps. These findings are also extended to the effects of awe on science interest as one possible outcome of awareness of knowledge gaps.     

The global community, religion, and education: the modernity of Dewey’s social philosophy

As a starting point this paper takes Dewey’s nowadays often stressed modernity and examines his social philosophy against the background of the current debates on republicanism and communitarianism. Particularly, the anaysis of Dewey’sThe Public and its Problem (1927) concludes that the attention being paid to Dewey is problematic as specific religious assumptions — explicitly developed inA Common Faith (1934) -lie in the background of his social philosophy, and are hardly being recognized. However, as it shall be shown, without considering the religious basis, neither Dewey’s social philosophy nor his educational theory can be properly understood.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

Respond,don’t react: The influence of mindfulness training on performance monitoring in older adults

A sizeable body of literature demonstrates positive effects of mindfulness training on brain, behavior, and psychological processes in both novice and expert practitioners as compared to non-meditators. However, only more recently has research begun to examine the specific mechanisms by which mindfulness exerts these effects. In the current study, we used event-related potentials (error-related negativity (ERN), error positivity (Pe)) to test the hypothesis that performance monitoring is one such mechanism. We conducted a randomized controlled trial in healthy older adults (n = 36), relevant because markers of performance monitoring are known to decline with normal aging. Compared to an active control condition, mindfulness participants showed an increase in the ERN, without an increase in the Pe. Participants in both groups reported a reduction in self-report of anxiety and self-judgment of one’s own mental functioning, indicating the subjective impression of benefit from each intervention type. The current results are important insofar as they support the purported self-regulatory functions of mindfulness (i.e., learning to respond, not react), as well as demonstrating that such positive effects can be obtained in an older adult sample, both of which have important implications for intervention.     

Arrows don’t look at you: Qualitatively different attentional mechanisms triggered by gaze and arrows

Eye gaze conveys rich information concerning the states of mind of others, playing a critical role in social interactions, signaling internal states, and guiding others’ attention. On the basis of its social significance, some researchers have proposed that eye gaze may represent a unique attentional stimulus. However, contrary to this notion, the majority of the literature has shown indistinguishable attentional effects when eye gaze and arrows have been used as cues. Taking a different approach, in this study we aimed at finding qualitative attentional differences between gazes and arrows when they were used as targets instead of as cues. We used a spatial Stroop task, in which participants were required to identify the direction of eyes or arrows presented to the left or the right of a fixation point. The results showed that the two types of stimuli led to opposite spatial interference effects, with arrows producing faster reaction times when the stimulus direction was congruent with the stimulus position (a typical spatial Stroop effect), and eye gaze producing faster reaction times when it was incongruent (a “reversed” spatial Stroop effect). This reversed Stroop is interpreted as an eye-contact effect, therefore revealing the unique nature of eyes as special social-attention stimuli.