Choice,the Invisible Element in Our Work

Unless they use a highly structured approach, psychotherapists make choices all the time in their work, but the role of choice is neglected in the professional literature. Because choices tend to issue under the radar, sometimes as personal enactments, our profession could benefit from examining them. This is especially true for leaders of therapy groups where there are pressures to align with conventional perspectives of pathology, of popular “goodness” and “badness.” Two important influences on our decisions here are milieu—the historical period in which we work—and our clinical identity (training, personality, identifications and practical experience). It is to reinforce these that we often make our choices.     

Flashing the Yellow Traffic Light: Choices Forced Upon Us by Gene Editing Technologies

The 2018 birth of two designer babies in China has sparked an immediate global controversy over the ethics of gene editing. For the longer range future, however, we must assess how CRISPR/Cas9, like so many other new bio-technologies, is forcing choice—moral choice—on a large scale. Gene editing for purposes of medical therapy, human enhancement, engineering of future children, and even creating a posthuman species, confront our society with the inescapable necessity of making moral choices. The task for churches in partnership with universities is not to decide in advance what is right or wrong. Rather, it is to prepare our people to make responsible choices.     

Effects of self-other decision making on regulatory focus and choice overload

A growing stream of research is investigating how choices people make for themselves are different from choices people make for others. In this paper, I propose that these choices vary according to regulatory focus, such that people who make choices for themselves are prevention focused, whereas people who make choices for others are promotion focused. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, in particular work on errors of omission and commission, I hypothesize that people who make choices for others experience a reversal of the choice overload effect. In 6 studies, including a field study, I found that people who make choices for themselves are less satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options, yet, people who make choices for others are more satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options. Implications and suggestions for other differences in self-other decision making are discussed.     

The Monty Hall dilemma in pigeons: Effect of investment in initial choice

In the Monty Hall dilemma, humans are initially given a choice among three alternatives, one of which has a hidden prize. After choosing, but before it is revealed whether they have won the prize, they are shown that one of the remaining alternatives does not have the prize. They are then asked whether they want to stay with their original choice or switch to the remaining alternative. Although switching results in obtaining the prize two thirds of the time, humans consistently fail to adopt the optimal strategy of switching even after considerable training. Interestingly, there is evidence that pigeons show more optimal switching performance with this task than humans. Because humans often view even random choices already made as being more valuable than choices not made, we reasoned that if pigeons made a greater investment, it might produce an endowment or ownership effect resulting in more human-like suboptimal performance. On the other hand, the greater investment in the initial choice by the pigeons might facilitate switching behavior by helping them to better discriminate their staying versus switching behavior. In Experiment 1, we examined the effect of requiring pigeons to make a greater investment in their initial choice (20 pecks rather than the usual 1 peck). We found that the increased response requirement facilitated acquisition of the switching response. In Experiment 2, we showed that facilitation of switching due to the increased response requirement did not result from extinction of responding to the initially chosen location.     

Matching choices to avoid offending stigmatized group members

People (selectors) sometimes make choices both for themselves and for others (recipients). We propose that selectors worry about offending recipients with their choices when recipients are stigmatized group members and options in a choice set differ along a stigma-relevant dimension. Accordingly, selectors are more likely to make the same choices for themselves and stigmatized group member recipients than non-stigmatized group member recipients. We conducted eight studies to study this hypothesis in different choice contexts (food, music, games, books) and with recipients from different stigmatized groups (the obese, Black-Americans, the elderly, students at lower-status schools). We use three different approaches to show that this effect is driven by people’s desire to avoid offending stigmatized group members with their choices. Thus, although prior research shows that people often want to avoid being associated with dissociative groups, such as stigmatized groups, we demonstrate that people make the same choices for self and stigmatized other to minimize offense.     

Ethics and Counseling Decisions

Although some behavioral scientists and practitioners contend that man has no genuine moral choices to make, common sense and philosophical reflection ineluctably affirm the moral nature of man. When young people are faced with moral decisions, they often seek the assistance of a counselor. Although such counselors are routinely expected to aid clients in making decisions about their education and their careers, there is considerably less agreement about their responsibility for helping students to make moral choices. The central thesis of this article is that a knowledge of ethical theories, the practical principles which flow from them, and the method of decision-making which they indicate will enable the counselor to assist his clients with their moral problems.     

Choice

Understanding how and why analysands make the choices they do is central to both the clinical and the theoretical projects of psychoanalysis. And yet we know very little about the process of choice or about the relationship between choices and motives. A striking parallel is to be found between the ways choice is narrated in ancient Greek texts and the experience of analysts as they observe patients making choices in everyday clinical work. Pursuing this convergence of classical and contemporary sensibilities will illuminate crucial elements of the various meanings of choice, and of the way that these meanings change over the course of psychoanalytic treatment.     

