Self‐Awareness Part 2: Neuroanatomy and Importance of Inner Speech

The present review of literature surveys two main issues related to self‐referential processes: (1) Where in the brain are these processes located, and do they correlate with brain areas uniquely specialized in self‐processing? (2) What are the empirical and theoretical links between inner speech and self‐awareness? Although initial neuroimaging attempts tended to favor a right hemispheric view of self‐awareness, more recent work shows that the brain areas which support self‐related processes are located in both hemispheres and are not uniquely activated during self‐reflective tasks. Furthermore, self‐awareness at least partially relies on internal speech. An activation of Broca’s area (which is known to sustain inner speech) is observed in a significant number of brain‐imaging studies of self‐reflection. Loss of inner speech following brain damage produces self‐awareness deficits. Inner speech most likely can internally reproduce social mechanisms leading to self‐awareness. Also, the process of self‐reflection can be seen as being a problem‐solving task, and self‐talk as being a cognitive tool the individual uses to effectively work on the task. It is noted that although a large body of knowledge already exists on self‐awareness, little is known about individual differences in dispositional self‐focus and types of self‐attention (e.g., rumination versus self‐reflection).     

Selflessness as a Foundation of Spiritual Transcendence: Perspectives From the Neurosciences and Religious Studies

Although of increasing scientific interest, the neurologic foundations of spiritual experiences remain ambiguous due to the neurological complexity of such experiences and the lack of a clear taxonomy of “spiritual experiences.” A previously proposed preliminary neuropsychological model of spirituality (Johnstone & Glass, 2008) suggests that decreased self-orientation (or increased selflessness), associated with reduced right hemisphere/right parietal lobe (RH/RPL) functioning, serves as a neuropsychological foundation of spiritual transcendence (defined as the ability to emotionally and cognitively connect with higher powers beyond the self or experience cosmic unity). This model was based on research that indicates that transcendent spiritual experiences are related to reduced activation of portions of the RH/RPL during religious rituals (e.g., Buddhist meditation, Christian prayer), as well as research that indicates that individuals with RH/RPL dysfunction report increased transcendence. This model has been supported by research with other populations (e.g., brain injury, epilepsy, tumor) and technologies (e.g., repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation), although limitations in the model persist. The current article addresses such weaknesses by demonstrating the existence of “spiritual transcendence” as a psychometrically valid construct, identifying specific self-orientation processes (e.g., physical self, mental self, autobiographical self) that may serve as a foundation for transcendence, and explaining how transcendent experiences can involve both a decreased and enhanced sense of the self. To further support the model, citations from the texts of multiple faith traditions are offered to illustrate the importance of selflessness in transcendent experiences across diverse religions. Suggestions for future research and practical implications are offered.     

Integration of social identities in the self: toward a cognitive-developmental model.

This article presents a model of social identity development and integration in the self. Classic intergroup theories (e.g., social identity theory, self-categorization theory) address the situational, short-term changes in social identities. Although these theories identify the contextual and environmental factors that explain situational changes in social identification, the intraindividual processes underlying developmental changes in social identities and their integration within the self remain to be identified. Relying on recent intergroup models as well as on developmental (i.e., neo-Piagetian) and social cognitive frameworks, this article proposes a four-stage model that explains the specific processes by which multiple social identities develop intraindividually and become integrated within the self over time. The factors that facilitate versus impede these identity change processes and the consequences associated with social identity integration are also presented.     

Profit maximization versus disadvantageous inequality: the impact of self‐categorization

Choice behavior researchers (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992 ) have found that individuals tend to choose a more lucrative but disadvantageously unequal payoff (e.g., self—$600/other—$800) over a less profitable but equal one (e.g., self—$500/other—$500); greater profit trumps interpersonal social comparison concerns in the choice setting. We suggest, however, that self‐categorization (e.g., Hogg, 2000 ) can shift interpersonal social comparison concerns to the intergroup level and make trading disadvantageous inequality for greater profit more difficult. Studies 1–3 show that profit maximization diminishes when recipients belong to different social categories (e.g., genders, universities). Study 2 further implicates self‐categorization, as self‐categorized individuals tend to forgo profit whether making a choice for themselves or another ingroup member. Study 3, moreover, reveals that social categorization alone is not sufficient to diminish profit maximization; individuals must self‐categorize and identify with their categorization. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Facts, rules, and procedures in normal calculation: evidence from multiple single-patient studies of impaired arithmetic fact retrieval.

