Brand placement disclosure effects on persuasion: The moderating role of consumer self‐control

The inclusion of branded products in media entertainment has become a popular marketing strategy, because viewers are less likely to recognize the persuasive intent of sponsored content as compared with traditional advertising. To guarantee fair communication and protect consumers against unobtrusive persuasion attempts, European media policy has obligated broadcasters to disclose the presence of brand placement in their television shows. Recent studies demonstrate that disclosures raise viewers' persuasion knowledge; however, the circumstances under which brand placement disclosures may affect brand evaluations and resistance to the persuasive impact of brand placement are still unclear. In two experiments, we uncovered self‐control depletion as an important moderator of disclosure effects on brand evaluations and resistance to brand placement influence. Whereas disclosures increase resistance and decrease persuasion for viewers not depleted of their self‐control, disclosures do not affect resistance and even result in more favorable brand evaluations when viewers' self‐control is depleted by a previous self‐control task. Because a state of self‐control depletion can be perceived as the “couch‐potato” mindset in which people expose themselves to entertaining television content, our findings imply that instead of protecting consumers from hidden persuasion, disclosures may unintentionally increase the persuasive effects of brand placement. We discuss several possible mechanisms that could explain our findings. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of self‐efficacy on the effects of framed health messages

Health promoting messages can be framed in terms of the gains that are associated with healthy behaviour, or the losses that are associated with unhealthy behaviour. In this study, we examined the influence of self‐efficacy to quit smoking on the effects of gain framed and loss framed anti‐smoking messages in a randomized controlled trial among 539 adult smokers. Participants with a high self‐efficacy to quit smoking reported higher levels of motivation to quit smoking after receiving a loss framed message than after receiving a gain framed message or no message. For these participants receiving a gain framed message did not result in a higher motivation to quit smoking than receiving no message. For participants with a low self‐efficacy to quit smoking there were no differences in motivation to quit smoking between the gain framed message condition, loss framed message condition and control condition. Our results suggest that self‐efficacy can moderate the effects of message framing on persuasion. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A depleted mind feels inefficacious: Ego‐depletion reduces self‐efficacy to exert further self‐control

Recent research has found that ego‐depletion undermines self‐control by motivating cognition that justifies conservation of mental resource. One potential cognitive mechanism is reduction of self‐efficacy. Specifically, we propose that ego‐depletion might demotivate self‐control by making people believe that they are inefficacious in exerting self‐control in subsequent tasks. Three experiments support the proposal. First, we demonstrated that (a) ego‐depletion can reduce self‐efficacy to exert further control (Experiments 1 to 3) and (b) the temporary reduction of self‐efficacy mediates the effect of depletion on self‐control performance (Experiment 2). Finally, we found that (c) these effects are only observed among participants who endorse a limited (versus non‐limited) theory of willpower and are, hence, more motivated to conserve mental resources (Experiment 3). Taken together, the present findings show that decrease in self‐efficacy to exert further self‐control is an important cognitive process that explains how ego‐depletion demotivates self‐control. This research also contributes to the recent discussion of the psychological processes underlying ego‐depletion.     

I am a better driver than you think: examining self‐enhancement for driving ability

We examined whether people recognized that others might disagree with their high self‐assessments of driving ability, and, if so, why. Participants in four experiments expressed a belief that others would assess them as worse drivers than they assessed themselves. This difference appears to be caused by participants' use of their own, idiosyncratic definition of driving ability. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants reported that others would supply similar assessments of their ability when the skill was less ambiguous. Results of Experiment 4 indicate that participants recognize that there may be more than one way to view driving performance. Participants appear aware that others likely disagree with their self‐assessment of driving ability due to differences in how others define driving ability.     

