What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms,policies and perspectives

Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In Sect. 2 I consider van Fraassen’s argument for construing empiricism as a stance, and look at some responses to it. In Sect. 3 I outline my conception of stances as perspectives or ways of seeing, and explain how stances so understood may be justified. I illustrate this conception by way of a discussion of the model pluralist position with respect to the units of selection debate in biology, and suggest that on the model pluralist view different perspectives on the units of selection, such as the gene’s eye view, are in fact van Fraassian stances. In Sect. 4 I discuss the view put forward by Teller and Chakravartty among others that stances should be understood as epistemic policies, and argue that it is consistent with the conception of stances as perspectives. In the final section I criticise Rowbottom’s attempt to assimilate stances to Kuhnian paradigms. I argue that he has overlooked some important disanalogies between stances and paradigms, so that the comparison obscures more than it reveals.     

Why did this happen to me? Religious believers’ and non-believers’ teleological reasoning about life events

People often believe that significant life events happen for a reason. In three studies, we examined evidence for the view that teleological beliefs reflect a general cognitive bias to view the world in terms of agency, purpose, and design. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that individual differences in mentalizing ability predicted both the tendency to believe in fate (Study 1) and to infer purposeful causes of one’s own life events (Study 2). In addition, people’s perception of purpose in life events was correlated with their teleological beliefs about nature, but this relationship was driven primarily by individuals’ explicit religious and paranormal beliefs (Study 3). Across all three studies, we found that while people who believe in God hold stronger teleological beliefs than those who do not, there is nonetheless evidence of teleological beliefs among non-believers, confirming that the perception of purpose in life events does not rely on theistic belief. These findings suggest that the tendency to perceive design and purpose in life events—while moderated by theistic belief—is not solely a consequence of culturally transmitted religious ideas. Rather, this teleological bias has its roots in certain more general social propensities.     

Young children’s learning and generalization of teleological and mechanistic explanations

Young children often endorse explanations of the natural world that appeal to functions or purpose—for example, that rocks are pointy so animals can scratch on them. By contrast, most Western-educated adults reject such explanations. What accounts for this change? We investigated 4- to 5-year-old children’s ability to generalize the form of an explanation from examples by presenting them with novel teleological explanations, novel mechanistic explanations, or no explanations for 5 nonliving natural objects. We then asked children to explain novel instances of the same objects and novel kinds of objects. We found that children were able to learn and generalize explanations of both types, suggesting an ability to draw generalizations over the form of an explanation. We also found that teleological and mechanistic explanations were learned and generalized equally well, suggesting that if a domain-general teleological bias exists, it does not manifest as a bias in learning or generalization.     

Kierkegaard and the ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’

This article discusses the claim made by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling that the story of Abraham involves a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’. It tries to show that this claim is intelligible and plausible when considered within the context of a philosophical position which views morality as a system of duties.     

‘You're the doctor,Doctor!’: is social constructionism a helpful stance in general practice consultations?

This paper considers the advantages and limitations of using a social constructionist stance in general practice, and is illustrated with two case examples. An approach is suggested for clinical practice using social constructionism and biomedical knowledge dialectically, each as a commentary on the limitations of the other.     

Sharing attention and pointing to objects at 12 months: is the intentional stance implied?

The goal of the present research was to assess whether communicative gestures, such as gazing and declarative pointing of 12-month-old infants indicate that infants perceive people as intentional agents, or whether infant communicative behaviors are merely triggered by specific perceptual cues in joint visual attention situations. Two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, thirty-two 12-month-olds were conditioned to follow the gaze of a contingently interacting person or object. They were then submitted to a paradigm designed to incite them to initiate communicative gestures to the person or object. The temporal coordination between pointing, gazing, and vocalizations occurred at a significantly higher rate in the Person than in the Object condition. In Experiment 2, the effect of the attentional focus of others on the gaze, points and vocalizations of thirty 12-month-olds was investigated. Infants were assessed in conditions where the experimenter vocalized while looking at the same (In-focus), or a different (Out-of-focus) toy than the infants. Infants who pointed produced more co-occurrences of gaze, vocalizations and points in the Out-of-focus condition than in the In-focus condition. Thus, by 12 months, infants are aware of the attentional state of the person. Discussion centers on the implications of these findings for theories of social and cognitive knowing.     

Self,in‐group,and out‐group evaluation: bond or breach?

A number of studies have looked at causes of in‐group bias, but few studies have actually investigated whether the two components of in‐group bias, i.e. in‐group and out‐group evaluation, are related to each other and whether they have similar or different predictors. In the Fiji Islands, self‐, in‐group, and out‐group evaluations were obtained using within‐subject correlations from a sample of 336 indigenous and Indian Fijians. Self‐evaluation was positively related to in‐group evaluation, and both were positively related to out‐group evaluation, supporting a spillover model. After controlling for background variables and the other evaluation variables, regression analyses showed that in‐group identification was positively related to in‐group evaluation, and social distance and political ethnocentrism were negatively related to out‐group evaluation. Additionally, ethnicity interacted with collective self‐esteem in determining both in‐group favouritism and out‐group derogation. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamics of postural control during bilateral stance – Effect of support area,visual input and age