This article presents results from multiple single-case studies of brain-damaged patients with impairments in retrieval of arithmetic facts (i.e., "table" facts such as 8 x 7 = 56). The results provide a basis for exploring the types of knowledge implicated in simple arithmetic performance, the internal representations for the various knowledge types, the processes operating upon these representations, and the ways in which the representations or processes may be disrupted by brain damage.     

Finding levels of abstraction in speech production: evidence from sound-production impairment

A widely held view in linguistics and psycholinguistics is that there are distinct levels of processing for context-independent and context-specific representations of sound structure. Recently, this view has been disputed, in part because of the absence of clear evidence that there are abstract mental representations of discrete sound-structure units. Here, we present novel evidence that separate context-independent and context-specific representations of sound structure are supported by distinct brain mechanisms that can be selectively impaired in individuals with acquired brain deficits. Acoustic data from /s/-deletion errors of 2 aphasic speakers suggest both a phonological level of processing at which sound representations (e.g., /p/) do not specify context-specific detail (e.g., aspirated or unaspirated) and a distinct level at which context-specific information is represented. These data help constrain accounts of sound-structure processing in word production and crucially support the claim that context-independent linguistic information affects language production.     

Self‐reported inner speech use in university students

Remarkably little is known regarding what people talk to themselves about (inner speech use) in their everyday lives. Existing self‐directed speech measures (e.g., thought sampling and questionnaires) either uniquely capture inner speech frequency and neglect its content or classify self‐reported thoughts instances in overly simplistic categories determined by the researchers. In the current study, we describe an open‐format thought listing procedure as well as a refined coding scheme and present detailed inner speech content self‐generated by 76 university students. The most frequently self‐reported inner speech activities were self‐regulation (e.g., planning and problem solving), self‐reflection (e.g., emotions, self‐motivation, appearance, behavior/performance, and autobiography), critical thinking (e.g., evaluating, judging, and criticizing), people in general, education, and current events. Inner speech occurred most commonly while studying and driving. These results are consistent with the self‐regulatory and self‐referential functions of inner speech often emphasized in the literature. Future research avenues using the open‐format inner speech listing procedure and coding scheme are proposed.     

What moderates implicit—explicit consistency?

Implicit and explicit indicators of attitudes or personality traits are positively, and variably, related. This review places the question of implicit ‐ explicit consistency into the tradition of attitude/trait ‐ behaviour consistency (e.g., Wicker, 1969). Drawing on dual-process models, such as the recent distinction between associative and propositional representations (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we identify a working model of implicit ‐ explicit consistency that organises the empirical evidence on implicit ‐ explicit moderation into five factors: translation between implicit and explicit representations (e.g., representational strength, awareness), additional information integration for explicit representations (e.g., need for cognition), properties of explicit assessment (e.g., social desirability concerns), properties of implicit assessment (e.g., situational malleability), and research design factors (e.g., sampling bias, measurement correspondence).     

Composites, compromises, and CHARM: what is the evidence for blend memory representations?

Metcalfe's (1990) distributed memory model simulates many misinformation effects by assuming representations that superimpose information from multiple sources. In the present article, two types of evidence are reviewed for such "blend" representations: composite recollections, including items from both the original and postevent sources (e.g., a previously seen intersection is remembered with a subsequently suggested stop sign), and compromise recollections, including features that cannot be exclusively associated with either source (e.g., a green car that was later suggested to be blue is remembered as bluish green). The considerable evidence for composite recollections provides little support for blend representations. Compromise recollections, though seemingly more persuasive, are both rare and interpretable without postulating blend representations. Speculation is made about potential findings that would support blend representations.     

