Duty and Sacrifice: A Logical Analysis of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Vedic Injunctions

The Mīmā?sā school of Indian philosophy has for its main purpose the interpretation of injunctions that are found in a set of sacred texts, the Vedas. In their works, Mīmā?sā authors provide some of the most detailed and systematic examinations available anywhere of statements with a deontic force; however, their considerations have generally not been registered outside of Indological scholarship. In the present article we analyze the Mīmā?sā theory of Vedic injunctions from a logical and philosophical point of view. The theory at issue can be regarded as a system of reasoning based on certain fundamental principles, such as the distinction between strong and weak duties, and on a taxonomy of ritual actions. We start by reconstructing the conceptual framework of the theory and then move to a formalization of its core aspects. Our contribution represents a new perspective to study Mīmā?sā and outlines its relevance, in general, for deontic reasoning.     

On recognition and self: a discussion based on Nyāya,Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism

The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (ātman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyāyikas and Mīmā?sakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher ?āntarak?ita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.     

Theodicy in a Deterministic Universe: God and the Problem of Suffering in Vyāsatīrtha’s Tātparyacandrikā

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The classical traditions of Vedānta in India explored the problem of why an omnipotent being like God would permit sentient beings to suffer in His...     

The motivations for Walter Burley’s theory of the proposition

Walter Burley (born c. 1275; died. c. 1344) claims throughout his career that the mind can make a statement (propositio) out of things. Since things include entities that exist outside of the mind, Burley appears to be claiming that the mind can form a statement out of things that exist outside of it. Most scholars of Burley offer a deflationary reading of this claim, arguing that it confuses two distinct but closely related philosophical issues: the nature of propositional content, on the one hand, and the role of facts in a compelling account of truth, on the other. But I argue that Burley means exactly what he says: that the mind can, quite literally, form statements out of things that exist outside of it. In Burley’s account, statements of this sort function as the propositional contents of our thoughts and written or uttered sentences. This account of propositional content is motivated by three more fundamental theses to which Burley is committed: referentialism, compositionality, and a claim about truth-conditionality I call intellectualism.     

Kāma,Preman, and Bhakti in Śrīdhara’s Commentary on Kṛṣṇa and the Gopīs in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Although the Bhāgavata Purāṇa presents an innovative soteriology of emotion that explicitly identifies kāma as the gopīs’...     

What’s in a name, what’s in a place? The role of verbal labels in distinct cognitive tasks

The effects of congruent and incongruent labelling on two simple cognitive tasks, sequence learning and place learning, were investigated. The results of both studies indicate the greater cognitive importance of information derived from the object compared to information derived from the verbal label.     

What are the prospects for a higher-order stimulus theory of perception?

Abstract.— Gibson has advocated a pure higher-order stimulus theory of perception. Johansson has agreed that the stimuli for perception are higher order variables of stimulation. However, unlike Gibson, Johansson assigns an important role to decoding principles in determining perception. Evidence is reviewed to show that percept-percept relations are involved in perception. On this ground it was argued that the prospects for a successful pure-stimulus theory are poor and that Johansson's views should be elaborated to include various types of decoding principles.     

A cognitively-gated place? The role of need for closure in a biased perception of the place’s past

Biased memory of the past is often a starting point for intergroup conflicts. In three correlational studies, we examined the relationship between need for closure (NFC) and historical ethnocentric bias, a tendency to overestimate the role of one’s ethnic group in the multicultural history of the city of residence. In addition, we checked whether this relationship would be mediated by an individual preference for essentialist places. We found that higher NFC was related to increased historical ethnocentric bias. Moreover, this relation was mediated by preference for an essentialist type of a place. Our results may contribute to understanding the role of individual differences and preferred type of place in shaping a biased representation of the past. Furthermore, our research findings point to the importance of raising awareness of the multicultural past among high NFC individuals.

     

What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science

In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.     

The concept of joy in the context of F. Dostoevskij’s understanding of the essence of religious belief

In this article I show that Dostoevskij criticized traditional Christianity, and that for him the authentic teaching of Christianity concerned the unity of man and God, the existence in man of a divine “dimension,” the opening of which allows man to become an absolute being. In the context of this understanding of man and God the concept of “joy” is an important one. This concept includes, on the one hand, the fullness of earthly human life (this aspect of joy is expressed by Dmitri Karamazov) and, on the other hand, the transformation of man and of all earthly being into an absolute and divine state (this aspect of joy is expressed by Kirillov and the elder Zosima). Dostoevskij’s philosophical outlook appears to be a development of a well known philosophical tradition, mystical pantheism.     

Early Muslim Scholarship in Religionwissenchaft: A Study of Muhammad ‘Abd Al-Karīm Al-Shahrastānī's On the Concept of the People of a Dubious Book (Ahl Shubhat Kitāb)

The issue of the People of the Book has long been of central significance to Islam and later to the study of comparative religion. Many Muslim and European scholars have hence taken close heed of the People of the Book and their role as the holders of sacred books. The question of the People of the Book becomes more crucial when Muhammad ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī (d.548/1153) develops another category identified as “Man Lahu Shubhat Kitāb,” (those who possess doubtful sacred scrolls) or “Ahl Shubhat Kitāb” (the People of a Dubious Book), the term that may be considered similar to that of al-Shahrastānī. The question of the People of a Dubious Book remains vague or confusing for many people. This confusion occurs not only among lay Muslims, but also among the Jews and Christians. In effect, the condition of these groups has not yet been systematized properly, although they have been treated in several major works of theology as well as in Qur’ānic commentary. The present analysis is an attempt to evaluate the nature of the People of a Dubious Book as exclusively developed by al-Shahrastānī. Considering the fact that some of the Muslim scholars have considered these groups as belonging either to People of the Book or Polytheists, a critical study shall be attempted to investigate why al-Shahrastānī exclusively expands this concept in Islamic Religious Tradition. It is hoped that the study will provide a preliminary yet clear understanding of the People of a Dubious Book, which hopefully can inspire further investigation leading to a critical study on these groups of peoples.     

The development and use of the eight precepts for lay practitioners,Upāsakas and Upāsikās in Theravāda Buddhism in the West

Sometimes translating religious texts brings us up against the problem of scatological language. The author examines this problem in relation to a story of a former life of the Buddha and explores a variety of avenues for guidance on how to render gūtha ‘shit’ into English. This includes looking at Buddhist monastic law, which does not necessarily give us the guidance we might expect, and how the existing translation of this source of guidance illustrates the very problem in hand. The textual history and context of the story precludes some otherwise useful strategies for determining our translation and the best guide to the translator's hand in this instance turns out to be humour. The author makes a case that, employed judiciously, humour could become a useful hermeneutic tool for drawing meaning from religious literature. Along the way the author also reflects on the influence of the social context of the translator, including changes in British obscenity law, and on the possibility that academia is unconsciously constrained by unexamined assumptions of ‘decency’. Buddhist attitudes to language are also touched upon.     

Vedāntadeśika’s Systematization of Rāmānuja’s Self-surrender (prapatti): A Study Based on the Nikṣeparakṣā

International Journal of Hindu Studies - This article examines the Śrīvaiṣṇava validation of the doctrine of self-surrender to the Supreme God Viṣṇu (prapatti)....     

What is Enshrined in Morality? Understanding the Grounds for Nietzsche’s Critique

Abstract

It is a truism that Nietzsche is a critic of morality. But what does Nietzsche have against this institution of morality? I consider the prominent interpretation of Brian Leiter’s that Nietzsche takes morality to task for its bad effects in hampering the flourishing of great individuals and cultures. There are good reasons, I argue, to resist this reading as the best, and certainly as the exclusive, account of the grounds for Nietzsche’s criticism of morality. I go on to propose an alternative construal that sees Nietzsche as objecting to the expressive character of moral values themselves (an under-explored notion in anglophone ethics and social philosophy that I seek to elucidate in the paper). My project, in the first instance, is the exegetical one of understanding what is going on in Nietzsche’s texts when he criticizes morality. Nonetheless, there are important philosophical lessons to be learned here from Nietzsche’s work, if not necessarily about the actual failings of morality itself, then about the kinds of ethical and ideological objections that philosophers and cultural critics can sensibly raise. One of the central styles of critique that we see in Nietzsche’s work, exemplified especially in his criticism of morality, involves interpreting social and cultural phenomena, as one might interpret texts or works of art, with an eye toward extracting the meaning or significance they have in light of the ideals they enshrine, and then attacking them, on broadly ethical grounds, on account of this. It thereby creates the space for criticizing institutions not just for what pernicious effects they have, but for the intrinsically objectionable character of what they express.     

What is Original in Merleau-Ponty’s View of the Phenomenological Reduction?

Despite the recent increase of interest in the work of Merleau-Ponty there is still a persistent tendency to overlook the uniqueness of the philosophical position he advances in Phenomenology of Perception. In this article I present a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the phenomenological reduction that explains how it is original. I do this by contrasting his presentation of the reduction with that of the early Husserl, highlighting how his emphasis on the phenomenology of the ‘perceived world’ leads him to reject Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as a ‘philosophical science,’ and the Kantian language in which the this account is framed. I go on to critically discuss the interpretations of the reduction advanced by Stephen Priest and Joel Smith as examples of readings that fail to fully grasp Merleau-Ponty’s account of the ‘natural attitude’ as resting on the inherent objectivizing structure that is built into perception itself. The way that these authors misinterpret Merleau-Ponty helps to make maximally clear the profound philosophical significance that he places on the phenomenology of the ‘perceived world’.     

The safe haven of a new classicism: the quest for a new aesthetics in Hungary 1904–1912

Seen through the quest for a new metaphysics, the visual arts were interpreted in the framework of the particular sense of progress that the generation of György Lukács developed in the first decade of the twentieth century. They saw Impressionism as the veritable symptom of the deficiencies of their age and dreamed of a great, solid, lasting new Hungarian culture which would transcend the fragmentariness, sociological interests, and ethereality of Impressionism. Although exhibitions of contemporary modernist art were organized in Budapest and the Nagybánya artists’ colony was in contact with the living French art, the nascent aesthetic theory, first of all that of Lukács, based the appreciation of Post-Impressionism on ideological considerations rather than the artistic particularities of the artists. Central to this aesthetic was the notion of greatness and a sense of metaphysics derived from German idealist philosophy and applied to the art of Cézanne, Gauguin, and the Budapest group The Seekers (founded in 1909, renamed, in 1911, as The Eight), all of whom were appreciated for features pointing in the direction of a new Classicism.     

What’s in a Name? Two Approaches to Evaluating the Label Feminist

Across two studies, we employed unique approaches to investigating the meaning of the label feminist using a sample of undergraduates from a large Northeastern university in the U.S. In Study 1 (N = 60), we utilized an impression formation paradigm to investigate the meaning of the label feminist when applied to typical college student. The results revealed that feminist males were rated less favorably than nonfeminist males and feminist females were rated more favorably than nonfeminist females. In Study 2 (N = 112), we examined the context-free associations that people have with the label feminist using two implicit attitude measures. Females reported positive implicit associations with the label feminist while males expressed neutral to slightly negative implicit associations with feminists.