Risk preference and choice stochasticity during decisions for other people

In several contexts, such as finance and politics, people make choices that are relevant for others but irrelevant for oneself. Focusing on decision-making under risk, we compared monetary choices made for one’s own interest with choices made on behalf of an anonymous individual. Consistent with the previous literature, other-interest choices were characterized by an increased gambling propensity. We also investigated choice stochasticity, which captures how much decisions vary in similar conditions. An aspect related to choice stochasticity is how much decisions are tuned to the option values, and we found that this was higher during self-interest than during other-interest choices. This effect was observed only in individuals who reported a motivation to distribute rewards unequally, suggesting that it may (at least partially) depend on a motivation to make accurate decisions for others. Our results indicate that, during decision-making under risk, choices for other people are characterized by a decreased tuning to the values of the options, in addition to enhanced risk seeking.     

Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? Making Choices for Non‐Human Animals

Animals are usually considered to lack the status of autonomous agents. Nevertheless, they do appear to make ostensible choices. This article considers whether, and how, I should respect animals' choices. I propose a concept of volitionality which can be respected if, and insofar as, doing so is in the best interests of the animal. Applying that concept, I (we) will argue that an animals' choices be respected when the relevant human decision maker's capacities to decide are potentially challenged or compromised. For example, it will be best to respect the animals' choice when the human decision maker: (1) lacks accurate knowledge of the animal's subjective experiences; (2) does not know what will lead to desirable experiences or allow for the avoidance of undesirable ones; (3) is biased; (4) is less aware of the animal's specific situation; (5) cannot appreciate all elements comprehensively, including considering any (content‐neutral) value to the animal being allowed to make and implement a choice, such as where a lack of control or liberty would be unpleasant or where an animal would usefully learn from the process of choice‐making; and (6) when the animal's choice is achievable. This additionally suggests that we may often beneficially choose to set up situations that empower animals to make better choices.     

Developmental patterns of change in the influence of safe and risky peer choices on risky decision‐making

Adolescents take more risks when peers monitor their behavior. However, it is largely unknown how different types of peer influence affect adolescent decision‐making. In this study, we investigate how information about previous choices of peers differentially influences decision‐making in adolescence and young adulthood. Participants (N = 99, age range 12–22) completed an economic choice task in which choice options were systematically varied on levels of risk and ambiguity. On each trial, participants selected between a safer choice (low variability in outcome) and a riskier choice (high variability in outcome). Participants made choices in three conditions: a solo condition in which they made choices with no additional information, a social condition in which they saw choices of supposed peers, and a computer condition in which they saw choices of a computer. Results showed that participants’ choices conform to the choices made by the peers, but not a computer. Furthermore, when peers chose the safe option, late adolescents were especially likely to make a safe choice. Conversely, when the peer made a risky choice, late adolescents were least likely to follow choices made by the peer. We did not find evidence for differential influence of social information on decisions depending on their level of risk and ambiguity. These results show that information about previous decisions of peers are a powerful modifier for behavior and that the effect of peers on adolescents’ decisions is less ubiquitous and more specific than previously assumed.     

What do differences between own,admired, and attributed choices have to do with group induced shifts in choice

Two studies examined certain discrepancies which have been considered important evidence in support of interpersonal comparison (value-adherence) explanations of group induced shifts in choice. These are (a) the differences between a person's own choice and the choice he predicts others would make and (b) the difference between the former and the choice he admires. Findings from the first study indicate that own choices are more extreme than those a person predicts others would make because he is more certain and confident about the former than the latter, not because he wishes to appear to outdo others as interpersonal comparison theories of choice-shift effect would have it. The second study strongly suggests that extreme choices are admired not because they display maximal adherence to a social ideal but because they imply that the person's solution to a problem involving choice is well-founded, that he has persuasive reasons for the choice. On the whole the evidence bodes well for explanations of choice-shift effects based on persuasive argumentation and poorly for those relying on interpersonal comparison processes.     

Same destination,different paths: When and how does observing others' choices and reasoning alter confidence in our own choices?

Seeing others make the same decision we do does not always increase choice confidence or tell the whole story of social influence when consumers expect to have to publically discuss their choice and reasoning. Instead, consumers' confidence in their publically stated choices can be diminished if observed others make the same choice but justify the choice using different reasoning. This effect occurs because confidence in one's own reasoning is thrown into doubt, rather than due to a desire to affiliate with the observed other. These effects are eliminated in both private choice contexts and in rejection versus selection tasks.     

