Pedagogical cues encourage toddlers' transmission of recently demonstrated functions to unfamiliar adults

Young children use pedagogical cues as a signal that others' actions are social or cultural conventions. Here we show that children selectively transmit (enact in a new social situation) causal functions demonstrated pedagogically, even when they have learned and can produce alternative functions as well. Two‐year‐olds saw two novel toys, each with two functions. One experimenter demonstrated one function using pedagogical cues (eye contact and child‐directed speech) and a second experimenter demonstrated the alternative function using intentional actions towards the object, but without pedagogical cues. Children imitated both functions at equal rates initially, indicating equal causal learning from both types of demonstration. However, they were significantly more likely to enact the pedagogical function for a new adult not present during the initial demonstrations. These results indicate that pedagogical cues influence children's transmission of information, perhaps playing a role in the dissemination of cultural conventions from a young age.     

Two‐year‐olds are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility

Data from three experiments provide the first evidence that children, at least as young as age two, are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility, and flexibly use these cues to facilitate learning. Experiment 1 revealed that 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds prefer to learn about objects from someone who appears, through non‐verbal cues, to be confident in performing actions on those objects than from someone who appears uncertain when performing actions on those objects. Experiment 2 revealed that when 2‐year‐olds observe only one model perform a single action, either confidently or unconfidently, they do not use the model’s level of confidence in this single instance to influence their learning. Experiment 3 revealed that 2‐year‐olds will use a single model’s level of confidence to guide their learning if they have observed that the model has a history of being either consistently confident or consistently uncertain. These findings reveal that young children selectively alter their learning based on others’ non‐verbal cues of credibility, and underscore the importance of an early sensitivity to socio‐cognitive cues for human learning and development.     

Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences

Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind‐relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three‐year‐old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non‐pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., ‘No, not like that’), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non‐conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend – at least for their strength – on the nature of the acquisition process.     

Rationales in children’s causal learning from others’ actions

Shown commensurate actions and information by an adult, preschoolers’ causal learning was influenced by the pedagogical context in which these actions occurred. Four-year-olds who were provided with a reason for an experimenter’s action relevant to learning causal structure showed more accurate causal learning than children exposed to the same action and data accompanied by an inappropriate rationale or accompanied by no explanatory information. These results suggest that children’s accurate causal learning is influenced by contextual factors that specify the instructional value of others’ actions.     

The double-edged sword of pedagogy: Instruction limits spontaneous exploration and discovery

Motivated by computational analyses, we look at how teaching affects exploration and discovery. In Experiment 1, we investigated children’s exploratory play after an adult pedagogically demonstrated a function of a toy, after an interrupted pedagogical demonstration, after a naïve adult demonstrated the function, and at baseline. Preschoolers in the pedagogical condition focused almost exclusively on the target function; by contrast, children in the other conditions explored broadly. In Experiment 2, we show that children restrict their exploration both after direct instruction to themselves and after overhearing direct instruction given to another child; they do not show this constraint after observing direct instruction given to an adult or after observing a non-pedagogical intentional action. We discuss these findings as the result of rational inductive biases. In pedagogical contexts, a teacher’s failure to provide evidence for additional functions provides evidence for their absence; such contexts generalize from child to child (because children are likely to have comparable states of knowledge) but not from adult to child. Thus, pedagogy promotes efficient learning but at a cost: children are less likely to perform potentially irrelevant actions but also less likely to discover novel information.     

Parallels Between Action‐Object Mapping and Word‐Object Mapping in Young Children

Across a series of four experiments with 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds we demonstrate how cognitive mechanisms supporting noun learning extend to the mapping of actions to objects. In Experiment 1 (n = 61) the demonstration of a novel action led children to select a novel, rather than a familiar object. In Experiment 2 (n = 78) children exhibited long‐term retention of novel action‐object mappings and extended these actions to other category members. In Experiment 3 (n = 60) we showed that children formed an accurate sensorimotor record of the novel action. In Experiment 4 (n = 54) we demonstrate limits on the types of actions mapped to novel objects. Overall these data suggest that certain aspects of noun mapping share common processing with action mapping and support a domain‐general account of word learning.     

