Observing preschoolers' social-emotional behavior: structure, foundations, and prediction of early school success

Social-emotional behavior of 352 3- and 4-year-olds attending private child-care and Head Start programs was observed using the Minnesota Preschool Affect Checklist, Revised (MPAC-R). Goals of the investigation included (a) using MPAC-R data to extract a shortened version, MPAC-R/S, comparing structure, internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and stability of both versions; and, using the shortened measure, to examine (b) age, gender, and risk status differences in social-emotional behaviors; (c) contributions of emotion knowledge and executive function to social-emotional behaviors; and (d) contributions of social-emotional behaviors to early school adjustment and kindergarten academic success. Results show that reliability of MPAC-R/S was as good, or better, than the MPAC-R. MPAC-R/S structure, at both times of observation, included emotionally negative/aggressive, emotionally regulated/prosocial, and emotionally positive/productive behaviors; MPAC-R structure was similar but less replicable over time. Age, gender, and risk differences were found. Children's emotion knowledge contributed to later emotionally regulated/prosocial behavior. Finally, preschool emotionally negative/aggressive behaviors were associated with concurrent and kindergarten school success, and there was evidence of social-emotional behavior mediating relations between emotion knowledge or executive function, and school outcomes. The importance of portable, empirically supported observation measures of social-emotional behaviors is discussed along with possible applications, teacher utilization, and implementation barriers.     

Evidence for an emotion-cognition interaction in the statistical prediction of suicide attempts

Suicidal behavior is a prevalent problem among adolescents and young adults. Although most theoretical models of suicide suggest that this behavior results from the interaction of different risk factors, most prior studies have tested only bivariate associations between individual risk factors and suicidal behaviors. The current study was designed to address this limitation by testing the effect of an emotion–cognition interaction on suicide attempts among youth. Specifically, we hypothesized that the interaction of emotion reactivity and problem-solving skills would statistically predict the probability of a recent suicide attempt among 87 adolescents and young adults. Results revealed a significant interaction, such that emotion reactivity was strongly associated with the probability of a suicide attempt among those with poor problem-solving skills, moderately associated among those with average problem-solving skills, and not significantly associated among those with good problem-solving skills. The next generation of studies on suicidal behavior should continue to examine how risk factors interact to predict this dangerous outcome.     

Quasi-truth,paraconsistency, and the foundations of science

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it’s perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it’s not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality.     

Pilfering ravens, Corvus corax, adjust their behaviour to social context and identity of competitors

Like other corvids, food-storing ravens protect their caches from being pilfered by conspecifics by means of aggression and by re-caching. In the wild and in captivity, potential pilferers rarely approach caches until the storers have left the cache vicinity. When storers are experimentally prevented from leaving, pilferers first search at places other than the cache sites. These behaviours raise the possibility that ravens are capable of withholding intentions and providing false information to avoid provoking the storers' aggression for cache protection. Alternatively, birds may refrain from pilfering to avoid conflicts with dominants. Here we examined whether ravens adjust their pilfer tactics according to social context and type of competitors. We allowed birds that had witnessed a conspecific making caches to pilfer those caches either in private, together with the storer, or together with a conspecific bystander that had not created the caches (non-storer) but had seen them being made. Compared to in-private trials, ravens delayed approaching the caches only in the presence of storers. Furthermore, they quickly engaged in searching away from the caches when together with dominant storers but directly approached the caches when together with dominant non-storers. These findings demonstrate that ravens selectively alter their pilfer behaviour with those individuals that are likely to defend the caches (storers) and support the interpretation that they are deceptively manipulating the others' behaviour.This contribution is part of the special issue “Animal Logics” (Watanabe and Huber 2006).     

Clinical and statistical prediction: a retrospective and would-be integrative perspective

One of the early participants in the clinical-statistical controversy describes his effort to mediate the dispute and to direct attention to the underlying issues, to most of which the box scores were irrelevant. A previously undiscussed undercurrent of the controversy is the conflict between different metaphysical world views, the history of which for the past few hundred years is quickly sketched. The mechanist metaphysics of behaviorism, which has long been dominant in American mainstream psychology, favors objective and statistical approaches and discourages interest in judgement, an issue that nevertheless refuses to go away. Systems philosophy is proposed as an integrative alternative.     

Probability, logic and the cognitive foundations of rational belief

Since Pascal introduced the idea of mathematical probability in the 17th century discussions of uncertainty and “rational” belief have been dogged by philosophical and technical disputes. Furthermore, the last quarter century has seen an explosion of new questions and ideas, stimulated by developments in the computer and cognitive sciences. Competing ideas about probability are often driven by different intuitions about the nature of belief that arise from the needs of different domains (e.g., economics, management theory, engineering, medicine, the life sciences etc). Taking medicine as our focus we develop three lines of argument (historical, practical and cognitive) that suggest that traditional views of probability cannot accommodate all the competing demands and diverse constraints that arise in complex real-world domains. A model of uncertain reasoning based on a form of logical argumentation appears to unify many diverse ideas. The model has precursors in informal discussions of argumentation due to Toulmin, and the notion of logical probability advocated by Keynes, but recent developments in artificial intelligence and cognitive science suggest ways of resolving epistemological and technical issues that they could not address.     

Computational evidence for the foundations of numerical competence

INFANT is a computational model of Simon's (1997) ‘non-numerical’ account of the foundations of numerical competence. It operationalizes the memory, individuation, object permanence and spatiotemporal representation competencies of that account into a simulation of the Simon, Hespos & Rochat (1995) study. Results demonstrate that infants’ responses can indeed be reproduced without numerical representations.