Group identity‐based self‐protective strategies: the stigma of race,gender, and garlic

We examine the importance of group membership in stigma and its role in the effectiveness of self‐protective cognitions in three experiments. In Experiment 1, men are asked to interact with an attractive female who will judge their value as a potential date, and either eat a mint or a clove of raw garlic prior to the interview. Although the stigmatized‐by‐garlic men discounted negative feedback and attributed it to their garlic breath, discounting and attributions were negatively correlated with self‐esteem. In Experiment 2, White participants were evaluated positively or negatively by a bogus partner who the participants believed had been told that the participant was either White or Black. Although participants receiving negative feedback engaged in several self‐protective cognitions, including attributing their negative feedback to racism, the strategies were uncorrelated with self‐esteem. In Experiment 3, women prepared to interact via computer with a partner who expressed sexist or non‐sexist beliefs. In the absence of feedback, self‐esteem increased when their partner was sexist. In contrast with the first two experiments, perceiving the partner as prejudiced was significantly and positively correlated with self‐esteem. Together, these experiments suggest that self‐protective cognitions find their effectiveness when stigma has a basis in group membership. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivational cues: The role of perceived senders' self‐control ability in raters' deception judgements

Previous studies have found that senders' personal traits may be used by others to make judgements about the senders' truthfulness. Two studies were conducted to examine whether perceived self‐control ability has an effect on deception judgement. Perceived self‐control was hypothesized to act as a motivational cue that participants would use to assess the sender's motivation to lie, which in turn would influence their deception judgement. Results revealed that when participants assessed the sender as having higher self‐control ability, they would consider the sender to be less motivated to lie in daily life (Study 1), and judge the sender more truthful in a text‐based deception judgement task (Study 2). However, the effect of perceived self‐control ability disappeared in a video‐based task (Study 2), likely due to the multitude of various cues available in audio‐visual stimuli. The theoretical and applied implications of the results are discussed.     

Self‐framing of risky choice

Previous research on framing effects has largely focused on how choice information framed by external sources influences the response of a decision maker. This research examined how decision makers framed choice options and how the hedonic tone of self‐framing influenced their risk preference. By using pie charts and a complementary sentence‐completion task in Experiment 1, participants were able to interpret and frame the expected choice outcomes themselves before making a choice between a sure option and a gamble in either a life–death or a monetary problem. Each of these self‐frames (phrases) was then rated by a group of independent judges in terms of its hedonic tone. The hedonic tone of self‐frames was mostly positive and was more positive in the life–death than the monetary context, suggesting a motivational function of self‐framing. However, positive outcomes were still more likely to be framed positively than negative outcomes. In Experiment 2, choice outcomes were depicted with a whole‐pie chart instead of a pie slice in order to emphasize positive and negative outcomes equally. The results showed that the hedonic tone of self‐framing was still largely positive and more positive in the life domain than the monetary domain. However, compared to Experiment 1, the risk preference in the life–death domain was reversed, showing an outcome salience effect: when the pie‐slice chart emphasized only survival outcomes, participants were more risk taking under positive hedonic frames whereas when the whole‐pie chart depicted both survival and mortality outcomes, they became risk averse under positive frames. In sum, self‐framing reflected a positive bias in encoding risk information and affected the risk preference of the decision maker. Like the tone of voice used in communication, the hedonic tone of self‐framing, either positive or negative, can affect risk perception of a choice problem. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Too exhausted to remember: Ego depletion undermines subsequent event‐based prospective memory

Past research has consistently found that people are likely to do worse on high‐level cognitive tasks after exerting self‐control on previous actions. However, little has been unraveled about to what extent ego depletion affects subsequent prospective memory. Drawing upon the self‐control strength model and the relationship between self‐control resources and executive control, this study proposes that the initial actions of self‐control may undermine subsequent event‐based prospective memory (EBPM). Ego depletion was manipulated through watching a video requiring visual attention (Experiment 1) or completing an incongruent Stroop task (Experiment 2). Participants were then tested on EBPM embedded in an ongoing task. As predicted, the results showed that after ruling out possible intervening variables (e.g. mood, focal and nonfocal cues, and characteristics of ongoing task and ego depletion task), participants in the high‐depletion condition performed significantly worse on EBPM than those in the low‐depletion condition. The results suggested that the effect of ego depletion on EBPM was mainly due to an impaired prospective component rather than to a retrospective component.     

