Perceiving an exclusive cause of affect prevents misattribution

Affect misattribution occurs when affective cues color subsequent unrelated evaluations. Research suggests that affect misattribution decreases when one is aware that affective cues are unrelated to the evaluation at hand. We propose that affect misattribution may even occur when one is aware that affective cues are irrelevant, as long as the source of these cues seems ambiguous. When source ambiguity exists, affective cues may freely influence upcoming unrelated evaluations. We examined this using an adapted affect misattribution procedure where pleasant and unpleasant responses served as affective cues that could influence later evaluations of unrelated targets. These affective cues were either perceived as reflecting a single source (i.e., a subliminal affective picture in Experiment 1; one's internal affective state in Experiment 2), or as reflecting two sources (i.e., both) suggesting source ambiguity. Results show that misattribution of affect decreased when participants perceived affective cues as representing one source rather than two.     

On being lonely: fear of one's own aggression as an impediment to intimacy

This paper considers loneliness from the point of view of compromise formation and the development of fantasy as a means of defending against painful affect. Our idea is that at least one strand of loneliness derives from longing for an ideal object with whom one would never have to feel aggression and from whom no aggressive actions would have to be tolerated. The development of such a fantasy in a middle-aged man is traced to early loss of a parent with missed mourning, and is shown to be ameliorated by psychoanalytic treatment that allowed the mourning to take place.     

Perceiving one's nation: entitativity, agency and security in the international arena

The perception of groups as real entities rather than mere aggregates of individuals has important consequences on intergroup relations. Social psychological research, in fact, shows that it affects stereotyping, identification process, and intergroup bias. Previous research has also shown that group entitativity is not a positive or negative group attribute per se; rather, it depends on the context and the relationship between the perceiver and the group. While enhancing entitativity leads to worse expectations about the out‐group actions, high entitativity is a valued characteristic when associated with an ally or with the in‐group. Indeed, enhancing in‐group entitativity leads to stronger in‐group identification. The specific reasons for why this is the case, however, remain to be ascertained. What is good about in‐group entitativity? In the present contribution we propose that in‐group entitativity may lead to perceive the group as a real entity provided with intentions and capacity for planned actions, notably ensuring the safety of its members by protecting them against external threats. We report two correlational studies conducted with American citizens (Study 1) and Italian citizens (Study 2), showing that in‐group entitativity is associated with a higher level of identification, attribution of intentionality, and perceived security provided by the in‐group. These findings were replicated in a third study—conducted with a role‐play method on a fictitious scenario—in which entitativity was manipulated rather than measured. Study 3 also shows that artificially increasing the perception of in‐group entitativity enhances perceived safety in an international context and reduces the perception of threat from an out‐group. Findings are discussed in terms of possible implications for intergroup and international relations.     

The illusion of courage in self‐predictions: Mispredicting one's own behavior in embarrassing situations

People exhibit an “illusion of courage” when predicting their own behavior in embarrassing situations. In three experiments, participants overestimated their own willingness to engage in embarrassing public performances in exchange for money when those performances were psychologically distant: Hypothetical or in the relatively distant future. This illusion of courage occurs partly because of cold/hot empathy gaps. That is, people in a relatively “cold” unemotional state underestimate the influence on their own preferences and behaviors of being in a relative “hot” emotional state such as social anxiety evoked by an embarrassing situation. Consistent with this cold/hot empathy gap explanation, putting people “in touch” with negative emotional states by arousing fear (Experiments 1 and 2) and anger (Experiment 2) decreased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distant embarrassing public performances. Conversely, putting people “out of touch” with social anxiety through aerobic exercise, which reduces state anxiety and increases confidence, increased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distance embarrassing public performances (Experiment 3). Implications for self‐predictions, self‐evaluation, and affective forecasting are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taking care of one's own: justice and family caregiving

