群体内疚:界定、心理机制、行动倾向及干预策略

当个体认为内群体为外群体受到的不道德伤害负有责任时会体验到群体内疚。该情绪常见的触发情境包括过往历史的伤害事件、当下的群际冲突、不公正的社会关系及未来的伤害事件。群体认同、内群体责任和不当性评估是影响群体内疚产生的三大心理机制。群体内疚会导致施害群体对受害群体表现出积极行动,如友善态度,冲突和解、群体补偿及群际支持。通过群体肯定、自我肯定、促进共同认同、强调内群体责任及展现已有补偿行为等干预策略可以引发施害群体的群体内疚。未来的研究应澄清群体内疚的成因机制,进一步探索群体内疚与补偿行为间的作用关系。     

补偿他人还是保护自己?内疚与羞耻情绪对合作行为的影响差异

作为两种常见且易被混淆的自我意识情绪, 诸多研究者对内疚和羞耻的产生前因及影响后效进行研究, 尤其是近年来的研究逐渐关注两者对合作行为的影响。我们通过对已有研究进行梳理发现, 内疚和羞耻对合作行为的影响及其机制存在差异, 内疚的影响更为稳定及具有普适性, 羞耻的影响具有复杂性和多样性, 更容易受到其他因素的影响。内疚和羞耻对合作行为的不同影响可从动机机制和调节机制两方面进行解释。首先, 动机机制包括内疚对他人的补偿、修复动机以及羞耻对自我的保护、修复动机。内疚对他人的补偿、修复动机主要体现在维护社会互动中的公平; 弥补对他人造成的伤害, 降低自己和他人的痛苦; 修复人际关系, 重新获得他人或自己的接纳与认同。羞耻对自我的保护、修复动机主要体现在释放消极的情绪状态; 维护积极的自我形象和声誉, 修复自我; 保护自我, 防止后续伤害及不良后果。总体而言, 内疚者关注过失行为及后果, 侧重于对受害他人的补偿或对与他人关系的修复, 而羞耻者关注整体自我的受损, 侧重于对自我的保护和对自己社会形象的修复, 基于此, 我们在前人研究的基础上构建了内疚与羞耻影响合作行为的动机机制对比模型图。其次, 调节机制涉及到个体因素和情境因素的调节作用, 其中个体因素包括认知因素、社会价值取向、自我控制能力、情绪特质和情绪状态, 情境因素包括暴露情境和掩蔽情境、实验情境和日常情境、相关情境和不相关情境。具体而言, 内疚对合作行为的影响的较少受情境的限制, 而羞耻受情境因素限制较多, 在暴露情境、相关情境中更能促进合作行为的产生, 而在掩蔽情境、不相关情境中, 羞耻较难影响个体的合作抉择, 且无论是实验室情境还是日常情境, 内疚似乎都比羞耻更易影响合作。最后, 鉴于内疚与羞耻的诱发和测量方法的有效性仍需检验, 两种情绪对合作行为影响的过程机制和生理机制仍不明晰, 个体因素影响的研究尚不充足以及跨文化研究较为缺乏, 未来研究可以从内疚和羞耻诱发与测量方法的有效性, 情绪作用发生的内在过程和生理机制, 情绪影响的个体和文化差异这几方面进行扩展和深挖。     

初中生内疚情绪体验的发展及其对公平行为的影响

为探讨初中生内疚情绪体验的发展特点及其对公平行为的影响,研究1采用自编的初中生内疚情绪体验情境问卷,对335名七、八、九年级初中生的内疚情绪体验特点进行测查,研究2采用独裁者博弈游戏研究范式,考察了120名初中生的内疚情绪体验对不同情境中公平行为的影响,结果表明：初中生的内疚情绪体验随年级的增长而降低,且在性别、他人评价、情境类型以及情境类型与他人评价的交互作用上存在显著差异。在内疚情绪唤醒状态下,初中生在两人情境中分配给搭档的代币数显著高于分配给自己的代币数;初中生在三人情境中分配代币的数量依次从分配给搭档、自己和第三人而递减,但与控制组没有显著差异。研究说明初中生的内疚情绪体验对两人情境中的公平行为有积极影响,而对三人情境中的公平行为没有显著影响。     