Monitoring and Control of Learning Own‐Race and Other‐Race Faces

The own‐race bias refers to the finding that individuals are better able to recognize faces of the same race or ethnicity compared with faces of another race or ethnicity. The current study examined whether the own‐race bias was also evident in participants' predictions of memory performance and their self‐regulation of learning. In three experiments, participants studied own‐race and other‐race faces and predicted the likelihood of recognizing each face on a future test. Experiment 1 showed that participants provided similar predictions for own‐race and other‐race faces, despite superior recognition of own‐race faces. Experiments 2 and 3 permitted participants to control their study of faces and revealed better self‐regulation of learning for own‐race relative to other‐race faces. Collectively, these experiments suggest that the own‐race bias may partially reflect a metacognitive deficiency, as participants are less able to effectively self‐regulate learning for other‐race faces. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐esteem moderates preferences for accepting versus rejecting interaction partners

Two experiments compared the social orientations of people with high and low self‐esteem (HSEs vs. LSEs). In Experiment 1, participants received positive or negative interpersonal feedback from an accepting or rejecting evaluator. HSEs chose to interact with a rejecting evaluator more often than LSEs did. In Experiment 2, participants received solely negative interpersonal feedback from an accepting or rejecting evaluator of high or low social status. This time, both HSEs and LSEs chose an accepting/high‐status evaluator over a rejecting/low‐status one, but only HSEs chose a rejecting/high‐status evaluator over an accepting/low‐status one. Implications are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forewarned is forearmed: Conserving self-control strength to resist social influence

Recent research has shown that resisting persuasion involves active self-regulation. Resisting an influence attempt consumes self-regulatory resources, and in a state of self-regulatory resource depletion, people become more susceptible to (unwanted) influence attempts. However, the present studies show that a forewarning of an impending influence attempt prompts depleted individuals to conserve what is left of their regulatory resources and thus promotes self-regulatory efficiency. As a result, when these individuals are subsequently confronted with a persuasive request, they comply less (Experiments 1 and 3), and generate more counterarguments (Experiment 2) than their depleted counterparts who were not forewarned and thus did not conserve their resources, and they are as able as non-depleted participants to resist persuasion.     

The illusion of courage in self‐predictions: Mispredicting one's own behavior in embarrassing situations

People exhibit an “illusion of courage” when predicting their own behavior in embarrassing situations. In three experiments, participants overestimated their own willingness to engage in embarrassing public performances in exchange for money when those performances were psychologically distant: Hypothetical or in the relatively distant future. This illusion of courage occurs partly because of cold/hot empathy gaps. That is, people in a relatively “cold” unemotional state underestimate the influence on their own preferences and behaviors of being in a relative “hot” emotional state such as social anxiety evoked by an embarrassing situation. Consistent with this cold/hot empathy gap explanation, putting people “in touch” with negative emotional states by arousing fear (Experiments 1 and 2) and anger (Experiment 2) decreased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distant embarrassing public performances. Conversely, putting people “out of touch” with social anxiety through aerobic exercise, which reduces state anxiety and increases confidence, increased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distance embarrassing public performances (Experiment 3). Implications for self‐predictions, self‐evaluation, and affective forecasting are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

But I'm No Bigot: How Prejudiced White Americans Maintain Unprejudiced Self‐Images

Four experiments investigate a modern paradox: White Americans harbor racial prejudice, but view themselves as unprejudiced. We hypothesized that social representations of prejudice available in American culture lead many Whites to conclude that they are relatively unprejudiced. In Experiment 1, participants primed with the bigot stereotype viewed themselves as less prejudiced. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants exposed to media representations of racists viewed themselves as less prejudiced. In Experiment 4, participants sought exposure to media representations of prejudice after a threat to their unprejudiced self‐image. These experiments suggest that representations of prejudice in American culture lead prejudiced individuals to view themselves as unprejudiced, and the effect of these representations on people's unprejudiced self‐images can be passive or intentional.     

Affective valence and the self‐reference effect: Influence of retrieval conditions

Positive trait information is typically better recalled than negative trait information when encoded in reference to the self, but not when encoded in reference to someone else or when processed for general meaning. This study examined whether this influence of affective meaning is modulated by retrieval conditions. Participants encoded positive and negative trait adjectives in reference to themselves or to a celebrity. They were then presented with either a free‐recall task (Experiment 1) or a recognition memory task (Experiment 2). Positive adjectives were better recalled than negative adjectives, but only when they were encoded in reference to the self. In contrast, encoding condition and valence did not interact in the recognition memory task. Taken together, these findings suggest that the difference in memory between positive and negative self‐referent information is due, at least in part, to a control exerted on memory retrieval.     

Self‐control in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: the role of trial spacing and an interfering task

Self‐control was studied in an iterated one‐player Prisoner's Dilemma game in which students' choices affected the payoff matrix on the next trial. The frequency of self‐control responses (choice of the smaller payoff now, but with the more generous payoff matrix more likely on the next trial) and defection responses (choice of the larger payoff now, but with the less generous payoff matrix more likely on the next trial) were measured. In Experiment 1, players achieved a criterion of five consecutive self‐control responses more quickly as a positive function of trial spacing, the presence between trials of a discriminative stimulus associated with the upcoming payoff matrix, and the probability that the self‐control or defection response would be reciprocated by the computer. Experiment 2 replicated the effect of trial spacing except when there was an interfering task during the interval, suggesting that trial spacing permits better appreciation of the contingencies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Distinct pathways to persuasion: The role of affect in message‐framing effects

Health‐promoting messages can be framed in terms of the gains that are associated with healthy behaviour (gain frame) or the losses that are associated with unhealthy behaviour (loss frame). In the present research, we examined the role of positive and negative affect in the persuasive effects of gain‐ and loss‐framed health‐promoting information. Experiment 1 (N = 98) showed that gain‐framed information resulted in higher levels of information acceptance than loss‐framed information and that this effect was mediated by positive affect. The results of Experiment 2 (N = 129) showed that gain‐framed information resulted in higher levels of information acceptance and attitude, an effect that was again mediated by positive affect. In addition, loss‐framed information resulted in more negative affect than gain‐framed information and negative affect increased participants' intention to engage in the healthy behaviour. These results suggest that affect may be of great importance in the persuasion process and may be particularly helpful to explain the underlying mechanisms of message framing effects. The findings also suggest that gain‐ and loss‐framed messages offer distinct pathways to persuasion. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Source Credibility and Attitude Certainty: A Metacognitive Analysis of Resistance to Persuasion

Recent research (Tormala & Petty, 2002) has demonstrated that when people resist persuasion, they can perceive this resistance and become more certain of their initial attitudes. This research explores the role of source credibility in determining when this effect occurs. In two experiments, participants received a counterattitudinal persuasive message. When participants counterargued this message, they became more certain of their attitudes, but only when it came from a source with high expertise. When the message came from a source with low expertise, resisting it had no impact on attitude certainty. This effect was shown using both a traditional measure of attitude certainty (Experiment 1) and a well‐established consequence of certainty—the correspondence between attitudes and behavioral intentions (Experiment 2). In addition, the effect was confined to high elaboration conditions, and occurred even when participants were not explicitly instructed to counterargue. These results are consistent with a metacognitive framework proposed to understand resistance to persuasion.     

Rejection Sensitivity and Vulnerability to Self‐Directed Hostile Cognitions Following Rejection

We examined the hypothesis that rejection increases self‐directed hostile cognitions in individuals who are high in rejection sensitivity (RS). In four studies employing primarily undergraduate samples (Ns = 83–121), rejection was primed subliminally or through a recall task, and self‐directed hostile cognitions were assessed using explicit or implicit measures. Negative or neutral control conditions were used in three of the studies. Measures of RS were obtained in pretesting. High RS participants were more likely than low RS participants to report or show greater self‐directed hostile cognitions in rejection conditions, compared to control conditions. Results held when controlling for depressive symptoms, history of self‐directed hostile cognitions, and general hostility. RS may represent a unique vulnerability for self‐directed hostile cognitions, a predictor of self‐harmful behavior.     

I,me, mine: Automatic attentional capture by self‐related stimuli

Drawing on decades of research suggesting an attentional advantage for self‐related information, researchers generally assume that self‐related stimuli automatically capture attention. However, a literature review reveals that this claim has not been systematically examined. We aimed to fill in this dearth of evidence. Following a feature‐based account of automaticity, we set up four experiments in which participants were asked to respond to a target preceded by a cue, which was self‐related or not. In Experiment 1, larger cuing effects (faster reaction times to valid versus invalid trials) were found with a participant's own name compared with someone else's name. In Experiment 2, we replicated these results with unconscious cues. Experiment 3 suggested that these effects are not likely driven by familiarity. In Experiment 4, participants experienced greater difficulties from having their attention being captured by their own compared with someone else's name. We conclude that attentional capture by self‐related stimuli is automatic in the sense that it is unintentional, unconscious, and uncontrolled. Implications for self‐regulation and intergroup relations are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.