Executive functioning by 18‐24‐month‐old children: effects of inhibition,working memory demands and narrative in a novel detour‐reaching task

Infants can inhibit a prepotent but wrong action towards a goal in order to perform a causal means‐action. It is not clear, however, whether infants can perform an arbitrary means‐action while inhibiting a prepotent response. In four experiments, we explore this executive functioning in 18–24‐month‐old children. The working memory and inhibition demands in a novel means‐end problem were systematically varied in terms of the type and combination of means‐action(s) (causal or arbitrary) contained within the task, the number of means‐actions (1 or 2), the goal visual availability and whether the task was accompanied by a narrative. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that children performed tasks that contained causal as opposed to arbitrary information more accurately; accuracy was also higher in tasks containing only one step. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that performance in the arbitrary task improved significantly when all sources of prepotency were removed. In Experiment 3, task performance improved when the two means‐actions were intelligibly linked to the task goal. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the use of a narrative that provided a meaningful (non‐causal) link between the two means‐actions also improved children's performance by assisting their working memory in the generation of a rationale. Findings provide an initial account of executive functioning in the months that bring the end of infancy. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ten‐month‐old infants use prior information to identify an actor's goal

For adults, prior information about an individual's likely goals, preferences or dispositions plays a powerful role in interpreting ambiguous behavior and predicting and interpreting behavior in novel contexts. Across two studies, we investigated whether 10‐month‐old infants’ ability to identify the goal of an ambiguous action sequence was facilitated by seeing prior instances in which the actor directly pursued and obtained her goal, and whether infants could use this prior information to understand the actor's behavior in a new context. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the goal preview impacted infants’ subsequent action understanding, but only if the preview was delivered in the same room as the subsequent action sequence. Experiment 2 demonstrated that infants’ failure to transfer prior goal information across situations arose from a change in the room per se and not other features of the task. Our results suggest that infants may use their understanding of simple actions as a leverage point for understanding novel or ambiguous actions, but that their ability to do so is limited to certain types of contextual changes.     

Infants' perception of goal-directed actions: development through cue-based bootstrapping

It is now widely accepted that sensitivity to goal-directed actions emerges during the first year of life. However, controversy still surrounds the question of how this sensitivity emerges and develops. One set of views emphasizes the role of observing behavioral cues, while another emphasizes the role of experience with producing own action. In a series of four experiments we contrast these two views. In Experiment 1, it was shown that infants as young as 6 months old can interpret an unfamiliar human action as goal-directed when the action involves equifinal variations. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that 12- and 9-month-olds are also able to attribute goals to an inanimate action if it displays behavioral cues such as self-propelledness and an action-effect. In Experiment 4, we found that even 6-months-olds can encode the goal object of an inanimate action if all three cues, equifinality, self-propelledness and an action-effect, were present. These findings suggest that the ability to ascribe goal-directedness does not necessarily emerge from hands-on experience with particular actions and that it is independent from the specific appearance of the actor as long as sufficient behavioral cues are available. We propose a cue-based bootstrapping model in which an initial sensitivity to behavioral cues leads to learning about further cues. The further cues in turn inform about different kinds of goal-directed agents and about different types of actions. By uniting an innate base with a learning process, cue-based bootstrapping can help reconcile divergent views on the emergence of infants' ability to understand actions as goal-directed.     

A bias for social information in human cultural transmission

Evolutionary theories concerning the origins of human intelligence suggest that cultural transmission might be biased toward social over non‐social information. This was tested by passing social and non‐social information along multiple chains of participants. Experiment 1 found that gossip, defined as information about intense third‐party social relationships, was transmitted with siginificantly greater accuracy and in significantly greater quantity than equivalent non‐social information concerning individual behaviour or the physical environment. Experiment 2 replicated this finding controlling for narrative coherence, and additionally found that information concerning everyday non‐gossip social interactions was transmitted just as well as the intense gossip interactions. It was therefore concluded that human cultural transmission is biased toward information concerning social interactions over equivalent non‐social information.     

Causal learning from probabilistic events in 24‐month‐olds: an action measure

How do young children learn about causal structure in an uncertain and variable world? We tested whether they can use observed probabilistic information to solve causal learning problems. In two experiments, 24‐month‐olds observed an adult produce a probabilistic pattern of causal evidence. The toddlers then were given an opportunity to design their own intervention. In Experiment 1, toddlers saw one object bring about an effect with a higher probability than a second object. In Experiment 2, the frequency of the effect was held constant, though its probability differed. After observing the probabilistic evidence, toddlers in both experiments chose to act on the object that was more likely to produce the effect. The results demonstrate that toddlers can learn about cause and effect without trial‐and‐error or linguistic instruction on the task, simply by observing the probabilistic patterns of evidence resulting from the imperfect actions of other social agents. Such observational causal learning from probabilistic displays supports human children's rapid cultural learning.     

