Routine and the perception of time

The authors investigated the influence of routine on people's estimation of time, testing the hypothesis that duration is remembered as being shorter when time is spent in a routine activity. In 4 experiments and 2 field studies, the authors compared time estimations in routine and nonroutine conditions. Routine was established by a sequence of markers (Study 1), variation of the task (Studies 2 and 3), or the number of repetitive blocks (Study 4). As hypothesized, the duration of the task was remembered as being shorter in routine conditions than in nonroutine ones. This trend was reversed in experienced (prospective) judgments when participants were informed beforehand of the duration-judgment task (Study 3). In Studies 5 and 6, the authors examined remembered duration judgments of vacationers and kibbutz members, which provided further support for the main hypothesis.     

Extraversion-introversion and time perception

The relationship between stimuli complexity extraversion-introversion and time perception was tested. It was found that extraverts estimated the exposure duration of simple figures to be longer compared to introverts and that this discrepancy vanished in regard to complex figures. The findings were explained in terms of Hogan's (1978) model and on the basis of differential utilization of cognitive mechanisms for time perception by extraverts and introverts.     

Circadian time perception

The variability of anticipating a meal was investigated. Sprague-Dawley rats earned food by inspecting a food source during a 3-hr interval. Food was not available at other times. In Experiment 1, the meal started 3 or 7 hr after light offset in a 12-hr light-dark cycle. Experiment 2 was conducted in constant darkness with 14-, 22-, 22.5-, 24-, 25.5-, 26-, or 34-hr intermeal intervals. Inspections increased before the meal. Rats timed intervals in the circadian range (22-26 hr) with lower variability than that for intervals outside this range (3-14 and 34 hr). Higher precision in timing selected intervals violates the scalar property. Proximity to a circadian oscillator improves timing precision. Variability may be used to identify oscillators with noncircadian periods.     

The perception of time

The present paper organizes and evaluates selected portions of the time perception literature. Emphasis is on data and theory concerned primarily with judgments of brief temporal intervals. Research concerning the psychophysical law for time, Weber’s law, the time-order error, and the role of nontemporal information is evaluated. This is followed by a consideration of current, quantitatively oriented, theoretical formulations for time perception.     

Simultaneous time and size perception

Judgments of the apparent duration and size of visually presented circles vary directly with the duration and size of the presented stimuli. When the frequencies of stimulus duration (short vs. long) and stimulus area (small vs. large) are varied, perceived size and duration are directly related to the frequency of the lower attribute value (short or small). These data are compared to the predictions of different information-processing models. The model which accounts for the data best is one in which it is assumed that perceived size and perceived duration grow together over the course of time spent sampling size information, and that attribute frequency affects the rate of sampling and/or the point at which sampling stops.     

Cognitive processing and time perception

When a visual field is presented for 40 or 80 msec and a subject is asked to judge the duration of the stimulus, judged duration is found to be less when the field is blank than when the field contains three letters, but is the same whether the three letters form a word or not. The perceived difference between “filled” and “blank” fields increases when the subject is required to memorize the presented letters. These data are consistent with a theory which assumes,inter alia, that a stimulus is analyzed by a visual information processor and a timer, that attention is shared between these processors, and that temporal judgments are based on the output of both processors.     

Neuropsychology of timing and time perception

Interval timing in the range of milliseconds to minutes is affected in a variety of neurological and psychiatric populations involving disruption of the frontal cortex, hippocampus, basal ganglia, and cerebellum. Our understanding of these distortions in timing and time perception are aided by the analysis of the sources of variance attributable to clock, memory, decision, and motor-control processes. The conclusion is that the representation of time depends on the integration of multiple neural systems that can be fruitfully studied in selected patient populations.     