The present study investigated the effect of support area, visual input and aging of the dynamics of postural control during bilateral stance. Fifteen young (22.1 ± 1.7 years) and fifteen older (68.3 ± 2.7 years) individuals completed four different 90 s bilateral stance trials: 1) shoulder wide feet distance with eyes open, 2) shoulder wide feet distance with eyes closed, 3) narrow feet distance with eyes open, and 4) narrow feet distance with eyes closed on a force plate form. The anterior (AP) and mediolateral (ML) center of pressure (COP) trajectories were calculated from the middle 60 s of the ground reaction forces and moments. Sample entropy (SaEn), correlation dimension (CoD), the largest Lyapunov exponent (LyE) and entropic half-life (ENT½) were calculated for the COP in both directions. In young individuals, a narrower support area resulted in a restricted movement solution space with lower SaEn, lower LyE and longer ENT½ in the executed motor control strategy, whereas it increased the CoD in the older individuals. During the eyes closed trials, SaEn, CoD and LyE increased and decreased ENT½ for both groups in the AP direction and increased SaEn and LyE in the ML direction for the older individuals alone. This indicates that aging is associated with direction- and task-dependent changes in the dynamics of the executed COP movements during postural stance tasks.     

Culture, self, and the emergence of reactance: Is there a “universal” freedom?

In this article we suggest that independent vs. interdependent aspects of the self yield different manifestations of psychological reactance and that this is especially relevant in a cross-cultural context. In Studies 1, 2, and 4 we showed that people from collectivistic cultural backgrounds (individuals holding more interdependent attitudes and values) were less sensitive to a threat to their individual freedom than people from individualistic cultural backgrounds (individuals holding more independent attitudes and values), but more sensitive if their collective freedom was threatened. In Study 3 we activated independent vs. interdependent attitudes and values utilizing a cognitive priming method and yielded similar results as the other studies hinting at the important causal role of self-related aspects in understanding reactance in a cross-cultural context.     

Self‐Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice,Self‐Determination,and Will?

The term autonomy literally refers to regulation by the self. Its opposite, heteronomy, refers to controlled regulation, or regulation that occurs without self-endorsement. At a time when philosophers and economists are increasingly detailing the nature of autonomy and recognizing its social and practical significance, many psychologists are questioning the reality and import of autonomy and closely related phenomena such as will, choice, and freedom. Using the framework of self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), we review research concerning the benefits of autonomous versus controlled regulation for goal performance, persistence, affective experience, quality of relationships, and well-being across domains and cultures. We also address some of the controversies and terminological issues surrounding the construct of autonomy, including critiques of autonomy by biological reductionists, cultural relativists, and behaviorists. We conclude that there is a universal and cross-developmental value to autonomous regulation when the construct is understood in an exacting way.     

Commentary on “deconstructing difference: Gender,splitting, and transitional space”;

This essay identifies Kohut's major contribution as methodological: that psychoanalytic inquiry entails the sustained empathic immersion in the patient's psychological experience. Kohut's consistent employment of this method enabled him to discover that it was not instinctual drive derivatives but selfobject needs that were central to all psychological relationships. This discovery was the basis for the transformation of analysts’ approach to the “narcissistic”; aspects of a wide variety of disorders—a transformation whose theoretical and therapeutic importance rivals the revolutionary approach taken by Freud to the vicissitudes of psychosexuality and its disturbances. The author describes the major areas of progress in self psychology—much of which centers on the growing recognition that the health and vitality of the self depend on complex relational, or intersubjective, selfobject experiences. He indicates how this recognition is changing our perspectives on transference and countertransference and is improving our ability to respond optimally to our patients. He describes how optimal responsiveness constitutes the guiding principle for therapeutic work, and how it may both constitute, and be different from, “being empathic.”;     

A teleological account of Cartesian sensations?

Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological account cannot be sustained for both theoretical and textual reasons and that it does not have the advantages it is claimed to have.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis> and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward,Smilansky, and Perry

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned (even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own account.

Job Complexity,Performance, and Well‐being: When Does Supplies‐Values Fit Matter?*

We extend person–job fit research by investigating job performance as a moderator of the supplies–values fit relationship with strain outcomes (somatic complaints and depression). Drawing on cybernetic stress and psychological centrality perspectives, we argue that supplies–values misfit relates to lower well‐being levels when job performance is low but that this effect is attenuated when job performance is high. The results are consistent with this prediction across 3 studies that provide progressively more rigorous tests of the hypothesis. Implications of the results for theoretical and empirical person–job fit research are addressed.     

Forgive and Forget? Forgiveness,Personality, and Wellness Among Counselors‐in‐Training

Forgiveness as a method of addressing “wounds” has been linked to enduring aspects of personality and improved physical and mental health outcomes. The aim of this study was to understand the effects of forgiveness on counseling students’ overall wellness. Counseling students (N= 115) from 5 universities completed self‐report measures of forgiveness, wellness, and personality. Results indicate that, when personality factors are controlled, forgiveness contributes a significant proportion (10%) of the variance in wellness for counseling students. Implications for counselor training and counseling are discussed.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Metontology</Emphasis>, moral particularism,and the “art of existing:” a dialogue between Heidegger,Aristotle, and Bernard Williams

An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time, in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological level—to metontology. Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were excluded from Being and Time. It is within metontology, Heidegger states, that “the question of ethics may be raised for the first time.” This paper makes explicit both Heidegger’s argument for metontology, and the relation between metontology and ethics. In examining what he means by “the art of existing,” the paper argues that there is an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s thinking that corresponds to a moderate form of moral particularism. In order to justify this position, a comparative analysis is made between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams.