How to evaluate counterfactuals in the quantum world

In the article I discuss possible amendments and corrections to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals that are necessary in order to account for the indeterministic and non-local character of the quantum world. I argue that Lewis’s criteria of similarity between possible worlds produce incorrect valuations for alternate-outcome counterfactuals in the EPR case. Later I discuss an alternative semantics which rejects the notion of miraculous events and relies entirely on the comparison of the agreement with respect to individual facts. However, a controversy exists whether to include future indeterministic events in the criteria of similarity. J. Bennett has suggested that an indeterministic event count toward similarity only if it is a result of the same causal chain as in the actual world. I claim that a much better agreement with the demands of the quantum-mechanical indeterminism can be achieved when we stipulate that possible worlds which differ only with respect to indeterministic facts that take place after the antecedent-event should always be treated as equally similar to the actual world. In the article I analyze and dismiss some common-sense counterexamples to this claim. Finally, I critically evaluate Bennett’s proposal regarding the truth-conditions for true-antecedent counterfactuals.     

Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism

Based on archival material from the Carnap and FeiglArchives, this paper re-examines Carnap's approach tothe issue of scientific realism in the 1950s and theearly 1960s. It focuses on Carnap's re-invention ofthe Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theoriesand argues that Carnap wanted to entertain a genuineneutral stance in the realism-instrumentalism debate.Following Grover Maxwell, it claims that Carnap'sposition may be best understood as a version of`structural realism'. However, thus understood,Carnap's position faces the challenge that Newmanraised against Russell's structuralism: the claim thatthe knowledge of the unobservable is limited to itspurely structural characteristics is eitheruninformative or unsustainable.     

How magic survived the disenchantment of the world

This article argues that the process described by Max Weber as the ‘disenchantment of the world’ is compatible with the continued vitality of ‘the occult’ in contemporary western culture. Focusing on the example of ‘hermetic’ magical traditions in western culture before and after the pivotal period of the Enlightenment, the article analyses the relation between continuity and change in the development of these traditions from three angles: their theories of magical efficacy, the nature of their practices and the ways in which magicians seek to legitimate magic to the wider society as well as to themselves. The discussion demonstrates that the transformation of magic under the impact of modernization and secularization resulted in the paradoxical phenomenon of a ‘disenchanted magic’. The article concludes by proposing a theory that explains why it is actually quite natural for magic to have survived the disenchantment of the world.     

Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New American Wittgensteinians

James Conant, a proponent of the 'New American Wittgenstein', has argued that the standard interpretation of Wittgenstein is wholly mistaken in respect of Wittgenstein's critique of metaphysics and the attendant conception of nonsense. The standard interpretation, Conant holds, misascribes to Wittgenstein Carnapian views on the illegitimacy of metaphysical utterances, on logical syntax and grammar, and on the nature of nonsense. Against this account, I demonstrate that (i) Carnap is misrepresented; (ii) the so–called standard interpretation (in so far as I have contributed to it) is misrepresented; (iii) Wittgenstein's views, early and late, are misrepresented. I clarify Wittgenstein's conception of logical syntax and of the nonsense that results from transgressing it.     

How to behave ethically in a world of fads

Although applied behavior analysis (ABA) has significant scientific support for treating people with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), the field of autism treatment has been plagued with rapidly proliferating fad treatments subjecting people with ASD to various ineffective, pseudoscientific, and antiscientific treatments. To combat this, professionals must learn to make ethical treatment decisions, sometimes before research is conducted or published. Even when research is available negating fads, behavioral professionals must also overcome misperceptions about ABA. The purposes of this paper are to provide behavioral professionals with (a) a mechanism for making ethical treatment decisions (using sensory integration as an example) and (b) a method for responding to potential misperceptions and obstacles to using ABA. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How are habits formed: Modelling habit formation in the real world

To investigate the process of habit formation in everyday life, 96 volunteers chose an eating, drinking or activity behaviour to carry out daily in the same context (for example ‘after breakfast’) for 12 weeks. They completed the self‐report habit index (SRHI) each day and recorded whether they carried out the behaviour. The majority (82) of participants provided sufficient data for analysis, and increases in automaticity (calculated with a sub‐set of SRHI items) were examined over the study period. Nonlinear regressions fitted an asymptotic curve to each individual's automaticity scores over the 84 days. The model fitted for 62 individuals, of whom 39 showed a good fit. Performing the behaviour more consistently was associated with better model fit. The time it took participants to reach 95% of their asymptote of automaticity ranged from 18 to 254 days; indicating considerable variation in how long it takes people to reach their limit of automaticity and highlighting that it can take a very long time. Missing one opportunity to perform the behaviour did not materially affect the habit formation process. With repetition of a behaviour in a consistent context, automaticity increases following an asymptotic curve which can be modelled at the individual level. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Beleuchtung von anwendungen der logistik in werken von Rudolf Carnap

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Carnap and weyl on the foundations of geometry and relativity theory

An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on Semantical Aspects of Space-Time Theories at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung at the Universität Bielefeld in May 1994. I am indebted to the participants for helpful comments. I am also, and especially, indebted to comments from and discussions with Thomas Ryckman. All translations from the German are my own.     

James and Carnap on philosophical systems and the role of temperaments

The relationship between American pragmatism and logical empiricism is complicated at best. The received view is that by around the late 1930s or early 1940s pragmatism had been replaced, supplanted, or eclipsed by the younger and more logic-oriented form of empiricism developed in interwar Vienna. Recently, however, this picture has been challenged, and this paper offers further reasons for thinking that the received view is inadequate. Through a critical examination of William James's Pragmatism and “The Sentiment of Rationality” and Rudolf Carnap's “Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language” and other works, the paper builds a case for the existence of a rather striking correspondence between the work of one of pragmatism's most vaunted figures and the thought of logical empiricism's most famous advocate. Not only were both philosophers interested in what might be called metaphilosophy or the psychology of philosophy, both held very similar deflationary views.     

Carnap and Kuhn: On the Relation between the Logic of Science and the History of Science

This paper offers a refutation of J. C. Pinto de Oliveira’s recent critique of revisionist Carnap scholarship as giving undue weight to two brief letters to Kuhn expressing his interest in the latter’s work. First an argument is provided to show that Carnap and Kuhn are by no means divided by a radical mismatch of their conceptions of the rationality of science as supposedly evidenced by their stance towards the distinction of the contexts of discovery and justification. This is followed by an argument to the effect that the fact that Carnap’s own work concentrated on formal aspects of scientific theories does not licence the conclusion that he thought historical investigations and concerns irrelevant for what we nowadays would rightly call “philosophy of science”.