Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information‐Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information‐theoretic framework of Dretske (1981) , we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so‐called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so‐called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them.     

Meanings,propositions, and verbs

The event template for a verb is a lexical representation of the type of event that the verb can denote. Manner of motion verbs have a simple template: An entity is engaged in a manner of motion activity (e.g., walk). Change of location verbs have a different template: An entity changes from one location to another (e.g., arrive). We propose, and support empirically, that these templates determine the propositional structures of sentences in which the verbs are used.     

“重”“错”之义与六十四卦的生成

六十四卦如何由八卦重叠而成,思想家们给出了不同的说法。本文立足“重”与“错”的同异,探讨其成卦的内在机制及其与天地万物变化的联系。孔颖达以相错解释相重,在忽略二者矛盾的前提下进行推论。邵雍立足一分为二发明相错,”重”在他是指天圆地方的天道运动,而与重卦无关。以为邵雍言先天方位的八卦相错是讲重卦的观点缺乏根据。胡宏从太极——天道的运动说明八卦与六十四卦的关系。利用“重道”去解释“重卦”,揭示了六十四卦生成的不同机理。朱熹在总结前人的基础上,按照太极生万物模式的需要发挥邵雍的理论,反映了邵雍以后易学的发展。来知德批评了邵雍、朱熹对相错与相重的混淆,但又不是胡宏的一“重”到底．而是重与错双方相互补充发明,合力生成六十四卦。尽管哲学家们对”重”与“错”的方法的把握和定位不尽相同,但易卦的生成应当是天道运动规律的概括和表现则是他们的基本的共识。     

Concepts,Attention, and Perception

Abstract

According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we must possess concepts for all the objects, properties and relations which feature in our perceptual experiences. In this paper, I investigate the possibility of developing an argument against the conceptualist view by appealing to the notion of attention.

In Part One, I begin by setting out an apparently promising version of such an argument, a version which appeals to a link between attention and perceptual demonstrative concept possession. In Part Two, however, I show how the conceptualist can challenge what appears to be the key premise of the argument, and I go on to describe, in Part Three, an important further difficulty which we face if we attempt to overcome this challenge in a particular way. My conclusion will be that the conceptualist's challenge to the argument is convincing and hence that the argument remains inconclusive.     

Concepts,conceptions, and critics

The author responds to the various reactions to his original article on the concept of deviant behavior (see p. 1). Some points of the original (empirical) proposal are clarified; the necessity for a clear concept of norm is observed.     

Concepts,structures, and meanings

Concepts are basic elements of thought. Piaget has a conception of the nature of concepts as informational or computational operations performed in an inner milieu and enabling the child to understand the world in which it lives and acts. Concepts are, however, not merely logico‐mathematical but are also conceptually linked to the mastery of language which itself involves the appropriate use of words in social and interpersonal settings. In the light of Vygotsky's work on the social and interactive nature of children's thinking and the nature of language as an essentially public currency of rule‐governed signs, we are led to reconstrue conceptual mastery as the acquisition of an interactive and interpersonal repertoire of tools which introduces the child to the world of those who educate it. In this way we come to see the elements of mind as constitutively involving that activity in which the determinants of meaning constrain and direct the child's linguistic development.