This paper asks whether adult children have aduty of justice to act as caregivers for theirfrail, elderly parents. I begin (Sections I.and II.) by locating the historical reasons whyrelationships within families were not thoughtto raise issues of justice. I argue that thesereasons are misguided. The paper next presentsspecific examples showing the relevance ofjustice to family relationships. I point outthat in the United States today, the burden ofcaregiving for dependent parents fallsdisproportionately on women (Sections III. andIV.). The paper goes on to use Rawls'theoretical tool of the veil of ignorance toargue that caring for parents should not belinked to a person's sex and more generally,that there is no duty of justice to assume therole of caregiver for dependent parents(Sections V.). Although justice does notprovide the moral foundations for parent care,I show that it nonetheless places importantlimits on the instinct to care. I concludethat the voice of justice should be audible,and is intrinsically present, withinfamilies.     

Predicting one's own forgetting: the role of experience-based and theory-based processes

The authors examined the hypothesis that judgments of learning (JOL), if governed by processing fluency during encoding, should be insensitive to the anticipated retention interval. Indeed, neither item-by-item nor aggregate JOLs exhibited "forgetting" unless participants were asked to estimate recall rates for several different retention intervals, in which case their estimates mimicked closely actual recall rates. These results and others reported suggest that participants can access their knowledge about forgetting but only when theory-based predictions are made, and then only when the notion of forgetting is accentuated either by manipulating retention interval within individuals or by framing recall predictions in terms of forgetting rather than remembering. The authors interpret their findings in terms of the distinction between experience-based and theory-based JOLs.     

Misinformation and unexpected change: Testing the development of epistemic-state attribution

Summary Children's ability to infer a person's ignorance and false belief was tested in two stories which differed as to the relative ease for making these inferences. In the Unexpected Change story ignorance could be directly inferred from the emphasized fact that the target character had not witnessed the change, while false belief required the additional inference that the character would assume that things would stay as they had been initially. In the Misinformation Story false belief was made directly accessible by the content of a false message, while ignorance was not directly indicated by absence of information. It needed to be inferred from the fact that the available information was misleading. Results from 3- and 4-year-old Austrian and English children showed that manipulation of inferential difficulty did not affect their ability to make epistemic state attribution. In both stories children found it easier to attribute ignorance than false belief. To integrate this finding in the larger developmental context we suggest that children younger than 4 years find it difficult to distinguish between knowledge and ignorance because they do not understand the role of informational access in the formation of knowledge and they fail in false-belief attribution because they do not understand that incompatible truth values can be assigned to propositions.     

Perceiving choice and constraint: the effects of contextual and behavioral cues on attitude attribution

We examined how features of the situation and the target's behavior in the attitude-attribution paradigm may lead observers to infer that the behavior was performed purposefully and how these perceptions may contribute to correspondence bias. Experiment 1 demonstrated that cues suggesting that essay assignment resulted from the target's purposeful action lead to correspondent inferences. When these cues were absent, observers' inferences were not correspondent. Experiment 2 demonstrated that observers are sensitive to cues emitted by the target (facial expressions of delight and disappointment) and that those cues' meaning depends on the context in which they take place. When the essay was freely chosen, the expression had little effect; observers judged that the essay accurately reflected the target's attitudes. When the essay assignment was constrained, observers used the expressions to discount the essay when judging the target's attitudes. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of correspondent inferences and correspondence bias.     

Self-relevance increases the irrelevant sound effect: Attentional disruption by one's own name

Memory performance is severely disrupted when task-irrelevant sound is played during item presentation or in a retention interval. Working memory models make contrasting assumptions on whether the semantic content of the auditory distractors modulates the irrelevant sound effect. In the present study, participants made more errors in serial recall when they had to ignore sentences containing their own name as opposed to that of a yoked-control partner. These results are only consistent with working memory models that allow for attentional processes to play a role in the explanation of the irrelevant sound effect. With repeated presentation the disruptive effect of one's own name decreased, whereas the disruptive effect of the auditory distractors in the control condition remained constant. The latter finding is most consistent with the duplex model of auditory attention, which assumes that the irrelevant sound effect is primarily caused by automatic interference of acoustic distractor features, but at the same time allows for a disruption of encoding due to attentional capture by unexpected deviants. However, to explain the present results, the mechanism responsible for the attentional capture has to be extended to highly (self-)relevant auditory distractors.     