Working memory modulates the perception of time

Recent research has indicated that reentrant feedback from the contents of working memory can enhance neural representations and the perceptual strengths of matching stimuli in the visual field. However, whether the contents of working memory can also distort conscious experiences of perception remains unclear. Our present results show that the durations of perceptual stimuli matching the nontemporal representations in working memory tend to be perceived as longer than those of mismatching stimuli. This is the first demonstration that working memory can lead to distortions of time perception. Our findings are consistent with the ideas that the perceived duration of a stimulus depends on the magnitude of the neural responses to that stimulus in visual cortex and that there is a common system for representing both temporal and nontemporal magnitudes. We conclude that top-down modulation from the nontemporal contents of working memory distorts the perceptual experience of temporal duration.     

Social contagion of time perception

To test the hypothesis that the perception of time’s passage converges towards consensus in interactive groups, 38 participants completed a “word puzzles” task in groups of four to six. Four groups performed the task interactively (Interactive Condition) and four groups performed it without interacting (Control Condition). Both intraclass correlations and within-group variance measures revealed, as predicted, that more within-group consensus emerged in the Interactive Condition (versus the Control Condition) for measures of perceived time speed and mood. Alternatives to an explanation based on the dynamics of interaction are discussed, and the results are placed in the larger scope of recent theory and research on socially shared cognition.     

The emotional body and time perception

We examined the effects of emotional bodily expressions on the perception of time. Participants were shown bodily expressions of fear, happiness and sadness in a temporal bisection task featuring different stimulus duration ranges. Stimulus durations were judged to be longer for bodily expressions of fear than for those of sadness, whereas no significant difference was observed between sad and happy postures. In addition, the magnitude of the lengthening effect of fearful versus sad postures increased with duration range. These results suggest that the perception of fearful bodily expressions increases the level of arousal which, in turn, speeds up the internal clock system underlying the representation of time. The effect of bodily expressions on time perception is thus consistent with findings for other highly arousing emotional stimuli, such as emotional facial expressions.     

Anger and time perception in children

The present study investigated age-related variations in judgments of the duration of angry facial expressions compared with neutral facial expressions. Children aged 3, 5, and 8 years were tested on a temporal bisection task using angry and neutral female faces. Results revealed that, in all age groups, children judged the duration of angry faces to be longer than that of neutral faces. Findings are discussed in the framework of internal clock models and the adaptive function of emotion.     

On the duality of simultaneous time and size perception

When subjects are asked to judge the duration and size of visually presented circles that vary in duration and size, perceived duration is directly related to stimulus size and perceived size is, in most cases, directly related to stimulus duration. When subjects are asked to process time and size information simultaneously, their time judgments are the same as when only time processing is required, but their size judgments are less than when only size processing is required. These data are discussed within the context of an explicit model for the processing of size information, added to which is the assumption that time judgments are influenced by the time spent processing size information.     

The time of perception and the other way around

The world we perceive is delayed in relation to its flowing content, as well as the outcome of our actions on the world in relation to the moment we decide to act. This mosaic of different latencies permeating both perception and action has to be taken into account critically in order for us to cope with the temporal challenges constantly imposed by the environment. Fundamental notions, such as the sense of agency and causality, depend on the temporal relationship of events occurring in well-defined windows of time. Here, we offer a broad, yet abridged, historical view of some thought-provoking issues concerning the time of perception and action. From the pioneering work of Wundt, Titchener, and Libet to recent findings and ideas related to the employment of visual illusions as psychophysical probes (such as the flash-lag effect), we have tried to expose some problems inherent to the act of measuring the time of both perception and action, and devise possible solutions as well.     

Dedicated and intrinsic models of time perception

Two general frameworks have been articulated to describe how the passage of time is perceived. One emphasizes that the judgment of the duration of a stimulus depends on the operation of dedicated neural mechanisms specialized for representing the temporal relationships between events. Alternatively, the representation of duration could be ubiquitous, arising from the intrinsic dynamics of nondedicated neural mechanisms. In such models, duration might be encoded directly through the amount of activation of sensory processes or as spatial patterns of activity in a network of neurons. Although intrinsic models are neurally plausible, we highlight several issues that must be addressed before we dispense with models of duration perception that are based on dedicated processes.