Motion tracking of parents’ infant‐ versus adult‐directed actions reveals general and action‐specific modulations

Parents tend to modulate their movements when demonstrating actions to their infants. Thus far, these modulations have primarily been quantified by human raters and for entire interactions, thereby possibly overlooking the intricacy of such demonstrations. Using optical motion tracking, the precise modulations of parents’ infant‐directed actions were quantified and compared to adult‐directed actions and between action types. Parents demonstrated four novel objects to their 14‐month‐old infants and adult confederates. Each object required a specific action to produce a unique effect (e.g. rattling). Parents were asked to demonstrate an object at least once before passing it to their demonstration partner, and they were subsequently free to exchange the object as often as desired. Infants’ success at producing the objects’ action‐effects was coded during the demonstration session and their memory of the action‐effects was tested after a several‐minute delay. Indicating general modulations across actions, parents repeated demonstrations more often, performed the actions in closer proximity and demonstrated action‐effects for longer when interacting with their infant compared to the adults. Meanwhile, modulations of movement size and velocity were specific to certain action‐effect pairs. Furthermore, a ‘just right’ modulation of proximity was detected, since infants’ learning, memory, and parents’ prior evaluations of their infants’ motor abilities, were related to demonstrations that were performed neither too far from nor too close to the infants. Together, these findings indicate that infant‐directed action modulations are not solely overall exaggerations but are dependent upon the characteristics of the to‐be learned actions, their effects, and the infant learners.     

Exploring the evolutionary origins of overimitation: a comparison across domesticated and non‐domesticated canids

When learning from others, human children tend to faithfully copy – or ‘overimitate’ – the actions of a demonstrator, even when these actions are irrelevant for solving the task at hand. We investigate whether domesticated dogs (Canis familiaris) and dingoes (Canis dingo) share this tendency to overimitate in three experiments. In Experiment 1, dogs and dingoes had the opportunity to solve a puzzle after watching an ostensive demonstrator who used both a relevant action and an irrelevant action. We find clear evidence against overimitation in both species. In contrast to human children (Horner & Whiten, 2005), dogs and dingoes used the irrelevant action less often across trials, suggesting that both species were filtering out the irrelevant action as they gained experience with the puzzle (like chimpanzees; Horner & Whiten, 2005). Experiments 2 and 3 provide further evidence against overimitation, demonstrating that both species’ behavior is better characterized by individual exploration than overimitation. Given that both species, particularly dogs, show human‐like social learning in other contexts, these findings provide additional evidence that overimitation may be a unique aspect of human social learning. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/g2mRniJZ7aU .     

Information from multiple modalities helps 5‐month‐olds learn abstract rules

By 7 months of age, infants are able to learn rules based on the abstract relationships between stimuli ( Marcus et al ., 1999 ), but they are better able to do so when exposed to speech than to some other classes of stimuli. In the current experiments we ask whether multimodal stimulus information will aid younger infants in identifying abstract rules. We habituated 5‐month‐olds to simple abstract patterns (ABA or ABB) instantiated in coordinated looming visual shapes and speech sounds (Experiment 1), shapes alone (Experiment 2), and speech sounds accompanied by uninformative but coordinated shapes (Experiment 3). Infants showed evidence of rule learning only in the presence of the informative multimodal cues. We hypothesize that the additional evidence present in these multimodal displays was responsible for the success of younger infants in learning rules, congruent with both a Bayesian account and with the Intersensory Redundancy Hypothesis.     

Children extend both words and non‐verbal actions to novel exemplars

Markson and Bloom (1997) found that some learning processes involved in children's acquisition of a new word are also involved in their acquisition of a new fact. They argued that these findings provided evidence against a domain‐specific system for word learning. However, Waxman and Booth (2000) found that whereas children quite readily extend newly learned words to novel exemplars within a category, they do not do this with newly learned facts. They therefore argued that because children did not extend some facts in a principled way, word learning and fact learning may result from different domain‐specific processes. In the current study, we argue that facts are a poor comparison in this argument since facts vary in whether they are tied to particular individuals. A more appropriate comparison is a conventional non‐verbal action on an object –‘what we do with things like this’– since they are routinely generalized categorically to new objects. Our study shows that 2¹/₂‐year‐old children extend novel non‐verbal actions to new objects in the same way that they extend novel words to new objects. The findings provide support for the view that word learning represents a unique configuration of more general learning processes.     