道德情绪：道德行为的中介调节

道德情绪是心理学的一个重要研究主题。道德情绪是个体根据一定的道德标准评价自己或他人的行为和思想时所产生的一种情绪体验。它是一种复合情绪, 主要包括厌恶、移情、内疚, 羞耻等。道德情绪影响下人类会产生某些典型行为, 这主要包括道德洁净行为和道德补偿行为。心理学研究道德情绪的实验范式很多, 主要有行为回忆范式、实物或图片刺激范式、情境设置范式等。有关道德情绪的未来研究主要应注重于探讨正性道德情绪在道德发展中的作用, 探讨道德情绪对群体行为的影响, 以及探讨道德情绪在不同文化背景下的价值意义。     

内疚的认知和情绪活动及其脑区调控

内疚是个体做出危害他人的行为或违反道德准则之后产生的良心上的反省, 对行为负有责任的一种负性体验。内疚在道德规范和人际社会中具有重要的作用。研究者主要采取自我报告范式、情境模拟范式、过失范式和经济博弈范式考察内疚的发生发展及其功能。近年来, 研究者尝试揭示内疚脑机制, 研究发现内疚主要激活前额叶皮层和脑岛等脑区, 前额叶可能与内疚的认知成分相关, 而脑岛主要与内疚的情绪成分相关。未来的研究需要采用多种技术手段进一步考察内疚的认知神经机制。     

9-11岁儿童对社会性害怕和内疚情绪的理解

社会性害怕和内疚都属于个体体验到的消极情绪,但这两种消极情绪对个体而言都有积极的社会意义,本研究采用临床访谈的方法,以9岁和11岁儿童为被试,探讨他们对内疚与社会性害怕这两种情绪的理解能力,结果发现,(1)随年龄的增长,9-11岁儿童对内疚情绪的理解能力不断提高,但儿童到了11岁仍然不能很好地理解内疚的第二、第三层次。(2)相对于模糊故事,在内疚故事中,儿童表现出更高的对内疚三个层次的理解。(3)两个年龄组的儿童都能很好地理解社会性害怕情绪。因而本研究认为,儿童对社会性害怕情绪的理解明显好于对内疚情绪的理解,且儿童对内疚的理解可能建立在对社会性害怕理解的基础上。     

内疚和羞耻对自我服务偏向的影响

内疚和羞耻虽同为消极的自我意识情绪，却有着本质的区别，且二者对自我服务偏向的影响尚不明确。本研究采用成败责任归因任务和人际责任归因任务考察了内疚和羞耻对自我服务偏向的影响。结果表明：情境中缺乏外部线索时，仅羞耻情绪会增加个体的自我提升；情境中存在外部线索时，内疚情绪会抑制个体的自我服务偏向，而羞耻情绪会增加个体的自我保护。本研究结果为个体更好地适应社会、维持心理健康水平提供了启示。     

内疚与亲社会行为的关系：来自元分析的证据

内疚作为一种典型的道德情绪, 被认为具有亲社会作用, 但很多研究却发现内疚并不总能促进亲社会行为。为了明确内疚对亲社会行为的作用, 分析造成结论分歧的可能原因, 本研究采用元分析方法探讨了特质内疚与亲社会行为的关系以及状态内疚对亲社会行为的影响。共有46篇文献92个独立样本纳入元分析(N = 17248)。元分析结果表明：(1)特质内疚与亲社会行为之间存在中等程度的正相关, 二者之间的关系受到亲社会行为类型的调节, 相比较捐赠、助人、环保行为等, 特质内疚与补偿之间的相关更强; (2)启动内疚状态能显著提升个体的亲社会行为, 但两者之间的关联呈较小的效应量, 亲社会行为对象在其中起到调节作用, 感到内疚的个体更愿意对受害方做出亲社会行为; (3) p曲线(p-curve)分析发现, 两个元分析研究的p曲线均呈显著右偏态, 表明特质内疚与亲社会行为的关系以及状态内疚对亲社会行为的影响均存在真实的效应, 而不是出版偏倚或者p hacking导致。     

相对剥夺感:概念、测量、影响因素及作用

相对剥夺感(relative deprivation,RD)是指个体或群体通过与参照群体比较而感知到自身处于不利地位,进而体验到愤怒和不满等负性情绪的一种主观认知和情绪体验。目前,相对剥夺感的测量模型主要有个体–群体RD与认知–情感RD的二维垂直结构模型、认知–情感RD的双维结构模型、个体–群体RD的双维结构模型以及RD的三维结构模型。影响相对剥夺感的相关因素主要包括人口统计学变量、个体特征变量和社会环境变量。影响效应方面,相对剥夺感与心理健康、个体行为等个体水平变量以及群际态度、集群行为等群体水平变量的关系是当前关注的焦点。今后研究的重点应包括完善相对剥夺感的概念与结构、注重青少年及特殊群体研究、丰富研究内容和视角、强化纵向干预研究以及本土化和跨文化研究等。     

