共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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Philosophia - I argue that ‘Moore’s paradox for God’. I do not believe this proposition shows that nobody can be both omniscient and rational in all her beliefs. I then anticipate... 相似文献
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Michael Cholbi 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):495-510
Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s
paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while
also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’).
I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory.
2. This paradoxicality can be traced to a form of epistemic self-defeat that also explains the paradoxicality of ordinary
Moore-paradoxical statements. 3. Although a simple form of internalism about moral judgment and motivation can explain the
paradoxicality of these moral equivalents, a more plausible explanation can be provided that does not rely on this simple
form of internalism. 4. The paradoxicality of such statements suggests a more credible understanding of the thesis that those
who are not motivated by their moral judgments are irrational. 相似文献
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Timothy Chan 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):395-414
In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually
contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the
functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA),
the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean
assertions are absurd, and that BAA explains why they are. I shall argue that ATB implies that some Moorean assertions are,
in some fairly ordinary contexts, well justified. Thus BAA and ATB are mutually inconsistent. In the concluding section I
explore three possible ways of responding to the dilemma, and what implications they have for the nature of the constitutive
relationships linking belief, assent and behavioural dispositions.
相似文献
Timothy ChanEmail: |
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John Nicholas Williams 《Philosophical Studies》2006,127(3):383-414
For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don’t believe it is) or
that (it is raining but I believe it isn’t), such assertions might be true. But I would be also absurd in judging that the
contents of such assertions are true. I argue for the strategy of explaining the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of
conscious Moorean belief. Only in this way may the pathology of Moorean absurdity be adequately explained in terms of self-contradiction.
David Rosenthal disagrees with this strategy. Ironically, his higher-order thought account has the resources to fulfil it.
Indeed once modified and supplemented, it compares favourably with Brentano’s rival account of conscious belief.
*This paper was written with the support of a grant from the SMU-Wharton Research center. 相似文献
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Daniel Stoljar 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(3):609-618
I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method
he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be
self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s
being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken. 相似文献
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Timothy Chan 《Synthese》2010,173(3):211-229
One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who
asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are
contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper
I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd
because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean
belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not
just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly,
while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that
it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more
precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person
transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations,
I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be
couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry
recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry
highlighted by Moore’s Paradox. 相似文献
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John N. Williams 《Philosophical Studies》2013,165(3):1117-1138
Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such as Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. This assumption gives explanatory priority to belief over assertion. I show that the translation involved is much trickier than might at first appear. It is simplistic to think that Moorean absurdity in assertion is always a subsidiary product of the absurdity in belief, even when the absurdity is conceived as irrationality. Instead we should aim for explanations of Moorean absurdity in assertion and in belief that are independent even if related, while bearing in mind that some forms of irrationality may be forms of absurdity even if not conversely. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a... 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim to support a substantive metaphysical conclusion, can be used to... 相似文献
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Thomas Verner Moore published a book calledCognitive Psychology in 1939, almost 30 years before Neisser’s (1967) more familiar and far more influential work. Although it covers most of the standard topics found in current cognitive psychology textbooks, and even anticipated several current trends, Moore’s text is not cited by any of the major histories of the “cognitive revolution” or any current cognitive textbook. We provide a brief sketch of Moore’s academic life and summarize several of his papers that are still cited. After describing the psychologies prevalent in 1939, we compare Moore’s text with two contemporary works, Woodworth (1938) and McGeoch (1942). We conclude by comparing the older text with Neisser’s and by offering several reasons why the book is virtually unknown. 相似文献
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Famously, Frank P. Ramsey suggested a test for the acceptability of conditionals. Recently, David Chalmers and Alan Hájek