Young children attribute normativity to novel actions without pedagogy or normative language

Young children interpret some acts performed by adults as normatively governed, that is, as capable of being performed either rightly or wrongly. In previous experiments, children have made this interpretation when adults introduced them to novel acts with normative language (e.g. 'this is the way it goes'), along with pedagogical cues signaling culturally important information, and with social-pragmatic marking that this action is a token of a familiar type. In the current experiment, we exposed children to novel actions with no normative language, and we systematically varied pedagogical and social-pragmatic cues in an attempt to identify which of them, if either, would lead children to normative interpretations. We found that young 3-year-old children inferred normativity without any normative language and without any pedagogical cues. The only cue they used was adult social-pragmatic marking of the action as familiar, as if it were a token of a well-known type (as opposed to performing it, as if inventing it on the spot). These results suggest that - in the absence of explicit normative language - young children interpret adult actions as normatively governed based mainly on the intentionality (perhaps signaling conventionality) with which they are performed.     

Spilling thoughts: configuring attentional resources in infants’ goal-directed actions

The focus and organization of attention in perception-action coupling is systematically examined in two studies involving 9 and 10 -month-old infants engaged in learning goal-directed behaviors. Experiment 1 (discrimination study) observed the influence of an attentionally demanding motor task on learning and cognition, while Experiment 2 (means-ends study) observed the influence of an attentionally demanding goal on motor planning and reaching performance. Taken together the results of these two experiments revealed that when mental processing resources were directed to thinking about movement, discrimination performance became compromised; conversely, when processing resources were directed to thinking about the goal-state, the motor planning and execution became compromised. These results suggest a “spilling forward” of thoughts onto actions and goal-states and thus an attention-driven cognition/action trade-off for infants’ goal-directed actions. Findings highlight the ultimate importance of emerging motor skills on cognition and are contextualized within the on-going dialogues and developmental debates surrounding perceptual-motor skill development and problem-solving strategies during the first year.     

Split‐Attention and Coherence Principles in Multimedia Instruction Can Rescue Performance for Learners with Lower Working Memory Capacity

This study examined the relation between working memory capacity (WMC) and the principles of Split‐Attention (Experiment 1) and Coherence (Experiment 2) in multimedia learning. Split‐Attention refers to reduced comprehension when learners must divide their attention between images and text, and Coherence refers to reduced comprehension when learners must process irrelevant information. In Experiment 1, those with lower WMC performed worse compared with those with higher WMC when learning from the Split‐Attention condition (audio + on‐screen text + images), but not when learning from the Complementary condition (audio + images). In Experiment 2, those with lower WMC performed worse compared with those with higher WMC when learning from the Incongruent condition (audio + irrelevant images), but not when learning from the Congruent condition (audio + relevant images). Findings reinforce the importance of pedagogically sound instructional design, as it may especially benefit those with lower WMC and equate learning across working memory abilities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Infants' perception of goal‐directed actions on video

Imitation studies and object search studies show that infants have difficulties using action information presented on video to guide their own behaviour. The present study investigated whether infants also have problems interpreting information shown on video relative to real live information. It was examined whether 6‐month‐olds interpret an action with a salient action effect as goal‐directed when it is performed by an actor on a video‐screen and when it is performed by a live actor. A video presentation of a goal‐directed action display was presented to one group of infants, and another group received the same action display, matched in all details, live on a stage. Results indicate that 6‐month‐olds in the video group as well as in the live group interpreted the human action as goal‐directed. Moreover, comparison across both groups revealed no difference in the overall looking pattern between the video and the live presentation group. Thus, our findings show that infants as young as 6 months of age can take important information from video clips and interpret televised actions in meaningful ways that is equivalent to their interpretation of live actions.     

Beyond naïve cue combination: salience and social cues in early word learning

Children learn their earliest words through social interaction, but it is unknown how much they rely on social information. Some theories argue that word learning is fundamentally social from its outset, with even the youngest infants understanding intentions and using them to infer a social partner's target of reference. In contrast, other theories argue that early word learning is largely a perceptual process in which young children map words onto salient objects. One way of unifying these accounts is to model word learning as weighted cue combination, in which children attend to many potential cues to reference, but only gradually learn the correct weight to assign each cue. We tested four predictions of this kind of naïve cue combination account, using an eye‐tracking paradigm that combines social word teaching and two‐alternative forced‐choice testing. None of the predictions were supported. We thus propose an alternative unifying account: children are sensitive to social information early, but their ability to gather and deploy this information is constrained by domain‐general cognitive processes. Developmental changes in children's use of social cues emerge not from learning the predictive power of social cues, but from the gradual development of attention, memory, and speed of information processing.