儿童内疚情绪对其亲社会行为的影响

为考察儿童内疚情绪对其亲社会行为的影响,本研究采用现场实验的方法探讨了小学5年级学生内疚情绪与其亲社会行为的关系。结果显示：（1）内疚情绪能促进儿童亲社会行为水平的提高,难过情绪不能促进儿童亲社会行为水平的提高;（2）当儿童将注意力集中于自己对团体造成的不良影响,产生内疚情绪,但如果其将注意力集中于自己的不良结果时,则产生难过情绪。结论：儿童的消极情绪是否能促进其亲社会行为水平的提高,取决于其将注意力集中于自己还是他人。     

Shame and Guilt—Do They Really Differ in Their Focus of Evaluation? Wanting to Change the Self and Behavior in Response to Ingroup Immorality

Shame and guilt are often theorized to differ on a self versus behavior focus. However, we propose that this is not true when taking a group perspective. In our field study, 196 communal participants were confronted with historical ingroup immorality. Results showed that participants who were old enough to have understood what happened in that time-period felt more guilt and shame than did those who were too young. Partly due to their ingroup anger, shame motivated an intention to change the ingroup self and behavior. In contrast, partly due to personal anger, guilt motivated an intention to change personal self and behavior. This suggests that the distinction between shame and guilt are not as clear-cut as previous research have assumed.     

Shame, guilt, and identity in men and women: the role of identity orientation and processing style in moral affects

In the current study, 200 women and 106 men (M age = 19.6 years old) completed measures of shame, guilt, identity-orientation, and identity-processing styles. Women reported greater shame and guilt than men. Zero-order and partial correlates indicated that for both women and men shame was related positively to a social identity (one’s public image as presented through roles and relationships) and a diffuse processing style (both self-relevant information and self-exploration about one’s identity is avoided), while guilt was related to personal identity (conceptualizing oneself as unique) and an information-oriented style (self-exploration of personal issues occurs). Integration of identity orientation and cognitive processing styles in relation to shame and guilt was discussed.     

The Role of Innocent Guilt in Post‐Conflict Work

The phenomenon of ‘innocent guilt’ regards cases where people feel guilty without being responsible for the wrongdoing or suffering at which the guilt is directed. The aim of this article is to develop a consistent account of innocent guilt and show how it may arise in the aftermath of conflicts. In order to do this, innocent guilt is contrasted with guilt and collective guilt, and the account is substantiated by drawing on the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Emmanuel Levinas, who both consider the phenomenon of innocent guilt a necessary element in the fundamental structure of the ethical subject. These thinkers, furthermore, show a connection between guilt and possible victims of wrongdoing, rather than between guilt and personal acts of wrongdoing. Innocent guilt may thus appear in the aftermath of conflicts as an ethical and emotional response to the fact of finding oneself in a post‐conflict situation still marked by suffering. It thus reveals a fundamental need to contribute to the relieving of such suffering.     

White guilt and racial compensation: the benefits and limits of self-focus

In two studies, the authors investigated guilt as a response to group-based advantage. Consistent with its conceptualization as a self-focused emotion, White guilt was based in self-focused beliefs in racial inequality. Thus, guilt was associated with belief in White privilege (Study 1) and resulted from seeing European Americans as perpetrators of racial discrimination (Study 2). Just as personal guilt is associated with efforts at restitution, White guilt was predictive of support for affirmative action programs aimed at compensating African Americans. White guilt was not, however, predictive of support for noncompensatory efforts at promoting equality, such as affirmative action programs that increase opportunities (Study 2). In contrast, the other-focused emotion of group-based sympathy was a more general predictor of support for different affirmative action policies. Our findings demonstrate the benefits and limits of group-based guilt as a basis of support for social equality and highlight the value of understanding the specific emotions elicited in intergroup contexts.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Empathy and the Self-Absorption Paradox II: Self-Rumination and Self-Reflection as Mediators Between Shame,Guilt, and Empathy