Claiming hidden memories as one's own: A review of inadvertent plagiarism

Inadvertent plagiarism, or cryptomnesia, occurs when an individual claims another's idea as his or her own with no recollection of having been exposed to the idea before. Although some variation exists in the explanations of this occurrence, the source monitoring framework has emerged as the most plausible account. The purpose of this paper is to review the core body of research that has been conducted on cryptomnesia over the past two decades, with particular focus on the factors that affect the propensity of this phenomenon and how these influences inform a theoretical explanation of cryptomnesia. This paper also includes some suggestions for how future research might continue to explore the phenomenon of inadvertent plagiarism.     

Recognising the usual orientation of one's own face: the role of asymmetrically located details

Our ability to recognise the usual horizontal orientation of our own face (mirror orientation) as compared with another very familiar face (normal orientation) was examined in experiment 1. Participants did not use the same kind of information in determining the orientation of their own face as in determining the orientation of the other familiar face. The proportion of participants who reported having based their judgment on the location of an asymmetric feature (eg a mole) was higher when determining the orientation of their own face than when determining that of the other familiar face. In experiment 2, participants were presented with pairs of manipulated images of their own face and of another familiar face showing conflicting asymmetric features and configural information. Each pair consisted of one picture showing asymmetric features of a given face in a mirror-reversed position, while the facial configuration was left unchanged; and one picture in which the location of the asymmetric features was left unchanged, while the facial configuration was mirror-reversed. As expected from the hypothesis that asymmetric local features are more frequently used for the judgment of one's own face, participants chose the picture showing mirror-reversed asymmetric features when determining the usual orientation of their own face significantly more often than they chose the picture showing normally oriented asymmetric features when determining the orientation of the other face. These results are explained in terms of competing forward and mirror-reversed representations of one's own face.     

Laughter: an empirical test of some reversal theory hypotheses

Hypotheses derived from reversal theory on state-specific responses to humorous material were tested by recruitment of 10 telic (serious minded) and 10 paratelic (playful) state-dominant individuals from a larger sample of university students completing the Telic Dominance Scale. They were individually exposed to a comedy programme displayed on television in a psychophysiological laboratory. Polygraph record of respiration provided operational measurement of laughter. Subjects ratings were derived for felt and preferred level of arousal and for telidparatelic state in the laboratory situation. Results confirmed (1) that humorous material tends to induce the paratelic state, even in telic state-dominant individuals, and (2) that frequency of laughter in the paratelic state is positively correlated with degree of felt arousal and with arousal preference, thus indicating a linear , rather than ditonic, relation of hedonic tone to felt arousal in this state.     

From the child to one's own child: Social dynamics and identities at work

The present research considers how mothers explain the development of characteristics in different targets, namely their own children, children in general and pupils. This study also examines the role played by mothers' occupation in shaping their expressed views. A questionnaire was completed by 415 mothers in different occupations, housewives, office workers and teachers, and with children between four and eight years of age. The questionnaire presented six types of explanation (from intra-individual to societal) regarding the development of four characteristics, autonomy, intelligence, order and obedience. Results indicate that when talking about development mothers use different kinds of explanation depending on the target child. Moreover, mothers' professional role is relevant in shaping explanations of children's development.     

Behavioral sequelae of long-term self-attributed success and failure: an attribution theory analysis

Starting from earlier results that self-caused long-term failure improved performance, this experiment tested the effect of "working conditions" as well as successes and failures succeeding the experience of long-term success and long-term failure. 64 subjects participated in recognition tests, composed of 9 tasks (with 42 stimuli each), to be solved within five different experimental sessions. Subjects received false feedback concerning each judgement. The feedback was designed to correspond to Kelley's informational requirements for self-attributions. Results clearly show an impairment of performances within new "working conditions" if successes succeed long-term failure or long-term success. Failure succeeding long-term failure in new "working conditions", on the other hand, improves performance. Different attribution theories' capacity to explain these results is discussed.     

