Can spatialisation be extended to episodic memory and open sets?

The SPoARC effect (Spatial Positional Associated Response Codes) has only been observed in working memory (WM) using closed sets. It is interpreted as showing that individuals spatialise to-be-remembered items in a left-to-right fashion, using spatialisation as context. Given that context is crucial for episodic memory (EM), we tested if this effect could be observed in EM by using 15-word lists taken from an open set. After each list, 30 probes were sequentially displayed to test recognition. The left/right-hand key assignment for yes/no answers was varied. No SPoARC effect was observed. However, as all previous SPoARC experiments had used short lists and closed sets, it was not possible to know if this absence of SPoARC was due to the open set feature or the length of the lists. A second experiment was thus run using open sets and short 5-word lists, which do not necessitate EM to be remembered. A SPoARC effect was observed indicating that Experiment 1 result was due to the involvement of supra-span lists and that SPoARC effects do not extend to EM with open sets. Experiment 2 also enabled us to generalise the SPoARC effect to open sets in WM for the first time.     

Intelligence and emotional disorders: Is the worrying and ruminating mind a more intelligent mind?

Previous research has shown that anxiety and depression symptoms are negatively associated with measures of intelligence. However, this research has often not taken state distress and test anxiety into account, and recent findings indicate possible positive relationships between generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), worry, and intelligence. The present study examined the relationships between GAD, depression, and social anxiety symptoms, as well as their underlying cognitive processes of worry, rumination, and post-event processing, with verbal and non-verbal intelligence in an undergraduate sample (N = 126). While the results indicate that verbal intelligence has positive relationships with GAD and depression symptoms when test anxiety and state negative affect were taken into account, these relationships became non-significant when overlapping variance was controlled for. However, verbal intelligence was a unique positive predictor of worry and rumination severity. Non-verbal intelligence was a unique negative predictor of post-event processing. The possible connections between intelligence and the cognitive processes that underlie emotional disorders are discussed.     

Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported by empirical evidence. Dreams can indeed replicate waking phenomenal experience during inactive periods of sleep, and we have no reason to suspect that dreams which are more inactive are less “full-blown”. Taken together, this shows that dreams are indeed relevant to extended conscious mind theories and need to be taken into account by enactivists.     

Is the mind inherently forward looking? Comparing prediction and retrodiction

It has been suggested that prediction may be an organizing principle of the mind and/or the neocortex, with cognitive machinery specifically engineered to detect forward-looking temporal relationships, rather than merely associating temporally contiguous events. There is a remarkable absence of behavioral tests of this idea, however. To address this gap, we showed subjects sequences of shapes governed by stochastic Markov processes, and then asked them to choose which shape reliably came after a probe shape (prediction test) or before a probe shape (retrodiction test). Prediction was never superior to retrodiction, even when subjects were forewarned of a forward-directional test.     

Prospective memory and ageing: Is task importance relevant?

Memory for activities to be performed in the future, i.e., prospective memory, such as remembering to take medication or remembering to give a colleague a message, is a pervasive real‐world memory task that has recently begun to attract the attention of numerous researchers. Age effects in prospective memory have been found particularly in complex paradigms requiring participants to remember to switch between several subtasks in a limited time period (e.g., Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2000). Here, most of the older adults try to complete one or two subtasks and to forget the prospective instruction to work on all subtasks. Since recent findings in this context show that one profits from tips regarding the relevant task in complex double tasks, it seems likely that age effects in prospective memory tasks might also be due to the lack of information about the importance of the prospective task. To test this hypothesis, the importance of the prospective task was varied in the present study with 104 young and old participants by providing motivational incentives to interrupt and switch during the introduction phase (plan formation) as well as during the execution phase. Also, interindividual differences regarding nonexecutive as well as executive cognitive resources were analysed, thus allowing estimation of the relationship between these factors and (age‐related) performance in complex prospective remembering. The results show age effects in favour of the younger group in all task components of the complex prospective multitask. In contrast, there was no effect of the present experimental manipulation of motivational incentives. Finally, in regression analyses, intention formation, in particular, was found to be a significant predictor of intention execution, explaining most of the age‐related variance. In sum, our results specifically highlight the fundamental importance of adequately planning the complex intention and do not support the hypothesis that age‐related decrements in performance are reflecting a lack of motivation in the present complex prospective memory paradigm.     

Is working memory still working?

The current state of A. D. Baddeley and G. J. Hitch's (1974) multicomponent working memory model is reviewed. The phonological and visuospatial subsystems have been extensively investigated, leading both to challenges over interpretation of individual phenomena and to more detailed attempts to model the processes underlying the subsystems. Analysis of the controlling central executive has proved more challenging, leading to a proposed clarification in which the executive is assumed to be a limited capacity attentional system, aided by a newly postulated fourth system, the episodic buffer. Current interest focuses most strongly on the link between working memory and long-term memory and on the processes allowing the integration of information from the component subsystems. The model has proved valuable in accounting for data from a wide range of participant groups under a rich array of task conditions. Working memory does still appear to be working.     

Is working memory training effective?

Working memory (WM) is a cognitive system that strongly relates to a person's ability to reason with novel information and direct attention to goal-relevant information. Due to the central role that WM plays in general cognition, it has become the focus of a rapidly growing training literature that seeks to affect broad cognitive change through prolonged training on WM tasks. Recent work has suggested that the effects of WM training extend to general fluid intelligence, attentional control, and reductions in symptoms of ADHD. We present a theoretically motivated perspective of WM and subsequently review the WM training literature in light of several concerns. These include (a) the tendency for researchers to define change to abilities using single tasks, (b) inconsistent use of valid WM tasks, (c) no-contact control groups, and (d) subjective measurement of change. The literature review highlights several findings that warrant further research but ultimately concludes that there is a need to directly demonstrate that WM capacity increases in response to training. Specifically, we argue that transfer of training to WM must be demonstrated using a wider variety of tasks, thus eliminating the possibility that results can be explained by task specific learning. Additionally, we express concern that many of the most promising results (e.g., increased intelligence) cannot be readily attributed to changes in WM capacity. Thus, a critical goal for future research is to uncover the mechanisms that lead to transfer of training.     

Do preschoolers remember what to do? Incentive and external cues in prospective memory

Prospective memory, which involves remembering to perform an action at a future time, is used frequently in daily life. Few researchers, however, have studied this type of memory with children. The present study examined and compared 3- and 5-year-olds' performance on naturalistic and computer-based prospective memory tasks. The effects of incentive and external cues on memory performance were examined along with the relationship between prospective and retrospective memory. The results indicated that 5-year-olds demonstrated greater prospective memory performance than did 3-year-olds and neither incentive nor external cues consistently improved performance. Relationships between performance on the naturalistic and computer tasks varied with age. In contrast to the adult literature, younger children's prospective and retrospective memory performances were related. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Is a closed mind better for students?

A commentary is given on the seven articles in this special issue. Ordered in terms of interest and importance this readers preference list begins with the broad review articles by Boekaerts, De Raad and Schouwenburg, and Messick, in this order. Next comes the curious article by Eysenck. It is curious because it so clearly reveals his continuing refusal to accept Conscientiousness or W as an independent factor of personality. How to open a closed mind? The three research articles left this reader in a state of depression, mostly because of the negative correlations found in two of the three studies between students self-ratings on Openness and their grades obtained in the early years of University schooling.     

Is the human mind a Turing machine?

In this paper I discuss the topics of mechanism and algorithmicity. I emphasise that a characterisation of algorithmicity such as the Turing machine is iterative; and I argue that if the human mind can solve problems that no Turing machine can, the mind must depend on some non-iterative principle — in fact, Cantor's second principle of generation, a principle of the actual infinite rather than the potential infinite of Turing machines. But as there has been theorisation that all physical systems can be represented by Turing machines, I investigate claims that seem to contradict this: specifically, claims that there are noncomputable phenomena. One conclusion I reach is that if it is believed that the human mind is more than a Turing machine, a belief in a kind of Cartesian dualist gulf between the mental and the physical is concomitant.     

Is memory for stimulus magnitude Bayesian?