群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动的驱动：内在责任感的中介作用

采用问卷法（研究一）和实验法（研究二）探讨群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿的影响及其内在心理机制。结果表明：（1）群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿有显著的预测作用;（2）内在责任感中介群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿的影响;（3）应对群体问题的自我效能感是联接群体效能与内在责任感的桥梁（中介变量）。     

The metabolic mind: A role for leptin and ghrelin in affect and social cognition

Leptin and ghrelin are metabolic hormones central to energy regulation in the body. Theories of allostasis suggest that metabolism could matter for more than just food intake and weight regulation but also ultimately for psychological processes, such as affect and social cognition. Allostasis is the process by which the brain monitors ongoing physiological states and, in turn, regulates physiology based on expectations about how a given situation will impact the self. Motivated by this allostatic perspective, we argue that leptin and ghrelin may be influenced by and even contribute to psychological processes such as affect and social cognition. Specifically, we review literature suggesting that leptin and ghrelin may be sensitive to social affective signals and related contexts (e.g., social status, and social threat vs. support), given that these signals and contexts may represent access to tangible physical and psychological resources that support allostasis and metabolic needs. We then review literature showing that leptin, ghrelin, and associated metabolic states may feed into the construction of social affective states and behaviors (e.g., emotion and risk taking), in order to motivate behaviors in line with allostatic needs. We close by offering guidelines for researchers interested in contributing to this emerging field and highlight opportunities for future research. We believe that leptin and ghrelin offer exciting new directions for social and affective scientists interested in linking the mind, brain, and body.     

Weaving the fabric of social interaction: Articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of motor cognition

In this article, we bring together recent findings from developmental science and cognitive neuroscience to argue that perception-action coupling constitutes the fundamental mechanism of motor cognition. A variety of empirical evidence suggests that observed and executed actions are coded in a common cognitive and neural framework, enabling individuals to construct shared representations of self and other actions. We review work to suggest that such shared representations support action anticipation, organization, and imitation. These processes, along with additional computational mechanisms for determining a sense of agency and behavioral regulation, form the fabric of social interaction. In addition, humans possess the capacity to move beyond these basic aspects of action analysis to interpret behavior at a deeper level, an ability that may be outside the scope of the mirror system. Understanding the nature of shared representations from the vantage point of developmental and cognitive science and neuroscience has the potential to inform a range of motor and social processes. This perspective also elucidates intriguing new directions and research questions and generates specific hypotheses regarding the impact of early disorders (e.g., developmental movement disorders) on subsequent action processing.     

Self‐expression and relationship formation in high relational mobility environments: A study of dual users of American and Japanese social networking sites

This study proposes that self‐expression motivation, an aspect of independent/individualistic psychological tendencies, aids in the formation of social relationships when social relationships are open and mobile. In societies characterised by high relational mobility (e.g., North America), which creates market‐like competition in social relationships, individuals must express their uniqueness and worthiness to form new social relationships. Self‐expression motivation has a relatively weak effect on relationship formation in low relational mobility societies (e.g., Japan), where social relationships are generally predetermined. This hypothesis was examined and supported through a study on dual users of two social networking sites—Facebook and Mixi (the “Facebook of Japan”). As expected, relational mobility was higher on Facebook than on Mixi. Moreover, the association between self‐expression motivation and the number of new friends met on Facebook/Mixi was more positive for Facebook than it was for Mixi. The social functionality of independent tendencies is then discussed.     

从动作模仿到社会认知：自我-他人控制的作用

在社会互动中, 人们具有自动模仿他人动作的倾向。尽管这种自动模仿有利于个体理解他人动作的感受, 但有时也会与自身的动作意图产生冲突。因此我们需要将自身动作意图与他人动作进行区分并调控二者之间的冲突。这种能力被称为自我-他人控制(self-other control, SOC)。与动作模仿控制相同, 心理理论、观点采择和共情等更高级的社会认知同样涉及对自我和他人信息的加工。很多证据表明, SOC可能是一种领域普遍的(domain-general)加工机制, 即在动作模仿控制和其他社会认知中, 大脑对自我和他人双方信息的区分和冲突调控共用同一套SOC系统。最近一些研究发现, 相比于抑制自身优势反应的抑制控制(inhibitory control), SOC是社会认知中一个更为关键的影响因素, 抑制控制对社会认知的作用受到SOC的调节。此外, SOC的领域普遍性提示我们, 未来可以通过简单的动作模仿控制训练, 来为社会认知受损个体(如孤独症和述情障碍者)进行康复训练。     