The present study tested the hypothesis that proneness to shame would predict self-rumination (and personal distress) whereas proneness to guilt would predict self-reflection (and perspective taking, and empathic concern). Results supported the majority of these predictions, and revealed that self-reflection mediates the relationship between guilt and perspective taking. Additional results provided some support for the hypothesis that self-rumination mediates the relationship between shame and personal distress. However, results also revealed that shame mediated the relationship between self-rumination and personal distress, suggesting that shame and self-rumination may feed each other within a reciprocal cycle that is likely to result in a maladaptive empathic response (i.e., personal distress). Empathic concern was associated with higher levels of guilt, but results failed to replicate earlier findings demonstrating a positive relationship between empathic concern and self-reflection. The present results replicate and extend past research and suggest several promising avenues for future research.     

A study of the comparative structure of guilt and shame in a Chinese society.

On the basis of previous theoretical and empirical analyses of the comparative structures of guilt and shame, the authors hypothesized that antecedent condition (personal inadequacy vs. moral norm violation), audience presence, and personal responsibility attribution would distinguish shame from guilt. Although the subject population was Hong Kong Chinese, evidence from previous studies suggests that the comparative structures of guilt and shame are quite similar across cultures. The subjects were asked to recall either a guilt or a shame incident, and their responses were then coded into the predictor variables. The results of the study indicated that guilt was most likely to emerge when individuals had violated a moral norm and held themselves responsible for their conduct. In contrast, shame emerged more frequently when subjects felt personally inadequate than when they had violated moral norms. Moreover, when a guilt incident was reported, and audience was rarely mentioned, whereas subjects who reported a shame incident would generally feel personally responsible and often mentioned being looked at or evaluated. However, neither personal responsibility nor the presence of an audience seemed to be essential for a person to experience shame.     

A group approach to guilt in depressive and suicidal patients

Summary A psychiatrist and a pastoral psychologist considered the problem of guilt as a source of alienation in depressed and suicidal patients by using a four-dimensional approach in a group psychotherapy setting. This involved functioning as cotherapists representing theological and psychiatric orientations and utilizing both didactic and insight-oriented approaches to elicit and explore meaningful material related to guilt feelings. With a number of exceptions, the patients did not appear to make a sharp distinction between the cotherapists' roles. The didactic openings on guilt served to provoke ready discussion of personal conflicts involving guilt feelings, especially in the silent patients who were not easily drawn into spontaneous discussion.     

大学生羞耻和内疚差异的对比研究

以 48名北京大学本科生为被试 ,检验羞耻和内疚差异的 3种假设 :研究一同时检验“公开化与私人化”和“个人无能与违背道德”两个假设 ;研究二检验“伤害自我与伤害他人”假设。方法是依次呈现一系列不同的负性情境 (情境事先已按要检验的假设加以控制 ) ,要求被试设想自己亲身经历该情境 ,然后回答体验到的羞耻和内疚的程度及理由。结果表明 :①“公开化与私人化”对羞耻和内疚的影响有显著差异 (p <0 0 5 ) :“有他人在场”可以易化羞耻 ,而内疚感的产生一般不需要“观众”在场。②“违背道德”在引发羞耻和内疚感上基本相等 ,而“个人无能”引起更多的羞耻感 (p <0 0 1)。③“公开化与私人化”和“个人无能与违背道德”的交互作用不显著。④“伤害自我”更多引起羞耻感 (p <0 0 5 ) ,而“伤害他人”更多引起内疚感 (p <0 0 1)。     

Mediators of the shame-guilt-psychological adjustment relationship

Lynch, J. S., Hill, E. D., Nagoshi, J. L. & Nagoshi, C. T. Mediators of the shame-guilt-psychological adjustment relationship. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 437-443. A college student sample (109 women, 90 men) was administered measures of psychological adjustment, shame, guilt, personal fear of invalidity, and aspects of empathy, including personal distress in emergencies and fantasy involvement. Consistent with previous studies, shame but not guilt was significantly positively correlated with poor psychological adjustment. Path analyses with bootstrapped mediation tests indicated that the shame-adjustment relationship was significantly mediated by fear of invalidity, personal distress, and fantasy involvement. A novel finding was that the relationship between guilt and maladjustment was significantly mediated by proneness to fantasy. The findings are discussed in terms of an integrated theory of the shame-fear/distress-maladjustment relationship as a framework for understanding the maladaptive, individualistic shame experience.