This study was designed to determine whether memory for stimulus values is a Bayesian weighting of the magnitude of a stimulus and the central tendency of an exemplar's category (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000). In five experiments, participants reproduced the remembered size of a geometric figure drawn from one of two categories whose means for size differed. Reproductions were biased toward the mean of the combined distribution rather than the mean of either category. Reproductions were also influenced by the size of the stimulus on the preceding trial. Neither of these results is entirely consistent with the view that recollections are partially constructed from a consideration of the long-run probabilities established by category membership.     

Is the brain a memory box?

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.     

Is there a memory for sentences?

A critical discussion of the model of sentence memory which enjoyed greatest popularity in the psycholinguistic research of the sixties, namely the model based on the deep-structure-plus-tag hypothesis of sentence memory, is presented together with the results of an experiment on prompted recall for sentences with various intervals after presentation and with two types of instructions. This experiment contributed to show that immediate memory for sentences can be affected by appropriate instructions, and that after a short time after presentation only the main semantic information of the sentences is recalled. An alternative model is presented, based on the notion of storage of the meaningful elements of the sentences in a rather abstract form, and of recall as a reconstructive process to produce new sentences. The results of two new experiments on sentence memory, the first a free and prompted recall experiment with children, the second a recognition memory study with adolescents, are then presented and discussed in relation to the model.     

Training attentional control and working memory – Is younger,better?

Authors have argued that various forms of interventions may be more effective in younger children. Is cognitive training also more effective, the earlier the training is applied? We review evidence suggesting that functional neural networks, including those subserving attentional control, may be more unspecialised and undifferentiated earlier in development. We also discuss evidence suggesting that certain skills such as attentional control may be important as ‘hub’ cognitive domains, gating the subsequent acquisition of skills in other areas. Both of these factors suggest that attentional training administered to younger individuals ought to be relatively more effective in improving cognitive functioning across domains. We evaluate studies that have administered forms of cognitive training targeting various subcomponents of attention and the closely related domain of working memory, and we contrast their reported transfer to distal cognitive domains as a function of the age of the participants. Although negative findings continue to be common in this literature we find that cognitive training applied to younger individuals tends to lead to significantly more widespread transfer of training effects. We conclude that future work in this area should concentrate on understanding early intensive training, and discuss a number of practical steps that might help to achieve this aim.     

The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and discuss the role of embodied intentionality in the extended mind project. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for the extended mind hypothesis in embodied intersubjective interaction, namely, simulation theory and a non-simulationist perceptual account. I argue that, if the extended mind adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding, it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a non-simulationist perceptual account of action-understanding, it rejects the classical sandwich view of the mind.     

Is overgeneral autobiographical memory an isolated memory phenomenon in major depression?

The present study explored the relation between overgeneral autobiographical memory (AM) and other aspects of memory functioning in depression. A total of 26 patients with major depressive disorder completed a set of memory tasks measuring AM specificity (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), working memory, semantic memory, verbal learning, delayed verbal recall, recognition memory, and source memory. Reduced specificity of AM was related to poor working memory (central executive functioning) and poor source memory. The former finding conforms to the idea that the voluntary retrieval of specific autobiographical memories (AMs) involves central executive processes (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000 Conway, M. A. and Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. 2000. The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107: 261–288. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). The latter finding replicates and extends recent findings suggesting that overgeneral AM is part of a broader memory deficit in retrieving the specific details of the context in which information was acquired (Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004 Raes , F. , Hermans , D. , Williams , J. M. G. , Demyttenaere , K. , Sabbe , B. , Pieters , G . & Eelen , P. ( 2004 ). Reduced specificity of autobiographical memory: A mediator between rumination and ineffective social problem solving in major depression? Journal of affective disorders , 87 , 331 – 335  [Google Scholar]). Furthermore, in line with Ramponi et al. (2004 Raes , F. , Hermans , D. , Williams , J. M. G. , Demyttenaere , K. , Sabbe , B. , Pieters , G . & Eelen , P. ( 2004 ). Reduced specificity of autobiographical memory: A mediator between rumination and ineffective social problem solving in major depression? Journal of affective disorders , 87 , 331 – 335  [Google Scholar]), rumination was found to be related to both overgeneral AM and poor source memory.