Towards a Psychological Analysis of Anomie

Anomie, as defined by sociologists, refers to a state of society characterized by deregulation and erosion of moral values. In the present conceptual analysis, we bring the concept of anomie under a social psychological spotlight. We explore the conditions under which anomie arises and develop a model outlining various responses to anomie. We define anomie as a shared perception of the state of society and propose that two conditions must be met for anomie to emerge. First, a society's social fabric must be perceived to be breaking down (i.e., lack of trust and erosion of moral standards). Second, a society's leadership must be perceived to be breaking down (i.e., lack of legitimacy and effectiveness of leadership). We highlight two key responses of individuals to an anomic situation: a contraction of the personal self and a contraction of the social self. We discuss how a psychology of anomie can inform and advance broader theorizing on group processes.     

When is it wrong to eat animals? The relevance of different animal traits and behaviours

Research suggests that animals’ capacity for agency, experience, and benevolence predict beliefs about their moral treatment. Four studies built on this work by examining how fine‐grained information about animals’ traits and behaviours (e.g., can store food for later vs. can use tools) shifted moral beliefs about eating and harming animals. The information that most strongly affected moral beliefs was related to secondary emotions (e.g., can feel love), morality (e.g., will share food with others), empathy (e.g., can feel others' pain), social connections (e.g., will look for deceased family members), and moral patiency (e.g., can feel pain). In addition, information affected moral judgements in line with how it affected superordinate representations about animals’ capacity for experience/feeling but not agency/thinking. The results provide a fine‐grained outline of how, and why, information about animals’ traits and behaviours informs moral judgements.     

Effector-independent and effector-dependent sequence representations underlie general and specific perceptuomotor sequence learning

Perceptuomotor sequence learning could be due to learning of effector-independent sequence information (e.g., response locations), effector-dependent information (e.g., motor movements of a particular effector), or both. Evidence also suggests that learning of statistical regularities in sequences (general-regularity learning) and specific sequences (specific-sequence learning) are dissociable. The authors examined the degree to which general and specific-sequence learning rely on effector-independent and effector-dependent representations. During training, participants typed sequences that followed a construction rule with a subset of sequences repeatedly processed. At test, effector-independent and effector-dependent learning was examined with respect to general-regularity and specific-sequence learning. Results suggest that general-regularity learning is subserved by effector-independent sequence representations, whereas specific-sequence learning is subserved by effector-dependent sequence representations, further dissociating these types of learning.     

A social neuroscience approach to self and social categorisation: A new look at an old issue

We take a social neuroscience approach to self and social categorisation in which the current self-categorisation(s) is constructed from relatively stable identity representations stored in memory (such as the significance of one's social identity) through iterative and interactive perceptual and evaluative processing. This approach describes these processes across multiple levels of analysis, linking the effects of self-categorisation and social identity on perception and evaluation to brain function. We review several studies showing that self-categorisation with an arbitrary group can override the effects of more visually salient, cross-cutting social categories on social perception and evaluation. The top-down influence of self-categorisation represents a powerful antecedent-focused strategy for suppressing racial bias without many of the limitations of a more response-focused strategy. Finally we discuss the implications of this approach for our understanding of social perception and evaluation and the neural substrates of these processes.     

Representations of Self and Other: A Semantic Space Model

ABSTRACT This article describes a semantic space model of personality. According to the model, representations of facets of the self (e.g., actual self, self) and of others are arrayed in a semantic space, with proximities among representations predicted to be associated with mood, self-evaluation, broad personality dimensions. The relation of proximities among pairs of representations to personality and mood measures was found to be mediated by spatial proximity of other representations, indicating that the representations constitute dynamic systems. Proximities among representations were shown predict self-esteem and self-evaluative moods even after controlling for the contribution of the personality dimensions of Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Agreeableness. Generally, the semantic space model led to better predictions did several related models concerning representations of self and other.