(2007) have criticized a qualitative variant of the Ramsey test for indicative conditionals. In this paper we argue for the
following three claims: (i) Chalmers and Hájek are right that the variant of the Ramsey test that they attack is not the correct
way of spelling out an acceptability test for indicative conditionals. But there is a suppositional variant of the Ramsey
test which is still stated in purely qualitative terms, which avoids the problems, and which looks correct. (ii) While the
variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek criticize is not correct, it is still a good approximation of a correct
formulation of the Ramsey test which may be usefully employed in various contexts. (iii) The variant of the Ramsey test that
Chalmers and Hájek suggest as a substitute for the deficient version of the Ramsey test is itself subject to worries similar
to those raised by Chalmers and Hájek, if it is given a non-suppositional interpretation. 相似文献
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G.E. Moore's theory of the nature of the quality referred to by the word good asserts that this quality is non-natural. If it is, further, supposed that this non-natural quality belongs necessarily and exclusively to those events, human acts, entities, etc., which possess certain strictly determined natural qualities, and those qualities only, then it becomes difficult to explain the relation and the supposed interdependence allegedly existing between the two so disparate categories of qualities. This paper purports to show that, in fact, any mutual dependence of natural and non-natural qualities, including the causal one, is unconceivable. To deny this would allow no less but the possibility of deriving an ought from an is. A final consequence of this is that a non-natural quality, denoted by the predicate good, does, in fact, attach to a strictly delineated and limited morally relevant behaviour (and whatever else we may consider morally relevant), and to it only. But it is attached there in randomly; it is contingent, not inherent; it is there without regard to, and not as a consequence of, the natural qualities of what is the subject of moral judgment ... whether we like it or not. 相似文献
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We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rationally asserted. We then explain why Moorean assertions of the sort we discuss do not incur the irrationality charge. Our argument involves an appeal to the dual-process theory of the mind and a contrast between the conditions for ascribing beliefs to oneself and the conditions for making assertions about independently existing states of affairs. We conclude by contrasting beliefs of the sort we discuss with the structurally similar but rationally impermissible beliefs of certain psychiatric patients.
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John N. Williams 《Synthese》2013,190(12):2457-2476
Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘p and I do not believe that p’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity to be a form of irrationality, objects to this solution by arguing that it is circular and thus incomplete. This is because it must explain why Moorean beliefs are irrational yet, according to Chan, their grammatical third-person transpositions are not, even though the same proposition is believed. But the solution can only explain this asymmetry by relying on a formulation of the ground of the irrationality of Moorean beliefs that presupposes precisely such asymmetry. I reply that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the irrationality that the contents of Moorean beliefs be restricted to the grammatical first-person. What has to be explained is rather that such grammatical non-first-person transpositions sometimes, but not always, result in the disappearance of irrationality. Describing this phenomenon requires the grammatical first-person/non-first person distinction. The pragmatic solution explains the phenomenon once it is formulated in de se terms. But the grammatical first-person/non-first-person distinction is independent of, and a fortiori, different from, the de se/non-de se distinction presupposed by pragmatic solution, although both involve the first person broadly construed. Therefore the pragmatic solution is not circular. Building on the work of Green and Williams I also distinguish between the irrationality of Moorean beliefs and their absurdity. I argue that while all irrational Moorean beliefs are absurd, some Moorean beliefs are absurd but not irrational. I explain this absurdity in a way that is not circular either. 相似文献
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Manuel Pérez Otero 《Synthese》2013,190(18):4181-4200
A common view about Moore’s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore’s Proof is—in that sense—dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore’s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my defence is to conceive the Proof as addressed to subjects with a different epistemic condition. To sustain this view I formulate some hypothesis about the common general purpose of arguing and I defend that it can be fulfilled even when the addressee of an argument is not someone who disbelieves or doubts its conclusion. 相似文献
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Daniel David 《Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy》2014,32(4):345-351
In this brief article I reply to Gardner et al. (J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Ther. doi:10.1007/s10942-014-0196-1, 2014)’s comments to my previous article titled “Some concerns about the psychological implications of mindfulness. A critical analysis” (David, in J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Ther. doi:10.1007/s10942-014-0198-z, 2014). While initially—humorously and for the sake of debate—adopting an attitude towards mindfulness based on a modified version of Galileo’s Abjuration, I then critically argued that Gardner et al.’s criticism is focused on a priori defending a construct and its associated practices that, by the very nature of empirically supported constructs/interventions, are not perfect (i.e., panacea), but subject to clarifications, limitations, and improvements. 相似文献