共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Hofmann B 《Science and engineering ethics》2002,8(1):17-29
Technology is believed to have liberated health care from dogmas, myths and speculations of earlier times. However, we are
accused of using technology in an excessive, futile and even detrimental way, as if technology is compelling our actions.
It appears to be like the monster threatening Dr. Frankenstein or like the socerer’s broom in the hand of the apprentice.
That is, the same technology that should liberate us from myths, appears to be mythical. The objective of this article is
to investigate the background for the re-entrance of the myth: How we encounter it and how we can explain it. The main point
is that a myth of technology is normative: it relates ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and directs our actions. This becomes particularly
clear in health care. Hence, if there is a myth of technology, it is an ethical issue, and should be taken seriously. 相似文献
2.
Frances Howard-Snyder 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):233-246
I argue for a version of “ought” implies “can”. In particular, I argue that it is necessarily true that if an agent, S, ultima
facie ought to do A at T’, then there is a time T* such that S can at T* do A at T’. In support of this principle, I have
argued that without it, we cannot explain how it is that, in cases where agents cannot do the best thing, they often ought
to do some alternative action – such as get help or do the promised action later; nor can we explain the phenomenon of necessary
enablers or the phenomenon of more stringent prima facie obligations overriding less stringent ones in cases where the agent
cannot fulfill both. 相似文献
3.
In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous
motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account
for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate
the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason,
and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”.
In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view.
This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in
each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible. 相似文献
4.
Stephen Finlay 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):315-340
This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis
of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms
of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the
end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical
uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform
the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.
相似文献
Stephen FinlayEmail: |
5.
Stephen Finlay 《Synthese》2010,177(1):67-89
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing ‘detaching problems’ by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine
three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed
to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number
of senses for ‘ought’. The semantics for ‘ought’ that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these
problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for ‘ought’ provides a more satisfactory solution. 相似文献
6.
Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):567-574
In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired
debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued
that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different
answers.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
7.
Michelle Ciurria 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(2):259-269
In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action
as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed
to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a
person can do the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) the idea that a virtuous person can have “mixed motives.” In
this paper, I argue that Doviak’s account makes an important contribution to agent-based virtue ethics, but it needs to be
supplemented with a consequentialist account of the efficacy of well-motivated actions—that is, it should be transformed into a mixed (motives-consequences) account, while retaining
its net-IVV calculus. This is because I believe that there are right-making properties external to an agent’s psychology which it is important to take into account, especially when an agent’s actions negatively affect
other people. To incorporate this intuition, I add to Doviak’s net-IVV calculus a scale for outcomes. The result is a mixed view which accommodates tenets (ii) and (iii) above, but allows for (i) to fail in certain cases.
I argue that, rather than being a defect, this allowance is an asset because our intuitions about ought-implies-can break
down in cases where an agent is grossly misguided, and our theory should track these intuitions. 相似文献
8.
Diego Marconi 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(3):301-318
The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent
entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled
out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true
in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of
w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w
and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who
hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A”
as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. 相似文献
9.
10.
Damon A. Young 《Sexuality & culture》2005,9(4):58-79
Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities.
Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory
character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt
to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual
onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is
not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development
of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges,
this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed.
“Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger
“I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche 相似文献
11.
The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications
of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions
on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions,
according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will
be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ of identity or of constitution, and (c) whether ‘Q’ is being used as a subject or predicate
term. We conclude that this latitude is beneficial, as it conforms with linguistic reality (i.e., the multiple uses actually
in place) and also enables one to turn what is ordinarily perceived as a problem for universalist perdurantism viz., a commitment
to all sorts of weird and gerrymandered temporally extended entities, into an advantage, for the richness in questions allows
us to make sense of the many different readings of sentences of the same grammatical form. 相似文献
12.
Pär Sundström 《Synthese》2008,163(2):133-143
A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or
functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion
generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential
version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness
produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin
with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further,
and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion,
I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim
(ii). 相似文献
13.
Daniel Guevara 《Synthese》2008,164(1):45-60
Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from
an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples.
But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated
formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive
about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be. 相似文献
14.
Mikel Burley 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(3):141-153
This article addresses some issues concerning the relation between religious beliefs and the fruits of those beliefs, where
‘fruits’ implies certain relevant forms of behaviour and affective attitudes. My primary aim is to elucidate the dispute between
D. Z. Phillips and theological realists, emphasizing the extent to which this dispute is symptomatic of a deeper disagreement
over how words acquire their meanings. In the course of doing so, I highlight an important difference between two alternative
realist claims, exemplified by Trigg and Hick respectively, and draw attention to an infelicity in Phillips’ way of presenting
his case. 相似文献
15.