Aspiring to become a therapist: Personal strengths and challenges,influences, motivations,and expectations of future psychotherapists

Ten female students who were considering therapy as a career path wrote self-reflection papers and were interviewed regarding their career choice. Consensual qualitative research was used to analyze the data. These participants all indicated a passion for helping others, believed in the importance of giving back, and had prior experiences in helping activities. They considered themselves to have personal helping-related strengths (e.g. empathy) as well as challenges (e.g. avoidance of interpersonal conflict), and worried about potential problems they would encounter as therapists (e.g. being too emotionally invested). Participants expressed both other-oriented (e.g. to help others who had similar painful experiences) and self-oriented (e.g. to help self) motivations for wanting to become therapists. Implications for helping undergraduate students reflect about therapy as a career choice are offered.     

Understanding alliances. How can research inform user‐friendly practice?

'User-friendliness' is described as a therapist stance which involves attentiveness to the quality of the 'therapeutic relationship', both between therapist and family and between service providers and their public. This article draws on research published in the last seven years from within and outside the family therapy field which can help improve this relationship. I will argue that the issues which challenge user-friendly practice need to be related to the theories which inform family therapy and to the traditional tension within the research field between focusing on measurable outcomes or on user satisfaction. The urgency for a clear analysis of what can make family therapy practice more sensitive to its public comes partly from the relative state of maturity which family therapy has now reached and its need actively to work alongside other approaches. Other crucial influences considered are a greater public demand for choice and improvements in public services, and social policy trends towards greater efficiency and accountability within the helping services.     

Inaccurate self-knowledge formation as a result of automatic behavior

Four studies tested a post-priming misattribution process whereby a primed goal automatically influences people's behavior, but because people are unaware of that influence, they misattribute their behavior to some other internal state. People who were primed with a goal were more likely to choose an activity that was relevant to that goal, but did not recognize that the prime had influenced their choices. Instead, people used more accessible and plausible reasons to explain their behavior. The goals were seeking romantic interaction (Studies 1 and 2), helping (Study 3) and earning money (Study 4). People made choices related to these goals but misattributed the choices to temporary preferences (Studies 1 and 3) and more permanent dispositions (Studies 2 and 4). The misattribution had downstream effects, leading to choice behavior consistent with the erroneous self-knowledge. We suggest that automatic behavior can lead to a confabulated self-knowledge with behavioral consequences.     

Perceptions of personal control and conformity of vocational choice as correlates of vocational development

This study examined differences in vocational maturity of women across different levels of internal-external control and typical versus atypical vocational choice. It was predicted that internally controlled women would have higher vocational maturity scores than externally controlled women; women who make atypical vocational choices would have higher vocational maturity scores than women who make typical choices. Data from the Attitude Scale of Crites' Career Maturity Inventory, MacDonald and Tseng's I-E Scale, and dichotomized ratings of typical versus atypical vocational choice were obtained from 179 freshmen to senior female student volunteers in a large New England university. Analysis of variance indicated that internally controlled women had significantly higher vocational maturity than externally controlled women (p <. 01); no differences were found in vocational maturity between those making typical or atypical vocational choices; the lowest level of vocational maturity was found for externally controlled females making atypical vocational choices. Implications of these findings for counseling are discussed.     

The Predictive Value of a Student's Choice of Vocation

Using large samples of college students, this study compares the forecasting value of a student's initial report of his vocational choice with the Vocational Preference Inventory. Student vocational choices were categorized according to a 6-category classification scheme for men and an 8-category scheme for women. The relationships between initial and final vocational choices, and between VPI high-point codes and final vocational choices over 8- and 12-month intervals, were examined. The results indicate that the predictive efficiency of a student's expressed choice is about twice that of the Vocational Preference Inventory. The results suggest that researchers and counselors should make greater use of a person's expressed choices and that interest inventories should be used with more discrimination. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

Transformative Choice,Practical Reasons and Trust

Abstract

In this article I reflect on the question of whether we can have reason to make transformative choices. In attempting to answer it, I do three things. First, I bring forward an internalist account of practical reasons which entails the idea that agents should deliberate to the best of their ability. Second, I discuss L.A. Paul’s views on transformative choice, arguing that, although they present a real problem, the problem is not as profound as she believes it is. Third, I argue that, given the situation in which we face transformative choices (a situation of principled uncertainty though not cluelessness), trust is an appropriate response to transformative choices, and that when one’s trust that one’s current desires will be fulfilled in making a transformative choice is reasonable, one has a reason to make it. Thus, trust turns out to be a crucial response to a profound problem each of us will face during our lives.