Self-monitoring and the prediction of one's own and others' personality test scores

This study had two aims. Firstly, it examined the similarity between subjects' ratings of themselves and others and their scores on various personality tests. A group of 264 undergraduates in psychology completed Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale and the Neuroticism and Extraversion Scales from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975; 1986). Then, they estimated both their own score and that of a peer on those questionnaires. The results showed that subjects (i) were fairly good at estimating their own and others' extraversion and neuroticism scores, (ii) were less accurate at estimating self-monitoring scores, (iii) were better at predicting their own scores than those of others, and (iv) erroneously believed themselves to be significantly similar to the chosen peer. Secondly, individual differences in the accuracy of personality estimation were studied. According to Synder's (1974) self-monitoring construct, people high in self-monitoring would be especially adept at reading others' expressive behaviours; therefore, any differences in the accuracy of perceiving the personality of others might be associated with differences in self-monitoring. High self-monitors were more accurate than low self-monitors at estimating neuroticism scores for others. Another implication of the self-monitoring theory is that, taking high and low self-monitors as targets of others' estimations, there should be greater discrepancy between actual scores and peer estimations for high self-monitors. The results here supported this prediction, but only in self-monitoring estimation.     

The action model of relationship security: How one's own behavior shapes confidence in partners' care,regard, and commitment

The authors present and test the action model of relationship security, which predicts that people's behavior toward a relationship partner shapes their security regarding that partner's care, regard, and commitment. Specifically, actors who enact prosocial or antisocial behavior develop corresponding prosocial or antisocial metaperceptions (i.e., they believe they are viewed as prosocial or antisocial by their partner). In turn, these metaperceptions have a strong influence on actors' security in their partner's care, regard, and commitment due to lay theories positing that prosocial and antisocial behavior impacts others' sentiments. Four studies supported this model. Moreover, findings suggest that prosocial metaperceptions buffer the harmful effects of attachment anxiety on relationship security. This research suggests the relevance of own behavior for relationship security.     

The spotlight effect in social judgment: an egocentric bias in estimates of the salience of one's own actions and appearance

This research provides evidence that people overestimate the extent to which their actions and appearance are noted by others, a phenomenon dubbed the spotlight effect. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who were asked to don a T-shirt depicting either a flattering or potentially embarrassing image overestimated the number of observers who would be able to recall what was pictured on the shirt. In Study 3, participants in a group discussion overestimated how prominent their positive and negative utterances were to their fellow discussants. Studies 4 and 5 provide evidence supporting an anchoring-and-adjustment interpretation of the spotlight effect. In particular, people appear to anchor on their own rich phenomenological experience and then adjust--insufficiently--to take into account the perspective of others. The discussion focuses on the manifestations and implications of the spotlight effect across a host of everyday social phenomena.     

Causal attribution and self-justification as explanations for the consensus expectation of one's social value orientation

This study focuses on explanations for the perceived consensus of one's own social value orientation. The prediction of the triangle hypothesis that the consensus expectation of individualistic and competitive people is higher than that of cooperative people was partially supported. Only individualists expected their own orientation more frequently of other people. According to a causal attribution explanation, it was expected that subjects' causal attributions for their own orientation to internal and external causes influenced their consensus expectations. Only attributions to internal causes differed significantly between subjects with different orientations and corresponded with their consensus estimates. Individualism was attributed least internally, cooperation most internally, and competition in between. Additionally, direct support for the effect of internal attributions on consensus expectations was found. Compared with subjects who attributed their own orientation more internally, subjects who attributed it less internally were more likely to expect their own orientation among other people. According to a self-justification explanation, it was hypothesized that the consensus expectations of individualists and competitors would be higher when first their own social orientation was assessed and then the orientation they expected to predominate among others than in the reversed order. This hypothesis was not supported.