Prior research indicates that category labels influence category judgments, but little is known regarding the effects for
familiar categories with significant social consequences. The present studies address this issue by examining the effect of
linguistic form on judgments of illnesses. Both mental and physical illnesses were presented in each of three linguistic forms:
noun, adjective, and possessive phrase. In Study 1, participants were asked to judge the permanence of a set of novel illnesses
that differed in wording (e.g., “He is a baxtermic”; “He is baxtermic”; “He has baxtermia”). In Studies 2 and 3, participants
were asked to judge which forms of wording were most familiar for actual mental illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia) and physical
illnesses (e.g., diabetes). In Study 4, participants were asked to judge the permanence of a set of familiar illnesses that
differed in wording. The results indicated that for novel illnesses, nouns (“is a”) imply greatest permanence and possessive nouns (“has”) imply least permanence. However, for familiar illnesses, permanence judgments are also influenced by how frequently each form appears in ordinary language use. Mental
illnesses are more often expressed with relatively permanent forms (“is” and “is a”) , whereas physical illnesses are more
often expressed with relatively transient forms (“has”). The results demonstrate the importance of both linguistic form and
conventional wording patterns on how categories are interpreted. 相似文献
16.
The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches. 相似文献
17.
18.
Marilyn Ford 《Synthese》2005,146(1-2):71-92
Three studies of human nonmonotonic reasoning are described. The results show that people find such reasoning quite difficult,
although being given problems with known subclass-superclass relationships is helpful. The results also show that recognizing
differences in the logical strengths of arguments is important for the nonmonotonic problems studied. For some of these problems,
specificity – which is traditionally considered paramount in drawing appropriate conclusions – was irrelevant and so should
have lead to a “can’t tell” response; however, people could give rational conclusions based on differences in the logical
consequences of arguments. The same strategy also works for problems where specificity is relevant, suggesting that in fact
specificity is not paramount. Finally, results showed that subjects’ success at responding appropriately to nonmonotonic problems
involving conflict relies heavily on the ability to appreciate differences in the logical strength of simple, non-conflicting,
statements. 相似文献
19.
In recent years Derrida has devoted a considerable number of writings to addressing “the question of the animal,” and, more
often than not, this question arises in a reading of one of Heidegger's texts. In order to appreciate more fully the stakes
of Derrida's posing of this question in relation to Heidegger, in this essay I offer some prefatory remarks to the question
of the animal in Derrida's reading of Heidegger. The essay opens with a careful analysis of Derrida's early essay “The Ends
of Man,” in which Heidegger's “Letter on ‘Humanism”’ is read in terms of the motif of man's “proper.” Taking my point of departure
from this Derridean reading of Heidegger's humanism, I return to Heidegger's “Letter” in order to uncover the manner in which
Heidegger distinguishes man's “proper” from what is “improper,” namely, animality. This reading reveals that, while Heidegger
offers a convincing account of the limits of metaphysical humanism, this critical account nevertheless ends up uncritically reinforcing the anthropocentrism of this same tradition. My closing suggestion is that Derrida's rethinking of animality should be understood as an extended
meditation on the various consequences and effects of this dogmatic anthropocentrism in Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian
thought. 相似文献
20.
David Botting 《Argumentation》2012,26(2):213-232
From Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations the following classifications are put forward and defended through extensive excerpts from the text. (AR-PFC) All sophistical
refutations are exclusively either ‘apparent refutations’ or ‘proofs of false conclusions’. (AR-F) ‘Apparent refutations’
and ‘fallacies’ name the same thing. (ID-ED) All fallacies are exclusively either fallacies in dictione or fallacies extra dictionem. (ID-nAMB) Not all fallacies in dictione are due to ambiguity. (AMB-nID) Not all fallacies due to ambiguity are fallacies in dictione. (AMB&ID-ME) The set of fallacies due to ambiguity and fallacies in dictione together comprise the set of arguments said to be “dependent on mere expression”. Being “dependent on mere expression” and
“dependent on language” are not the same (instances of the latter form a proper subset of instances of the former). (nME-FACT)
All arguments that are not against the expression are “against the fact.” (FACT-ED) All fallacious arguments against the fact
are fallacies extra dictionem (it is unclear whether the converse is true). (MAN-ARG) The solutions of fallacious arguments are exclusively either “against the man” or “against the argument.” (10) (F-ARG) Each (type of) fallacy
has a unique solution (namely, the opposite of whatever causes the fallacy), but each fallacious argument does not. However,
each fallacious argument does have a unique solution against the argument, called the ‘true solution’ (in other words, what
fallacy a fallacious argument commits is determined by how it is solved. However, if the solution is ‘against the man’ then
this is not, properly speaking, the fallacy committed in the argument. It is only the ‘true solution’—the solution against
the argument, of which there is always only one—that determines the fallacy actually committed). 相似文献